Saturday 1st September 1917
Received orders to embark on the 4th at Birkenhead on board the S.S. "KATORI MARU" of the N.Y.K. line.

[Captain Kennedy was accompanied by Captain Richard Bennett. The two officers had been selected to go out to Japan to learn the language and study the Japanese army. The exchange of Language Officers between Japan and Britain was a product of the alliance between the two countries signed in 1902.]

Monday 5th November 1917

Landed at Kobe - just three years to the day since landing in France with the old 90th [regiment].

Wednesday 7th November 1917

Reached Tokyo 9.30 a.m. Took a rickshaw to the Embassy, but was first taken to the American Embassy by a mistake, the man apparently thinking I said "Beikoku" instead of "Eikoku". Reported myself to Colonel Somerville (the Military Attaché), who took me across to see the Ambassador, Sir Cunyngham Greene, and also took me to the Chancery and introduced me to Mr. Norman (Counsellor), Wingfield, Count Bentinck, Mr. Hobart-Hampden, Davies Haig and Roscoe.

[Met] a Colonel Hunter, a Canadian in some Indian Army cavalry regiment. [He] has just returned from Russia and told some very interesting things about it. Says Russian officers are committing suicide in hundreds and many are literally dying of disgrace. If a man is seen in officer's uniform, he gets his shoulder-strap torn off him, and if he tries to resist, he not only gets killed himself, but brings about a wholesale massacre of other officers. As a result, many officers prefer to shoot themselves rather than put up with the insult. Says the Russian officers fight magnificently, and mentioned one case in which officers tried to urge their men to advance, but the men refused, so the officers went on by themselves to certain death and fought till they fell while their men laughed and jeered at them from the rear, and made no attempt to help them. Very anti-Kerensky whom he says is a useless humbug, and the sooner he is done with the better.

Friday 9th November 1917

Tennis with Roscoe after tiffin. Tea with Hampden's. News of Kerensky's removal received in evening [Bolshevik Revolution].

Sunday 11th November 1917

Tokyo is a bad place for getting about, as the only means of conveyance are trams and rickshaws. Also, street-numbering is very bad, and it beats me how anyone can ever find a house, as the place is a perfect maze, and seems to have no real system of numbering.

Tuesday 20th November 1917

Went to the Imperial Chrysanthemum Garden Party in the afternoon, held at the Aoyama Detached Palace, a fine building with beautiful grounds. The Royal Party fetched up about 2.15 p.m. and some of us - those just arrived in Japan, and those just leaving, in an official capacity - were presented to the Emperor - a funny wee man in very badly-fitting uniform, and with the appearance of not being quite right in the head.
Tuesday 11th December 1917
Went to tiffin with France, and afterwards went on with him to Asakusa - rather reminiscent of Earl's Court Exhibition. Fine temple in the grounds to Kannon [Kannon], Goddess of Mercy. Saw several lepers begging from passers-by. Looked into a Japanese theatre, but could not understand much of what was being said.

17th December 1917
[Letter to his mother from Captain Kennedy in Aoyama]
My darling Mother,
I was very sorry to hear you had not received my letter from Cape Town even when you wrote on the 8th. I’m afraid it must have been sunk, and also all the others I sent off at the same time. Last mail went off, I think, on the 13th. That evening I received a very welcome Coll. Chronicle [Glenalmond College, Perthshire] and another "Times", though it is awful to see in the former the number of O.G.’s [old boys] who have been knocked out recently. On Friday I got down to tennis in the afternoon, but there was no sun that day, and it was freezing slightly, so it was not as enjoyable as it might have been!
Roscoe and his wife came back to tea with me; so, as there was nothing for tea in the house but bread and peanuts (my servant insists on giving me these at every meal!), I decided to open the tin containing the cake you sent me for Xmas, as was very bucked to find it contained nothing less than short-bread, which was thoroughly appreciated by all. It was A.1. and once more, dear old Ma, thanks awfully for it.
My programme for the day being, roughly, as follows: 7 a.m. Get up and put in half an hour or so’s exercise before breakfast at 8 a.m. 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. Work. 1 p.m. Tiffin. 1.30 to 3 p.m. Work. 3 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. Take exercise out-of-doors. 4.30 Tea. 5 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. Work. 7.30 Dinner, and after dinner generally "read, write and inwardly digest" till about 10 p.m., when I turn in. I don’t say I keep strictly to these hours, except as regards meals and getting up in the morning, but I work out my day pretty much as I have said, as I always try to get in six to eight hours’ actual work at the lingo per day. As a matter of fact, last night, by way of combining business with pleasure, I went with Davies and Wood (from the Embassy) to a Japanese "tempuraya". A "tempuraya" is a kind of restaurant where you make your meal off "tempura" and rice - "tempura" being a kind of baked lobster, which is simply top-hole. We had, of course, to remove our shoes and sit on our haunches, and eat with chopsticks.
Personally, I kept my old "game" leg stuck out, and sat on my good one, but, even so, I felt a bit cramped by the end of it! After the meal, we went to a Cinema. This may not sound like studying the lingo, but it is so nevertheless, because in every Japanese Cinema they have a "benshi", a man who explains what is happening all the time, and it is said to be very good practice to go to Cinemas entirely to try to make out what the "benshi" is saying.
Well, Mother, I must end off now. Much love to all, especially yourself.
Ever your very loving son,
MALCOLM.
Tuesday 1st January 1918

Streets crowded with people in their "Sunday best", as the New Year is the greatest festival of Japan. Small girls all dressed in very pretty, gaily-coloured, kimonos, playing "battle-cock and shuttle-dore", the game played by all Japanese kiddies at the New Year. Really rather a pretty sight. "Kado- matsu"[a pine tree put up outside the door to the house at New Year] outside every house and shop, so that all roads were lined with avenues of pine trees. Also other decorations such as bamboos, lobsters (representative of long life) etc.

Monday 21st January 1918

In the evening went to a dinner given by the War Minister. I was seated between two Japanese generals, neither of whom knew English, so I had to try and make conversation in very broken Japanese! Could not get them to talk much at first, but they both became very affable after stoking up with liquor! Asked one of them if he like European music, to which he replied "Seiyo ongaku wa inu no koe no yoo desu" - "European music is like the barking of a dog"! Felt inclined to tell him that that just about described my feelings in regard to Japanese music, but did not like to hurt the old gentleman's feelings!

Monday 28th January 1918

Went to Lady Lily's "At Home" in afternoon and had to try and make myself pleasant to a crowd of Dago diplomats and others.

Wednesday 30th January 1918

Dined in evening with [Captain] Homma at his house. First time I have been inside a proper Japanese house. Everything is very simple - no furniture of any kind as you just squat on the floor on "zabutons", a sort of cushion. Straw "tatami" [mats] instead of carpets. Mrs. Homma acted as servant and did not eat with us. Apparently Japanese women never eat with their men folk, but have their meals separately. Felt rather awkward, as I did not know whether to talk to Mrs. Homma as one would normally do to one's hostess, or to regard her as a servant and say nothing. Very glad though to have the chance of seeing the inside life, as it were, of a Japanese house, as it is very unusual for a foreigner to be asked in to a meal. Generally, when a Japanese invites a foreigner or other friend to a meal, he takes him to a restaurant.

Thursday 28th February 1918

The Russian Military Attaché held a sale of a fine collection of curios etc. in order to get some cash, as now, owing to the Revolution, none of their Embassy get paid.

Monday 4th March 1918

Went to the War Office in morning to give thanks to General Sugano for the "geisha" dinner. On the way, the same dirty-looking beggar-man who had followed Bennett and me a few weeks ago [who, according to a policeman, was a demented Korean], tagged on to me again, and once more kept on calling out "ketto, ketto". When I got to the War Office, I remembered that Sugano, after getting somewhat "bottled", had told me that, if ever I wanted to know anything, I was just to call on him at the War Office and he would tell me. Thought this was a golden opportunity to pull the old man's leg, as I knew he had only said so under the influence
of drink, and never meant it! When he appeared, I reminded him of his promise, and told him there was something I wanted to ask him. His jaw dropped somewhat on hearing this, as I suppose he thought I was going to ask him to reveal some military secret! However he brightened up when I said I only wanted to know the meaning of "ketto, ketto"! Told me he thought the man had probably said "kento, kento" meaning "to fight". However, Watanabe, [Kennedy's Japanese teacher], whom I have since asked, says that "ketto" means "hairy barbarian", and is a term of abuse which Japanese used to use to foreigners, though it is not much used nowadays. Sugano was actually sober - the first time I have seen him in that condition!

Thursday 28th March 1918
Went riding with Bentinck in afternoon. Had a great argument with him about the Diplomatic Corps, and the way things are done out here. I remember when I arrived in Tokyo, one of the first things that struck me as extraordinary was that none of our diplomats out here speak Japanese; and another thing was that the clerks and messengers in the Chancery are all Japanese. And the more I think over it, the more extraordinary does it seem. How can you be a real diplomat if you can't speak the language of the Country you are in? And what is there to prevent the Japanese clerks and messengers picking up most useful information? The Embassy servants also - they all understand English, even though they don't speak much, and they must pick up any amount of information during meal times when everyone talks quite unrestrainedly. Another thing is that the Embassy has not got its own telegraph, all "wires" coming through the public office. True, the important ones are in cipher, but with hundreds coming through weekly, a cipher expert, if he wishes to do so, could probably make out a key. Seems as though something is wrong in the whole system.

Wednesday 17th April 1918
Went for tea to meet a party of nurses etc. just back from Russia. Heard some pretty ghastly stories of the doings out there. Russian officers are often seized and put under steam-hammers; wounded are dragged from hospital and bayoneted to death. All say though that the British were well-treated with the exception of the Intelligence Officer.

Saturday 18th May 1918
[Walking holiday: Hakone and Hata Pass]
Stopped at the village of Hata for a rest. The old lady and girl at the teahouse refused to believe there is a War on! France tried to convince them of the fact by pointing to my leg and saying it was groggy owing to having been wounded. Seeing my leg, the girl said "How very much your wife and children must have wept when they heard you were wounded"! When I replied I was unmarried, she replied "Uso yo"! ("Don't tell lies"). Being at last convinced that neither of us were married, the old lady offered to look out for wives for us! Very bucked with myself to have managed to walk the whole length of the Hata Pass. It is about 7 miles, and pretty rough going, so it is certainly by far the best walk I have done since I got knocked out, and shows the leg is improving.

Thursday 23rd May 1918
Gad, how I wish I could get back to the "front", and put in a bit of fighting - It's awful to be living here in comparative ease and comfort while all my remaining pals are going through hell out there.

Wednesday 29th May 1918

Kennedy was invited by McDonald, a friend on the staff of the U.S. Embassy, to accompany him on an official trip to Shimoda on the Izu Peninsula to decorate the graves of some of Commodore Perry's men.

On arriving at Shimoda we were met by the deputy mayor and other village "officials", all rigged out in frock-coats and a wonderful selection of pink ties, brown boots, bowler hats, tweed trousers etc. - apparently their idea of "smart" clothes! As McDonald and I got out of the car, the deputy mayor came forward with much bowing and scraping, and enquired as to which was the British Ambassador and which the American, and seemed somewhat overcome on learning that neither of us were either of these dignitaries! Apparently the U.S. Embassy had sent a wire to the local "pub" to engage rooms for a representative of the British and one of the American embassies, and the good people had promptly jumped to the conclusion that the ambassadors of those two countries were coming in person!

Hence the wonderful attires of the local "dignitaries"! To add to it, the village band had also turned out and was wheezing out a tune of sorts in a terrible succession of discords, but we found out subsequently that this was not really specially for our benefit, but was, in fact, the "orchestra" of the neighbouring cinema! But the whole effect - the "town council" in full "war-paint"; the stately bowing and greeting of the same and the painful sounds emanating from the "orchestra" - was very reminiscent of a Gilbert and Sullivan opera! Personally I was attired in a pair of old grey flannels, and McDonald's clothes were not anything much to write home about, so the whole affair was decidedly comic to say the least of it! As McDonald speaks no Japanese except "Banzai", which he said frequently and quite irrelevantly, I had to act as interpreter to the "delegation" who followed us in to the "hotel" in order to exchange cards and greetings!

Tuesday 18th June 1918

Visit of Prince Arthur of Connaught to Japan

When I was presented to him, he remarked that he thought he had met me before - out in France - but I had to admit that he was mistaken! Seemed very friendly and behaved like an ordinary British officer.

All the trams were decorated with two Union Jacks and two Rising Suns each. Crowds and decorations - especially the Union Jack and Rising Sun crossed - everywhere.

Saturday 20th July 1918

Spending summer at hill resort of Lake Hakone to escape the humid heat of Tokyo

Very fine all day. Set off about 10.30 a.m. in boat with Bennett's, Carol, Howard and Miss Woodman, and rowed to Umijiri, having picnic lunch there at the teahouse, walking on afterwards up to Ojigoku ("Big Hell"). Awful smell of burning sulphur. There's a small
teahouse a few yards away from the crater which does a roaring trade in the sale of drinks and cakes, and of eggs boiled in holes in the ground. Most economical way of living, no doubt, as you have no fuel bill, but you always have the chance of proceeding heaven-wards at somewhat short notice in the case of a bad eruption!

On way back we stopped an paddled in a large hot spring. Tea at Umijiri and then rowed back, getting back about 6.30 p.m. having rowed it in 1 hour. Had some fine views of [Mount] Fuji, looking as though the top were floating in air.

Monday 8th September 1919

[Tour of Inland Sea area - on island of Shikoku]

Left for Kotohira by somewhat primitive type train. A real bit of "Old Japan", such as one had visualised Japan to be before coming to it - old-fashioned in appearance, with stone steps for roads, rows of funny wee shops, houses and inns on either side, shaded by kinds of canvas sails overhead, pilgrims in old-world clothes, and shrines, giving a strangely old-world atmosphere. One finds bits of "Old Japan" in hill villages and the like, but this is something different - a whole town, built on the side of the hill.

The two main shrines are the Asahi and the Kompira, the latter being the principal one, on the summit of a hill surrounded by towering great cryptomerias, with wee bits of shrines on either side all the way up. A lovely view of the surrounding country from the top and hordes of pilgrims popping up prayers at the smaller shrines on the way up the 900 steep stone steps to the main shrine. In this, the Kompira Shrine, are two sacred horses and the poor beasts are only allowed out once a year. Also several bronze horses, one of which has a hole in his nose from pilgrims rubbing it in the belief that they will be cured of whatever disease they have. Kompira being the god of sailormen, there are hundreds of model boats, paintings of naval battles etc. given as tokens of thanks. Somewhat incongruously there is also a picture of Prince Arthur of Connaught, who apparently visited the shrine on one occasion. Equally out of place in this old-world atmosphere is an automatic telephone!

There is something pleasantly unsophisticated about the people here, with men sitting around in nothing but a "fundoshi" [loincloth], women bare from the waist up, and small boys running around naked - all in the cause of keeping cool and all most decorous. Strange, too, how ignorant some of them are about the late War. On a number of occasions I have been asked how I hurt my leg, and on my replying that I had been wounded, they have asked in some surprise, "In what war?" Some of them have heard there had been a war, but seemed a bit vague as to who had fought who and imagined that it had ended with the capture of Tsingtao in 1914 [Captured by Japan from Germany]. Seems almost incredible!

Friday 12th September 1919

Amused by the "neesan" [waitress] who attended me for the mid-day meal, as she talked of the "Nichi-Bei Senso" [Japan-American War], which she was convinced had taken place, and asked who it was that Japan had fought at Tsingtao. On my saying it was Germany, she asked if Germany was near Japan and said she thought Germany had been a friend of Japan's.
Friday 19th September 1919
Stopped at [hotel in Shimonoseki] for the night. Very nice to sleep in a proper bed once more and to have water laid on. Amused to find I had been expected, as the Manager said he had been told by the police that I would probably be coming. On my remarking that the police seemed to keep a good watch on me, he replied with a smile that they were always concerned with the safety of a foreigner. A pleasant thought!

Saturday 25th September 1919
Tait [U.S. Assistant Military Attaché] tells me of a 37 mm gun used by U.S. troops against machine gun nests, similar to the "soogekihoo". Tells me the General [Woodroffe] and Burnett [U.S. Military Attaché] have been comparing notes on details of the "soogekihoo" [Japanese Army assault gun].

Sunday 2nd November 1919
[Morgan] warned me to beware of Tait as apparently Burnett has put him on to pump both him (Morgan) and me about the "soogekihoo" and other matters while Burnett himself tries to pump Bennett.

Tells me that Tait, in giving me details of the U.S. 37 mm gun was merely bluffing and leading me on to say how it compared with the "soogekihoo", as the Yanks are anxious to find out all about it and know that we, as Japan's allies, are in a far better position than themselves to obtain details. Tait, in fact, seems to have been guilty of deliberately lying when he assured me that Burnett and the General exchange all such information between themselves. Burnett and Tait are also trying to find out where Marsden has gone and why he has gone, and they have been making up to Mrs. Burnett with a view to obtaining information on movements etc. Very sorry to learn about this, as I have always looked on Tait as a good friend and never imagined that he was exploiting the friendship in this way.

Friday 14th November 1919
Up at 3 a.m. and went off by train to a place some 30 or 40 minutes beyond Osaka to see the final stage of the manoeuvres. Met there by our horses and watched the assault, which was carried out in great masses. A fine exhilarating sight, but quite impracticable under modern conditions.

Saturday 15th November 1919
[At the annual Japanese Army Grand Manoeuvres] [Went] to the customary banquet given by the Emperor [Taisho] to the leading officers, civil authorities etc. who had taken part or help in the manoeuvres. Although never admitted, it has long been known that [the Emperor] is mental. Today there was no doubt about it and it was really rather tragic seeing all these high dignitaries making their obeisance to him while he himself appeared to take no notice of them and made grimaces. So ends this year's Grand Manoeuvres. Much struck by the preferential treatment given to the British officers, the Japanese going out of their way to help us in every way possible. We are, of course, their allies, but it seems to indicate their keenness to keep up the Alliance, despite the pro-German views held by the Army as a whole until recently. The General [Woodroffe], for his part,
seems to have them almost eating out of his hand and it was most noticeable how Tanaka, Uehara and other "big noises" in the Army made a point of showing their friendship towards him while taking little notice of the other Military Attachés. The only trouble is that some of them seem to resent this; but as he [Woodroffe] says, "I don't care a damn what they think. We are Japan's ally and our job out here is to strengthen the Alliance".

Wednesday 19th November 1919
[Working temporarily as assistant to Brigadier-General Woodroffe, British Military Attaché]
Deciphering wires from Siberia all morning. The General [Woodroffe] thinks we may soon find ourselves in Siberia if the present situation does not improve. Says the Japanese War Office is very "shimpai" [worried] about the way things are going out there. Speaking about our Alliance with Japan, he expressed the opinion that China and the Far East seem likely to be amongst the World's greatest problems before long. With Japan more or less holding the destiny of China in her hands, he considers that we, as her ally, will have a strong foothold in the Far East. Although the U.S. are doing their best to discredit Japan and there is a certain amount of truth in what they say, the Yanks themselves have done some pretty discreditable things against her and they are acting largely out of selfish motives. The individual Yank is a very good chap and some of my best friends are Americans, but some of the things done by their countrymen make one utterly disgusted.

[Kennedy was on attachment to the 34th Regiment at Shizuoka from the end of November 1918 to the end of January 1920.]

Tuesday 2nd December 1919
To dinner in evening with Colonel Kimura [Commander 34th Regiment, Shizuoka]. A very convivial dinner, but soon became apparent that the main object was to loosen my tongue with the aid of plentiful quantities of "sake" and to pump me on the question of what Britain would do if Japan and the U.S. went to war. Would she stand by her Japanese ally or would blood prove thicker than water and lead her to side with the U.S.? Or would she remain neutral and try to mediate between the two? As Britain was relieved from any obligation to go to the aid of Japan in the event of such a war [provided America was not joined by another country], I pointed out (as Japan had agreed to this when the Alliance was renewed in 1911), she would probably stand aside, but would certainly not join in against her. This was, of course, my personal view I said; but I was put in a bit of a hole when Nakayama, who was rather more tight than the others, proposed a toast to the downfall of America. As they were all watching how I reacted to this, I realised that the only thing to do was to laugh it off and propose an alternative toast, which I did by wishing good luck to Japan whatever happened. This seemed to satisfy them all, except Nakayama, who leaned over towards me with an orange, which he pulled to bits and then put the bits in his mouth, telling me that that was what Japan would do to America - pull her to bits and gobble her up!

Although Nakayama was the only one aggressively drunk, I was struck by the fact that the only one who drunk little and remained sober was Sakata and that he was the one who put
the most pointed questions and watched me the most closely. Couldn't help feeling that as he had just finished the Staff College course, he had been specially selected to do so.

**Wednesday 3rd December 1919**

Wrote out a detailed report on last night's dinner, as the General will be interested to hear about it on account of its bearing on the increasing tension between Japan and the U.S. and on Japan's anxieties about her British ally's reaction in the event of such a war.

**Friday 26th December 1919**

[General Woodroffe] spoke very highly of my report on the dinner with Colonel Kimura and said that he considered it of such interest and value that he passed it on to the Director of Military Intelligence.

**Saturday 27th December 1919**

Marsden told me of a talk the General had with Colonel Tani and an officer going to Singapore. Without mincing his words, he told them why the Japanese are disliked and how to prevent this dislike. He also spoke to Colonel Hata recently about the need to refute the lies about Japan that are appearing in the papers - largely due to a propaganda campaign to discredit Japan and to bring our alliance with her to an end. As a result of the General's advice, Hata has twice written to the "[Japan] Advertiser", one of these letters being to refute the rumour that Japan has been buying German 'planes.

Incidentally, Bennett tells me that the Commanding Officer of his regiment in Tokyo asked him recently why it was that Colonel Somerville was so anti-Japanese and why he sent in anti-Japanese reports to our War Office. Somerville was, of course, very critical of the Japanese at times and no doubt some of his reports reflected this; but how do the Japanese know this? Very strange! Much as I liked him, he always struck me as being rather too much linked up with our own and foreign diplomats, who never get on really close terms with the Japanese and only mix with them on formal occasions. That is where the General is so very different. He goes out of his way to get to know them and to win their confidence and respect, and he has no use at all for the diplomatic fraternity.

**Tuesday 30th December 1919**

The General well pleased with himself, as the War Minister, General Tanaka, asked himself to lunch with him - a most unusual thing for a Japanese to do and shows how highly he thinks of him.

**Wednesday 31st December 1919**

Lunched at the Imperial with Captain Gurney of the London Regiment, who is on his way back from Siberia. Very interesting about things out there, but from what he says there is precious little to choose between the Bolsheviks and the White Russians out there. Says the Russian peasant is a very good chap and easy to handle if you go about things the right way, but the White Russian officers treat their men like brutes. On one occasion he saw some of Kolchak's men being flogged to death at Omsk. This was being done as punishment for the "crime" of having asked for food after having none for 2 days, although their officers were well supplied with both food and drink. Gurney tried to get the flogging stopped, but no notice was taken.
On another occasion, he said, Semenov held up a train and ordered all the men in it to join his forces. Those who refused were shot in cold blood. What lovely “allies”!

Monday 12th January 1920
Went to the Regiment [34th] in morning. Tried to find out the views of Colonel Kimura and some of the other officers on the Siberian question, but could not gather much from any of them, though Colonel Kimura said in a very unconvincing way that he thought Japan ought to withdraw. I don't think though that he really meant it, and personally I think they will have to send more troops, otherwise Bolshevism will over-run Siberia, and be a very serious menace to Japan owing to its proximity. Furthermore, if Japan withdraws from Siberia, there will be nothing to prevent Bolshevism spreading to China, and with China under Soviet rule, things would be pretty bad.

In the evening about 6.30 p.m. a young girl came in to see me saying she came from Major Kawanabe's house. Seemed very high class and was well dressed, so I thought at first she was Major Kawanabe's new wife or possibly a daughter. I asked her to come in, as she had been left standing in the "genkan" [lobby]. Having come in, she told me she wanted to become my servant, but as I did not want one I asked if she would like me to find out if any of the other foreigners in Shizuoka needed a servant. She thanked me and said she would come again tomorrow evening. Says she is only 19, and came from her home in Fukuoka-ken [Prefecture] (Kyushu) last May. Also says that she herself graduated from the "kotojogakko" [Girls' High School] last year, which shows she must be of good family. Seems funny for a girl of her class to wish to become a servant.

Tuesday 13th January 1920
Told [Captain Jimbo] of the girl who came last night, and on his advice sent a letter to Major Kawanabe to verify her story. Reply came back that she was a distant relative of his, and he asked me to let him know as soon as she came to me, and he would send along for her. It seems she had run away from him and he had been looking for her everywhere. Later in the day he sent word to say she had been found and brought back to his house for which I was thankful as I could not help feeling sorry for the girl and did not like the idea of having to hand her over to him. No doubt, as she has been through the "kotojogakko", she has rather advanced ideas, whereas Major Kawanabe always strikes me as being of the very conservative type of Japanese, and no doubts treats women accordingly; or he may even be going to make her marry him. In either case the poor girl obviously wants to get away, or she would not want to become a mere servant, so I feel very sorry for her.

Monday 19th January 1920
Went to the Regiment in morning. Was told that the officers of the Regiment were recently given a lecture on the Siberian Question by Captain Sakata, who has just graduated from the Staff College. Tried to find out the general opinion of those present. All said they considered that no fresh reinforcements were needed, but would give me no reason for it except that if such were required, the 15th Division might very likely be sent, and for that reason they hoped no more forces would be sent, as it was too cold out there! I can't help thinking that this
reply was made up beforehand, as they know I am interested in the matter, and they don't want to give away the idea of the Military Authorities on the subject, Sakata, in all probability, having enlightened them on the point during his lecture.

Wednesday 21st January 1920

A plainclothes detective turned up in the morning to ask if Miss Kawatami had been round again, as she has once more run away from Major Kawanabe.

Sunday 29th February 1920

[General Woodroffe] seems very pleased with my report on [Japanese hostility to the U.S.] and is going to show it to the Minister. Tells me Bennett is to be attached to Army Headquarters in Korea and have a free run of the Country, which ought to be jolly interesting for him and very useful.

Marsden tells me that the reason for the sudden and unexpected dissolution of [Japanese] Parliament last week was partly due to having to hush up the details of a "certain political blunder" which certain papers published recently, and for which they were suppressed. It seems that when Baron Makino was recently dining with King George, the latter referred to [President] Wilson (presumably jokingly) as "that schoolmaster". Baron Makino promptly jumped to the conclusion that, as the King referred to him in this somewhat slighting manner, it showed that Anglo-American relations were not all they should be, which, of course, pleased him very much, and he promptly wired the remark to his Government - a great breech of etiquette, as the remark was made by the Sovereign, and, moreover, in a private conversation. The contents of his wire somehow leaked out and the papers got hold of it, and, as a result, were at once suppressed. The Japanese Government, fearing diplomatic complications, should questions be asked about it in the Diet, got the Emperor's permission to dissolve Parliament then and there. Most people imagine this was done on account of the Universal Suffrage question becoming too heated, but apparently the reason is as above mentioned.

Wednesday 10th March 1920

Went round to see the General [Woodroffe] and found him very fed up about the receipt of a cable to say that the post of Assistant Military Attaché was to be abolished at the end of the month. Presumably it is part of the "economy" programme; but apart from the fact of giving very short notice to Marsden, it makes it impossible for the General to carry out all the necessary work. It is very bad luck on him, as he has been slaving away all these months and is just beginning to reap the fruits of his labour and has just got everything running smoothly; but now this will knock everything on the head. It seems very short-sighted policy as there is no doubt but that the Far Eastern situation is rapidly becoming the centre of the World's interest, and is therefore of vital importance. The Americans evidently realise this, as they are just getting out a third Military Attaché, yet here we are cutting ourselves down to one. Incidentally it is ridiculous for a Brigadier [General] to be left alone without a single Staff officer.
Wednesday 24th March 1920
Today's papers give details of the bomb explosion outside the Foreign Office on the Emperors birthday last year. It seems the bomb was brought to Japan by one of the Chinese Peace Delegates on the way to Versailles, and was handed over to Kroupenski's (the last Tsarist Ambassador in Japan) Chinese servant. It was hoped to throw it in to the ballroom when the ball to the members of the Diplomatic Corps on [the Emperors birthday] was in full swing. Had this been done several diplomats would probably have been killed and wounded, and Japan would have got the blame. China imagined that Japan would thereby be brought into such disfavour that she, China, would then have no difficulty in getting Shantung restored to her.
Luckily the Foreign Office was too well guarded to bring this scheme into effect, so the bomb had to be exploded outside, a Japanese gatekeeper being bribed to light the fuse.

Thursday 25th March 1920
[Kennedy was on attachment to the Chiba Infantry School from the beginning of February 1920 to July 1920.]
Bitterly cold driving rain and sleet all day. Got thoroughly wet and cold attending company training. Felt very sorry for the men, as they were without coats or gloves, and I was just about frozen stiff with both. After having been kept hanging about for an hour or more, they were made to advance through flooded paddy fields with freezing cold mud and water up to their knees. This was done, so I was told, by way of "seishin kyoiku" [spiritual education].

Sunday 4th April 1920
Wallace and Mrs. Swift arrived back from Mukden [last] night and had great tales about doings out there. Say the Japanese there and throughout Manchuria generally are of a very low type, including many undesirables who have been given the chance of prison or of leaving Japan. No one allowed outside Mukden after nightfall owing to bandits. The present Chinese Governor of the City - Chansuli [sic] [Chang Tso-lin] is an ex-bandit chief, and got the governorship by inducing another band of bandits to attack the city. He himself, at the head of his band, then entered the city from the other side, fought them, and drove them out, whereupon he informed Peking that he had saved the city and said he considered the city should have a governor to guard against further attacks, and said he could find no man better suited for the job than himself, whereupon he was appointed as such, as Peking was in too much of a funk of him to refuse! He now lives in a "yamen" [government office] closely guarded by his own soldiers, and never goes out except in his own private armoured motor car, as he knows he would be shot if he did! He managed to wangle this car and one other from Peking by threats.
Semenov and two of his wives were staying in the same hotel as Mrs. Swift, who says he is in close touch with [Chang Tso-lin]. Cheerful companions!

Sunday 11th April 1920
Went up to Tokyo by the 8.56 a.m. train. Found a refugee Russian officer searching about for rooms for himself and family, so helped him to look round. Fine-looking fellow who had
obviously seen better days and looked as though he had been through pretty fair hell. Unshaven and shabbily dressed, but in spite of it had the appearance of a sahib. Had lunch at St. Andrew's house, the Shaw's, Wallace Swift, a missionary fellow from Korea named Lawrence [being there]. Lawrence has not apparently much use for Koreans, who he said were lazy, dirty, and, when possessed of a little education, very conceited and corrupt in their dealings. Had a very interesting conversation with Mr. Swift about Siberia. He, unlike most Americans, seems to be quite in sympathy with the action of the Japanese in staying on out there, and maintains that America ought to cease backing up the Chinese. The Chinese, according to him, have no more love for America than they have for Japan, and only cause trouble with Japan because they feel they have America behind them. If America gave up her present policy in China, and gave Japan more or less a free hand, he thinks China would at once settle down and would cease her anti-Japanese agitations. As he says, Japan is the only nation in the East who has shown herself to be possessed with a capacity for organisation, and he thinks that, if things were left to her, Far Eastern affairs would soon settle down. He says the Chinese brigand chief, [Chang Tso-lin], is the real ruler of Manchuria, and is in absolute accord with the Japanese, and pays frequent visits to the Japanese Consul at Mukden, and he believes that between them they could bring peace and prosperity to those parts if America withdrew.

Saturday 17th April 1920
Experiments with tanks 10 a.m. - 1 p.m. to which Lt. General Ono and a large staff of officers of all branches of the Service came. The experiments were somewhat of a failure so far as the passage of shell craters were concerned, and got stuck each time!

Sunday 18th April 1920
Tokyo crowded with people up to see the flowers - parties of students in masquerade costume, small girls in their brightest and most multicoloured kimonos, and most of the sightseers decked out with artificial flowers stuck in their hair, their hats, or their clothes, and all very full of "joie de vivre".

Called on Sir Charles Eliot and had tea with him. He is said to be a great scholar and speaks 25 languages, but he did not appear to have a very striking personality, and did not give me the impression of being the right type of man for an ambassador, as he has a rather awkward appearance. Seemed rather pathetic to have him living alone in that large house, as he gives one the appearance of being a man who would much rather live in a small house and be left alone to his books. When I arrive he was standing alone in the huge drawing room of No. 1, looking at the effect of the colour scheme caused by green carpets and pink chair covers, and seemed very worried as to whether they matched or not. Must be very hard for a man in his position to be unmarried.

Monday 3rd May 1920
Had interesting conversation with Captain Yokotsuka on the Siberian Question, his views amplifying those of General Kawamura when he tackled me on the subject at Mishima. Thinks Britain and Japan should act in concern and remain in Siberia till a stable government has
been set up, and thinks Japan should certainly declare War as a result of the Nikolaevsk massacre, pointing out with great bitterness that when, in 1897, two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung, their government received Kiao-chao etc. in compensation, yet when several hundred Japanese are massacred at Nikolaevsk, nothing is done.

Sent off report in evening on Siberian Question, the two main points dealt with being: (1) the idea on the part of Japanese officers that Britain ought to help Japan against the Bolsheviks, and (2) that Japan intends to retain Vladivostok and wants the area of Siberia as far as Trans-Baikal turned into an independent buffer State.

Thursday 20th May 1920

Heard from Withers that the police have twice been round to his house in his absence and have tried to find out why he went to Nokogiriyama - also, whether or not he took any photos. His cook replied that she never inquired into the doings of her "danna san" [master], which apparently rather nonplussed the police, who, knowing they had no right to make such enquiries, thereupon withdrew, impressing on her the fact that she must on no account let the "danna san" know of this visit. Withers also tells me that he learns from his cook that the police have also been round here to my house making enquiries during my absence, but they apparently met with no greater success from my old couple.

I mentioned the case to Mr. Swift, and he maintains that we ought to report the matter to the Embassy and have the matter looked into, as police supervision of diplomats and other members of embassies or legations is illegal.

Saturday 22nd May 1920

During the meal Major Yamada came in, very drunk, and proceeded to rail against foreigners in general and British in particular, especially against Hughes and the Australians for talking about a "White" Australia. Bitterly denounced the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, as he maintained that Britain got all the advantages whereas Japan got none. Several of the officers tried to shut him up, but he only became more vehement. I must admit that I have great sympathy for Japan for the way she is being held back by Australia and America, but I can quite understand the feelings of those two countries on the subject.

Sunday 23rd May 1920

Several of the officers who were at the evening meal last night came up and apologised to me for Major Yamada's "warukuchi" [abusive language], which struck me as very good of them. As a matter of fact, I was very glad to hear his real sentiments on the subject, as Japanese officers are generally too polite to express their true feelings on such questions. Though Yamada's remarks were decidedly insulting about Europeans in general, he told me he meant nothing personal, and even went so far as to say, in obvious sincerity, that if all foreigners were ready to share the life of the Japanese instead of looking down on them, he would not be so hostile towards them, and he expressed admiration for me coming to share camp life and poor food with them when I might have stayed at an inn in comfort and with good food. This remark was made in all sincerity. It is extraordinary how much Japanese officers seem to appreciate it if you are prepared to live with them, and be content with the same food and
quarters, and so on. It would not be an exaggeration to say that more than half the officers have made practically this same remark to me, and have shown great surprise and obvious appreciation on finding that I am living exactly the same as themselves and taking no special privileges, and several have remarked in absolute sincerity that they have never come across another foreigner who would do so. This fact no doubt helps to explain the somewhat anti-foreigner attitude of many Japanese. They get the idea that foreigners look down on them for their simple ways of living, and they in their turn are apt to look down on foreigners who they think incapable of hardships. Even during these few days in camp, I have seen a marked difference in the attitude towards me - Major Yamada being a case in point; and it seems to be simply due to the fact that they find that I, far from looking down on them, am prepared to live and share their life with them.

Monday 24th May 1920
Left for Tokyo to finish off my April report in the Military Attaché's office. Found Marsden there, he having got back from Vladivostok a day or two ago. Showed me his diary and reports, which were most interesting. Says General Oi, the present Japanese Commander-in-Chief out there, is of a very coarse and cunning type - a man to cause the antipathy of the other foreign nationals out there - but a brilliant soldier. Speaks very well though of all the other Japanese higher officers whom he met out there, and who gave him a great welcome. Oi has no use for either Czechs or Russians, except Semenov who is thought very highly of by the Japanese, though they dislike his men, whom they say are just a rabble of wild and undisciplined Cossacks. Says the price of the Czech evacuation was the handing over of Kolchak and payment of gold. British and French were Kolchak's chief supporters. His being handed over seems to have been a piece of the blackest treachery, but not due to the British. Marsden also had interviews with several of the Russian commanders, including Boldirev, the present Commander-in-Chief, whom he describes as being kindly, but weak, and no match for Oi. Another Russian commander with whom he had an interview had a Bolshevik commissar sitting in the room with him, the Bolshevik being there to see that he gave nothing away. The wretched commander, according to Marsden, was a miserable looking creature in abject terror of his life.

Marsden says the Japanese out there are very anti-American, and that the Japanese themselves are very unpopular with everyone, though they get on best with the French. He attributes their unpopularity largely to Bolshevik propaganda, which is mostly composed of lies; but owing to Japanese hypersensitiveness, want of tact, narrow perspectives etc. it is generally believed. In spite, however, of their unpopularity, most of the other foreign nationals out there admit that, if Japan withdraws her troops, a general massacre of her nationals in Siberia would immediately follow. They also admit that Japan must continue to guard the railways, as there is no one else to do so; and if once the Japanese railway guards were withdrawn, the railways would at once be destroyed by Bolsheviks, Chinese bandits etc. Nearly all the stories of Japanese atrocities etc. have, on investigation, been found to be untrue.
Thursday 3rd June 1920

[In Tokyo] Set off about 9.20 p.m. to catch the last train back to Chiba but owing to a fire breaking out near Mansei-bashi, and the road being blocked by fire-engines and falling debris, the cars had to stop running, so I missed the train. While in the tram, a Japanese fellow had started a conversation with me, and when we were turned out on account of the fire, he walked along with me towards Ryogoku. After legging it along in pouring rain and filthy mud for some time, we saw it was impossible to get to the station in time. I asked him if he knew of any "pub" round about where I could put up for the night, but he insisted on taking me to his house and putting me up for the night. He turned out to be a Mr. Nakai, late of the Shanghai Municipal Police, and I found he knew Mc.Ewan (O.G.) [Glenalmond Old Boy], whom I had met at Shanghai on my way out to this Country. When we got to his house about 11.30 p.m. his wife was already in bed, so he routed her out and got her to make some coffee for us, and to prepare a "futon" for me. I was very struck by the simple, homely say everything was done, as though it were nothing out of the common to suddenly have a stray foreigner thrown in on them unawares. The house was just a wee bit of a thing with a "nikai" [first floor] consisting of a 4-mat and a 6-mat room. Nakai and his wife generally sleep in the latter, but on my arrival they insisted on moving their "futon" into the 4-mat room and spreading mine in the 6-mat room. In true Japanese style I was given a "yukata"[informal cotton kimono], and both Nakai and his wife sat talking to me while I undressed, and saw me into bed before they turned in themselves - everything so simple, and everything spotlessly clean, and no forced modesty. Though we did not turn in till nearly 1 a.m. Mrs. Nakai was up by 4 a.m. preparing breakfast and I was called shortly afterwards. I find he went out to San Francisco at the age of 17 in 1888 and was there till 1903. I asked him about the anti-Japanese feeling out there, but he tells me there was only very little in his time. He seems to think the Japanese have brought it on themselves, as the majority of those who go out there are of a very low type.

Set off in pouring rain to catch the 6 a.m. train back to Chiba, but as I had to wait nearly 15 minutes for a tram, I just missed it, so had to wait on till the 7.20 a.m. I must say the Nakai’s were awfully good to me, and even insisted on giving me a foreign breakfast, and have told me to be sure to let them know if ever I want to be put up for the night again. They seem very pro-British, and seem specially keen on Scottish people, most of their foreign friends in Shanghai being Scots.

Thursday 1st July 1920

Prince Carol, the Romanian Crown Prince, paid a visit to the [Chiba Infantry] School. He had about half a dozen other Romanian officers with him in a weird assortment of uniforms, one old warrior with a little white Uncle Sam beard being rigged out in a wonderful assortment of colours and looking for all the World like a musical comedy officer! When the Prince was about to leave, we were all lined up to see him off. However, he had apparently spotted my uniform, as I was suddenly sent for and was presented to him. Not realising that he could speak English, I was endeavouring to concoct a sentence in French to shoot at him, so was very surprised when he held out his hand with a smile and said in very good English "What on
earth are you doing in this place"! He then asked me about my regiment and my war service, and looking at my medal ribbons remarked, "I see you are an Old Contemptible". Altogether he seemed a very friendly sort of fellow, and shook me warmly by the hand when he left, and wished me good luck. The Prince's suite included a couple of cinematograph operators, who worked their machines with some considerable vigour.

Wednesday 14th July 1920

[Chiba] In the evening went to a farewell dinner given me by Captain Tsuji and the officers of No. 1 Company at Captain Tsuji's house. Much to my surprise the dinner was in foreign style (so-called!) and served sitting at a table, the food being obtained from a neighbouring "foreign food" restaurant. In order to render everything truly "foreign", Captain Tsuji even made his wife sit beside him at the table. I felt awfully sorry for the poor little woman, as it is a thing never done by Japanese amongst themselves, and she, accordingly, was frightfully shy and never said a word the whole time. It was awfully good though of Captain Tsuji to do everything in what he imagined to be foreign style by way of compliment to me, and it must have cost him a pretty stiff sum and very much more than he, as a Japanese officer, could afford; but the whole thing was really rather pitiful as, in reality it was very far from being European, though one could tell by the whole thing that he was doing his best to make it so, and was frightfully anxious to do the correct thing, and was continually asking me whether this, that, or the other was correct. "Wines" consisted of "sake", beer, "tansan"[soda water], claret (?), and sweet vermouth, the latter being taken as port, and each "wine" being served in order, one for each course, though only three glasses were provided for the lot! Incidentally, the same knife and fork had to be used for each course, the courses served also being of a somewhat curious description!

Thursday 15th July 1920

Went round to the Embassy and had tea with Davidson and Collier. All the Embassy ladies and most of the Staff have left for the hills [summer residence at Chusenji] for the hot weather. Heard some details of the map-selling incident which has been causing a lot of excitement in the papers recently. It seems that Colonel Burnett [American Military Attaché] is the culprit, and, as a result, will probably have to return to the U.S.. According to Colonel Burnett, a man came to his house late one night and showed him some so-called secret maps of Siberia and asked him how much he would give for them. Colonel Burnett asked him to leave them with him and come back again in a few days for his answer. The man agree to do so, and Burnett cabled off to his agent in Vladivostok to find out if they were genuine. The reply came back that they were genuine alright, but not secret - in fact they could be bought on the streets in Vladivostok! Meantime, however, the man who had tried to sell them to Burnett had been arrested by the Japanese, and the whole case came out in the papers. Burnett was naturally somewhat upset and went straight off to the War Office to see Tatekawa, and tell him at all costs to keep the matter out of the papers owing to the diplomatic consequences involved. He maintained that he had intended to return the maps, but Tatekawa very naturally replied, "Yes! No doubt you intended to do so when you found
that they were valueless, but what would you have done if you had found them to be really important ones?" The case certainly looks pretty black against Burnett though I can't help feeling sorry for him if he really never intended to buy them; but he was certainly a fool for having any dealings with the man at all.

A similar case happened recently when a man came to Captain Marriott, offering to sell him certain secret naval maps. Captain Marriott however was so disgusted at being approached in this way that he at once 'phoned to the Japanese Admiralty and had the man arrested.

**Thursday 22nd July 1920**

Went off for the day on a farewell "outing" given by General Kawamura. About a dozen of the more senior instructors came also. As soon as we got to Yawatajuku, about 20 miles by train on the Hojo line, we all tramped off to the Azumaya, a local "ryokan", and changed into "yukata" [informal cotton kimono] provided by the pub. From there we padded down to the sea, and about mid-day set off in a large sampan. The sea all along this coast is very shallow, and you can wade out 2 or 3 miles with the water barely up to your waist. On the outward journey the boat was propelled by means of punt-poles, but 2 or 3 times struck "sand banks", on which occasions we all, including the old "kakka" [lit. 'Your Excellency', i.e. General Kawamura] himself, got out and pushed her into deeper water! Some 2 or 3 miles out are sort of "mazes" made of light bamboo sticks. The fish enter these mazes and then forget the way out, and the fishermen come down with sort of shrimping nets and scoop them out. On this occasion we acted as the fishermen and it was really a splendid sight to see the old general and pot-bellied old colonels, clad in "yukata" tucked up round their "middles" and wearing "tengui" [face-cloths] on their heads, all paddling about in the water and scooping up fish with as much zest and enjoyment as a party of children at the seaside! Like a fool I forgot my camera. I could have got some top-hole "snaps" if only I had brought it with me.

[In August 1920 Kennedy travelled up to the northern island of Hokkaido. His aim was to make a walking tour, visiting, if possible, villages inhabited by the Ainu, the indigenous inhabitants of Hokkaido. Kennedy's first destination in Hokkaido was Hakodate, where he called on Captain R.W. Russell of the 9th Gurkha Rifles, a recently-arrived fellow Language Officer.]

**Monday 2nd August 1920**

Went round in evening with Russell to the Gotoken and found there Mr. Purington and Mr. Holmes, who insisted on us joining them for dinner. Both are Americans, though the former has a house in England. He, Mr. Purington, is a mining engineer and one of the heads of the Syndicat Minier du Pacifique, which is chiefly run by British and French capital. Holmes is his Business Assistant and was in Siberia as U.S. Captain of infantry. (Now working for M.I.[Military Intelligence]). The two of them are now here fitting up an expedition to go up to Okhotsk and Sakhalin to find out the true state of affairs in regard to the possibility or otherwise of starting work on certain gold claims in the former and of staking out claims and obtaining concessions for coal in the latter. The claims near Okhotsk were staked out for the
syndicate last year by a young American mining engineer, but he was killed later while
prospecting for gold further south, and all the claims have been over-run and seized by the
Reds. The object of the expedition up to Okhotsk is to find out the damage done to the claims
by the Reds, and to see if it is possible to start work there. For this purpose a 150-ton
schooner has been purchased and Mr. Purington is knocking together a crew to work her and
laying in arms and ammunition in case of opposition from the Reds and for protection against
bears and wolves, which are said to be in large numbers up there. Mr. Purington has asked
Russell and me to join the expedition, which will probably be away about 2 months, but of
course we can't manage it, worst luck, though it ought to be a damned interesting show.
Russell left for Kutchan in the evening and I went back with Purington to his rooms at the
Katsuya, and sat talking till nearly midnight. Very interesting conversation. Tells me the district
round Okhotsk is very much richer in gold that the Transval, and maintains that, owing to the
present World shortage of the metal (less than 60% of the output of 1914), and the absolute
necessity of obtaining it if a gold standard is to be maintained, the place ought to be
internationalised, as the Russians, though they have held it for hundreds of years, have never
tried to develop the gold-fields and are simply acting "dog in the manger". All North East
Russia is a mass of gold and precious minerals, but the Russians are so slack that they never
attempt to raise any, and instead of it being their most valuable possession, the annual
revenue of North East Russia is not sufficient to cover the cost of its administration. Mr.
Purington made an offer some 10 or 12 years ago to the then Minister of Finance in Russia to
buy this huge strip of territory for any sum he liked to name, pointing out these facts at the
time, but the Minister of Finance refused on so-called patriotic reasons. Mr. Purington is very
annoyed at his own Government and the British Government for their lack of interest in what
is happening in those parts, and the way they are playing into the hands of the Labour Party.
Few people, he says, realise the size and the possibilities. From the Korean frontier to the
Bering Straits is a seaboard 6,000 miles in length, i.e. greater even than America, and the
lands bordering on it contain the richest deposits in the World, and are practically anyone's for
the asking. Mentioned that 7 of the claims staked out for his syndicate last year - an area of
about 6,000 acres - are capable of turning out two million pounds sterling a year. Showed me
some very interesting photos of the district round about, and also a very interesting letter from
a man named Dyer, who was thrown into prison by the Reds at Orsk near Nikolaevsk, after
they had murdered the British manager and most of the Staff, and had wrecked the mines.
Dyer was saved eventually by Chinese, but all the prisoners with him were butchered. Mr.
Purington maintains that such a thing could have been prevented by sending a British warship
up there, as Orsk is well within range of naval guns. He also maintains that British troops
should be sent to Okhotsk to guard the claims, 500, or so, he says, being quite sufficient.
Tells me that mining engineers foresaw the present state of affairs as far back as 1917, and,
in order to prevent it, requested both the British and U.S. Governments to send a force of
50,000 which, so he holds, would have been sufficient force at that time to stop the spread of
Bolshevism. The British were, of course, too occupied at the time on the Western Front, but
the U.S., so Purington maintains, could have sent the required force. Instead, they waited until 1918, and only sent 4,000 then, and they were not given a free hand, but were kept hanging about in towns doing nothing. Holmes mentioned a case in which a party of his men were surprised and attacked, and almost completely wiped out, but in order not to hurt the feelings of the Labour Party at home [?], no retaliation was allowed.

Mr. Purington says there is coal in North Sakhalin almost as good as Cardiff coal, and close by is coal of an inferior quality which, if mixed with the former, makes excellent bunker-coal. In South Sakhalin there is only inferior coal, and it is for that reason that the Japanese want to gain possession of the whole Country.

[From Hakodate Kennedy travelled north by train to Sapporo.]

**Wednesday 4th August 1920**

Arrived Sapporo in pouring rain. In afternoon went round to call on Dr. John Batchelor (Archdeacon), the greatest living authority on the Ainu. Dr. Batchelor is a fine-looking old man with a long flowing, white beard, and has been in Japan about 45 years working among the Ainu. Says there were 30,000 or 40,000 when he first came, but they are now reduced to only about 16,000, and of these, less than half are pure Ainu, owing to inter-marriage and the custom of adopting Japanese children. Mentioned a case which occurred recently, when three Ainu women came into Sapporo and bought two Japanese children each at 5 yen per head! Thinks the race will have ceased to exist within 50 years from now. Their main weakness is "sake", and if they once open a cask, they can't stop drinking till they have emptied it. Their own native drink is made of millet and is only very slightly intoxicating; but owing to the Government Monopoly in wines and spirits, they are no longer allowed to make it, nor, for the same reason, are they allowed to grow their own tobacco.

Dislike, and are disliked by, the Japanese, and Dr. Batchelor meets with much opposition from the authorities on this account, though only from the lower officials, and they not openly. Dr. Batchelor professes to have the power of healing by the laying on of hands, and many wonderful cures are credited to him.

Says that even the civilised Ainu frequently feel "the call of the wild", and such as are living in towns or cities have to go off for at least a week or 10 days per year to seek solitude in the mountains and commune with the gods of nature. During those 10 days or so they practically revert to their old barbaric state, and will spend the time fishing and hunting, running rolling on the ground and shouting.

Ainu women have huge moustaches tattooed on the upper lips when they marry. (Cf. the old Japanese custom of blackening the teeth). I had heard of this before, but only saw an example of it for the first time today, Dr. Batchelor's housemaid being an Ainu disfigured in this way.

Says the Ainus on the whole are very lacking in common sense, and mentioned a case in which he sent an Ainu to see if there were any letters for him waiting at a certain village some distance off. The Ainu came back next day with the news that there were several letters for him there. When Dr. Batchelor asked him why he hadn't brought them with him, he replied
that he (Dr. B) had told him to go and see if there were any letters for him, but had said
nothing about bringing them back! In another case he told his servant to post some letters, so
she went round to the front door and put them in his letterbox!

Thursday 5th August 1920

Went back with Dr. Batchelor to his house, and he tried laying his hand on my leg to see if he
could do it any good. It gave me sensations similar to those of an electric current passing
through my leg, but showed no improvement. However, as the paralysis is due to a wound, he
told me from the first that he was not very hopeful.

Dr. Batchelor has given me a letter of introduction to an Ainu priest who lives at Piratori,
asking him to show me round those parts. The letter, which Dr. Batchelor got me to read, is
signed "Nishpa" the Ainu word for "Chieftain". He tells me this is the name by which he is
always known among the Ainu.

Saturday 7th August 1920

[Kennedy left Sapporo by train for Sarufuto and from there by horse-drawn cart for Piratori,
travelling with Kimura, the headman of Piratori village, whom he had met on the train.]

Left Sapporo by the 9.12 a.m. train. Since leaving Sapporo, the scenery had been quite unlike
any I had seen in Japan before - in fact it very much resembled what one sees in pictures of
North West Canada, with here and there a settler's cottage, these cottages also being unlike
the usual Japanese "paper" house, all being built of wooden planks or even logs, and having
windows instead of "shoji"[paper sliding doors]. The "keiben" [light railway] to Sarufuto is a
very primitive affair, and, so I am told, has only been open to passenger traffic about 5 years.
Very jolty. Follows the coast line most of the way, the land side for the first hour or hour and a
half being a dead-level monotonous plain of high grass as far as the eye can reach. The rest
of the way is made through virgin forest-land and dense jungle. Most of the traffic appears to
be the transportation of lumber and charcoal, several trains loaded with enormous tree trunks
and charcoal passing us on the way. Another striking feature is that nearly everyone, even
women, are mounted on horses - generally two per horse.

Fetched up at Piratori about 7 p.m. and put up for the night at the local inn - the Osaka-ya.

Passed a number of settlers on the way, most of whom look a very fine type. Rice seems to
be the chief form of cultivation, though Mr. Kimura told me that it was only started about 5
years ago, the land up to then from the time it had been opened up 13 years ago, having
been "hatake" [cultivated field not growing rice]. According to him, rice is 4 times as profitable.
Much of the cultivated land is, however, wasted, as the settlers have never troubled to
remove the tree stumps since clearing the forest land, so that huge tree stumps are to be
seen dotted about among the rice.

Piratori stands in a lonely dell, surrounded at a distance by well-wooded hills, and is the
largest of nine villages near by, of which Mr. Kimura is the headman. All these villages were,
until recently, Ainu, but are now rapidly becoming Japonicised, and it is only a question of
time before the Ainu become extinct. The number of deaths per year greatly exceed the
number of births; the Japanese are doing their best to stamp out their language and to
Japonicise them by intermarriage; many so-called Ainus are really Japanese who have been adopted by Ainu women who have no children of their own; they are rapidly drinking themselves to death; owing to Japanese restrictions on fishing and the taking of game, they have had to change their diet; diseases of all kinds, especially consumption and ophthalmia, are rife. As an example of this latter, Mr. Kimura tells me that, out of 18 youths who presented themselves this year for military service, only 2 were able to be passed fit. They are said to be fine riders, but owing to low standard of education, are sent to infantry units. They also make good rifle shots as a result of shooting with the bow and arrow from their youngest days. Mr. Kimura tells me they still use the poisoned arrow for bear-hunting, which is chiefly carried out in the hills round about.

There are a number of Ainu huts in this village - dirty-looking places made of straw. The men have long black hair and are well bearded, while their women folk have their faces disfigured with tattooing on their upper lips. Rather darker than the Japanese, and have dark shaggy eyebrows and eyelids, though their eyes are lighter.

Went round to see Mr. Mukai, the Ainu "bokushi" [clergyman] to whom Dr. Batchelor had given me a letter of introduction, but found he was away. Met his wife, an intelligent, good-looking girl, who, being a Christian of the younger generation, is not disfigured with tattooing. She took me round to see Miss Bryant, the Church Missionary Society missionary lady up here. It must be a terribly lonely life for her, as there are no other foreigners living within 100 miles or more of her, and only very primitive communications in between. She is a tall, white-haired, woman of 65, and has spent most of her life working amongst the Ainu. Seemed very pleased to see me, and told me I was the first white man, except for Dr. Batchelor, who had been up there for 2 years. Dr. Batchelor she says, comes over 2 or 3 times a year, and in pre-War days, 2 or 3 foreigners would come per year; but since the War they have been very scarce, and she tells me I am the first person she has seen who has been to the War!

It seemed very funny to meet a white woman up in these parts, and, moreover, to find her sitting in a room furnished in foreign style, she herself being dressed very correctly in black clothes, and looking as calm and serene as though she were in her drawing room in London. It was almost difficult to imagine oneself miles away from anywhere, and that one had just to open the door to find oneself in an Ainu village of squalid straw huts - for Miss Bryant lives in the Ainu part of the village.

**Sunday 8th August 1920**

It's funny that even up here everyone seems very anti-American. The "soncho" [village headman] let out his views on the subject on the way up from Sarufuto, and Asai [proprietor of inn] brought up the subject this morning. Mukai has just been in to see me, and he also got started on the subject. Tells me it will be impossible to set off up-country till the rains stop, as rivers have to be crossed in four places, and, there being no bridges, they are now impassable owing to the heavy rain. Says it is about 24 ri [60 miles] to Kanayama through forest and jungle all the way. He can guide me as far as Usappu, and will arrange for guides and horses from there onwards, but warns me that the latter part will be very difficult, as two
densely wooded mountain ranges have to be crossed, and he says that at this time of year the "abu" [horse-flies] and mosquitoes are very bad.

[Kennedy planned to walk across-country to Kanayama, which had a railway station.]

Tells me there are about 2,000 Ainu left in the 8 villages of Saru-gun, including about 300 in Piratori.

**Wednesday 11th August 1920**

Woke up to find that the rain had at last cleared off, and everything seemed to point to a fine day, so decided to set off on the long-delayed trip up country to Kanayama - river permitting.

Set off about 10.30 a.m. with Mukai and an Ainu woman "nimpu" [porter] to carry my suitcase. As the case contains shoes, books etc., it is the deuce of a weight, and personally I should not care to carry it more than the length of a station platform myself, but the lady slung it over her shoulders with two ropes, carrying it like a knapsack, and seemed quite hurt when I suggested getting a man to carry it instead of her. Crossed the river by the wire-rope ferry near the village. Owing to the state of the river from the heavy rain, the ferry had not been working for 2 or 3 days, but the river though still very high and rapid, had fallen about 4 feet during the night, so the ferry was working again. I could not, however, help wondering what would happen if the wire snapped owing to the force of the current! I should not care to be in the boat if such a thing happened, as the boat would be smashed to bits in no time, and it would be impossible to swim in such a current.

Reached Nioi about 2 p.m. and ordered chow at the Etchuya, a small, and not over-clean inn, owned by a Japanese and his wife. While the food was being prepared, walked up to Porosaru, an Ainu village or "kotan", as it is called, about half a mile away on the top of rising ground. All the villages round these parts are really Ainu villages, but all those we had seen so far had been more or less Japonicised and contained a number of Japanese houses as well; but Porosaru is a true Ainu village of 40 or 50 houses made of reeds, each house having its own "kura" [storehouse] close by, these "kura" also being built of reeds. Inside are kept the family "treasures" etc., the actual "kura" being raised on four poles 3 or 4 feet from the ground, as a safeguard against rats etc.

About 5 p.m. passed through the Ainu "kotan" of Nioi, and had a look inside one or two of the houses whose owners were friends of Mukai. All very dirty and filled with smoke, as the fire for cooking is in a hole in the floor in the middle of the hut, there being no arrangement made for getting rid of the smoke. No wonder that ophthalmia and diseases of all kinds are so prevalent. On the whole am rather disappointed with the scenery, as I had imagined the path led through dense forest all the way. Instead, there is a rough but widish road with cultivated ground on both sides most of the way, the forest on either side being cleared back, on an average, 100 yards or so from the road.

Mukai tells me that, nominally, the Ainu have the same rights as Japanese, but the Japanese look down on them as barbarians and do nothing to help them. I had gathered as much from conversations with various Japanese on the subject.

**Thursday 12th August 1920**
Set off 8.20 a.m. saying goodbye to Mukai who had to return to Piratori. As no other coolies were to be had, the same Ainu girl offered to carry my kit as far as Osatsunai about a ri up the main river. Came to another wire-rope ferry after walking about a mile, and crossed over in it. Arrived at Osatsunai, another pure Ainu village of reed huts, about 9.30 a.m. and headed for the "shitei" [appointed inn] at the far end of the village to hire a horse and another "nimpu" [porter] in place of the Ainu girl. Found, however, that a "nimpu" was unnecessary, as I was provided with a pack-pony on which both I and my baggage was put. The baggage was roped on to the pony's near side while a large wooden log was roped onto the off side so as to balance it, and I was made to sit on top! Thinking the weight would be too much for the wretched wee pony, I tried to get two ponies, one for my baggage and one for myself; but they would not hear of such a thing and insisted that the pony was quite strong enough. As they wanted the pony back that night the Ainu girl said she would come with me in order to bring it back. Ainus have certainly plenty of "go" in them! This girl had already carried my heavy suitcase on her back for 3 or 4 miles, yet she then did the 15 miles from Osatsunai to Iwachishi in 3 hours and after a rest of an hour or so, set of back on the pony for another 15 miles!

About mid-day reached Ikeuri, passing through the Ainu villages of Okotnai and Sorokessu on the way. The road part of the way runs through dense forest on high ground above the river. Huge great oaks and trees of all kinds with dense undergrowth. A bit dangerous in parts owing to landslides caused by the rain. Much of the cultivate area consists of "soba" [buckwheat]. Horse-flies and stinging insects of all kinds very bad. Amused by the way the Ainu girl always addresses me as "Sensei" ["teacher" - term of respect]!

Ikeuri is the last Ainu village on the way to Kanayama, I am told, so we are now out of the Ainu Country. At Niseu, a village or rather, hamlet - 1 miles or so before reaching Iwachishi, the river has to be crossed again. As the ferry was too small to take a horse, I tried crossing 100 yards or so further up stream where I was told there was a ford. The current was too rapid and the water too discoloured from the rains to see the bottom, so I got the pony to wade slowly across. It may be a ford in ordinary weather, but before I knew what was happening, I found a swirling mass of muddy water up to my pony's breast, and next moment he stumbled into a hole, the water coming over the saddle and soaking both me and my baggage. By good luck rather than good management I managed to hang on and to keep the pony on his feet or we should all have been swirled down by the current. The Ainu girl who saw the whole thing from the bank, if one might judge from her expression, got as bad a shock as either I or the pony did!

Arrived Iwachishi about 1.30 p.m. and put up at the "ekitei" [post house]. Had intended just to lunch and change ponies there, and then go on to Usappu for the night, but found that (1) owing to the road having been damaged, as well as two bridges, by the rain, it was impassable for horses and that, (2) even if I walked I could not get there before 9 p.m. and (3), as it was only a mountain road and there would be bears about, it would not be safe.
Paid off the Ainu girl, who set off on the pony about 3 p.m. and must have had a very unpleasant return journey, as heavy rain set in a few minutes later.

Friday 13th August 1920

Set off about 7 a.m. having hired two ponies, one for myself and the other for my baggage and the guide who sat perched up on top of it as I had to do yesterday. About 9 a.m. came to a point where the track was blocked by a huge tree fallen across it, so had to dismount and hack a way through the thick undergrowth with axes, which we had luckily brought with us.

A mile or so further on, came to a river with the bridge broken down, so once more had to set to work to hack a path through the jungle to a point 20 or 30 yards upstream, where the banks were not so steep and where we were able to ford our ponies across. In places the track had all but been washed away by the rain, and owing to the precipitousness of the track in parts, and the thick mud into which we sank from time to time, it was dangerous to remain mounted and the only thing to do was to dismount and leave the ponies to themselves, as the narrowness, steepness, and slipperiness of the track made it too dangerous to think of even leading them.

Heavy rain, which had been threatening all morning, set in about 10 a.m. to add to the general cheerfulness; and having been told that the woods were infested by bears and that rain generally set them on the prowl, I began to wonder if there were not perhaps something in the belief that the 13th of the month falling on a Friday was unlucky, as today happens to be Friday the 13th! Horse-flies also caused us and our ponies a lot of trouble.

Occasionally came to clearings in the forest with half a dozen or so settlers' houses, most of the inhabitants being too hard at work even to do more than glance up at us as we passed, though one or two to whom we spoke seemed very surprised to hear that I had come up here merely for pleasure, and said they had never seen a white man up there before.

Very surprised at the number of settlers up here who come from Osaka and the south of Japan, as it a journey of nearly a week, and the climate is so very different. Most of them say they came up here with the idea of making money, but have been disappointed in that respect, and their main object now seems to be to make enough to get back to their own provinces. They all complain of the long, cold winters, and tell me they need snow shoes and sledges from November to March, during the whole of which period the country here is snow-bound.

Some of the settlers' houses look like hayricks from a distance, as they are made entirely of straw. Most of them look very dirty inside.

The country all round is certainly very fine with its magnificent wooded hills and overhanging precipices, and wee mountain streams everywhere; but it must be a terribly lonely life so completely shut off from the outside world as they are.

Their main dread, however, seems to be of mountain fires, and even in the thick forest miles away from anywhere, one comes across the notice "Yama kaji chui" [attention, danger of mountain fires] nailed onto trees.
Fetched up at Usappu about noon and had "chow" at the "ekitei"[post house]. Paid off the Iwachishi guide and hired another to take me on to Shimukappu. As ponies were unobtainable had to pad it on foot, the guide carrying the suitcase while I carried the rest of the gear. Set off about 1.15 p.m. and shortly after got into thick jungle and forest again, seeing no signs of habitation till we had crossed the Pass and climbed down the other side some distance, when about 3.30 we came to a clearing in the forest with 2 or 3 settlers' houses.

Fetched up at the village of Nojo about 6 p.m. and an hour later reached Shimukappu, where we put up for the night at the "ekitei". Shimukappu is ringed in on all sides by densely wooded hills. Very glad to arrive, as was feeling just about all in, having done 6 ri [1 ri = about 4 km] on horseback and 6 ri on foot since the morning. Rather pleased though with the effort - 30 miles in one day, including the crossing of two mountain ranges of about 4,000 feet each, not to mention having to make our own road in parts. Shows the old leg is coming on.

Owing to the number of bears about, it is unsafe to travel by night, and I must say that, even though I went by day, I was very glad to have someone with me, as, owing to the thick jungle, a bear could come up to within a yard or two of you before being seen; and there is something uncanny in the stillness of these huge mountain forests with never a sign of life other than very fine butterflies and an occasional snake, and of course the ubiquitous horse-fly.

Saturday 14th August 1920

Found that a cart was going in to Kanayama, so got it to take my baggage, which left about 5 a.m. Set off walking 6 a.m. A so-called cart-road goes the whole way to Kanayama, but it is simply a sea of mud most of the way, and in two places bridges have been broken down by the rains. The second of these is a big one and quite impassable, though there is a ford close by. The road crosses a mountain pass about 3,000 feet in height some 2 ri before reaching Kanayama, and most of the way is through thick forest and jungle, though said to be free of bears. Much of this jungle here, as also in other parts, consists of plants like giant rhubarbs - often 7 or 8 feet in height with leaves 3 feet or more across.

Fetched up at Kanayama about 11.30 a.m. very footsore and quite glad to get back to a railway again, and to have finished my cross-country tramp of about 76 miles.

[From Kanayama Kennedy continued his tour of Hokkaido by travelling by train north to Asahigawa.]

Sunday 15th August 1920

[In Asahigawa]

After lunch, went to a wee shoemaker's shop owned by an old fellow named Mori, whom I found to be a great friend of Captain Yonezawa and his late wife's family. It seems curious the way "classes" seem so intermingled in Japan. Here was a little shoemaker with the Chief of Police (Yonezawa's father-in-law) and an infantry captain [Yonezawa] as intimate friends; and one comes across similar cases time after time. Japanese officers have told me that this
intermingling of the classes is one of the safeguards against Bolshevism, and there may possibly be some truth in it. The old shoemaker claimed to be of "samurai" birth, and certainly was a very refined old man for a shoemaker. Tells me Yonezawa's wife took her own life in the old "samurai" way by committing "hara-kiri", in order to avoid returning to her parents-in-law, who apparently gave her a pretty poor time, though she was very fond of her husband, Yonezawa, himself. The Japanese marriage system is certainly pretty rotten in that way, the wife becoming the absolute slave of her husband's parents when, as is usually the case, the young married couple live in the house of the husband's parents.

[From Hokkaido Kennedy travelled back to Tokyo and then on to Hakone for a few days rest.]

Sunday 22nd August 1920

[In Hakone]

France tells me the Japanese Government have offered to subsidise the [British] Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in order to keep them out here rather than have the mission handed over to the Americans. Also tells me of a new religion or creed known as "Motokyo", which the Government are doing their best to suppress, as one of its main tenets is that Japan and America will shortly go to war. It is founded on a prophesy by an old woman who foretold the wars with China and Russia and also the late World War. A Mr. Asano of Kyoto and his brother, Vice-Admiral Asano, are said to be the prime movers at the present time. According to Alms, who has managed to obtain some books on this creed, the coming war is to be Japan against the World, and not merely against America. In any case, Japan is to be badly defeated at first and the Emperor and Government is to be removed to Ayabe where it is said they will be quite safe from aircraft owing to the air-pockets in those parts. But after a time, there is to be a huge tidal wave, which will sweep over a large part of America, and Japan will come into her own again and will hold the World in her power!

Monday 30th August 1920

[In Tokyo]

Very hot and sticky all day. Spent the morning in the Military Attaché's Office working at reports. Read some very interesting ones about Korea by Bennett. Bennett states that the tactics adopted by the disaffected Koreans are similar to those employed by the Sinn Feiners in Ireland, namely, intimidation and murder of loyal subjects. According to him it is the Koreans in Japanese pay who suffer more than the Japanese themselves. Says the Northern frontier of Korea is very unsettled, and it is unsafe for anyone to travel there unless accompanied by an armed guard. Even in Gensan and suchlike places, sentries are always armed with ball ammunition, as also are all troops when they go route-marching. Officers all carry their war swords with leather scabbard, in place of the ordinary "tailor's" sword as worn in this Country. Roads and communications in Korea are very bad. Says that the Japanese out there are very anti-U.S. One of the most anti-U.S. officers is one of the Brigade Commanders who, when he was a boy, had his face likened to that of an
American-Indian by an American teacher, and has never forgiven him for the remark, even to the present day.

Says that Colonel Burnett [American Military Attaché] was over in Korea a short time ago, and tried to get him [Bennett] to take him round. Colonel Burnett seems very worried about the General’s [British Military Attaché] attitude towards him, and wanted to know whether he was out here as a soldier or as a diplomat! The General, of course, goes on the principle that, as we are Japan’s Ally, we get certain privileges and are given information which is withheld from the Military Attachés of other countries; but if he, or any of us, pass on that information to U.S. or any other officers, the Japanese will at once stop giving us special information. Colonel Burnett and other foreign attachés do not realise this, and are therefore rather hurt and mystified by the General’s attitude towards them.

Went to Yokohama after lunch in order to fix up about cash for [trip to] Siberia etc. Much to my surprise, met Marsden, who tells me he has just got back from Vladivostok on 3 weeks’ leave. Tells me that recently, while out motoring, he was held up by a gang of 6 armed robbers who relieved him of such valuables as he had, and then let him go. A similar case had also taken place a few weeks previously to the American Consul. As a result, patrols of militia were sent out to guard the roads, but Marsden says they are no good, as they are all hand-in-glove with each other.

Thinks the Japanese will hold onto the railway territory up to Harbin, and that the people will be only too glad to have them do so, if only they can get back to peace and settle down to business once more.

The 5th Division is being rapidly evacuated from Chita [Siberia] and is to return to Japan without being relieved by a fresh division. On this account, Semenov is very fed up, and threatened to hinder the evacuation, but decided that "discretion was the better part of valour" when the Japanese told him they would wipe him out of existence if he tried anything of the sort!

The 13th Division is now in and around Vladivostok, while the 14th Division is on the Khabarovsk area. There is also a Japanese Military Mission with representatives at Harbin and elsewhere. Nominally they are under General Oi, the Commander- in-Chief, but in reality they are pretty well independent. The troops up in Nikolaevsk area are a separate force entirely, and have no connection with Oi and his lot.

Wednesday 1st September 1920

Had rather an amusing letter from Major Kaneko a few days ago. It read:

"Dear Captain,

I am very glad to see your letter, and to know you are keeping safely your tripe in Hokkaido. I could keep unreserved relation with you from the first moment I met you, because I understand quiet well that Scotish character among many Europians is very resemble to the Japanese Bushido. Whenever I hear our officer are applausing your candid, nice and gentle characters, I used to detaild about Scotish Special Character.

I am playing God you will be healthy and happy until you will arrive at your native country."

Yours very sincerely,

F. Kaneko.

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In September 1920 Kennedy made a tour of (Japanese-occupied) Vladivostok, Manchuria and Korea. His primary aim was to visit the battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War which he had studied at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst in 1912-13, but his visit also provided material for an intelligence report on the Japanese Army in Vladivostok and Manchuria and on the tense state of American-Japanese relations.

The British Military Mission to Siberia had left in May 1920, but, for intelligence purposes, two British officers had been left attached to Japanese army headquarters in Vladivostok.

At the time of Kennedy's visit, Major Marsden, assistant Military Attaché in Japan and the British military representative at the Japanese army headquarters, was in Japan. Kennedy was met on his arrival in Vladivostok by Sergeant Goldney, Marsden's confidential clerk.

Wednesday 8th September 1920

Left in evening by the 8.20 p.m. train from Tokyo Station, Lyes turning up with a "confidential bag" from the Embassy for me to hand over to the Consul at Vladivostok, a cursed nuisance, as it means I shall have to hang onto it like a leach the whole way.

Monday 13th September 1920

[Arrived in Vladivostok] About 9 a.m. Major Dunlop came along in the car to meet me, and took me off to the house - a large barrack-like building from the outside, but comfortably furnished inside. Tells me it was given to the British Military Mission by the Russian Government, and that, though the Mission has now left and the Government (Kolchak at that time) has now changed, the Vladivostok Provisional Government are letting our military representatives keep it in order to prevent the Japanese taking it over!

Find Dunlop was in the 12th Scottish Rifles, but has been out here on Intelligence work for the last 4 years, as he has lived in Russia most of his life, and talks the language as though it were his own. Both his mother and his wife are Russians.

Having deposited my gear at the house, went off to the Consulate in order to hand over the confidential bag to Preston, the Consul. His wife also is Russian.

Seems very funny after 3 years in Japan to come out here and see so many white people about! They are a pretty cosmopolitan-looking crowd though and are clad in a wonderful assortment of clothes - uniform and otherwise. Quite a number of the Russians are wearing British uniforms. Difficult to tell in many cases which are soldiers and which are civilians. Those in uniform are a terrible-looking rabble, and there are some awful-looking toughs amongst the dhrosky drivers etc. husky looking beggars with shaggy unkempt hair and beards. The soldierly bearing of the Japanese troops, and their businesslike appearance, is in marked contrast to the unkempt rabble employed by the Russian Government under the title of "militia". Surprised at the number of Chinese and Koreans one sees about, many of the former still having pigtails. Most of the foreigners here seem to employ Chinese servants.
Most of the main buildings here seem to be occupied by the Japanese - in fact one might imagine Vladivostok had been seized by the Japanese for good and all! I wonder?!

[Spence] tells me one should never walk out in the streets after dark, as you are liable to be stuck in the back, and that even if you go out in a car it is necessary to go armed. Also insists on me sleeping with a loaded revolver under my pillow. Sounds cheerful! Says the Militia are supposed to act as police, but that they are as bad as anyone for robbery and murder. The Japanese send out military patrols each night, but not up this direction. Says one frequently hears revolver shots at night. As a result of the Consular Body appealing recently to the Japanese for the protection of their nationals, owing to the frequent cases of "hold-ups" in broad daylight outside the town, the Japanese have arranged for a military escort for foreigners who wish to go out into the country on Sundays motoring. At 10 a.m. an armoured car sets off, and all who wish its protection fall in in rear while a second armoured car falls in in rear of them. At 4 p.m. the convoy has to return! Sounds rather like a Gilbert & Sullivan comic opera!

Dunlop tells me a large number of the American troops married while out here, but left their wives behind under false pretences. Many of the Czechs also married Russians, but took them with them when they left; but they also took a lot of loot with them, and did other rather shady bits of work, including the selling of arms and ammunition to discontented Koreans and others for use against the Japanese.

Wednesday 15th September 1920

After lunch, set off with Major Dunlop to see his house at Okianskaya about 13 miles away by the 3 p.m. train. At the station, saw the place where a batch of 70 of Gajda's men were massacred last December. Sgt. Goldney told me about it yesterday, he having been in the British Military Mission Headquarters [opposite the station] when the fighting started. It seems that 70 of those taken prisoner, were forced to march up the steps from the platform to the station exit, and a machine gun was place so as to cover the head of the steps, not more than 15 or 20 yards away. As soon as the prisoners reached the top step, this machine gun was turned onto them, the whole lot being murdered in cold blood. Sgt. Goldney says he went to see the place about an hour later, and found it an absolute shambles.

Got to Okianskaya - or rather, 19th Verst Platform [i.e. distance from Vladivostok] about 4.30 p.m. The Dunlop's have a very prettily situated wee house in the woods. Mrs. Dunlop's mother and father live with them, and are a very nice set, though the two latter speak no English, which was rather trying.

General Moisseyeff, her father, I find is not an Army man, but is what is known in Russia as a "Civil General", that is, a high official ranking as a general. He was head of the Russian railways at the time War broke out, and was attached to the Czar's Headquarters near Minsk during the War. After the murder of the Czar he joined Kolchak and was in charge of the Siberian Railways, and later on was appointed Minister of Ways and Communications, but the day before he was to take up this post, the Kolchak Government collapsed, amongst the murdered being the minister from whom he was to have taken over. He himself narrowly
escaped with his life through the help of Hodgeson, who was then acting British High
Commissioner in Siberia. Hodgeson left by the last train with the remaining British residents,
and got General Moisseyef's private railway coach hitched on to the train.

[Mrs. Duncan], like most others out here, seems quite confident that Bolshevism will be
stamped out in time, as the peasants are tired to death with their tyranny, and long to settle
down to a quiet existence again.

Returned to Vladivostok by the 8.40 p.m. train, getting back about 10 p.m. This train consisted
of 4th Class cars only, and was even more barn-like than the one I came by. I don't wonder
that people are a bit chary about travelling after dark in these days. There was only one other
passenger in the car with me, a great barn-like affair with 10 rows or seats with a semi-
partition between every other one, and a passage running down one side of the car. Each
seat could hold 6 people comfortably, as it is a 5 ft. gauge [Russian standard] with very broad
cars; yet the sole means of lighting was by 3 guttering candles on a ledge above the corridor,
so the car was all but in darkness. I don't wonder that so many murders take place in these
trains at night time, and I felt thankful I had brought my automatic with me.

[On 16 September Kennedy left Vladivostok by train for Harbin in Manchuria.]

Friday 17th September 1920
[Travelling through Manchuria]

Like yesterday, the train took things easily and did not hurry itself, but stopped at every little
station on the way. Country very sparsely inhabited. Every station through which we passed
appeared to be guarded by Chinese troops, a dozen or so with fixed bayonets lining up to
attention in extended order so long as the train was in the station. At the larger stations there
were also Japanese troops of the 16th Division with R.T.O.'s [Railway Telegraph Operators],
mostly subalterns, there as well.

About 4.20 p.m. we got to Imienpo, where we stopped about 45 minutes. Had a long talk with
the R.T.O. Lt. Kawano, and the subaltern in charge of the detachment on guard there 2nd Lt.
Hiragawa, both very nice fellows and very friendly. The former had been in the Toyohashi
Cavalry Regiment, so we found several mutual acquaintances.

In talking about the Chinese troops on guard, who appeared specially numerous at this point,
they told me they are very untrustworthy, as most of them are mountain bandits, and you
never know which side they will take in the event of a raid on a train by Hunghutses [Red
Beards -Bandits], which takes place from time to time, the last big one in those parts having
been in April. The last commander of these troops, so Kawano tells me, is now leader of a
band of Hunghutses! Some of them certainly had pretty cut-throat-like appearances, as did
also many of the men loafing about in the station.

As the line frequently gets attacked in the Imienpo sector, an armed guard of a dozen or so of
these gentry were put on the train before she left.

About 10.30 p.m. train fetched up at Harbin, and I found Captain Takahashi, with whom I had
crossed from Japan last week, there to meet me, together with a couple of N.C.O.'s for which
I was heartily thankful, as I speak no Chinese or Russian, and would have been quite up the pole otherwise.

Saturday 18th September 1920

[In Harbin]

First went to the Headquarters of the Military Mission and Military Communications, and was somewhat surprised by the way I was received, General Ishikawa, Colonel Shioden, Lt. Colonel Honda, and Captain Yamamoto, all coming down together to the Reception Room where I had been left to wait, and having a long talk with me. Can't help thinking from some of their remarks that they imagined I had been sent up here on some special mission, as it seems funny for a mere captain with no such mission to be received as I was! Tomizawa told me afterwards that a wire had been received from the Military Police at Pogranichnaya of all places, saying that I had passed through there, but I was described as a sapper major! The wire from the General Headquarters apparently told them to look after and assist me in every way, so I suppose the two combined are responsible for giving the people the wrong impression! However, it is very useful for me, as I am being treated like a prince, and, so I find, am having all my hotel bills etc. paid for me! Harbin is an interesting sort of place, divided, as it is, into 3 parts - one Russian, one Japanese, and one Chinese, each part truly characteristic of its own country - but the roads are terrible - all cobbles of the worst description.

[Later on visits Porter, the British Consul].

Find he was the man who first brought Semenov to the front, and as far back as 1917 got the British Government to give him [Semenov] thirty thousand pounds for ammunition, equipment etc.

[Porter] tells me he has been busy all day with a party of Georgian delegates, who have been sent to him by their Government to get the British to supply them with food in exchange for tobacco etc., and they confirm the statement made by Captain Stilling [N.A. Stilling] that General Kuropatkin of Russo-Japanese War fame is now down at Tashkent organising a Bolshevik army for invading India.

Porter also told me of a very interesting trip he made through Korea in 1903, and the way they got into touch with Japanese spies, disguised as Koreans, making preparations for the war against Russia.

Sunday 19th September 1920

Having heard from Porter that a Captain Stilling had arrived from Irkutsk a day or two ago, I set off in search of the railway coach in which he was living. It's a curious sort of country in that way - Everyone who is on some special mission seems to have his own railway coach in which he lives. If he wants to go off somewhere up or down the line, he gets his coach hitched on to a train going to that place, and when he gets there he gets pushed off into a siding, where he remains till he wants to go somewhere else. In the case of Harbin, these sidings are the deuce of a size, and are packed with railway coaches belonging to missions of every kind
and description and about every nation under the sun, each coach having painted on it the national flag of the country to which it belongs.

After much searching, with the help of a subaltern from the R.T.O.’s office, I found Stilling’s coach, but found he had given orders to his Russian servant not to wake him till 2 p.m. so I said I would come round again.

Can't say I think much of the appearance of the Chinese soldiers here, dirty, sloppy-looking beggars with both arms and equipment in a filthy state. Like those I saw on the train journey from Vladivostok, their rifles are of every pattern under the sun, and an assortment of weapons which appear to have been made in the stone age. The Chinese police here, both military and civil, all carry rifles of sorts, and swarm everywhere.

As soon as I had had lunch, I set off to the sidings to see Stilling, whom I found just getting up. He is a wonderful sort of fellow, who apparently is never satisfied unless he is looking for trouble. He is an Australian of Scottish descent, the son of a naval officer. The following are a few of the items of his career:

Joined the Merchant Service, and was at Port Arthur in 1904 when the war broke out between Russia and Japan. Seeing the chance of a little fun, he joined the Russians and helped in the defence till he was badly wounded and sent off by hospital train to Vladivostok, where he found his old ship had managed to escape from Port Arthur. He then agreed with the captain to engage in gun-running for the Russians, and on 3 occasions the ship was chased by Japanese gunboats. On the third occasion a shell struck them amidships and only a timely mist saved them from capture. Having got back to Vladivostok they decided to patch up the ship, give up gun-running and push off to Japan, where they were received at Yokohama without a shadow of suspicion!

During the course of the next few years he fought in two wars in South America and then floated off to India, where he enlisted in the Gordons in hope of getting off on the Zakka Khel Expedition, but much to his disgust they stayed on in Calcutta, so he bought himself out. After numerous vicissitudes he found himself in India once more, this time with the Seaforth's, and somehow or other managed to get sent off on the Abor Expedition with the 8th Gurkhas of all regiments, so I found he knew Angus [Kennedy's brother] well. When the War broke out he was working as a sergeant on the Intelligence Staff at Simla, and later on was given a commission in the West Ridings and went out to Mesopotamia as a signallling officer. About 2 years ago he came out here with the British Mission and, when they left, he stayed on in order to get accurate information about British prisoners in Bolshevik hands. He is now pretty well on his own and has just come down from Irkutsk and is thinking of pushing through to Peking with certain information he managed to pick up from a Bolshevik Staff officer, who had been sent off from Moscow more or less in disgrace, and is therefore somewhat fed up with the Reds and was ready to give various bits of information to Stilling. Amongst other things he told him was that Kuropatkin is now organising an army of picked officers and men down Tashkent way, and making plans for an attack on India in conjunction with the Afghans, and hopes for help from the Punjab. The attack will probably start about November. Only the best
troops are to be used in this attack, chiefly those who have fought in the Caucasus, both officers and men being obtained by the usual Bolshevik methods of intimidation. On the strength of it, Stilling is going to try to get leave from Peking to push off in disguise up to Tashkent in order to find out further details.

Amongst other exploits of his, Stilling took part in a plot to save Kolchak after he had been handed over to the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks found out and Stilling had to make himself scarce, or he would probably have suffered the same fate as Kolchak. It was Stilling who sent off the first information of Kolchak's death. Tells me the British were quite blameless and did all they could to save him. It seems that Kolchak had been advised to flee sometime before, but refused to leave his men. When at last he put himself under Czech protection, the Czechs wired to Janin to ask what to do with him. Janin thinking that, if the Czechs took him with them, the Bolsheviks would retaliate by further hindering the evacuation and thereby causing more bloodshed, ordered the Czechs to hand him over to the Bolsheviks. Janin may have been right, but it sounds a pretty dirty trick.

Went along about 4.30 p.m. with Stilling to the Cafe Ural, a restaurant run by wives of late Russian officers. Rather an interesting sort of spot with an excellent orchestra. Being waited on by white women, the first for over 3 years, and having a good orchestra, made it feel quite like being at the Piccadilly Grill or some such place. Most of the men there were officers of Kappel's Army, all in proper uniforms - not just the half and half sort of thing which one sees so much of out here. Stilling knew several of the people there, and introduced me to some of them; but as I don't speak Russian and my French is putrid, our conversation was somewhat limited!

Monday 20th September 1920
[Travelling from Harbin to Mukden.]
Left by the 1 p.m. train. Got to Changchun about 10 p.m. Met at the station by the R.T.O. Captain Suzuki (11th Cavalry Regt.), who made me comfortable in his office while waiting for the train to Mukden. While waiting a rather dirty-looking Chinaman, (as I thought), walked in and said something to Suzuki which I did not catch, and then sat down on a chair. Was somewhat surprised when he started to talk to me in Japanese, and Suzuki told me he was a Japanese "kempei" [military policeman] in disguise. Tells me he has been out here some years on the game, his chief job at present being to keep an eye on Bolshevik plots by mixing in crowds at the station and elsewhere and pretending to be a Chinaman.

Tuesday 21st September 1920
Arrived Mukden at 8.26 a.m.
The road from here to the station is a fine broad smooth-surfaced one, and this, the Japanese part of the town, is beautifully clean; but in the other direction, the way to the bank, the roads are appalling - not the rough cobble kind like those of Harbin, but soft muddy ones with open drains on either side. The Chinese part of the town can only be described as filthy, and must be a regular breeding ground for diseases of all kinds. It certainly is truly Chinese in appearance and very interesting in its way - the women with their ridiculous little feet, some
so small that they looked just like pigs' trotters; other women with their hair done in extraordinary ways; men with their pigtailed and many with close-fitting black skull caps. As a Vladivostok and Harbin, numbers of black pigs stroll about the roads or sprawl in the dirt, the ones specially and offensively dirty. Many of the huts - you can hardly call them houses - are simply made of mud.

Saw a few Koreans strolling about with their ridiculous looking pot-hats perched on the top of their heads. Though one sees many Koreans in Vladivostok and Harbin, I had never before seen any (except in pictures) wearing these hats.

Wednesday 22nd September 1920

Find that the manager of this hotel [Miyako], Mr. Tsuruoka Eitaro, was a captain in the Regulars at the time of the war with Russia, and at the battle of Mukden was sent of on a special mission. He would tell me no more than that at first, except that he was acting as Chief of Staff to a mixed body of troops out on one of the flanks; so making a shot in the dark and pretending to know more than I did, I asked him if the force consisted of Hunghutses [Chinese bandits]. Seemed rather surprised at my question, and admitted that it was so. Tried to find out further details, but he made some excuse and left me. All I could find out was that the force was about 5,000 strong and had some guns, but as the latter were of very old pattern, they could not be used.

Had another long talk with him in the evening. Seems a very nice fellow and very pro-British. Evidently pretty well off, as he tells me he spent 2 years in England (1911-1913) and 3 years in South Germany "for pleasure", and he built and runs this hotel himself, the cost of building and fitting it up being 460,000 yen. Took a year to build, and was only opened last year. Tells me he is Chief Inspector of Police in the Kanto [Kwantung], which seems a curious job to combine with that of hotel manager.

Called on Lt. Colonel Machino in afternoon. He is military adviser to [Chang Tso-lin], and looks a very capable sort of man and, I should say, very straight forward. Tells me he has been 18 years in China.

Also called on the British Consul. Found he was out, but he turned up to see me about 7 p.m. He is a fellow named Wilkinson, and is in the China Service, though the Consul at Dairen is in the Japanese Consular Service. Tells me the Japanese are universally hated by foreigners in these parts, though he himself gets on with them very well. Says that Japanese business concerns out here are in a very bad way. They generally start well, but as soon as they begin to do well, they start to gamble and break down.

Friday 24th September 1920

Much to my surprise, was rung up about 8.30 a.m. from the station by Stilling, who had just fetched up from Harbin, so I went off to see him and stayed on talking till 11 a.m. when he left for Peking. He's a cheery sort of soul, and quite one of the best. Tells me he had a fight with a German in the Cafe Ural [Harbin] the day I left because, when the orchestra struck up "God Save the King", he started singing some other song and jeering! Stilling thereupon got up and pushed his face in for him!
[From Mukden Kennedy visited battlefield sites. On 26 September he travelled to Liaoyang and from there visited more battlefield sites. On 29 September he travelled from Liaoyang to Dairen in the Kwantung Peninsula. On 1 October he left Dairen for Port Arthur, the site of a famous siege during the Russo-Japanese War.]

Friday 1st October 1920

[Arrived Port Arthur]

At the hotel, found an American fellow [Williams] there. Find he used to be U.S. Consul at Dairen, but chucked the Service a year or so ago, and has now come out here on business. Was rather annoyed at the way he tackled me on the subject of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and spoke glibly about "the coming war between America and Japan". He was seated at a different table at first, so had to more or less shout at me across the room, and seemed quite oblivious to the fact that the hotel boys all speak English, and no doubt took in everything he said. He was very much against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and tried to pump me as to whether it is to be renewed or not, and, if renewed, in what form it would be. Maintained that it would have been a good thing for the Allies if Japan had sided with Germany from the start, as America would certainly have come in at once. One remark of his - that he would not be at all surprised if all Americans in Japan were interned within the next year or so, and that, in spite of the money question, Japan might fight America - rather shows what is in the minds of many Americans at the present time. Says the Japanese could easily seize the Philippines and smash up the Panama Canal so as to make it impassable for 4 years, and that America would be unable to retaliate, but I doubt the latter point. The war, he says, is bound to come off sooner or later, and the sooner Japan does it, the more chance she has of success, as aircraft have not yet advanced to such a stage as to make an invasion of Japan by air a possibility, and until that is possible, America could never defeat Japan if she chose to seize the Philippines. These remarks of his are certainly interesting, especially as they are similar in many respects to those made to me by one of the hotel boys at Dairen a few days ago. Maintains that the Californian question is more than a mere political one, and that it has come to stay.

Tuesday 5th October 1920

[On his return journey to Japan Kennedy travelled through Korea. On 5 October he sailed from Port Arthur to Antung on the Manchurian side of the Manchurian/Korean border at the mouth of the Yalu River.]

Wednesday 6th October 1920

Set off about 7.30 a.m. by "kuruma"[motor-car] for Shin-gishu [Sinuiju (in Korea)], crossing the Yalu river by the railway bridge.

The Korean dress is a curious-looking gear, everyone, men and women, being clad in white. Outwardly the Koreans look clean on account of this, but according to Corporal Ito [Japanese military policeman accompanying Kennedy to Shin-gishu], they are somewhat of the nature of "whited sepulchres", as they seldom change their underclothes and seldom wash. The
Japanese, of course, are just the reverse. Though their outward appearance, amongst the lower classes, is often dirty, they all "tub" every day, so they are generally clean so far as their bodies are concerned.

[In Uiju] Taken round to see Mr. Io Tojiro, Governor of Heianhokudo, the north-west Province of Korea. Am told the frontier is very unsettled, and that police, both Japanese and Korean, are frequently shot at, and a fair amount of scrapping goes on at times. For this reason all the police and gendarmes, as well as the troops up there, always carry ball ammunition. A scrap took place up that way only a few days ago in which 40 outlaws - Koreans, Chinese and Russians - were killed, and it was found that the party had been led by Russian officers. Much trouble is also experienced with men trying to smuggle in opium. On the way to the inn, tried to get an old Korean man to let me take his photo, but the old boy was very nervous about it, and tried to clear off. It seems they have a superstition that to have their photo taken is equivalent to having their souls extracted, and that they will therefore die.

Left for Seoul by the 5.40 p.m. train. Had a long talk with the Passport Officer on the train, who informed me of all my movements since I landed at Vladivostok a month ago! All these good people seem to keep sort of dossiers in which to enter up the various activities of foreigners in general!

Saturday 9th October 1920
[Sailing from Fusan (Pusan) to Shimonoseki]

Sunday 10th October 1920
Arrived Tokyo at 8.30 p.m. and took a taxi to St. Andrew's House. Had a long talk [with France] about the present relations between Japan and the U.S.. France takes a very serious view of it, and is afraid that there may be trouble next month if the Californian [Immigration] Question goes against the Japanese. If it does so, it will make the Japanese lose face by making Japan inferior to America, and of course there is nothing an Eastern feels more than to lose face. France tells me a petition, signed by Mr. Swift, has been sent from the American community in Tokyo to the U.S. Senate urging tolerance, and that in a conversation he had with Mr. Swift a few days ago, Mr. Swift spoke very seriously about the situation, and said he considered that it only needed the slightest overt act on the part of either in order to precipitate the two countries into war with one another. For a man so level-headed as Mr. Swift to take such a serious view of the case, shows that things must be pretty bad. The main fear seems to be that certain of the rougher elements in this Country may vent their wrath by stoning Americans, and if this happens, the Americans in California are sure to retaliate [against local Japanese] and there will be bloodshed. It will then not require much more to get battleships scrapping with one another, and then nothing can stop a war. As showing which way the wind blows, France tells me that many Japanese are refusing to rent their houses to Americans, and even business houses are said to be getting shy of trading with American firms.

Hear that the Burnett Case is causing a lot of excitement at present, and that things look very black for Colonel Burnett [U.S. Military Attaché] now that the case is being tried in Court. One
statement in the paper says that the fellow who tried to sell him the maps wanted ? 100,000 for them. Burnett refused them, as he said he had got similar ones already, but that he was ready to pay that sum if he could get maps of either Manchuria or Korea. As Burnett, owing to Diplomatic privileges, cannot be made to answer this charge, he could not be called; but as he is at perfect liberty to answer if he wishes to do so, the fact that he did not refute the statement makes it look pretty black against him.

Monday 11th October 1920
Spent all morning and afternoon at the Embassy, having lunch there with the General [Woodroffe - Military Attaché], who seems very pleased with my Hokkaido report, especially the bit about Mr. Purington [American businessman/adventurer], which seems to have caused great interest to the Embassy, the Ambassador [Sir Charles Eliot] himself having apparently got excited about it!

Thursday 14th October 1920
See by the papers that the negotiations about the Californian Question [Japanese immigration] by Japan and the U.S. have been broken off. Looks rather bad.

Monday 18th October 1920
Finished off report on Manchuria in morning, and after tea went round to see the General, who seemed very pleased with it.

Friday 29th October 1920
The latest news is that the General is to be succeeded by a Lt. Colonel who has never before been to Japan, and does not know a word of Japanese! Heavens knows what the War Office are thinking about to send a man like that out here as Military Attaché. They must be mad to think of such a thing. The General, needless to say, is just about mad about it, as it simply knocks all his work on the head, after the splendid way he has worked things up. The Ambassador is cabling Home to point out the futility of the idea, but I doubt if it will do much good. Incidentally, the man's name is Meinenhausen, or something equally "British"!

Sunday 7th November 1920
[Attending the annual Grand Manoeuvres, which were being held around Nakatsu in Kyushu]
Set off 10.30 a.m. by steam ferry for Moji, from where we went by train to Nakatsu, where we fetched up about 12.30. Found the remainder of our "colleagues" in the special compartment reserved for us on the train - 22 foreign attachés in all. These, together with the Japanese officers with us, represent 12 different countries! Britain (6), France (3), America (3), Italy (1), Spain (2), Russia [Tsarist] (1), China (1), Peru (1), Holland (1), Siam (1), Czechoslovakia (1), Japan (innumerable!). Nothing like being cosmopolitan!
At Nakatsu we were met by out "bear-leaders" and taken off in a young fleet of cars to the Yabakei Club for lunch. Huge crowds of onlookers, and triumphal arches and decorations of all kinds everywhere.

Tuesday 9th November 1920
The roads in certain parts of the manoeuvre area are simply thick with sightseers on both sides, and as we pass through these "human avenues", the crowds bare their heads and bow
to us as though we were the Emperor himself! This is especially noticeable this year, and I suppose is partly due to the fact that most of the people in the crowds are country people and have all got the old Japanese standards of courtesy, a virtue sadly lacking in the city districts, where the fact of foreign intercourse has had a bad effect in this, as in many other respects.

Thursday 11th November 1920

[Review at Bizenzenkoji]

At 10 a.m. the Crown Prince arrived with a flourish of trumpets and much noise from daylight rockets. He set off to review the troops of the three divisions which had taken part in the manoeuvres, the foreign attaches (Britain leading), following in the rear.

As there was no big open space like last year on which to hold the Review, the troops were drawn up by regiments in the "paddy" fields on the left of the road, while bodies of "zaigogunjin" [reservists], school children etc. were lined up in fields on the right of the road.

Monday 15th November 1920

[Kennedy's tour of duty as a Language Officer ended on 15 November 1920. Before returning to Britain he made a tour of northern China. On 15 November he boarded a boat at Moji on route to Tsingtao.]

Wednesday 17th November 1920

[arrival at Tsingtao]

Friday 19th November 1920

[In Tsingtao]

I met Major Huntingford of the Royal Marines who is Naval Intelligence Officer at Shanghai, and is now on his way back there from Vladivostok. Tells me Stilling is back at Harbin and that [the British Government] has turned down his scheme for pushing off to the Caucasus in disguise.

Dined in evening with the Archer's. Everyone violently anti-Japanese, and all seem to think me mad for trying to up-hold them. From all accounts the Japanese certainly seem to be antagonising everyone out here, but it seems to be more from lack of tact than anything else. It is largely a case of "trade morality", and the way they talk of "the Open Door Policy" and yet employ all kinds of methods to hold back the trade of other nations. I can't help feeling that many of the present misunderstandings between ourselves and the Japanese are also largely due to the "colour" question, as the British out here seem to think that, owing to their colour, the Japanese are inferior to them and should therefore lick their boots as the Chinese seem to do. Personally, I rather admire the Japanese in that respect, as it shows they have spirit in them, and to "kow-tow" to anyone is as objectionable to the Japanese as it is to the British or any other self-respecting nation. It is, incidentally, a characteristic of the Japanese to adopt their worst attitude when they feel they are looked down on, and no doubt this accounts very largely for their somewhat domineering attitude out here.

Saturday 20th November 1920

[On 20 November Kennedy travelled by rail from Tsingtao to Tsinan.]

Geoff Mumford [friend from school-days in Ealing] was on the platform to meet me.
Sunday 21st November 1920
[In Tsinan]
Went out to the old native city after lunch with Geoff. Very thick walls round the city, with large gates, which are kept closed at night. Roads filthy, shops filthy, people filthy, everything filthy and unsanitary - absolute breeding places for diseases of all kinds! John Chinaman ought to take a lesson from his neighbours in Japan. I don't altogether wonder that the Japanese look on the Chinks as very much inferior to them. They are cheery-looking rogues, but disgustedly filthy. Asked Geoff if he thought they would ever learn the value of sanitation. Replied in the negative, and said it would be a bad thing if they did, as they breed like rabbits and the only thing that keeps down their numbers is that so many hundreds of thousands die per year from these same unsanitary conditions! A curious way of looking at it, but there is certainly a lot to be said for it!
In spite, however, of the filth and squalor of these native cities, they are very interesting to see - crowds of Chinese, some with pigtails and some without, jostling each other, and clacking away like a lot of old hens, each one trying to do down the other.
Numbers of Chinese soldiers about - sloppy-looking beggars without arms or equipment, wearing wadded clothes. Nice and warm in cold, dry weather, but must be impossible to get dry again. However, from all accounts, no Chinaman, whether soldier or civilian, ever thinks of going out in the rain - in fact, in the recent operations heavy rain set in and both armies ceased fighting for 5 days in order to keep themselves dry! Truly wonderful gentry are the Chinese!
Very amused with the large wheelbarrows used here as a method of conveyance. A most comic sight to see two Chinks squatting quite unconcernedly on one of these barrows, one on either side of the big wheel which is in the front centre, while a sweating coolie wheels them along, the barrow emitting fearsome squeaks and groans, as the use of oil on an axle seems to be unknown in these parts.

Monday 22nd November 1920
Left Tsinan by the 8.06 a.m. express, arriving Tientsin about 5 p.m., passing through the famine-stricken area on the way - huge level sandy plains with barely a sign of vegetation, all the crops having failed this year for lack of rain. Millions are said to be starving. Rather ghastly to think of. At many of the stations down the line, crowds of beggars would press up to the railings, moaning and wailing and making signs that they wanted food or money. Rather pathetic and made one feel rather an outsider to be travelling about in comfort while all these poor devils were starving.

Wednesday 24th November 1920
[Arrived in Peking]
The British Legation compound is an enormous great place with quarters for the whole Legation Staff and for the Legation Guard and other oddments, the whole place being surrounded by high loop-holed walls, reminiscent of the Boxer Rebellion. All the legations
here are much the same in that respect - all guarded by troops and prepared for defence in case of trouble.
I must say that the more one lives and learns, the more one is forced to the conclusion that all countries, our own not excepted, are a set of darned hypocrites. We curse the Japanese for supplying armaments to the two opposing forces [In China], yet we do it ourselves, though we are such bally hypocrites that we pretend we don't. The long and the short of it all is that everyone is out for his own ends and the more one hears the more convinced one becomes that half the anti-Japanese propaganda is simply due to the fact that we and other countries are jealous of Japan's position out here, and if we were in her place we would probably do just the same.
The Chinese Army seems to be a thing of wonder and a joy for ever! [Major] Brookes [Military Attaché] tells me that even the Chinese War Office itself neither knows its strength nor its dispositions!
[In one recent case] two opposing forces of artillery agreed to fire to the left of each other instead of at each other, but one of the generals on seeing this ordered his men to fire actually at the enemy. As soon as he had gone, however, his men sent over a note of apology to the enemy, and it was agreed that in future they should only fire at each other when there were generals about!
According to Brookes, the two opposing forces very often agree beforehand when and where they are to fight, and which side is to retire, the side retreating being paid by the others to do so. The amusing part is that, as a result of these agreements, communiqués telling of the capture of some important pace are often published several days before the "victors" arrive!

**Wednesday 1st December 1920**
Left Peking by the 8.30 a.m. train.

**Monday 6th December 1920**
[Departed Shanghai on sea voyage home to Britain]

**Thursday 23rd December 1920**
Anchored in Colombo Harbour about 7 a.m. but owing to another suspected case of plague on board [previous case between Shanghai and Hong Kong], were not allowed to land till about 11 a.m.

**Friday 24th December 1920**
Hear that the fellow who was landed yesterday with the suspected plague has "gone west", and there are rumours that the two who had to be landed at Shanghai and Hongkong have done likewise. Some of the passengers seem to be getting "wind up", and cursing the N.Y.K. [Nippon Yusen Kaisha - the shipping company] and Japan in general, as a result of which I fear I am incurring the wrath of one or two of them because I laugh at them, and tell them not to be fools!

**Thursday 13th January 1921**
[Arrived Paris by train from Marseilles] Got to Victoria [station, London] about 10 p.m. and was met by Father. Taxi to Ealing, and about 11 p.m. fetched up at the "ancestral abode" [Parents' house, 16, Freeland Road, Ealing]. And very nice too!

The War Office, 1921 - 1922

Friday 14th January 1921
Lunch at the Club, and afterwards went to M.I.R.c at the War Office and reported to Colonel Piggott, whom I find is now there. Tells me he is probably going to succeed the General [Woodroffe] as Military Attaché after all, the colonel with the Bosch name, Meinenhausen, having been turned down as a result of Sir Charles [Eliot]'s cable etc. (Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had wanted a pal of his, Colonel Meinenhausen, appointed as Military Attaché). Wants me, if I stay on in the Service, to go into M.I.R.c. It will be a 4 years' job, and, all being well, he says I shall be made G.S.O.2 as soon as a vacancy occurs. If I wish to take the job, A.G.4 say they will square the Medical Board to keep me on. Wish the deuce I knew what to do about it. I hate to chuck the Service, especially as I have got this offer of a job at the War Office. But it is only a 4 years' job, and, after that, my leg is bound to hold me back, so I know I shall be a fool if I don't accept Scott's offer and chuck the Service. It's the devil.......

Went to A.G.4 about my leave, and have been granted two months.

Monday 17th January 1921
Lunched at the "Rag" with Piggott and Hill. The latter is now at Staff College. Piggott wants me to see Debenham before the 26th, so as to more or less decide my future course of action. Its a damned awful decision to make. Got a very nice report from the General and that makes me what to stay on even more than ever, but ??.. it's the devil to decide. If only I had cash of my own, I should not hesitate, but would most certainly take the War Office job. But one has to consider the future, and as I myself am never likely to be able to get back to the old Regiment, and if I stay on in the Service, am never likely to have sufficient cash to send my sons (if I have any) into the Service, I suppose my main object should now be to get a job which will bring me in enough cash to enable me to do so.

Piggott wants me to prepare a report on Tsingtao before the 26th. No rest for the wicked!

Monday 24th January 1921
Went up to see Debenham in morning, and have been definitely promised the post in Yokohama [adviser to the Rising Sun Petroleum Company] at ?800 a year if I accept it before the end of next month.

Wednesday 26th January 1921
Interview with Colonel Tandy at the War Office (M.I.) [Military Intelligence] in afternoon.

Friday 28th January 1921
Went along to Caxton Hall for a Medical Board. [They] wanted to invalid me out straight away, but told them about M.I.R.c., so they have put me in Category C2, and will keep me on so
long as the War Office need me. It now remains to be seen whether the A.P.C. [Asiatic Petroleum Company] will keep the job open for me at War Office request or not. If they won't, I shall have to chuck the Service straight away. It's rotten luck having to chuck up the Service and go into business; but as the Board say definitely that my leg will disqualify me for both regimental duty and the Staff College, there is no help for it. I suppose I ought to be thankful for having been so lucky up to now; but, God. Think of never again being able to march to the sound of the pipes - never again have one's own men to look after and command - never again to do soldiering. DAMN!!!!

Sunday 30th January 1921
Went to 8 a.m. Service. Captain Homma came to lunch. He is attached to the 1st East Lancs. at Blackdown at present, and expects to return to Japan in June. Tells me the Crown Prince is due in England on April 28th, and is going to tour round Europe and back by U.S.A. Rather a new line for Japan! Wonder how it will work, as nothing of the kind has ever been done before.

Monday 31st January 1921
Called on General Itami, the Japanese Military Attaché, in morning. Very friendly little man with a game leg. Found Oi and Homma at the office, and was introduced to Major Kawase (Assistant Military Attaché) and Major Ando, both very nice fellows.

Monday 7th February 1921
Rang up Piggott about interview with A.P.C. Quite satisfactory. Scott is to be recommended to allow the War Office to have me till February next year.

Monday 11th April 1921
Started in at the War Office. Share a room with Major Denny (Somerset Light Infantry), the China "expert". In the same "Section" are Molloy (Dorsets) and Hindsen (Royal Welch Fusiliers) in the Russian Sub-Section. Find I knew the latter out in Malta.

Wednesday 27th April 1921
Very interesting watching the course of events in Japan just now, both in regard to Yap and America, and also in regard to the Crown Prince's visit to Europe, which event seems to have a close connection with his betrothal. Roughly matters seem to have been as follows:
The Crown Prince became betrothed to Princess Nagako, daughter of Prince Kuni, who is not a member of one of the five "Kuge", the 5 royal families from which, for centuries past, the future Empress has been chosen. These 4 families are all of the Choshu Clan, whereas Prince Kuni is a Satsuma man. The Choshu Clan therefore, with Prince Yamagata at their head, became alarmed at the prospect of losing their power, and apparently plotted to have the betrothal annulled. The plot, however, leaked out through the Crown Prince's teacher of ethics, who was disgusted at the whole idea. Popular opinion was strongly against the annulment, so much so that Yamagata and Nakamura, Minister of the Imperial Household, (both Choshu), resigned their positions, though the Emperor refused to accept the resignation of the former. The latter was succeeded by Baron Makino, the Peace Conference Delegate, a Satsuma man. It seems that one reason for the Crown Prince's visit being arranged so
suddenly was that Yamagata and his lot thought they would be better able to carry out their
designs if he were absent from the Country.
Though, taken on the whole, his visit to England seems to have been approved of, there were
large numbers of the more conservative elements dead against it, and threats of various kinds
were made against the members of his suite, one of them, Saionji, having been actually
assaulted in his own house. The famous, or rather, infamous Black Dragon Society, with
Uchida Ryōhei at its head, is believed to have had a hand in the business.
It is certainly a great break with tradition - both the choosing of an Empress-to-be from an
"outside" family, and the visit to Europe, and both events are likely to have a great effect on
the future of Japan. Both are likely to break the power of the Military, the former by virtue of
the Empress being of Satsuma stock and the latter by reason of the [Crown Prince] having his
eyes opened to the happenings of the outside World.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE JUNE-AUGUST 1921
Among questions discussed were the retention or termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
and the need to confer, with the other countries primarily concerned, on the problems of the
Far East and on naval disarmament. All three matters were closely linked and called for
urgent attention, but careful handling was required if, as was essential, the Americans were to
be persuaded to join in. They, as was well known, were strongly opposed to the Alliance,
while we, for our part, were fearful of a head-on collision between Japan and the U.S. if
something was not done shortly to end the deadly race in naval armaments between them.
We were also much worried about the U.S. threat to outbuild our own Navy and to what
extend we could depend on her to co-operate with us in China.
The outcome of all this was that it was agreed to retain the Alliance for the time being,
pending the calling of a conference on Far Eastern affairs, and to sound out the U.S. about
holding such a conference. Washington was therefore approached early in July with the
suggestion, which was worded in such a way as to make it appear that the conference would
be called on U.S., not British, initiative, as this would be more likely to appeal to the
Americans. The British idea was that this should be in the nature of a preliminary conference,
confined to a consideration of Far Eastern questions only, and would be followed later by a
disarmament conference, but the U.S. insisted that both matters should be discussed
together and, without more ado, issued invitations, for a conference to be held in Washington
in November.
ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
As the question of the Alliance would play an all-important part at the Conference, I was
detailed by Piggott to make a close study of the pros and cons of retaining it and to draw up a
paper on my conclusions for the guidance of our military delegation, which he would be
accompanying before going on to Tokyo to take up his appointment as Military Attaché.
Briefly stated, these conclusions were:-
1) By scrapping it, we would please the Americans, as it would remove their wholly unwarranted fear that it contained secret clauses posing a threat to the U.S. Its termination would therefore help to improve Anglo-American relations.

2) Everything else pointed to the desirability of renewing the Alliance in some form or another.

3) Its termination would be resented by the Japanese if, as would be clear, it was carried out at their expense in order to ensure the friendship of their main potential enemy. After 20 years of close and mutually valuable ties, this would be regarded as base ingratitude.

4) If ended, Japan would be left in much the same plight as she had been in 1895 at the time of the Triple Intervention, isolated and without a firm friend to whom she could look for support and counsel in time of need.

5) Left friendless, she would almost certainly seek out a new friend in place of Britain and might well turn to either Germany, the most likely, or Russia, which would certainly not be to our advantage.

6) So long as the Alliance existed, Britain would be in a position to exert a restraining influence on her in China and elsewhere, but if it was scrapped, this could no longer be possible.

7) If the Alliance lapsed, Britain would have to face the expense of taking over defence commitments in the Far East, which had been performed for her previously by Japan, and she would have to construct a strong naval base at Singapore or some other strategic point in the Pacific. Besides the heavy cost of such defensive measures for the British tax-payer, construction of this kind would add further resentment in Japan, where it would be regarded as a threat and as indicating British distrust of her intentions.

8) With Britain and Japan no longer bound to assist each other in defending their respective interests and in maintaining the peace of the Far East, the Chinese would feel free to play off one against the other to the detriment of Far Eastern peace and stability.

JAPANESE REACTION TO PROPOSED CONFERENCE
Though hesitant to accept the American invitation, Japan finally agreed to do so.

ATAMAN SEMENOV
At the War Office, I shared a room with Major R.B. Denny of the Somerset Light Infantry, who was in charge of Chinese Intelligence. Denny had served some years as a language officer in Peking and had been engaged in Intelligence work in 1918 in Eastern Siberia at a time when we were looking around for a useful ally among the anti-Bolshevik guerrilla leaders. One of these who came to his notice was Ataman Semenov and it was on his recommendation that Semenov was supplied with British arms and money. Semenov was soon proved to be too ruthless and unreliable for our liking and was quickly dropped, but was taken on by the Japanese, who thought highly of him and he remained closely connected with them from then onwards.
For his services in recruiting Semenov, Denny had been awarded the O.B.E.; but, as he remarked ruefully to me on one occasion, he was careful, in view of Semenov's subsequent activities, never to boast of the reason for his decoration!

Thursday 15th September 1921
[Kennedy married Margaret Coutts at St. Albans Abbey. Their respective families had been friends out in the Straits Settlements (Malaya), where Kennedy's father, James Young Kennedy, had been an oil merchant and President of the Municipality of Penang.]

Saturday 25th February 1922
Four-Power Pact ratified yesterday by U.S. Senate, so that ends our 20-year alliance with Japan. The U.S., of course, are delighted at having persuaded us to give it up, but their means of persuasion amounted to virtual blackmail, as they threatened to outbuild us in naval armaments if we didn't. Burdened down as we are with war debts, we are in no position to engage in an armaments race to retain our -time Capital and on a banquet there, he called off his visit at the last moment. If he had made the excuse of being over-tired or of feeling unwell and had spent the day quietly at the Embassy or some other official residence, this might have passed muster; but instead, he got Mrs. A.P. Scott to take him out shopping in Yokohama, where he was easily recognisable, and spent the rest of the day with the Scotts. Apart from the bad impression this made on the Japanese, rumours went round that he had been philandering with Mrs. Scott. They were, of course, completely unfounded, but Scott himself was so upset about them that he approached me on the quiet to translate some of the reports in the Japanese papers in order to find out what had been said, as he was not satisfied with the translations made for him by Japanese members of the office staff. On another occasion, when visiting Nara, the Prince, while feeding the sacred deer, started throwing the buns intended for them at one of his staff and then insisted on trotting off, pulling a rickshaw with the old Admiral in it. Pranks of this kind might have gone down all right in the U.S. or Australia, but the Japanese, with their reverence for royalty, were horrified that the Heir to the British Throne should indulge in such undignified procedures. There were other regrettable incidents.

Monday 9th April 1923
Heard from Hughie Malcolm that the car, which I was to have had from the Rising Sun Petroleum Co. for my work, has been cancelled. As he is now Acting Manager for Scott, who has gone home on sick leave, the socio-political job for which I was brought out has been brought to a halt, as he has never been interested in it. The idea, he says, was purely Scott's, so I shall be left more or less kicking my heels until he comes back. All very disappointing and frustrating.

Monday 11th June 1923
Yet another quake. They seem very plentiful just now, though the seismologists assure us that no bad one is likely in the near future. Hope they are right!

Saturday 7th July 1923
Took the family up to Hakone, where they will be spending the summer, though I have to stay in Tokyo and will join them at week-ends. It will be quite a household, as the McCullums are sharing in with us and Piggott has asked us to take in a couple of newly-arrived Language Officers, Wards and Dicker.

Saturday September 1st 1923
[In Hakone]

Woke up to find it still raining in torrents and that the water in the lake had risen about a foot during the night. The Mc.Cullum's went out for a stroll about 11.30 a.m. and M. and I then began to argue. M. went into our bedroom and I followed in order to try to make up the quarrel. Suddenly, without warning, the house began to rock violently and M. at once jumped towards Mungo's cot and snatched him out. I shouted to her to jump out into the garden, but the din of breaking timbers was too great and the swaying and jumping of the floor too violent.

Next moment the whole building collapsed and I found myself pinned down under the eaves of the roof amongst a mass of splintered glass and wood-work. I called out for M. and was very relieved to hear that she and Mungo were both unhurt, though they also were pinned down inside the house somewhere. My main fear was that the earthquake might cause a tidal wave from the lake or that fire might break out before we were rescued, but I was also afraid that a further collapse of the building might take place, as the quakes continued every few minutes. Owing to part of the eaves resting on a stone in the garden, there was a long slit about 3 or 4 inches wide so that daylight was coming in, and a few minutes after the first quake I heard Mc.Cullum's voice outside and could see his feet and also some Japanese, so called out to him that we were O.K. and merely needed digging out. He said he was looking for his baby, who was also under the ruins somewhere, and promised to come back to our help as soon as possible. Before he arrived, however, I managed to worm myself along on my tummy and break my way through the wreckage to a small hole, through which I managed to squeeze myself into the garden some 10 or 15 minutes later. Mac had told me that all the houses and also the new hotel were down, and when I got through into the Malcolm's garden, I found the Tebbutt's baby amah [nurse] lying dead on the ground with a blanket over her. The Tebbutt's small baby had just been rescued from the debris with its mouth full of mud, and the Mc.Cullums' baby was being handed out through a hole in the roof when I arrived. Several members of the foreign community were collected together, and on learning that M. and Mungo were still buried, Watkins and Mr. Swift came with me to help dig them out and we got two coolies to saw a hole in the roof near where they were. After working on it for 10 minutes or so, they broke their way in and we got M. and Mungo out through the hole thus made.

Having got them safely out, I set off to see if anyone else needed digging out and learnt that there were some people buried under the ruins of the new hotel. Malcolm had told me that the Tebbutt's were missing, so I called out to see if either of them was in the hotel and was answered by Mrs. Tebbutt, who said she was pinned down under the entrance and that she believed that her husband had been killed outright. Several badly injured Germans were lying
out on the grass in front and were being attended to as well as possible, but owing to lack of medical appliances and to the fact of the village doctor being amongst the injured, it was impossible to do much.

With the help of 2 or 3 coolies, Butler, Sanders and I set to work to try to get Mrs. Tebbutt out, but it was 3 or more hours before we finally did so, and she died almost immediately. During that time there were fresh quakes every few minutes, but the coolies never ceased working once, though the rest of us cleared out of the building pretty rapidly on more than one occasion. During one such exodus a German woman, the mother of a badly injured boy and girl, begged us to look for her governess, whom she believed to be buried. She was found shortly afterwards lying dead, a heavy beam having broken her neck.

Shortly after getting Mrs. Tebbutt, a party of Germans set off for Mishima with improvised stretchers carrying the boy and girl who had been injured, as it was necessary to get them into hospital if their lives were to be saved and word had been received from Miyanoshita that no medical aid could be sent from there, as they also had suffered very severely. The boy was got down to Mishima safely, but the girl died on the way and was brought back shortly afterwards.

About 5 p.m. I went with M. to see if it was possible to get any of our things from our erstwhile house and was standing near the lake when a very severe quake took place and we were thrown about like a couple of drunken coolies. It must have been very nearly as bad as the original one which did all the damage.

During the afternoon a bivouac had been constructed by, and for, the foreigners and some of the ladies did yeoman work in preparing food etc. which we had rescued from some of the less damaged houses.

The majority of the houses in the village had been knocked down and there were several large fissures in the road and ground in general, and a number of scars on the hillsides showed where landslides had taken place. Except, however, in the cases already mentioned, serious casualties were scarce and, so far as I know, only one other death occurred in the village. Luckily Hakone was spared from fire, which was rather wonderful, considering that in most houses the mid-day meals were being prepared at the time the quake took place.

Towards evening various rumours began to arrive [about damage to nearby towns]. In the evening we settled ourselves in the bivouac as well as we could and the active male members of the party took it in turn to stay on watch throughout the night. While on watch during the night [I] saw sky lit up in far distance. Wondered what it was, but learnt next day that it was reflections of Yokohama and its oil storage tanks ablaze.

Quakes continued at frequent intervals throughout the night, but luckily the weather was fine and mild.

Sunday 2nd September 1923

Some of the foreigners set off for Mishima. The rest of us spend the day trying to salve belongings and in other ways.

Monday 3rd September 1923
Broke up camp in the early hours of morning and set off, some on foot, some in "kago"[palanquin], some on horse-back - men, women and children - a motley crowd in all stages of dress and undress!

There had been a rumour that a very severe earthquake was expected at mid-night. Happily this proved to be untrue, though there was one very nasty one and innumerable other ones during the night. I, for one, was glad when day came, for, although I did not actually believe the rumour, one was unable to tell what might not happen - a land-slide from the hills above us; a tidal wave from the lake; a chasm in the ground on which we were bivouacked. One felt that anything might happen, as the ground quivered almost continuously.

Throughout the day on the 2nd, a constant stream of refugees had passed through Hakone, and from two such parties we first heard the news that Yokohama had suffered heavily.

When we got to Mishima, where a good number of houses had been knocked about and where the inhabitants had rigged up light coverings in the streets, so that they could sleep out of doors, we were met by Tennent and Watkins, who had gone down the previous day. They had fixed up for cars to meet us, so we motored from there to Numazu, where arrangements had been made at the Mission House ... for food and drink and change of raiment. The latter was most welcome, as most of us had been drenched through by the rain. Personally I was given a Japanese kimono, for lack of any other male apparel, and I subsequently travelled in it to Shizuoka, as I had nothing else but a shirt and pair of trousers - both soaked.

Tuesday 4th September 1923

News from Tokyo is still pretty vague, as all communications are broken down, but in Yokohama it seems that the quake brought down most of the buildings and fires broke out almost immediately. At the same time a typhoon set in and fanned the flames in all directions. Those who could do so threw themselves into the sea or the creeks in order to escape the flames, but many were burnt to death even so, as the R.S.P.C. [Rising Sun Petroleum Co.] and the S.O.C. [Standard Oil Co.] oil tanks exploded and burst into flames, as also did some oil lighters up the creeks, and the burning oil flowed over the surface of the water and set light to boats and lighters which went drifting about helplessly in great burning masses.

Monday 10th September 1923

[Wards] tells me the people have been terrified lest there should be a tidal wave and have the wind up about marauding Koreans. Terrible accounts being received about convicts from Negishi, Koreans, and other cheery sportsmen being out for murder and loot, and of the young men's associations forming themselves into groups to round them up and beating to death those whom they catch.

Thursday 20th September 1923

Tokyo and Yokohama are entirely cut off from the south, except by sea - hence the food shortage. Telegraphic and telephonic communication has likewise been knocked to blazes and will take many weeks to repair, whilst gas and water mains have been destroyed.
About 9 a.m. I went to meet the party of [British] Marines which was to help to open up and clear out the strong room, which was all that was left of the the Rising Sun Petroleum Co. Office [in Yokohama].

The scene of desolation on shore was appalling and it was all but impossible to distinguish roads, as most of them were buried in ruins as deeply as were the sites of former buildings, some of which were still smouldering even then - nearly 3 weeks after the big quake and fire. In certain patches the air stank of the corpses rotting under the ruins, and in the Main Street, just opposite what had been the Hospital Pharmacy, lay the decaying body of a Japanese woman roughly covered with a sheet of corrugated iron, whilst a little further away a rotting hand was sticking up from under a pile of masonry.

One indication of what had been roads was that numerous derelict motor cars and bicycles, charred and crumpled, were to be seen - some of these being half buried under fallen masonry and debris of all kinds. Amongst the derelicts are the charred remnants of a couple of fire engines near the ruins of the [British] Consulate. The latter building, like most of the others, is absolutely levelled. It apparently collapsed like a pack of cards at the first shake, as also did the U.S. Consulate next door, so no one had a chance to escape. Mrs. Horne was sitting out on the verandah with her small son waiting for her husband at the time and was struck by some of the falling debris. There seem to have been any number of cases like this, where husbands were killed before the very eyes of their wives, and vice versa. Young Mrs. Mollinson had just gone upstairs to her husband's office, leaving her father-in-law downstairs. Both she and her husband were cut off from escape by the collapse of part of the building and both were burnt to death whilst old Mollinson could only watch on, powerless to help. In much the same way, Komor had to watch while his wife, who was pinned down, was burnt to death before his eyes. Mad with anxiety he tried to rescue her and was only prevented from sharing the same fate by the timely arrival of friends who dragged him away. Old Abbey, the auctioneer, could have saved himself but refused to leave his old friend Dr. Wheeler, so both lost their lives. One hears innumerable stories of this kind, each more pathetic than the last.

The case of the British and U.S. Consulates is a bit of a scandal. The former was condemned 11 years ago by architects as being unsafe, and for years past the U.S. Consul General had been urging his State Department to have their Consulate re-built for the same reason. No action was however taken by either Government. Result - both Governments lost valuable servants when the quake wrecked the two buildings as predicted. Had the same thing happened in the case of a commercial firm, the heads of the firm would have been liable to prosecution for criminal negligence in refusing to take adequate steps to safeguard the lives of their employees and would have had to pay compensation money to the dependents of those killed. Being Governments, so such steps can be taken and the unfortunate widows are not even granted pensions.

Whilst clearing out the strong room I noticed a Japanese woman with a half demented look and dishevelled appearance digging amongst the debris of what had been the mombans' [porters] quarters at the back of the office. Murai, who was with her, told me she was the
widow of one of the mombans who had been killed and that she was searching for his remains and for those of her four children who had also been burnt to death. Ten Japanese are said to have been killed in the office. We found the charred remains of four of them, though charred beyond all recognition. The woman and Murai collected these together and cremated them on the spot. The whole scene was somewhat ghastly - the woman, half demented with her loss, convulsed in tears, burning up the supposed remains of her husband and children, and prodding the smouldering embers so as to ensure proper cremation. This, combined with the scene of absolute desolation all round and the horrible smell from the burning corpses, was anything but pleasant, and, to add to it all, a heavy drizzle fell continuously whilst the mugginess of the day served still further towards the general feeling of depression.

At least one person escaped from the Grand [Hotel]. This was a woman who was in her bath at the time on the 3rd Floor. She had the curious and somewhat trying experience of being deposited, bath and all, onto the Bund! A Japanese man, on seeing her, handed her his "kimono".

Amongst other buildings destroyed is the Chartered Bank, so I am wondering whether I shall be left penniless, as all their records are said to have been destroyed and I have nothing to prove how much money I had in the bank at the time, as my Pass Book was in the office and has therefore been destroyed too.

McDougal had the unpleasant experience of being pinned down under a pile of fallen masonry whilst the flames from the fire came nearer and nearer. Two men did their best to release him, but as it seemed a hopeless task to get him away before the fire reached them, they asked him if he would like them to kill him before they went or whether he would prefer to be burnt to death. This so terrified him that he struggled for all he was worth and managed to free himself just in time.

[This], and many other, stories of the quake I heard from Laffin and Stillwell [Rising Sun employees], who had been in Yokohama at the time. They also told me of certain instances, witnessed by themselves, of Koreans being clubbed to death by infuriated mobs who, in some cases, had caught them looting and in other cases did so because the Koreans were suspected, rightly or wrongly, of incendiaryism. It seems that for the first few days after the quake, Yokohama was in a state of chaos and all semblance of law and order vanished, as there were no troops on hand and the police force, who had themselves suffered heavy casualties, were unable to cope with the situation. The convicts who had broken loose from the prison, and all the lower elements of the City who had escaped with their lives, had matters pretty well their own way for the first few days. Bands of "vigilantes" were therefore formed from the local Young Men's Associations for protective purposes, but these people appear to have lost their heads in many cases and started rounding up all people unknown to them and slaughtering all those who were unable to give a clear account of themselves or who appeared in any way suspicious. These were all put down as being Koreans, though quite a number of Japanese and Chinese are said to have been done in also. This Korean
scare seems to have been due to rumours having been sent around to the effect that Korean malcontents were taking advantage of the situation in order to further their own ends, in conjunction with socialists, who proposed starting a revolution.

Wednesday 26th September 1923
In the evening after dinner I walked up the Ginza [Tokyo]. The place is all but unrecognisable, and the appearance of hundreds of skeleton buildings clear cut against the moonlit sky reminds one of France during the War. It seems almost inconceivable that a few seconds of earthquake could possibly have been the cause of so much damage - damage such as it took 4 years of heavy bombardment to carry out in France. The musty, rotting sort of smell from some of the ruins; the quiet unlit streets; and the whole desolate appearance by moonlight is almost uncanny.

Wednesday 17th October 1923
Learnt some interesting details from Russell-Kennedy about the despatch of earthquake news to the outside World. He, as Reuter's agent, and Denny, as agent of the Associated Press, are the two main sources of information about the Far East to the World in general, but both were bottled up in Tokyo with all means of communication cut off. It was not till 2 or 3 days later that they learnt that the railway telegraph from Ueno Station had escaped destruction from the quake and that the operator there had been able to wire through to Nagano, from which point the news had been transmitted to Osaka and from there had been broadcasted by wireless. Some of these messages had been picked up by Reuter's Japanese representatives there and had then been sent out to the World in general as Reuter messages.

According to Russell-Kennedy, the Army did its best to protect Koreans and issued orders that Koreans were to be collected and sent to certain points for protection, but their orders were misinterpreted and were understood to mean that they were to be rounded up and slaughtered.

Friday 16th November 1923
[Sent over to Korea by Company]
From all accounts there seems to be excellent shooting to be had in Korea - pheasant, duck, geese, snipe and quail as well as "big game" such as tiger, leopard, wild boar, deer and wolves. Wish I had got my gun with me. They say that in mid-winter wolves sometimes come right into Seoul at night time.

Tuesday 4th December 1923
Piggott [British Military Attaché] tells us that his house has been raided by the police during his absence, as his "boy" was discovered to be running a gambling den in the basement.

Friday 14th December 1923
Our [the Company's] "beer-bottle" campaign seems to be progressing. The latest development is that some days ago a pitched-battle took place as a result of rival orators. Our spokesman was apparently holding forth on the virtues of the Rising Sun Petroleum Co. brands of kerosene and managed to attract a larger crowd than did the Standard Oil
Company orator who had started an opposition oration close by. Seeing this, the latter started
to hurl personal abuse on his rival and on the ancestors of that worthy. Back-chat thereupon
set in and after both orators had worked themselves up into a fury of righteous indignation,
stones and bottles began to fly, as the rival crowds decided that it was not to be merely a
private fight. Casualties occurred on both sides and the battle was only terminated by the
timely arrival of the local police, who proceeded to break up the meeting!

Thursday 10th January 1924
See by the papers the Choshu-Satsuma scrap seems to have come to the fore again in
regard to the new Cabinet. General Fukuda was recommended by Marshal Uehara as War
Minister, but General Tanaka objected, ostensibly on the grounds of his connection with the
Osugi murders, and insisted on the appointment of General Ugaki to the post. As Uehara is
head of the Satsuma faction and Tanaka is Choshu, the friction between the two is taken as a
sign of the renewal of clan strife.

Monday 21st January 1924
The split in the Seiyukai has at last occurred and Baron Yamamoto, Tokonami, Nakahashi
and Motoda seceded on the 16th in order to form a new party which will back up the new
Cabinet. This follows on the Seiyukai's decision to oppose it.

Thursday 14th February 1924
I had my interview with [Debenham], and was somewhat worried to learn that London [R.S.P.
Co. Head Office] had just cabled to say that, as Scott is coming out shortly as an adviser to
the Company and will be employed almost entirely on the social and political work, my job is
to be scrapped and I am to be given the option of clearing out altogether or else of being
absorbed into the business organisation. If I agree to the latter alternative, I am to be sent to
Moji and will be employed almost entirely in travelling. As there are only three other foreigners
in Moji and it would mean my being away most of the time, it would be terribly lonely for poor
old M. [his wife], so I don't feel much inclined to accept the offer, but, on the other hand, I
can't afford to leave the Company, as I have no other job in view. It strikes me as being a
damned dirty trick, inducing me to come out here on a specific job and then suddenly
abolishing it and giving me the alternative of either going on the streets or else being sent to a
place in which M's nerves would probably conk out.

Friday 15th February 1924
Colonel Piggott [British Military Attaché] tells me that our Government was the only "civilized"
one which did not send a cable on the occasion of the attempt on the Prince Regent's life. He
is naturally very disgusted about it.

Monday 3rd March 1924
Papers report many changes in vernacular Press since the earthquake e.g. the "Yomiuri",
which has been liberal since its foundation in 1892, has now been bought up by Shoriki, late
Assistant Chief of Police (February 27th) as a result of which the whole editorial staff has
resigned.
Tuesday 4th March 1924

Papers report that the garrison in Southern Manchuria is not to be reduced any further. Two of the independent battalions have already been disbanded and the remaining four were to have followed suit by the end of 1925, but owing to the present unsettled conditions in those parts, the Government has acceded to the appeals from the Japanese residents to retain the troops for their protection. Amongst the main causes of the unrest up there are the facts that the Soviet Government is wanting to get the Chinese Eastern Railway from the Whites and is annoyed with China. Also the Soviet is trying to extend Russian influence over Mongolia (another point of friction with China) whilst Chang Tso-lin is still brooding over the reverses he suffered in 1922 from the Chili party and is hard at it collecting munitions and training his armies. All these things add to the general feeling of unrest in those parts. The Chinese Eastern Railway itself seems to be a great bone of contention and it seems likely that Russia would have tried to wrest it from the Whites before now but that they fear the effect that such an action would have on the Powers, who are all interested in it.

Tuesday 11th March 1924

The Sakhalin Question seems to be coming to the fore once more. The Sinclair [Oil Company] people have sent two men there in connection with the concession granted them in January 1921 by the now defunct Far Eastern Republic [Soviet Far East]. Needless to say, the Japanese refuse to acknowledge the validity of the concession. Meanwhile the Hokushinkai (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Kuhara, and Nippon) continue to search for oil with the aid of the initial capital of ?3,000,000 plus subsidies from the Navy (?1.5 million in 1921 and ?600,000 in 1923).

Sunday 16th March 1924

Interesting to note the great interest shown by the Japanese Press the last few days about the Singapore Base and the pleasure expressed at its reported shelving. When first the scheme came to the fore last year, very little comment was made - and it struck me that the deduction to be drawn from this fact was, that the Japanese had taken it to heart very much, for it is one of their characteristics that their Press is generally quietest when tension is greatest and that it shouts the loudest when least trouble need be anticipated e.g. cf. U.S.-Japan relations in 1920-21. The fact of the Press now coming out so strongly on the subject of Singapore, as a result of tension being released, merely confirms one's belief in the fact that Japan had taken the matter very much to heart.

Wednesday 19th March 1924

Had talk with A.P. [Scott] in afternoon about leaving the R.S.P. Co.

Saturday 22nd March 1924

[Met] Shirogami, who used to be Chief of Police in Korea. Had quite an interesting talk on the Japanese Police system and the question of Labour unrest. In regard to the muzzling of free speech by the Police, he said quite frankly that it was necessary in Japan, because the people have never been trained to think for themselves and they therefore accept as gospel anything a tub-thumper may tell them.
Friday 18th April 1924
Papers very full of the Hanihara Note to Coolidge, as his protest against the anti-Japanese Immigration Laws under discussion appears to have been too strongly worded, the expression "judai naru eigyo" (grave consequences) being regarded as a threat to the U.S.

Saturday 26th April 1924
See that the ban on the news about the Nijubashi incident on January 5th has now been raised. It seems that a Korean malcontent had planned a kind of Guy Fawkes' scheme to blow up the Government and various members of the Diet whilst that august body was in Session. On landing in Japan (under a Japanese name) from Shanghai, however, he found that the Yamamoto Cabinet had just fallen and that the House was not sitting, so he decided to use his bombs elsewhere and set off to invade the Imperial Palace via the Nijubashi entrance. When the sentries tried to stop him, he threw a couple of his bombs at them, but they failed to explode and he was captured before any harm was done.

Saturday 3rd May 1924
[letter from Angus Kennedy]
He mentions the arrival of three Tibetan officers who are to be attached to the 8th Gurkha Rifles [Angus' regiment] for 4 months. It seems that the idea is to train a regular Tibetan Army on modern lines and they are buying arms and equipment from us. The Political Officer in charge of them is a man named Bailey who, disguised as a Bolshevik agent, chased himself right through Russia and Siberia! Angus says he is very keen to make Tibet as strong as possible, as they can never be any menace to India, whereas the stronger they are the better they can keep the Chinese out and act as a buffer state.

Friday 23rd May 1924
Hear that the U.S. Ambassador, Woods, has resigned by way of protest against the Exclusion Bill [against Japanese Immigration].

Wednesday 4th June 1924
Anti-Americanism is still spreading and the papers report that a Japanese who committed "hara-kiri" in the U.S. Embassy grounds in Tokyo a few days ago by way of protest has become a sort of national, though posthumous, hero - Uchida Ryohei, Toyama etc. are, of course, well to the fore in such matters.

Saturday 14th June 1924
Had an interesting talk with Martel about Korea, he having been out here [Korea] over 30 years. His love for Koreans appears to be about nil. He thinks a lot of Saito, but thinks he is too gentle with the Koreans, especially in his education policy. Korean students are continually going on strike. His theory on the origin of the Koreans is interesting, as he maintains that they come from Arab stock.

[On 26 June 1924 Kennedy set off on a sales trip to visit local paraffin wholesalers in North-east Korea and South-east Manchuria. He travelled by train from Seoul to Wonsan on the east coast and from there by ship to Chongjin. From Chongjin he travelled by rail to Hoeryong]
on the Manchurian border. On 30 June he visited Honchun on the Manchurian side of the border.]

Monday 30th June 1924
Arrived Konshun [Hunchun]. The most conspicuous object on the outskirts of the town being the Japanese Consulate, surrounded by high red-brick walls with steel loop-holed towers at each of the four corners. This building has been erected next to the site of the one which was destroyed by bandits in 1920 and has a force of about 100 armed Japanese police for the protection of itself and its nationals in that district. All these police are ex-soldiers. Met a party of y to Kainei runs along the edge of the Tumen [river] at the bottom of a precipice most of the way and, as can well be imagined, is not infrequently blocked by landslides. Wild, narrow valley in parts. Armed police on guard at all stations, but there is said to be but little fear of raids along that part of the frontier, as Chientao [Province] acts as a sort of buffer, owing to the Japanese police there being able to give warning of impending raids.
The Tumen is about 100 ri [250 miles] in length and the Yalu about 230 ri [575 miles]. Between them is the wild mountainous district around the Hakutozan [Paitow shan] [mountain]. The danger point starts from a little below Mozan [Musan] and stretches pretty well the whole way from there to the mouth of the Yalu, the thick mountain forests affording excellent cover to the raiders. Battalions are stationed at Mozan and Keizanchin [Hyesan] and other military detachments are spread out at intervals of 20 ri [45 miles] or so all along the frontier, whilst at intervals of 4 or 5 ri [10 or 12 miles] there are posts of armed police to patrol the intervening country. These posts are all linked up by telephone, though the wires are sometimes cut by raiders.
Deer, pheasant etc. are plentiful in Kanto [around Lungchintsun], and tiger, boar, bear etc. are plentiful on the Korean side further inland.

[On 4 July Kennedy travelled by ship from Seishin to Joshin (Odaejin).]

Saturday 5th July 1924
[In Joshin]
We had hoped to leave for Shinsho [Sinpo] at 1.30 p.m. but learnt that the boat had been put off for 2 or 3 days. As it would be a waste of time to wait all that time, we made enquiries about the possibility of going by car to Hokusei, which is our main destination and is only about 90 miles from here. Learnt that the trip has been done once by a car, but that the road from Tansen to Rigen is believed to be very bad. Have managed to charter a car for ?165 [?18]. Seems very expensive, but no one will try it for less.

Sunday 6th July 1924
Set off 7.50 a.m. in a very crowded 8-seater Ford with Inagawa, Kobayashi, Ren Kei Kun, the driver, and the owner. Baggage tied on outside. Our expectations of reaching Hokusei by the evening were doomed! The road as far as Tansen - about 25 miles - was fairly good, though very hilly, starting with a climb from sea-level up to 2,500 ft. at which height it crosses Martenrei [Mantap-san].
11 a.m. Reached the Hokudaisen, a broad shallow river with nothing but a foot bridge over it, so had to hire a bullock to tow us across.

12 Noon. Arrived Tansen and lunched at local inn.

1.45 p.m. Punctured

2 p.m. Set off again, the roads getting worse and being full of bad dips.

2.15 p.m. Arrived Nandaisen, another broad but fairly shallow river. Had to hire two bullocks to tow, and a whole swarm of villagers to push, the car across. As in the case of the previous river, we had to unship the baggage to prevent it getting wet, and the owner stripped himself naked in order to help hauling the car.

3 p.m. Started off again. During the next hour and a half we only advanced a couple of miles or so, as the road was badly cut up and had regular trenches cut across it in places as a result of rains. These we had to bridge as best we could with planks or anything we could get, and the spades came in useful. At one place we managed to borrow two large thick planks and wanted to buy them in case we needed them again, but the house to which they belonged refused to sell them, as they were being kept to use as a coffin for the aged owner, who was expected to die soon!

4.40 p.m. Punctured again and another river to cross with aid of two bullocks.

5.25 p.m. Got started again, but had only been going 5 minutes when we came to another river, branching in to two, and again had to requisition a bullock.

6.20 p.m. Started off once more.

7.20 p.m. Came to another river, a swift flowing mountain stream, through which we had to manhandle the car. Some of the baggage got drenched, as the water was deeper than we thought.

7.35 p.m. Started off again, but 5 minutes later had to manhandle the car across another stream.

7.50 p.m. Started again, the road winding upwards into wild, hilly country. Having learnt from a passer-by that we were still less than half way to Hokusei and that it would be dangerous to go any further in the gathering dusk, we decided to stop at a mountain village named Teidori, which we reached about 8.30 p.m. Villagers very interested, as most of them had never seen a car before. The only accommodation was a dirty little room measuring 6’ by 6’ which Kobayashi, Inagawa and I had to share between us. This belonged to a so-called Korean inn, which did not even boast of a washing place, so we had to perform our ablutions in a pail of water out in the open. As we did not like to risk the very dirty looking Korean food, we bought a chicken and some eggs and consumed these. Thought of sleeping outside in the open, but was warned against doing so on account of wolves. It seems that, in the hot weather, Koreans like sleeping out of doors and, as a result, quite a number, especially children, get killed by wolves every year.

Monday 7th July 1924

Intended to set off 6.30 a.m., but the local police found that our driver had forgotten his licence and they insisted that he must return to Joshin for it! We argued and offered to sign
declarations that he really had one, but all to no avail. The chief policeman was courteous and
gave us green tea but he was obdurate, and it was nearly 9 a.m. before he eventually agreed
to let us proceed after we had sworn by all that's holy that the necessary would be supplied in
due course.

Normally only one Japanese and one or two Korean police are kept in these mountain
villages, but owing to the temporary increase in population in this district just at present,
resulting from the construction of a new 2 to 3 ken [4-5 metre width] road from Tansen to
Rigen, the number of police has been increased and in this village there are now 2 Japanese
and 3 Korean policemen, their duty being to patrol the neighbouring country as well as the
village itself.

Most police officers in isolated districts like this are connected by 'phone to the main police
stations, but this one has no 'phone and it was due to this fact that no confirmation of the
driver's veracity could be obtained from Joshin direct.

[In frontier districts] owing to the formation of the country, raiders have no great difficulty in
being able to assemble under cover, and police posts are not infrequently overwhelmed as a
result of the raiders cutting telephone wires and thereby rendering telephonic appeals for help
impossible.

Set off in the car at 8.50 a.m. and a few minutes later were held up at a river spanned by a
very dilapidated trestle bridge with large gaps in it. The No.2 Japanese policeman, who had
done much to break down the opposition of his chief to our departure, came to our help and
conscripted a number of villagers to bring planks and help mend the bridge, and some 20 or
30 minutes later the car was able to crawl very gingerly across it.

From there to the top of Magetsurei (1,000 ft.) was about 1 ri [2 miles] and the road, which
was nothing more than a track for pack animals, was strewn with boulders and cut by
numerous rivulets as well as being too steep for the car, so we had to get out and push the
old bus pretty well the whole way to the top - a very sweaty operation in the blazing sun. The
badness of the "road" and the wildness of the country clearly demonstrated the truth of what
we were told last night, viz. that it would have been dangerous to try it in the dark! Our police
friend accompanied us to the top of the Pass, which we reached shortly after 10.30 a.m. and
which I decided could only have been reached by either a "Ford" or a Tank.

On reaching the top of the Pass we found to our relief that a well-graded road with a good
looking surface existed on the other side. This is one of the new roads recently completed by
the Japanese and we were told that the new road from Tansen up to this point is to be
opened to traffic on September 15th. Setting off from the top of the Pass shortly after 10.30
a.m. we started down the new road on the other side, but found that it only went a few miles
and then we got onto a bad road again. Even the new road, though well-engineered, had a
poor surface in places and was too soft for heavy traffic. One felt that the Japanese were
making the same mistake here as one sees in other parts of Korea. They spend huge sums of
money in opening up the country by building good roads in all directions, but having built them
they let them get bad for want of attention - a false form of economy.
At 11.45 a.m. we had another puncture and were held up for 20 minutes mending it, and from then until we reached Kunsen [Kwanso-ri] on the coast at 12.50, the road was crossed by so many ditches and streams that we were continually having to get out of the car in order to manhandle it across these obstacles. At Kunsen we halted for an hour in order to drink some beer and to discuss business with a local sub-buyer.

Leaving there at 2 p.m. we reached Rigen 20 minutes later, the surface of the intervening road being quite good. There we had lunch, a shave, and a wash-down, and visited a local sub- buyer; it was 5.50 p.m. before we got started again, as we found that, in the meantime, two of our tires had burst as a result of the car having been left out in the sun. As it was 92 degrees in the shade, this was hardly to be wondered at.

The road on from Rigen was quite good compared to what we had already experienced, but it was cut in innumerable places by unbridged streams, all of which had to be forded. Owing to the strain on the engines ever since we had left Joshin, the water in the carburettor had boiled over time and again and we had used up all our lub[ricant] oil, so, as we had been unable to obtain fresh supplies anywhere, we had bought a large bottle of olive oil in Rigen so we had to use it as a substitute. Owing, however, to the strain going up the range of hills on the other side of Rigen, we soon used this up and were in a bad fix when we met a "jitney" coming from the direction of Hokusei and were able to buy a tin of lub[ricant] oil from the driver. After 3 more punctures, we eventually got out of the hills and reached Shokori [Soho-ri] at 9 p.m.

From there to Hokusei, 5 ri further on, the road was level and the surface good.

It is said that up to a few years ago the country between Rigen and Shokori was infested by malcontents and "bad hats", who caused a deal of trouble and danger, but that now the Japanese have got the district well in hand. At 10.15 p.m. we at last reached Hokusei and put up at a very good Japanese inn.

Tuesday 8th July 1924

[Travelling down the coast from Hokusei to Kanko (Hamhung) via Shimpo (Sinpo) and Kogen (Hongwon).]

Kanko is a flourishing-looking town and the present terminus of the main railway. The road leading in to the town was crowded with Koreans returning from market, mostly on foot. One man, however, in a bull cart, did not get out of the way as quickly as our Korean driver wished. He therefore stopped the car, jumped out, and beat his surprised countryman over the head and body with a wooden stick! They say that the Japanese illtreat the Koreans, but judging from this incident one is inclined to think that the Koreans ill-treat their own countrymen much more than do the Japanese.

Wednesday 9th July 1924

[Caught the train from Hamhung to Gensan (Wonsan)]

[In Gensan]

After a bathe in the sea, Taisei, Yoshida etc. gave us a Japanese dinner in the open under the pines. Much to my surprise, one of the "neesan"[waitress] who waited on us was a young Russian girl - a refugee from Vladivostok. Tells me her two brothers were killed in the War
and her parent were, she believes, killed by the Bolsheviks. She and her sister had to flee from Moscow after the Revolution and took refuge in Vladivostok until it was evacuated by the Japanese, when they had to flee once more and escaped into Korea. Her love for Germans and Bolsheviks is, needless to say, less than nil; and although she says the Japanese are very good to her, she finds it very lonely living by herself amongst them and says she misses having no opera to go to!

Thursday 10th July 1924
Arrived Keijo [Seoul] and found Ellwell [Rising Sun Petroleum Co.] laid low with dysentery. Both houses [of the Diet in Tokyo] have passed resolutions against the anti-Japanese law [U.S. law against Japanese immigration into the States] and feelings are still very sore about it, but the main crisis appears to be over.

Another question much to the fore at present is that of Sakhalin. It was on this question that both the Dairen and Changchun conferences [between Soviet and Japanese representatives] broke down. Joffe and Goto also had great difficulty with it and now Yoshizawa and Karakhan seem to be held up for the same reason. Kato, when out of power, was loud in his demands for evacuation [by Japanese troops from northern Sakhalin] but now he has changed completely round. The reason for this complete "volte face" on his part is said to be that, whereas formerly Bolshevik rule was uncertain and the occupation of the island was therefore likely to continue for an indefinite length of time, it now appears to be an established form of rule under a stable Government with which negotiations can be carried out. He therefore contends that evacuation cannot be carried out whilst negotiations are still in progress. The Japanese Press is divided in its opinions as to the best course to take.

[Returning to Britain, having left the Rising Sun Petroleum Company because they had dispensed with the post of political adviser and had offered Kennedy the choice of going to Moji in Kyushu as a sales representative or resigning. Kennedy was to sail from Kobe to Vancouver in Canada, cross Canada by rail and sail from Canada to Southampton.]

Thursday 24th July 1924
Left Kobe. Just as boat was leaving I received a wire from Piggott [British Military Attaché in Tokyo] saying most important that I see him in Tokyo before I leave Japan.

Friday 25th July 1924
[The boat] put in to Shimizu for a cargo of tea, so I went ashore. I went up to Shizuoka [and] left for Tokyo [where I] was met at the station by Colonel Piggott. The reason for his telegram is that the job of Reuter's Correspondent in Tokyo is now vacant and he has suggested me for it if I care to try for it. Had a long talk with him about it and other possibilities. Awfully good of him to do so much for me.

Saturday 26th July 1924
Interesting talk with Piggott about military situation. The Military Party are generally accused of being the aggressors, but according to him he has definite proofs that the Army wanted to withdraw from Siberia in 1922; from Sakhalin in 1923; and to withdraw the Railway Guards
from Manchuria. It was the Foreign Office who insisted on retaining the two former and the local civilians who insisted on the retention of the latter. It is also the civilians who are pressing for an increase of troops in Korea, but the Army are against it for the same reason as they pressed for the withdrawals from Siberia, Sakhalin, and Manchuria viz. the interference which it causes to training.

In regard to the proposed reduction in the number of infantry divisions, Piggott says the Army will never agree to it, though they may agree to divisions being reduced in size.

The new Cabinet is said to be very thick with Mitsubishi as a result of both Kato [Prime Minister] and Shidehara [Foreign Minister] being married to daughters of Iwasaki. It is even reputed that Mitsubishi had inner knowledge of the [tariff on import of luxury goods] in time to enable them to make huge imports of some of the articles affected.

Monday 4th August 1924
[Arrived Vancouver]

Tuesday 5th August 1924

Had a talk with a Japanese fellow by name of Ninomiya, who is very upset about the new anti-Japanese Law in the U.S. His wife is American and he himself has lived over 20 years in the U.S. and his two children have been registered as Americans; but under the new [immigration] law he himself is debarred from staying more than 6 months in America as he was not actually in the Country on July 1st.

Wednesday 20th August 1924
[Arrived Southampton]

**Reuters' Correspondent in Japan, 1925 - 1934**

Tuesday 26th August 1924

Up to [London] in morning and called on Sir Roderick Jones [Head of Reuters] about the post of Reuters' Correspondent in Tokyo. Had a long talk with him and he has promised to get me into touch with some of the papers with a view to fixing up to supply them with articles on Japan in the event of my getting the job. Also met Murray, his secretary, and Buchan, his chief editor.

When Sir Roderick introduced me to Buchan, I asked jokingly, "Any relation to the John Buchan?". Much surprised when he replied, "He is the John Buchan". I had always visualised him as a rather tough sort of character, not the smallish, quiet little man I saw before me.

[Kennedy had taken a close interest in the Japanese political and economic situation as part of his work as a political adviser to the Rising Sun Petroleum Company. With the prospect of a career in journalism he also took an interest in the situation in China, where rival warlords were struggling for power.]

Wednesday 27th August 1924
The war between Kiangsu (North of Shanghai) and Chekiang (South of Shanghai) seems to be causing trouble in Shanghai, as the line to Nanking has been cut and rail communication with Peking is therefore impossible.

Thursday 28th August 1924

See by the papers that it has been definitely decided to reduce the [Japanese] Army by four divisions but to have three in Korea and that the period of conscript service is probably to be reduced to 1 year. The money to be saved thereby is to be used mainly on air defence and gas.

Thursday 4th September 1924

Fighting around Shanghai seems to be going strong, and I see a detachment of 150 Japanese troops have been sent there.

Monday 22nd September 1924

See by the papers that Chang Tso-lin has come to some sort of agreement with the Soviet about the Chinese Eastern Railway and that the Peking Government is very fed up about it, as they say that the Soviet has no right to make agreements of this kind when Chang is in open rebellion.

Monday 29th September 1924

Adachi, the Japanese Representative at Geneva, seems to be causing a certain amount of perturbation at the League of Nations pow wow, as he has presented an amendment, without which he refuses to sign the Protocol on Arbitration, Security and Disarmament. If Japan signs it without amendment, it means that she would be regarded as the aggressor in the event of a dispute on the question of immigration and would therefore have the forces of the whole League brought against her. She therefore insists that immigration shall not be regarded as an entirely domestic matter and wants an amendment to that effect, as otherwise an immigration dispute cannot be brought to the League for arbitration, as, by the Protocol, the League has no say in matters of domestic policy.

Thursday 2nd October 1924

Adachi's amendment to the Protocol has been accepted by the League after alterations in the wording, but it is feared that, in consequence, the U.S. is less likely to join than ever.

Thursday 23rd October 1924

Went to Reuters for interview with Sir Roderick Jones. He definitely offered me the job at £600 a year and will keep the offer open until I have had time to look round for a means of supplementing this income, for which purpose he has promised to give me introductions to the "Morning Post", "Observer" and "Yorkshire Post". As I would only be on a half-time job, Reuters would not pay my passage, though Sir Roderick hinted that they would probably help me with it. If I take it I shall probably leave for Japan about the end of January and would contract for 3 years.

Saturday 25th October 1924

Papers report that Feng Yu-hsiang has now seized Peking and dismissed Wu Pei-fu.
Papers report that Wu is still fighting and that he controls Tientsin.

Tuesday 28th October 1924

One hundred U.S. marines have been landed at Taku and sent up to Peking, and Japan is reported to be ready to despatch a force for protective purposes in case of China's anticipated violation of the Boxer Protocol by operations along the Peking-Tientsin railway. Japan can increase her troops in China five-fold without exceeding the number stipulated in the Protocol, which she does not wish to exceed. Shidehara's firm stand for non-intervention is much praised. Tokyo papers assert that Feng betrayed Wu for 5,000,000 dollars received from Chang.

Monday 10th November 1924

Went on to Cumberland Place for interview with Garvin. A heavily-built, clean-shaven man with longish hair, except for some baldish patches, he wears horn-rimmed glasses and speaks with a curious, almost foreign, accent and leaves one with the impression that he is a careful student and deep-thinker, but inclined to be an idealist and to be set on retaining Anglo-American friendship at all costs, e.g. although he seems friendly disposed towards Japan and sympathetic with her, he holds the view that, no matter what happens, Britain must help America in the event of a Japanese-American War. In part, this is due to his belief that Australia and Canada would insist on joining in and that the effect on India would be dangerous if Japan happened to defeat the U.S.

Had a long interesting talk with him and was impressed by the intense interest shown by him in Japanese affairs. He has offered me £120 a year for 12 articles of 1,000 to 1,500 words each, and extra payment for anything over an above this number for which he may ask.

Tuesday 11th November 1924

Although Japan's financial condition is none too good, the general idea seems to be that it will become no worse, though it will be many years before it can recover. Sir Charles Eliot [British Ambassador to Tokyo] says the Japanese authorities realise that the present adverse balance between revenue and expenditure cannot be continued indefinitely and that loans from foreign countries to make good this balance would only make conditions worse in the future. They intend therefore to carry out drastic economies though, in doing so, they are bound to meet with strong opposition from the departments concerned. This I heard at the War Office, where I was shown a copy of Sir Charles Eliot's despatch to the Foreign Office.

Saturday 17th January 1925

Letter from Jeans, Reuters' Chief Editor, giving some points for guidance in my work. Looks as though I shall have to tread warily, especially when cabling news connected with the Pacific Question [Japanese-U.S. relations].

Monday 19th January 1925

The situation in Shanghai seems none too good, as Lu Yung-hsiang is employing Russian "White" troops lent by Chang, and looting and burning are proceeding merrily in the neighbourhood of the Foreign Concessions.
[Kennedy was offered, and accepted, the post of Reuters correspondent in Tokyo. He sailed for Japan in January 1925 on board the N.Y.K. Line's Hakone Maru.]

Saturday 31st January 1925
The U.S. Naval manoeuvres, which are being held from January 4th for 6 months in the Pacific, seem to be causing considerable concern in Japan and several semi-official protests have been made to Washington. The main objective seems to be the expulsion of an imaginary enemy from Java and driving him towards the Orient across the Pacific.

Tuesday 10th March 1925
[On boat returning to Japan]
Several of the Japanese on board have spoken to me at different times very openly on [the subject of Japan-U.S. relations] and seem to regard it as as foregone conclusion that, sooner or later, there will be a war between the two countries.

Friday 13th March 1925
Arrived Shanghai. Went round to Reuters [Reuters Far Eastern Headquarters at Shanghai] to see Turner [Manager] and found that I have to stay on here for a few days to learn the ropes at this end.

Sunday 15th March 1925
The trouble in South China between the Cantonese [Kuomintang] and Chen Chiung-ming's people continues, despite the belief that Sun Yat-sen's death might put an end to the fighting. The Cantonese have taken Swatow, where, it is said, anti-Christian and Bolshevik demonstrations and propaganda are now in full swing. There seems to be a general belief that Sun's party, the Kuomintang, is likely to break up shortly. The saner members of it are very much against the "Red" element.

Papers report the inauguration of a Soviet Consul-General at Mukden on the 13th, and I am told there is one in Shanghai too, though most of the local Russians are "Whites". The Soviet has objected to the appointment of Sato, former Japanese Minister at Warsaw, as Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow, though no reason is given for their action in rejecting him.

The Japanese Diet has voted special expenditure for the opening of an Embassy in Moscow, 6 consulates in Siberia, and one in Odessa.

Papers report that Takarabe has hopes of obtaining from 2-300,000 tons of oil per year from Sakhalin, i.e. half the Navy's requirements.

Tuesday 17th March 1925
Wearne arrived from Peking yesterday to take over from Turner. Says that Karakhan [Soviet Ambassador to Peking] is regarded rather as a social outcast, though he is to be recognised as Doyen of the Corps Diplomatique.

Met a man named Harris, formerly Reuter's agent in Vladivostok. Owing to his knowledge of Russian, he was employed on M.I. work during the War and, later on, was sent to Simla [Indian Army Intelligence] and then on up to Kabul on political work. He is now on night work at Reuters in Shanghai.
Had [Captain] Wahl [of the Shanghai International Settlement Police] to dinner, which we had at the Cabaret show on the ground floor of the Plaza. Most of the men dining there were accompanied by Russian women of a very fast type. During the dinner there were intervals for dancing and intervals, during which Russian dancers in very scanty attire performed for the edification of those dining. I wonder what the Chinese think of such exhibitions of western culture.

Friday 20th March 1925
Arrived Kobe and left for Tokyo.

Monday 23rd March 1925
[The Japan Times gives a full report] of the action brought by Sinclair Oil Co. against the Soviet Government. The latter openly admits that it gave Sinclair the concessions in Sakhalin in the hope that the U.S. Government would be induced to take diplomatic action against Japan. The Sinclair people say they made 3 attempts to get their government to back up their claim against Japan, but Washington very wisely refused. Sinclair are, naturally, very angry with the Soviet for cancelling the concession and are trying to retrieve the $200,000 deposited with the Soviet as guarantee money. The Soviet maintains that this money has been forfeited by virtue of the fact that the oil company was unable to carry out the work.

Tuesday 24th March 1925
Called at the "[Japan] Advertiser" office and saw Frank Hedges, the present editor, Morris, Tait and Johnstone. Have been asked to join their staff and to write one leading article a week and other matter. Have declined the offer temporarily until I know how much time I shall have for work of this kind.

Hear that Goto is very unpopular with the Foreign Office and is leader of the Russo-Japanese entente policy group as opposed to Shidehara, who favours Anglo-Japanese-U.S. co-operation. There is also said to be friction between Shidehara and Hayashi.

Thursday 26th March 1925
Learned much of interest about the various news services - Reuter, Kokusai, Havas, A.P., and Wolff, are all closely connected and interlinked, and Rosta [predecessor of Tass] wants to join in, but is too much of a Soviet propaganda show at present. The Toho is a Japanese Government concern and the Nippon Dempo is the organ of the Seiyukai. It was organised with Seiyukai funds during the Hara regime, and a direct line between Tokyo and Fukuoka was constructed for them at the same time for election purposes for the benefit of the "Fukuoka Nichinichi", the main organ of the Seiyukai in South West Japan.

Friday 27th March 1925
Turner [Head of Reuters' office in Shanghai on visit to Japan] was very interesting on the subject of Soviet propaganda in China. He says Moscow is pouring money into the country for propaganda purposes, and it is having a very noticeable effect around Canton, Shanghai and Peking. Karakhan tries to ingratiate himself amongst the coolie class in Peking by paying large sums to riksha-men etc.

Monday 6th April 1925
Northern Sakhalin is now clear of Japanese troops, the evacuation from north of 51 degrees 10 minutes North Longditude having been completed on the 4th. There seems, however, to be a hitch in the negotiations about handing over the radio stations to Russia.

Thursday 9th April 1925
Abrikosov [Dmitri Abrikosov, Tsarist Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo until April 1925] does not say much, but one can see that he feels pretty deeply about the Soviet having taken over the Russian Embassy in accordance with the terms of the new Russo-Japanese Treaty.

Wednesday 15th April 1925
Russo-Japanese Treaty ratifications were exchanged to-day at Peking, à propos of which Colonel Piggott [British Military Attaché] tells me that he twitted [Count] Soyeshima jokingly the other day about his coming mission to Moscow, whereupon Soyeshima retorted - "It is you and your country who are forcing us into the arms of Russia. We want to be your friends, but you won't let us be".

The basis of his contention was so obvious that Piggott was unable to deny the accusation. If Japan decides to risk no more rebuffs from Britain and America, and goes over to the pro-Russian group headed by Goto, who advocates a Russo-Japanese-German combination, there is bound to be trouble in the future.

Colonel Piggott tells me that General Tanaka [Giichi], who looks like becoming the next Premier, is pro-Russian in his sympathies owing to his time there as a Language Officer in bygone days. If, therefore, he rises to the Premiership, it is probably that he will advocate much the same policy as Goto.

Saturday 18th April 1925
Wrote a long letter to Shanghai [Reuters' Far East Area Headquarters] about the Japanese naval construction messages, as some of the London papers seem to have misconstrued them to mean a new programme [of construction]. Sir Bertrand Russell, according to advices received here, has been writing a very scarist article on it in the "Daily Express".

Friday 24th April 1925
Kopp, the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador arrived in Tokyo from Moscow. The papers report a speech of his at Harbin, in which he said that his Government regarded the new Treaty with Japan as nothing more than a scrap of paper, used as a stepping-stone to force American recognition. It may be true that he holds these views, but it seems unlikely that he would be such a fool as to express them publicly.

Colonel Piggott told me some interesting things about General Fukuda, who is retiring on May 1st. He and General Tanaka hate each other and, on a recent occasion when they were both invited to dine at the [British] Embassy, they refused to speak to each other. Fukuda is a very able man and is of the Satsuma Clan. He is also at logger-heads with Goto on account of his, Fukuda’s, action in ordering a Soviet ship to leave the Martial Law area at the time of the earthquake [1923]. Reminiscent of the scrap between Goto [Mayor of Tokyo] and Akaike when the latter, as Chief of the Metropolitan Police, had Joffe’s baggage searched.
Colonel Piggott also tells me that General Itami is to be succeeded by General Matsui as Director of Military Intelligence. Matsui is an expert on China, having been many years in South China and in Nanking. For years past the Director of Military Intelligence has been either a British or American expert, so this looks like a further indication of a change in policy.

Monday 27th April 1925
Come to an agreement with "Japan Advertiser" to supply four leading articles and 6 or 8 others, totalling about 15,000 words a month for $200 per month.

Tuesday 28th April 1925
Kato Naoshi came in to see me. He is now Editor of the "Mainichi" English Edition. He maintains that Takahashi has been forced out of the Seiyukai Presidency because he can bring no further funds to his Party, whereas Tanaka has plenty at his disposal - or rather, according to Kato, he has received valuable concessions in land etc. from Chang Tso-lin. The story sounds rather unlikely, as Chang is receiving money from Japan, though it may be that Chang has promised railway or other similar concessions, which the Seiyukai could hand over to concerns like Okura, and that, in exchange, Chang will be assisted to power by Japan. The famous - or rather, infamous - Uchida Ryohei of the Black Dragon Society has been brought to book at last, and has been arrested on the charge of being implicated in a plot to murder the Premier.

Monday 4th May 1925
Went to the General Staff to say good-bye to General Itami, who leaves for Kanazawa to take over command of the 9th Division shortly. Met with a very friendly reception from him, and find that he has given instructions to afford me special facilities for obtaining military information.

Tuesday 5th May 1925
Kopp presented his credentials to the Prince Regent this morning. I am told that his presence at official dinners is greatly resented by the diplomats of the other Powers, and that the wives refuse to speak to him.

Wednesday 6th May 1925
Had an interview with Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister. He seems a genial old fellow, and speaks excellent English. Tells me that his speech at the Gubernatorial Conference yesterday, as reported in the "Asahi" is quite incorrect; but he added, with a laugh, that the reported one was so good that he does not want it altered! He commented on the fact that I had been a Regular, so I told him I was merely setting the example, followed by General Tanaka, of changing from uniform into mufti. He seemed delighted at the comparison, and chortled over it with great glee.

Friday 8th May 1925
Had an interview with Mr. Bancroft, the American Ambassador, whom I had not met before. [He] gives the impression of being a bit aggressive.

Wednesday 13th May 1925
Eubank [the Associated Press correspondent] made rather a fool of himself [at a dinner party] by professing to know everything there is to know about the Far East, and proving that his
knowledge of it is precisely nil. I have seldom heard anyone talk more concentrated rot on the subject. No wonder America gets such distorted views on Japan and the Far East if they have men of this type as their chief news distributors.

Tuesday 19th January 1926

Komura tells me that, despite expectations to the contrary, the Cabinet last night decided against raising the tariff on pig-iron, the Premier supporting the Foreign and Finance ministries against the Minister for Commerce who, goaded on by Mitsui's and other pig-iron interests, fought hard for a rise.

Thursday 21st January 1926

Baron Sakatani, after commenting on Shidehara's speech in the Upper House, drew attention to the increasing gravity of the situation in Northern Manchuria and asked the Government about its attitude, to which Shidehara replied that he regarded the friction between Chang and the Soviet over the operation of the line between Harbin and Changchun as a purely Sino-Soviet problem. He added that he thought it unlikely to lead to hostilities, though the Japanese Government was watching possible developments vigilantly lest action became necessary.

The trouble has arisen from the Soviet officials' refusal to transport Chang's troops down to Changchun at the time of the Kuo rebellion, their ostensible reason being that he wanted to get them transported without payment. Chang contends that the Sino-Russian agreement on the Chinese Eastern Railway entitles him to free transportation in such instances. Probably neither party is free from blame, though there is no doubt that the Soviet have been extending their influence in the management of the line unduly, and have precipitated matters by their latest action in cutting of all railway communication between Harbin and Changchun - an action which affects the interests of Japan and others besides those of Russia and China, as this is the busy season for the transportation of the soya bean and other important products, and consignments have, therefore, to be diverted to Vladivostok instead of to Dairen, which means a loss to the South Manchurian Railway and therefore to Japan.

Friday 22nd January 1926

Attended a farewell reception to Sir Charles Eliot [British Ambassador], given by the British community.

Saturday 23rd January 1926

The Chinese Eastern Railway question has now resulted in the arrest of Ivanov, the Soviet Manager at Harbin, by Chang's men.

Monday 25th January 1926

Had a talk with Komura about the Chinese Eastern Railway trouble. Tells me that, despite reports to the contrary, Japan has no intention of offering her services as mediator, but will continue her policy of "watchful waiting". Though he regards the situation as delicate, he thinks both parties are bluffing and that, for that reason, hostilities are unlikely to break out.

Thursday 28th January 1926
Nakamura, a police official, came in to see me and to find out my views on the dangers of Bolshevism in Japan! Another indication of Japan’s fears in this respect. Kato Naoshi [editor of the “Nichi Nichi”] also turned up to see me quite unexpectedly and questioned me on the same subject and on what I thought about Sino-Russian relations and the possibilities of China coming under Communism. An interesting coincidence that a police official and a newspaper editor should come to see me on the same subject the same day, and rather shows the way the wind blows. Whilst Kato was with me, Iwanaga suddenly hurried in with a very worried expression on his face, and announced that Viscount Kato, the Premier, has died suddenly.

Later in the day, the whole Cabinet tendered their resignations to the Regent, who thereupon sent off Viscount Irie to Okitsu to consult the last surviving genro, Prince Saionji.

Friday 29th January 1926

Learned that Wakatsuki had been summoned to the Palace, and about 10.30 p.m. received a telephone message to say that the Cabinet is to be re-appointed without any changes, Wakatsuki himself retaining the Home portfolio as well as being Premier.

Monday 1st February 1926

Sir Charles Eliot left for Home after nearly 6 years out here as Ambassador. Wrote an article about him for the Japan Advertiser some time ago, and it is coming out tomorrow.

Wednesday 3rd February 1926

Walser [a flight-lieutenant from India] came in to say goodbye, so before he left, I did my best to point out the fallacy of thinking that Japan has any intentions of attacking Australia - a belief which, according to Walser, is gaining ground in India, and seems to originate from the very scarist anti-Japanese articles in the semi-official Air Force magazine, “The Aeroplane”. As matters stand at present, the very idea of the whole thing seems absurd. Fifty years hence it might be feasible, but under present conditions such a scheme would be totally impracticable and doomed to failure - besides which, Japan is much too interested in the Asiatic mainland to divert her attention to wild-goose schemes for the conquest of Australia.

Thursday 4th February 1926

Looked up Major Hill, who arrived from England last night to take over from Colonel Piggott [as Military Attaché], who leaves for Home on the 24th.

Friday 5th February 1926

Met Kinney, the writer, for the first time. He is now doing propaganda work of sorts for the South Manchurian Railway.

Wednesday 10th February 1926

The Dohokai carried out their fusion with the Seiyukai today, thus giving the latter 160 seats against the Kenseikai’s 160, so the fate of the Diet rests in the hands of the Seiyuhonto with their 90.

Friday 12th February 1926

Komura tells me he expects the Diet to be dissolved next week, which will mean - (1) Tariff Revision will not take place; (2) last year's budget will be re-enforced automatically; (3) a
General Election, the first under Universal Manhood Suffrage, will be held within three months.

Komura thinks that, if Kato had not died, the dissolution would have been avoided, as the Seiyuhonto would have supported the Government, the reason for this being that Tokonami hoped that Kato would retire after the session and would recommend him as his successor. With Kato dead, and Wakatsuki in power, Tokonami would have very little chance of the premiership this year by supporting the Kenseikai.

Saturday 13th February 1926
Wakatsuki has gone off down to Okitsu to see Saionji - presumably to ask his advice about dissolution, which most people seem to regards as imminent, though Eubank tells me that Count Kabayama, who knows what is going on in the background, has bet him 10 to 3 against dissolution.

In evening dined at the Imperial with the Language Officers, who gave a farewell to the Piggotts. All the Language Officers, except for Macpherson were present:
Chappell (R.A.F.); E.V. Longinotto A.F.C. (R.A.F.); G.T. Wards (84th Punjabis); B.P Dicker (15th Punjabis); A.R. Boyce (Royal Engineers); C.G.O. Brennan (16th Punjabis); A.B. Millar (13th Frontier Rifles); Stockton (R.F.A.); Humpherson (Royal Warwicks); Ridley (Royal Engineers).

Monday 15th February 1926
The Kenseikai and the Seiyuhonto have come to an eleventh-hour compromise, and dissolution, which was regarded as a certainty a day or two ago, is now believed to be unlikely.

Saturday 20th February 1926
Attended farewell tea to the Piggotts. M. Patek, the Polish Minister, came up to me and, in loud and excited tones, asked me if I knew whether there was any truth in a certain cable from London, which made out that Japan was opposed to France's proposal for Poland, Spain, and Brazil to be given permanent seats on the Council of the League of Nations in order to offset Germany's entry. Komura had assured me this morning that the Cabinet had not even discussed the question as yet, so no decision had been made as to Japan's attitude. I told this to Patek, and the old fellow was frightfully pleased, and started gesticulating and saying that Germany must be kept down at all costs and that it was essential, therefore to give Poland etc. seats on the Council.
The awkward part of the whole affair was that Dr. Solf, the German Ambassador, was standing beside me all the time, and must have heard every word that was said! Certainly Tétu, the French Air Attaché, heard it all, as I could see him listening attentively! And that is the Locarno Spirit!!

Monday 22nd February 1926
Shot cards on Sir John Tilley, the new Ambassador, and on his son, though both were out. Another Cabinet crisis has been narrowly averted, as Sengoku, the Railway Minister, wanted to resign on account of his railway construction bill being turned down. The Premier and
General Ugaki, however, between them have induced him to stay on, though Komura tells me he will probably resign as soon as the session is over. As Sengoku is, or rather was, adviser to the Mitsubishi interests, his membership in the Cabinet is, for financial reasons, almost essential, according to Komura. No wonder it is known as "the Mitsubishi Cabinet", as the family ties - e.g. Shidehara and the late Count Kato - and financial ties are so strong.

Tuesday 23rd February 1926

Very sorry the Piggotts have gone, as they have been so extraordinarily good to us both.

Friday 26th February 1926

Feng is said to be on his way back to Peking, backed up by Soviet promises, whilst Chang [Tso-lin] and Wu have renewed their former friendship and are setting off to help Li Ching-lin against the National [Kuomintang] Army. A wonderful country is China!

Wednesday 3rd March 1926

Komura tells me confidentially that Viscount Ishii has been instructed to follow Britain's lead in the matter of voting for, or against, the enlargement of the League Council at Geneva. Meantime the question is bringing out very heated controversy in England and elsewhere in Europe.

The new Ambassador, Sir John Tilley, seems a quiet, unassuming old fellow, with a kindly, benevolent expression in his face.

Thursday 4th March 1926

The Diet is getting very excited over the scandals in which Generals Tanaka and Yamanashi are alleged to be implicated. Tanaka is said to have obtained a loan of Yen 3,000,000 for political purposes some months ago and failed to pay the negotiator any commission. He is also accused - together with General Sugano and others - of having misappropriated large sums of money for military purposes during the Siberian Campaign.

Yamanashi is accused of having tried to bribe Seiyuhonto men to desert to the Seiyukai, and Dr. Egi, Minister for Justice, is accused of having had a hand in the plot to assassinate the late Premier last year - his alleged intention being to act the part of "agent provocateur" in order to obtain the removal of Uchida Ryohei and others implicated in the plot.

Friday 5th March 1926

The stillborn Proletarian Party was resurrected this morning at Osaka, minus all extreme elements, under the name of Labour Agrarian Party (Nomin-Rodoto).

Wednesday 10th March 1926

Had an interesting talk on the Land Question with Tsurumi (Goto's son-in-law), who tells me that 90% of the so-called landlords in Japan own less than 2.5 acres each, and there are less than 1,000 individuals owning any large amount of land. Owing to the high price of land, agricultural pursuits - after deducting the cost of labour, seeds, manure etc. - leave no margin for profit, and the only way the farmers can make enough to live on is by indulging in side industries e.g. silk. Owing to the narrow margin left even so, the daughters are sometimes sold as prostitutes - a terrible state of affairs.

Friday 12th March 1926
The numerous charges and countercharges [of corruption etc.] that have been made culminated last night in a free fight in the Lower House, resulting in bloodshed, though no one was seriously injured.

Saturday 13th March 1926

Looked in to the Foreign Office to see Komura about the attitude of the Government towards China's latest outrage, three Japanese destroyers being fired on yesterday on their way up river to Tientsin, resulting in four officers being wounded - one seriously.

Monday 15th March 1926

Looked up Captain Terashima at the Navy Department. He rather confirms my opinion about the reason the destroyers [that were fired on by the Chinese] retired [rather than pressing on to Tientsin]. The present Government is all out for gaining China's friendship and is taking no chances, as it fears another anti-Japanese boycott more than anything - China's chief, and most effective weapon, against Japan.

Thursday 18th March 1926

Komura tells me that General Lu, the Kuomintang Commander at Tientsin, has intimated, through the medium of a go-between, that he is prepared to accept responsibility for the Toku incident. The ultimatum sent by the Protocol Powers demanding the immediate reopening of communications between Tientsin and the sea in accordance with the terms of the Boxer Agreement, has also been answered satisfactorily. A remarkable feature of the whole affair has been the extraordinary mildness of the Japanese Press in its comments. One might almost imagine that this was due to Government instructions, but Komura assures me that nothing of the kind has been done and that it is due entirely to the changed attitude of the Japanese people as a whole towards China in the last few years.

Friday 26th March 1926

Had a long talk with Davidson about the Tsingtao Campaign [1914], in which he acted as an interpreter. His sympathies on that occasion were entirely with the Japanese and he spoke very strongly against Colonel Pringle, Barnadiston's Chief of Staff, who was very anti-Japanese from the outset and induced Barnadiston to wire to Kitchener to allow the British contingent to act independently of the Japanese. Kitchener's reply was to order him to place himself unreservedly under the orders of General Kaiio!

It was Colonel Pringle who wrote to the War Office in 1921 telling them to place no faith in the Japanese at the Washington Conference. His letters all came to me when I was working in M.I.2c at the time, and I remember commenting on them very strongly to King.

Tuesday 6th April 1926

Went to the Premier's official residence for an informal tea-party given by him to the foreign correspondents. I had not met him before and was surprised to find that he only knew a few words of English. He gives the impression of being quiet and unassuming, and has a very pleasant, though not very forceful, personality. He is said to be very popular with all parties in the Diet and is credited with considerable administrative ability, though he has the reputation of being rather over-fond of the bottle.
Thursday 22nd April 1926
The chaos in China continues.

Saturday 24th April 1926
The papers are commenting a great deal on Chang's demand for Karakhan's removal from Peking. The "Izvestia" is very angry about it and threatens to hold Chang doubly responsible if any harm befalls him.

Chang's relations with the Soviet have been none too cordial of late. First there was the incident of Ivanov and the Chinese Eastern Railway; then the Soviet Consul at Mukden, who was getting on famously with Chang, was removed to Tientsin by the Moscow Government; and now there is this case of Karakhan's removal. If trouble arises between the two, Japan is bound to be drawn in, so the situation is rather delicate and needs careful handling.

Wednesday 28th April 1926
The dissolution of the Kokusai Tsushinsha ["International News Agency"] and its amalgamation, for the collection of incoming news, with the Toho and the eight leading papers under the name of Nihon Shimbun Rengosha ["Japan Newspaper Alliance"], which is to come into effect on May 1st, has been announced today. It will be organised on the same lines as the A.P. of America on a non-profit basis. Owing, however, to the Kokusai's agreements with Reuters etc., outgoing news will not be handled by the Rengo, so Toho remains an opponent in that respect.

Tuesday 11th May 1926
Had lunch with Wards. Says that even at the Hohei Gakko [Infantry School] military training is very antiquated.

Monday 24th May 1926
The Foreign Office issued a formal denial this morning of the report that Japan wishes to chuck up the Geneva parley and start a separate naval disarmament conference at Washington. Though the denial may be sincere, I am inclined to think that Japan would really prefer a separate conference at Washington.

Friday 11th June 1926
In commenting on Colonel Etherton's "In the Heart of Asia", which I am reading just now, Colonel Tatekawa told me that the Japanese Foreign Office made an enquiry at the General Staff a few days ago about the Japanese military mission in Turkistan mentioned by Colonel Etherton in his book. Apparently the Foreign Office had never heard of it before.

Tuesday 6th July 1926
Had an interesting talk with Abrikosov [former Tsarist Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo]. His opinion is that Chang Tso-lin is really no more friendly with White Russians than with the Red, though for the time being it pays him to make use of the Whites' hatred of the Reds. The Whites, he maintained, were partly deluded into believing that he had their interests at heart and therefore supported him. This delusion was strengthened for a time when he took their part against the Reds, when the latter tried to insist on the removal of ikons and other religious emblems from the railway stations on the Chinese Eastern Railway; but the delusion was
shattered a few months ago when Chang, in order to gain a point of sorts from the Reds, agreed to compromise by allowing the removal of ikons.

Wednesday 7th July 1926

Looked up Marquis Komura on the subject of Japan-Soviet relations, a propos of Kopp's departure for Moscow. Told me confidentially that he himself thinks that Kopp will not return and that, taken in conjunction with Karakhan's reported recall from Peking, it seems likely that Moscow is considering some change in her Far Eastern policy. He thinks that Moscow may try to jump on Kopp for failing to make headway in Japan with propaganda, but that Kopp will be able to show them the difficulties with which he has to cope on account of the vigilance of the Japanese police. Thanks to this vigilance, Komura maintains that no Bolshevik money has been given to Japanese workers, and he stated quite frankly that everyone entering or leaving the Soviet Embassy is noted by detectives specially appointed for the purpose.

Friday 9th July 1926

Had an interview with General Sato, General Tanaka's henchman, on the subject of Japan-Soviet rivalry in Manchuria. Though he agrees that the Wu-Chang combination is not likely to last long, he thinks there is no chance of either of the two joining up with the Kuominchun unless Feng gives up the commanderships, which he is now exercising from Moscow. Like Colonel Etherton, he considers the Soviet a greater menace than Tsarist Russia ever was, as it is one that works underground and cannot be seen.

Saturday 10th July 1926

Had an interesting talk with Colonel Hill on the subject of the Japanese Army. He fully agrees that, in view of Russia's proximity to Manchuria, 17 divisions cannot be regarded as too large, as at least 10 divisions would have to be despatched on the outbreak of war in order to cover the territory between the Tumen and Changchun [Southern Manchuria], whilst two more would have to be kept in Korea, and this would leave only 5 in the Home country as a reserve. The Soviet, he thinks, could soon collect 10 or 12 divisions between Harbin and Vladivostok with more to follow.

Friday 16th July 1926

Attended a luncheon gathering of the Pan-Pacific Club as one of the guests of honour, and had to make a short speech. The other guests of honour were also all newspaper men and fixed up a regular "frame up", which was nothing more nor less than U.P. propaganda, setting out but one side of the question of reducing trans-Pacific press tolls. The whole thing is so palpably aimed at ousting Reuters from China, that I shall have to write to Shanghai to expose it.

Wednesday 4th August 1926

Hear that some fool has cabled to New York that Nagoya has been badly knocked about by yesterday's quake. Utterly unfounded reports of this kind ought to be forbidden and treated as criminal offences.

Wednesday 18th August 1926
Lunched at the Imperial with Mr. Momiyama M.P. for Fukushima, who is one of the leaders in the movement for encouraging emigration to Hokkaido. Being a Kenseikai man himself, I was rather surprised at his frankness in saying that the dissolution of the Diet next session and the forcing of a General Election is a foregone conclusion. He was also quite frank in saying that the Kenseikai would have a much better chance of returning to power if they took this step than if they tried to hold on till 1928 when the election would follow in the normal course of events.

Tuesday 31st August 1926

The "Nichi Nichi" gives what purports to be the inside story of the alleged misunderstandings that have arisen in connection with a statement made by Komura to the foreign correspondents on the 23rd on Japan's emigration policy. According to this, Mr. Adam and I appear to be the two chief culprits, as it is alleged that it was we who had the interview with Komura and that, owing to Komura's poor knowledge of English and refusal to employ an interpreter, the misunderstanding arose! The whole story is, of course, without foundation as:

a) Neither Mr. Adam nor I were present at the interview in question;
b) Komura's English is excellent and no interpreter is needed;
c) No misunderstanding has arisen, as Komura definitely asked the foreign correspondents to emphasise the facts concerning Japan's emigration policy though there is nothing actually new about it. The news value merely lay in the fact that the Foreign Office Spokesman was emphasising, in the form of an announcement, the reasons actuating this policy.

Thursday 9th September 1926

Anti-foreign feeling in China seems to be running higher than ever, and "incidents" are being reported nearly every day, culminating in a very serious case at Wanhsien, where two British vessels had been seized by the local Chinese commander. A small party of naval men was sent to effect the rescue of the ships' officers, if not the ships too. Without warning, however, heavy machine-gun fire was suddenly opened on the rescue party at point blank range as they started to come on board and a number of officers and men were killed or wounded. Two British gunboats nearby thereupon started to rake the decks with pom-pom fire and then set to work to shell the town, as the Chinese field batteries had, in the meantime, opened fire on the British gunboats from the banks of the river.

Meantime the war in China drags on, though now the main theatre of operations is the Yangtze Valley.

Friday 10th September 1926

Looked up Komura at the Foreign Office to find out the views of the Government regarding the possible developments of the Wanhsien Affair. The Japanese Government, like the Japanese Press, seems sympathetic with Great Britain, but determined to avoid intervention, as they consider it would do more harm than good.

Friday 17th September 1926

Managed to score a "scoop" for Reuters, as young Tilley [son of British Ambassador] rang me up this afternoon to give me the full account of an incident which took place at the Embassy
yesterday and which the police have been hushing up. Briefly the facts are that, during a luncheon party there in honour of the Swedish Crown Prince and Princess, Tilley [junior] suddenly saw a man holding a dagger, looking in through the window, within about 6 feet of where the Princess was sitting between Sir John Tilley and the Belgian Ambassador [Bassompière], all three with their backs to the window. Young Tilley made a dart for the window and the man bolted though, before doing so, he hurled the knife, which struck Tilley on a cigarette case which was in his breast pocket.

The curious part about it is that, although several of the guests saw Tilley dart through the window and some of them heard the knife tinkle on the ground when it fell, no one, except Tilley himself, knew what had happened until later. Incidentally the knife turned out to be a Brazilian dagger belonging to Sir John, and had been stolen from the drawing room the previous night.

I have, of course, passed on the facts to Eubank for the A.P. and he is hugely delighted at the "scoop" which we have thus gained over the other correspondents. Unfortunately Eubank, in conformity with American newspaper ethics, has inserted a number of details which he said must be true, but which I subsequently learnt were wholly unfounded - e.g. he said great confusion arose and the only calm person was the Princess, who insisted on the lunch being continued, whereas the fact is that no one, except Tilley himself and Viscount Soma, for whom he sent, knew anything about what had happened until later! Great lads, the U.S. newspaper men!

Tuesday 21st September 1926

Hear that the other newspaper men are very "sore" at having been "scooped" on the Embassy incident, as they have been ticked off by their head offices. Tilley's version is backed up by what both Colonel and Mrs. Hill, and also Petersen, have told me.

Eubank tells me that Kumasaki has been round to see him about the matter and, like some of the papers, had the d___d impertinence to make out that the whole story was staged and made up by the young Tilley in order to gain notoriety. Obviously, of course, Kumasaki is merely acting as propagandist for the police or other interested party, just as he did in the case of the Pan-Asiatic Congress in August.

He seems to be a dangerous man, as Hedges tells me he is mixed up with Uchida Ryoei and the Black Dragon group and that he is playing a double game, pretending to foreigners that he is pro-foreign, and maintaining to the reactionary organisations that he is anti-foreign.

He, so Hedges avers, was one of the main instigators of the famous raid on the Imperial in July 1924 at the time of the U.S. Immigration Bill.

Wednesday 13th October 1926

Lunched with Wards and Blanch, and heard of the latest Embassy "incident", an attempt at incendiarism. No political significance is attached but, following as it does on the recent dagger episode, the police are a bit worried.

Friday 15th October 1926
Had a visit from my police friend, Nakamura, who came along to discuss the two Embassy incidents!

Friday 22nd October 1926
Had a visit from Dicker, who has just returned from a visit to the Japanese Mandated islands in the Pacific, and had a long and interesting talk with him on the subject. He visited Pelew, Truk, Jaluit, and one or two others, and was rather amused at the way he was always accompanied by police on the grounds that the natives were dangerous savages, whereas in reality they are very peaceable and friendly.
The Japanese, it seems, have done their best to develop the islands, but have not met with much success, copra being about the only industry that thrives, though some headway has been made in the cultivation of rice. Sugar and pineapple cultivation have proved rather failures.

There are not many foreigners and the few that there are are mainly anti-Japanese - rather, in fact, like those in the China ports. The Japanese, it seems, make very little attempt to make friends either with them or with the native chiefs, though the German officials used to be very friendly with both and used to do a lot of entertaining.
The Japanese, it seems, are afraid that the natives will lose respect for them if they make friendly overtures, and therefore try to retain their dignity by adopting a somewhat overbearing attitude, and the Japanese police are apt to manhandle them at times, an action which is much resented.
The Germans were very popular with both natives and foreigners, but not so the Japanese, who, incidentally, are trying to force the former to learn their language and make the study of Japanese compulsory in the schools.
It is a pity the Japanese do not know how to deal with subject races, as they have got so many excellent characteristics otherwise.
The terms of the Washington Treaty forbid fortifications, but Dicker seems to think that they exist in embryo form nevertheless.

Tuesday 9th November 1926
Had a talk with Captain Terashima about the naval budget and replacement programme which have just received the Cabinet's approval. Although, like everyone else, he expects the Diet to be dissolved early on in the coming session, which will mean the shelving of the new budget, he seems quite convinced that some way will be found to push the replacement programme through. Nor does he seem worried by the Cabinet's action in cutting down the Navy's original demands by Yen 33,000,000 and a destroyer, a submarine, and three of the proposed special service boats - in fact he seems to take much the same attitude as Admiral Takarabe, who jokingly hinted some days ago that he was prepared to compromise, "as all merchants are prepared to come down 10% on their first demands."!
Looked up Komura at the Foreign Office. Regarding the Manchurian railway question, Komura tells me it is expected that Mukden will agree to forego its plans for construction lines which would compete so heavily with the South Manchurian Railway.

Wednesday 24th November 1926

Had a private interview with Baron Shidehara [Foreign Minister] regarding the Singapore Base, about which he was very frank, though he stipulated that no mention of his name was to be made in anything sent out about it. While acknowledging Britain's right to do what she liked at Singapore, he said it was very difficult to persuade the Japanese people that it was not aimed at them, as there seemed no reason for provision being made for capital ships if, as Britain contended, the base was only meant for vessels employed in guarding the trade routes against commerce raiders. Capital ships, as he pointed out, were not required for this work; yet, with the exception of Japan and America, there was no country which could produce a naval force in those waters powerful enough to require capital ships to deal with it. As the Japanese, according to Baron Shidehara, are unable to conceive a war between Britain and America, the natural deduction is, therefore, that the Base is being constructed with Japan in view as an enemy.

Monday 6th December 1926

Looked up Marquis Komura at the Foreign Office and had an interesting talk with him on the Chinese situation. Tells me that the Cabinet is divided in opinion as to the attitude that Japan should adopt, though the Premier and other leading members are supporting Shidehara, who urges a continuance of the present liberal policy towards China.

Also tells me that Lampson, who has just arrived from England [as Minister at Peking] and Saburi are working together in the closest co-operation, carrying out independent investigations in the Yangtze Valley, but exchanging the frankest views. Komura himself is of the opinion that North and South [in China] will come to a compromise within the next few months instead of fighting it out to a finish.

Saturday 18th December 1926

General Sato is convinced that the Diet will not be dissolved but that the present Government will be overthrown and replaced by a Seiyukai-Honto Coalition with General Tanaka as Premier. Sato, of course, is Tanaka's right-hand man, so perhaps this is merely a case of the wish being father to the thought.

Thursday 20th January 1927

Diet prorogued as a result of the Opposition's intention to move a vote of non-confidence in the Government. Dissolution looks like a matter of certainty unless some agreement can be reached.

Friday 21st January 1927

An eleventh-hour agreement has been reached between the Government and the two Opposition parties whereby dissolution appears to have been averted after all. One reason for this sudden compromise seems to be that no party feels strong enough financially to bear the
huge cost of a general election. It is also rumoured that the Navy Minister, in his anxiety to get the naval programme through, threatened to withhold his consent to agreeing to dissolution.

Monday 24th January 1927
See that [Britain is sending a whole division to Shanghai]. Can't help thinking, however, that we are making a mistake in sending all these troops, as it will only increase Chinese hostility towards us; and, if Shanghai is really threatened, Japan, who is in the best position to act, will almost certainly send over as many troops as required, though naturally she prefers to lie doggo for the time being and not to take active steps until, and unless, absolutely necessary.

Thursday 10th February 1927
Davies rang me up to ask if I could find out who had sent a cable which appeared in the "Morning Post" on the 2nd, as the Embassy has had a cable from our own Foreign Office asking about it. Apparently Admiral Takarabe was quoted as comparing the Singapore Base to a hot stove, the heat from which could be felt by people nearby; but his remarks have been taken out of their context and therefore give a wrong impression.
The Embassy seem to think that the message was cabled by someone in the "Jiji" office, as the "Jiji" had an article on somewhat similar lines the other day. Personally I have no idea as to who could have sent it, as I am the only "Morning Post" correspondent in Japan so far as I know.

Friday 11th February 1927
Mr. MacVeagh, the American Ambassador, invited a number of Japanese and foreign newspaper men to his house this morning and released the text of a proposal made by Coolidge to Britain, Japan, France and Italy for a conference at Geneva to discuss the limitation of auxiliary combatant [naval] craft. By the evening most of the leading vernaculars had editorial comments out on the proposals - mainly favourable, though opposed to any suggestion of the 5-5-3 ratio being applied to secondary warcraft.
Iwanaga told me that Shidehara had expressed himself as well pleased with the Coolidge proposals and that the Japanese Government would almost certainly reply that they welcomed them.

Saturday 12th February 1927
Looked up Marquis Komura at the Foreign Office about the Coolidge proposals. He confirmed that the Government welcomes them and recalled that Baron Shidehara, in his speech to the Diet on the 18th of last month, expressed himself in favour of any conference aiming at the reduction of armaments on fair and reasonable terms. This part of his speech, Komura said, was only inserted after long and careful discussion by the Cabinet, as the Navy Department had, at first, been adverse to its insertion. It was finally put in in anticipation of America's action in proposing such a conference.

Sunday 13th February 1927
Had a talk with Royle about the despatch of British troops to China, and was interested to hear that both Japan and America had been approached with a view to providing one brigade each. As, however, they were unable to see their way to doing so, Britain was forced to
provide all three brigades herself, this, in the opinion of the local authorities, being the minimum force required for the defence of Shanghai. Japanese naval officers, Royle tells me, are very sympathetic with Britain in her present predicament and would have like to see their country sending a brigade to co-operate. Commander James, however, told me the other day that Admiral Funakoshi had told him outright that he considered we were acting very foolishly, so it would seem that naval opinion on that subject was not entirely unanimous. On the subject of the Coolidge proposal, Royle said that, although American naval officers fully appreciated the position regarding naval reduction, the American nation at large hated to feel that Britain or any other nation could be their equal in armaments or in anything else! Japan's policy, he said, was to avoid giving the World any reason to believe that she found her armaments a burden to herself, even though, in reality, they might be. Consequently, however much she might wish for an opportunity to cut down her naval expenditure, she would never initiate any proposals for armament reduction lest the other powers should think she was crying out for relief.

Sunday 27\(^{th}\) February 1927

The Kenseikai and the Seiyuhonto appear to have entered into some sort of alliance, and it is reported that Tokonami, the latter's President, is to succeed Wakatsuki as Premier sometime in June at the head of a Coalition Cabinet.

Monday 28\(^{th}\) February 1927

Moscow is furious with Britain for having sent a note threatening to break off relations if the Soviet do not cease their anti-British propaganda, and has replied in somewhat insolent vein.

Friday 11\(^{th}\) March 1927

Japan has replied to the American invitation for a Three-Power Naval Disarmament Conference at Geneva, accepting it gladly. Marquis Komura tells me that, in deciding on acceptance, the Government was partly influenced by its desire to increase its friendly relations with Great Britain and to demonstrate to the World that, despite apparent differences of opinion regarding the best policy towards China, and despite apparent signs of distrust about such matters as the Singapore Base, Japan desires to prove that there is no cooling of friendship on her part.

Monday 21\(^{st}\) March 1927

News from China is bad. The Southerners [Kuomintang] have captured the Chinese city in Shanghai and have clashed at one or two points with the foreign troops defending the [International] Settlement.

Saturday 26\(^{th}\) March 1927

Bad news from China, the Nationalists [Kuomintang] having committed anti-foreign outrages at Nanking, necessitating a bombardment by British and American warships.

Monday 28\(^{th}\) March 1927

The Japanese Press continues extraordinarily calm about the Chinese situation, despite the outrages at Nanking and elsewhere, and gives strong support to the Government's pacific policy.
Saturday 2nd April 1927

Looked up Colonel Shigeto, head of the Chinese Section of the General Staff, to talk over the Chinese situation. Though rather non-committal, I gather from what he says that the Army in general is in favour of strong action and does not altogether approve of Shidehara's pacific policy. He emphasised the necessity of the Powers acting in unison and showing a united front and was very anxious to know if we intended to send more troops. Struthers, who has just returned from Shanghai, tells me General Duncan has applied for another division. Viscount Saito, rather to most people's surprise, has agreed to head the naval delegation to the coming 3-Power Conference at Geneva.

Monday 4th April 1927

See that another brigade, including the Scots Guards, has been ordered to China. Japan, however, continues to withhold the despatch of land forces, despite increasing anti-Japanese outbursts, the latest being a mob attack on Japanese marines and residents at Hankow. The patience shown by Japan, and the way in which the Press, as a whole, continues to back up the Government's policy, is really extraordinary, and one cannot help admiring them for it as, from their own point of view, it is probably the wisest course.

I had long talks with Marquis Komura and Iwanaga on the subject today, the gist of which is as follows:

Owing to her distance from China, Britain's action in deciding to send reinforcements is natural. Japan, on the other hand, though much worried about the situation, fears that the despatch of Japanese troops might result in uniting the two wings of the Cantonese, as well as the merchants and general public in China against foreigners in general and Japan in particular. As, therefore, the situation would thus become worse than ever, Japan is determined to do everything possible to avoid sending troops. Owing, of course, to her proximity, she can afford to wait till the last moment in hope of avoiding the final crisis and can take risks which Britain and others can not.

Though Komura did not say so, it is pretty certain that Japan's efforts to avoid forceful measures are also closely connected with the fear of the reaction thereby caused in Soviet Russia, with whom she has no desire to fight at the present time.

Another thing, as Iwanaga pointed out, is that, if troops are to be sent to every place where there are Japanese lives and property to be protected, an enormous force would be required and, even so, little good would be done, as the mere presence of troops would not mean ability to trade and there is no saying how long the troops might have to stay there. If, of courses, trade could be restarted by the presence of troops, the cost of keeping them might be worthwhile; but if, as would be the case, nothing could be accomplished, other than guarding lives and property, there would be no material gain and there would merely be a repetition of the Siberian expedition, which cost ?600,000,000 and gained nothing.

An alternative would be to evacuate all Japanese to Shanghai and merely send enough troops to protect them there; but in that too there would be very little to gain, as Shanghai without the Yangtze trade would be useless from an economic point of view.
Wednesday 6th April 1927
Suzuki's has suspended payment of bills and new business temporarily - as they owe ?350,000,000 to the Bank of Formosa and ?150,000,000 to other banks, great anxiety is felt, though the Government is doing its best to aid the Bank of Formosa (and therefore Suzuki's indirectly), owing to the terrible economic blow it would cause to Japan in the event of failure.

Monday 11th April 1927
The latest news from China is likely to add still further complications and may possibly precipitate matters. Chang Tso-lin's men have carried out a raid on the Soviet Embassy in Peking and, in addition to arresting some 60 or 70 Russian and Chinese Communists in the Legation Quarters, have seized a large amount of secret documents and propaganda literature. The raid was apparently carried out with the consent of the Diplomatic Corps for the purpose of nipping a Communist plot in the bud. The Soviet, however, is hardly likely to take the matter lying down; but if she declares war on Chang, she is bound to come into conflict with Japan - a situation which neither Tokyo nor Moscow desires to face.

Tuesday 12th April 1927
Looked up Marquis Komura at the Foreign Office for a talk on the Chinese situation. Told me confidentially that Yoshizawa and the other Ministers at Peking had all given their consent to Chang's raid on the Soviet Embassy, but that it was a complete surprise to everyone else, more especially the Soviet!

Sir John Tilley, he tells me, is in particularly close touch with Baron Shidehara [Minister for Foreign Affairs] just now regarding China and the Soviet - far closer than the Americans or any other embassies or legations.

Dovgalevsky, the new Soviet Ambassador, gave a tea-party this afternoon to the foreign and Japanese correspondents, but once more Byas and I, the only two British, were excluded!

Sunday 17th April 1927
Learned that the Government had resigned, as the Privy Council had turned down their request for an urgent Imperial Ordinance sanctioning an advance of ?200,000,000 from the Bank of Japan to the Bank of Taiwan.

Monday 18th April 1927
Was dragged out of bed three times last night to answer the 'phone and to send off cables on the situation - the last being shortly after 2 a.m. - and they call this a "half-time job"!

Being unable to obtain an advance, the Bank of Taiwan has been forced to suspend business and things look pretty bad altogether.

Tuesday 19th April 1927
Tanaka Giichi has been given the premiership, so the Seiyukai are in high fettle. The Soviet, I imagine, will receive the news with misgivings! He is not likely to stand any nonsense with them.

Wednesday 20th April 1927
Kinney, who is over in Japan on a short visit, came in to look me up, so I had a long and interesting talk with him regarding Chang, Moscow, and the question of Manchuria. He tells
me Chang is getting more and more unpopular over there, owing to his arbitrary actions in the realm of finance, and that the only reason for his retaining his power is that it is realised that it would be almost impossible to keep the Three Provinces united by anyone but him. He retains the loyalty of his generals by giving them liberal rewards - mainly in the form of graft. Soviet propaganda, however, is rife, and Kinney tells me that the Soviet Consulate at Harbin has a staff of over one hundred, most of these gentry being nothing more than propagandists and agitators. Some of their efforts, however, are pretty futile e.g. their attempt to influence the peasantry of Manchuria by means of propaganda broadcasted by radio from Vladivostok - an excellent method, no doubt, if the peasantry had receiving sets, but, strange to say, they have not!

He doubts very much that Chang will try to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway, as he realises that, for all their bad points, the Soviet are able to run the line very much better than his own people could.

Thursday 21st April 1927

Much to everyone's surprise the 15th Bank has suddenly suspended payment. As it is capitalised at £100,000,000 and has deposits of £368,000,000, the effect is likely to be pretty serious. Several smaller banks have also been forced to close, and most banks have been suffering from runs all day, the Yasuda Bank, the Kawasaki Bank, and the 100th Bank included. There is now talk of the Government announcing a moratorium, as the panic is becoming general.

One interesting outcome of todays' trouble is that the Mitsubishi and one or two other big banks, far from having runs on them, have been literally besieged by crowds wishing to deposit money drawn from other banks.

Had a visit from my little police friend, Nakamura, to find out what I thought of the situation.

Friday 22nd April 1927

All banks closed all day and to remain closed tomorrow as well. Government declared a 3-week partial moratorium in the afternoon. It seems to have been the only thing to do, in order to stop the panic from spreading.

A statement on the new Government’s policy was issued in the evening. It makes some very outspoken remarks about Communist activities in China and will not be relished by Moscow!

Monday 25th April 1927

Banks, except those that have suspended, reopened and everything seems calmer once more.

Monday 2nd May 1927

Government have announced the preparation of another bill, guaranteeing £200,000,000 to the Bank of Japan for advances to the Bank of Taiwan, thus making a total guarantee of £700,000,000, as they are also to present a bill guaranteeing £500,000,000 for possible losses against advances to general banks.

Monday 9th May 1927
Special Diet Session came to an end after passing the Government's Financial Relief Bills, and the Taiwan Bank has, in consequence, been able to reopen. The session went off very quietly.

Saturday 14th May 1927

Had a long talk with Komura at the Foreign Office about anti-Communist police activities in Japan. Tells me there have been a number of arrests and some detained. Amongst those had up for examination, he said confidentially, are Slapec [TASS correspondent] and his translator. Although the matter is, so far, a police matter entirely, he rather hinted that there might be more serious developments later. It seems that Miyata, the new Chief of Police, made a careful study of Communist activities before taking office, and the sudden police activities are due to his entrance on the scenes. Incidentally, he is a protege of Suzuki, the new Home Minister, who is said to trust him implicitly.

Tuesday 24th May 1927

Komura tells me the Government has decided to send troops to Shantung if the situation gets any worse, as it is feared that, unless this is done, there may be a repetition of the Hankow and Nanking affairs.

Wednesday 25th May 1927

News came through that, as a result of discoveries made in the course of the Arcos raid [raid by British police on Soviet trade mission in London], we have broken off diplomatic relations with the Soviet.

Saturday 28th May 1927

Government announced decision to send force of 2,000 men from Manchuria to Tsingtao for protection of Japanese lives and property, in case of necessity - a great change from Shidehara’s policy.

Wednesday 1st June 1927

The Kenseikai and Seiyuhonto were dissolved and the Rikken-Minseito, an amalgam of the two, formally inaugurated, so now Japan has adopted the Two-Party System.

Thursday 2nd June 1927

Cabinet reorganisation took place, Takahashi resigning and Mitsuchi succeeding him as Finance Minister. That Takahashi’s appointment was only temporary was well-known, but his resignation has come far sooner than expected. Ostensibly it is because he has now completed the task of clearing up the financial crisis and therefore, being old, feels he is entitled to resign; but one rumour has it that it is due to opposition, on his part, to the despatch of troops to China.

Friday 3rd June 1927

Learned that Bose, an Indian journalist whom I have met at one or two shows here, is one of the three men concerned in the bomb-throwing incident, aimed at Lord Hardinge, some years ago. The other two men were caught, but he himself managed to escape to Japan, where he has remained ever since. He is a nasty, evil-looking creature and I have always disliked his appearance, but I never knew he had such a record behind him.
Friday 10th June 1927
Komura tells me that General Tanaka is watching the situation [of very strained Anglo-Soviet relations] very closely, but is avoiding any comment, owing to the delicacy of the situation. He also told me in strict confidence:

a) that although an actual renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is not possible, conversations aimed at a verbal understanding on much the same lines are in constant progress, both in Tokyo and in London,

b) that the Premier is contemplating a change, both of foreign and domestic policies, and that Prince Konoe is being used as a go-between, between himself and Saionji, with a view to winning over the latter to agree to his proposals.

Friday 17th June 1927
All attention is now directed to Geneva, where the 3-Power Conference is to open on Monday. So far as I can make out from talks with Komura and others, Saito has been given practically a free hand, and will be guided largely by circumstances. Eubank professes to have inside information that he has been instructed to press for a 5-5-5 [naval] ratio, but from what I have been told confidentially it would seem that no such proposal is to be made by him unless the "atmosphere" appears favourable. Similarly the question of Singapore and Hawaii will not be brought up by him direct, though it will probably be brought up in the course of discussion, in which case also he will be guided mainly by "atmosphere", and may possibly use it to bargain with.

Tuesday 21st June 1927
Cables from Geneva give the British, Japanese and American proposals. The U.S. has, after all, suggested the 5-5-3 ratio for auxiliary [naval vessels], which Japan will certainly never agree to. Japan has proposed limitation on the basis of the present "status quo", while Britain wants the size of individual classes of ships and gun calibres reduced.

Wednesday 22nd June 1927
Looked up Komura, who drew my attention to a cable from the "Kokumin's" Geneva correspondent saying that Saito has it in mind to propose a kind of triple entente between the three Powers participating in the Conference in order to strengthen whatever agreements may be reached regarding armament limitation. From the emphasis laid by Komura on the importance of concluding some such pact (though he denied all knowledge as to the truth or otherwise of the report), it would seem rather as though the Government were desirous of testing public opinion before definitely deciding to broach such a proposal.

Thursday 23rd June 1927
The "Nichi Nichi" having come out this morning with an editorial warning Japan to beware of a possible British attempt to utilise the present conference to propose a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in some form or another, with the main object of dragging Japan away from the Soviet, the "Japan Times" came out this afternoon with what looks like an inspired reply, welcoming some kind of renewal.

Tuesday 5th July 1927
Owing to sudden change for worse in Shantung, the Japanese troops at Tsingtao are to be moved up to Tsinan and other important points on the railway, and reinforcements are probably to be sent over from Dairen. Meantime the anti-Japanese boycott continues to increase in seriousness, the boycott having been instituted with a view to forcing Japan to withdraw her troops. Poor old Japan! It seems to be a case of Hobson's choice. Either she must risk a repetition of the Nanking Incident in Shantung or else keep her troops there to protect Japanese lives and property and suffer the boycott in consequence.

Thursday 7th July 1927
The Conference at Geneva seems to have struck another snag in the matter of cruiser tonnage and a regular Anglo-American scrap is taking place in consequence.

Much as I like individual Americans, the more I see of their countrymen as a whole, the more I dislike them and despise them for all their cant and hypocrisy.

Monday 11th July 1927
Chappell told me a lot about Hill's slackness as Military Attaché which all bears out what Wards has confided to me at various times - a great pity, as he is an awfully good chap himself, but obviously unfitted for his present employment.

Wednesday 13th July 1927
Looked up Komura at the Foreign Office and was told confidentially that the Japanese delegation at Geneva has definitely decided to withdraw and simply act as observers like the French and Italians rather than agree to any proposal entailing further increase of naval strength, if there is no other way out of the difficulty.

Friday 15th July 1927
Looked up Robinson at the Embassy about the Geneva Conference. He seems fairly well convinced that some sort of compromise is bound to be reached, as none of the 3 Powers concerned can afford to let the Conference break down, as the damage to international relations would be too great, and it would lead to a fresh armaments race.

Saturday 16th July 1927
Byas showed me a cable just received from Drew Pearson, the "[Japan] Advertiser" Correspondent at Geneva - the most arrant anti-British rot, "revealing" British intrigue and low cunning in connection with the Conference. Luckily Byas was able to stop the cable from being printed.

Friday 29th July 1927
The British delegates have returned to Geneva and announced their new proposals, which seem eminently fair, but the Yankees have expressed their disapproval and are apparently set on breaking up the Conference and trying to lay the blame on England. Their whole attitude from first to last has been absolutely beyond understanding.

Friday 5th August 1927
Robinson (Captain) [Naval Attaché] came in to see me about the latest news from Geneva, and brought Commander Allen, his newly arrived assistant, along with him.
Cables pouring in all morning, giving the closing speeches of the chief delegates, Bridgeman [Britain] saying he could not understand the American standpoint and Gibson [United States] saying much the same regarding the British, while Saito made a few well-guarded words on the lines of a "benevolent nootral". The Japanese papers seem to think that there will now be an armament race between Britain and America, and that both countries will strive for Japan's friendship - a not altogether unmixed blessing in their opinion.

Saturday 6th August 1927
The "Advertiser" has an interesting mail article from Drew Pearson about Geneva, according to which there was at least one American propagandist paid by American armament firms to do his best to prevent the Conference from becoming a success.

Tuesday 16th August 1927
Eubank went off to Chusenji for a fortnight, so I am in charge of A.P. [Associated Press] as well as Reuter during his absence.

Wednesday 24th August 1927
Met a Professor , the new President of the South Manchurian Railway.
Yamamoto, he says, is an exponent of economic imperialism and, moreover, wishes to enhance his own position by making people believe that he was put there instead of being given a Cabinet portfolio because its importance is to be increased very considerably. All his talking, which has been largely done for the purpose of self-glorification, has, when taken in conjunction with the recent Far Easter Conferences in Tokyo and Dairen, raised Chinese suspicions as to Japan's intentions in Manchuria and the present anti-Japanese boycott and agitation are the outcome.

Wednesday 14th September 1927
Had a letter from Colonel Piggott in which he says "The pendulum in England is swinging back again towards the,say, 1905 mark. In other words, there is very considerable interest in Japan and a growing feeling that our paths point in the same direction. People of all sorts and conditions talk openly of the folly of having given up the Alliance and press for its renewal...".

Monday 19th September 1927
Received an interesting communication from Kinney on the Manchurian railway situation, from which it seems that the South Manchurian Railway's only objection to Chang Tso-lin's [railway-building] schemes is that they are in violation of the Sino-Japanese agreement. As Chinese immigrants are now pouring into Manchuria at the rate of half a million or more a year, it is considered that the more lines that can be built the better, as there need be no fear of competition between them, as each one will be able to operate to its fullest.

Friday 30th September 1927
Met Mr. Amau, the Japanese Consul-General from Harbin, who is just being transferred to the Peking Legation. Amau seems convinced that the Chinese are determined to take over the Chinese Eastern Railway before very long. If so, it will be interesting to watch Japan's attitude, as she, like everyone else, knows that if once the Chinese get hold of it, it will soon suffer the same fate as all other Chinese railways, and go to rack and ruin.

Had a visit in afternoon from Russell [an Australian ex-serviceman whom the British Legion Tokyo Branch - of which Kennedy was a committee member - were proposing to help financially]. [He] came to me for advice as to what he ought to do. It seems that a fellow named Pearson has an old score, which he wants to pay off on Sheba, editor of the "Japan Times". Knowing that Russell is on the rocks and has not too clean a record himself, he approached him in strictest confidence with a proposal to blow up the office of the "Japan Times" and, if possible, do in Sheba at the same time. In return for this, Russell was to receive one hundred pounds down and a free passage out of the country. If it is true, Sheba certainly ought to be told, but if the whole thing is made up, it might only lead to a lot of unnecessary trouble to tell him, so I have asked Russell to give me a day to think it over before committing myself.

Monday 3rd October 1927

Russell came in to see me after lunch, so I took him round to see Sheba about the alleged plot on his life. Sheba seems to believe the story and tells me that this is not the first time that attempts have been made to do him in. He showed me a nasty gash in his neck, the result of an attack made on him in Honolulu, and told me that on another occasion an attempt was made to blow him up with dynamite.

Tuesday 4th October 1927

Iwanaga tells me confidentially that Goto [Mayor of Tokyo] has decided to leave for Moscow shortly with Tsurumi and Maeda Tomon, but that, as his visit, though alleged to be purely personal, is likely to arouse comment on account of his well-known advocacy of Russo-Japanese rapprochement, the Premier wants the matter kept quiet for the time being.

Wednesday 5th October 1927

Had interview with Viscount Saito and came away more convinced than ever that he would have liked to support the British proposals at Geneva if it had not been that, for political reasons, he considered it advisable to adopt a neutral attitude in the Anglo-American controversy.

Thursday 20th October 1927

Had an interesting talk with Iwanaga on the object of Kuhara's coming mission to Moscow. Coming, as it does, so soon after the announcement of Goto's visit (which, by the way, has been "postponed on the advice of his physician"!), it is apt to rouse suspicions, and the "Kokumin" makes the allegation that some sort of triple alliance with Russia and Germany, to offset the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, is contemplated. The official explanation given me by Marquis Komura up at the Foreign Office, however, is, that Kuhara is being sent to investigate the economic conditions in Soviet Russia and prepare a report, as
the Government is anxious to start negotiating a treaty of commerce with Moscow as soon as
the Fishery Agreement is finally signed. This explanation seems reasonable enough, as it is
unlikely that an ordinary business man would be sent off to carry out delicate diplomatic
negotiations of the kind envisaged by the "Kokumin".

It is certainly very unusual for a business man to be sent on an official mission of any kind and
even to be received in audience by the Emperor as Kuhara has been, but Iwanaga tells me
the reason is probably that the Premier wants to find an occasion for raising him to the
peerage by way of rewarding him in reality (though not ostensibly) for the financial assistance
that Kuhara has given him as President of the Seiyukai. It is the Kuhara interests that are
behind the present Government, just as it was Mitsubishi's that were behind the last.

Sunday 23rd October 1927

Brennan tells me he had a talk with Mahendra Pratap, the Indian revolutionary, a few days
ago, and was quite favourably impressed with him. He thinks he is an impractical idealist
rather than a wrong 'un. Pratap was quite frank in stating his desire to see the British turned
out of India, but emphasised that he admired those responsible for British rule in India, though
he objected to the system.

Wednesday 26th October 1927

Lunched with Wards and had a talk with him about the alleged trouble in the Japanese Army.
He thinks it is probably to do with the struggle between civil and military, as there is a lot of
discontent with Tanaka and the Seiyukai in connection with the proposal to appoint a civilian
War Minister.

Thursday 27th October 1927

Had a visit from Romm, the new Tass man, who has just arrived out here as successor to
Slapec. In appearance he is certainly an improvement on his predecessor, but that would not
be difficult, and I have no doubt that he is just as much a tool of Moscow.

Monday 31st October 1927

Went to a big luncheon party given to the foreign correspondents at the South Manchurian
Railway official residence by Mr. Yamamoto, the new President. He gives one the impression
of great ability and "push"; and judging by the way he is making things move, it would seem
as though his appearance did not belie him. His English is word perfect and he looks a real
sahib - clean-shaven, heavily-built, and a strong but pleasant face.

Saturday 5th November 1927

[The] Hills came to dinner in evening. Talking of Himatsinjhi [language officer from Indian
Army on temporary attachment to the Japanese Army] whom they visited recently at Gifu,
they said he is an excellent British propagandist, as the Japanese open out to him on the
subject of India, and he is able to disillusion them in their beliefs about the methods used by
our people to "oppress" the Indians. They would hardly believe him when he said that Indian
troops were properly armed and trained, as they thought that no Indian, soldier or civilian, was
given a rifle!

Thursday 10th November 1927
Brennan tells me, a propos of Mrs. Hill's dislike for Wards, that on one occasion when Wards was lunching at the Hills', Mrs. Hill carried on such a virulent tirade against the Japanese that Wards got up from the table and left the room! I am fully in sympathy with Wards' feelings and rather admire his moral courage in doing so, even though it may have been somewhat blunt on his part. It is a great pity that Mrs. Hill is so anti-Japanese, as it is bad for her husband and his job out here.

**Sunday 13th November 1927**

See that Prince Konoe and five other leading Peers have left the Kenkyukai and propose to form a new party in the Upper House composed of hereditary Peers. This action is said to be due to their belief that they can do better work for the country by withdrawing from the Kenkyukai, which they consider has become too powerful, selfish, and arbitrary and, by its ability to bargain with the Government, is a stumbling block to democratic and constitutional government. As Konoe is, to all intents and purposes, the mouthpiece of Saionji, his action must be regarded as a matter of no small importance.

**Monday 14th November 1927**

Had a talk at the Foreign Office with Komura about Konoe's action and find that he himself has been asked to join the seceders, though he has not yet decided whether to do so or not. He regards the action as an important step in the movement for the Reform of the Upper House. As for its effect on the Government, he seems to think that it will be helpful rather than adverse, though much will depend on circumstances.

**Wednesday 16th November 1927**

Went to hear a talk on the Labour movement by Matsuoka Komakichi, General Secretary of the Japan Federation of Labour. Quite an interesting lecture, and after it was over I had quite an interesting talk with him on the same subject. The main point that he emphasised was that the workers themselves are for evolution rather than revolution, and that, with the exception of the Printers' Union which he said was "loyal to anarchy", there is very little radical thought amongst them, radicalism being confined almost entirely to the professors and students. He condemned these latter strongly for trying to stir up trouble in the Labour ranks and keeping safely in the background instead of coming forward as leaders.

**Tuesday 22nd November 1927**

Met Kagawa Toyohiko. Had a most interesting talk with him on the Labour situation and social unrest out here. He is, in fact, a follower of the Sydney Webb teaching - that it is no concern to Labour whether the country is a monarchy or a republic so long as the form of government is in accordance with the wishes of the majority. Talking of Soviet propaganda in Japan he mentioned one quite interesting point, namely, that the Soviet Ambassador is only a figurehead and that the real representative of Moscow, is, or rather was, Slapec - so presumably Romm, his successor as Tass Correspondent, is now. Slapec, he said, was continually carrying out Soviet propaganda among the working classes.

What Kagawa says on this matter rather bears out what I have always maintained, namely that the post of Tass Correspondent is simply a cloak to hide under and that Slapec's real
work was nothing more nor less than Bolshevik propaganda. After all, what else can one think of a correspondent who leaves it to Rengo to do all his cabling and practically never comes to the office, though he has a desk here.

Thursday 24th November 1927
Lunched with Wards and Stockton. The latter has just returned from Grand Manoeuvres and mentioned that the Emperor seemed terribly jumpy and nervy and had a regular frightened, hunted sort of look in his eyes. This seems rather to confirm what Parlett told me just before leaving for England - viz. that he seems to be following mentally in his father's footsteps.

Wednesday 7th December 1927
Shot a card on Mr.

Friday 13th January 1928

Lunched with Wards, who tells me that Piggott has managed to get himself transferred from M.I.1 to M.I.2 in succession to Colonel Wagstaffe - a wonderful piece of wangling on Colonel Piggott's part, and I am delighted to hear of it, as he ought to be able to stir things up a bit. Also tells me that Delamaine is being sent out here to relieve him as assistant to Hill.

Saturday 21st January 1928
Had a pretty hectic day of cabling, as the Diet reassembled in the morning and was dissolved in the afternoon after the Minseito had announced its intention of putting a motion of non-confidence to the vote. The Government was denounced for its allegedly aggressive policy in China and Manchuria, especially in regard to the despatch of troops to Shantung last summer, and for its handling of the financial and economic readjustment. Three-fifths of Tanaka's speech as Foreign Minister was devoted to China, whom he warned to beware of consequences if Japanese lives and property continue to be endangered. He also emphasised that, although relations with America were good, Japan was not prepared to regard the immigration question as closed. The General Election is to be held on the 20th of next month, so the various parties will have to get busy.

Monday 23rd January 1928
Learned from an apparently reliable source that Kuhara is probably to be appointed Foreign Minister shortly, as

Monday 6th February 1928

Had a visit from Mori of the "Mainichi", who came for an interview, as his paper is going to bring out a series of sketches of "eminent" foreign correspondents in Japan!

Thursday 9th February 1928
Sent off my monthly report on financial and economic conditions out here to the F.B.I.

Friday 24th February 1928

An awful curse being laid up like this with 'flu, just at the time of the Election when things are particularly busy. The Seiyukai has scraped in by a small margin, which means that political conditions are likely to remain unstable, as the proletarians, who have secured 8 seats in all, and the independents etc. will be able to hold the balance of power and play old harry.

Thursday 15th March 1928

Large number of Communists rounded up by the police in various parts of the country shortly after midnight as result of investigation into origin of inflammatory pamphlets distributed during the Elections. News suppressed by police, so have sent copies of my cables to Shanghai by mail in case they failed to get through.

Saturday 17th March 1928

Lunched with the Davieses. Davies was much interested in what I told him about the Communist roundup, as the Embassy had heard nothing about it. Also much interested in the pamphlet seized by the police, a copy of which has come into my hands. He thinks it possible that there may be some connection between the roundup and the rumours that are going about concerning Soviet financial assistance to the Left Wing proletarians in the recent elections, though the Premier recently stated his reliance on Troyanovsky's [Soviet Ambassador] word that no assistance had been given.

Tuesday 20th March 1928

The "Jiji" [Press Agency] avers that Goto and Karakhan are carrying on private negotiations with a view to opening formal negotiations later about spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia and the purchase of the southern extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Harbin by Japan. Komura flatly denied it when I phoned him up at the Foreign Office and maybe he is right; but in view of the fact that General Sato, on behalf of the Premier, rang up Rengo asking them to keep the "Jiji's" statement from Eubank and myself if possible, and Goto got onto Date with a somewhat similar request, it looks rather suspicious, as otherwise why should they be so anxious to hush it up?

Thursday 22nd March 1928
Went to tea-party given at the Imperial to the foreign correspondents by an organisation called the Tokyo Kisha Renmei (Tokyo Journalists' League). I naturally imagined there would be a number of Japanese newspapermen there, but the only three were Kinoshita, the Secretary, late of the "Chugai", Okura, the Tass translator, and a very Bolsheviki-looking little worm, whose name I did not catch. What the purpose of the tea was, none of us could make out, but from subsequent enquiries it seems that the Renmei is an organisation of radical journalists, and this I can well imagine if those present were anything to go by. Romm, the "Tass" Correspondent, was among those present and got talking on the Zinoviev letter, but as I did not want to come to blows with him on the subject, I managed to side-track him onto something else. Okura, his Japanese assistant, tells me that the embargo on the news about the Communist roundup last week is to be lifted on the 24th at the request of some of the reactionary organisations, who are planning to hold a mass meeting on the 25th and to use the facts concerning this round up as ammunition in their attack on the Left Wing radicals. It will be interesting therefore to see if this really does happen, for, if it does so, it will indicate that the Government is prepared to utilise the reactionaries for their own purposes.

Friday 23rd March 1928

Had a visit from Ridley, who has just returned from a trip to the Bonins. It seems that only two of the islands in the group are fortified, namely Chichijima and a smaller one close to it. Even on these two, however, there is no proper garrison in peacetime - the only members of the fighting services being a lieutenant-colonel with a captain as adjutant, a sapper subaltern, and 4 N.C.O.'s. There are also 20 naval ratings in charge of the wireless station, but except for these, the whole population, some 300 families comprising about 1,500 in all, is civilian. Half of these are in official employment of one kind or another. Owing to the fortifications, immense precautions are taken to watch strangers, police detectives following them quite openly wherever they go.

Saturday 24th March 1928

Was rung up last night about a raid made on the Soviet Embassy by reactionaries, who had previously let off fireworks outside the Ronoto headquarters. They did likewise in the Soviet Embassy headquarters and then cleared off, leaving a dagger with a note attached, accusing Troyanovsky of providing funds to the proletarians at the time of the Elections. The news, however, has been suppressed, as the Foreign Office are afraid of its effect on Russia, though it seems ridiculous to do so, as the news will get out sooner or later all the same.

Friday 30th March 1928

Had a visit from Romm, the Tass Correspondent, who tells me that his cables on the recent Soviet Embassy incident were suppressed, so I suppose mine were too. Have sent duplicates and further details by mail accordingly.

As an indication of the Government's anxiety to keep in with the Soviet, he mentioned that, although no police appeared on the scene till more than half an hour later, Kishi was sent over post-haste from the Foreign Office to apologise on behalf of the Premier. The explosion
was apparently caused by a bag of gunpowder - not enough to do any real damage, but enough to make the deuce of a row!

Saturday 31st March 1928
Sat next to Baron Harada at lunch at the Club, and was much interested to see Suzuki Bunji of the Shakai Minshuto there too. As Harada is private secretary to the Genro, Prince Saionji, and as the Government would give a lot to have the support of the proletarian members in the coming Diet session - or at any rate keep them from siding with the Minseito in their vote of non-confidence - I am inclined to think that it was not just mere coincidence that brought Harada and Suzuki to the Club together.

Tuesday 10th April 1928
The Government has ordered the dissolution of the Ronoto (Rodo Nominto) and two other radical organisations on grounds of their connection with the Communists. It has also raised the ban on the Communist roundup of March 15th and, in a 50-page communique, has given full details of what led up to it. About 1,000 in all have been arrested and more arrests are expected, while up to now about 150 have been prosecuted. It seems that a regular Communist organisation was being planned all over the country. Numerically, however, they do not seem to have had much strength and personally I doubt if they would and his assistant had the damned sauce to turn up with revolvers on their belts. A wonder they didn't bring along a bomb or two as well while they were about it!

Wednesday 25th April 1928
Had the Iwanaga's, Zumoto [amongst others] in to dine in evening. Iwanaga and Zumoto were in very good form and were very interesting on politics, China, etc. Iwanaga is very definite that Kuhara is to be made Foreign Minister after the present Diet session is over, provided the Government remains in power. He also stated very definitely that Kuhara helped to finance the Chinese Revolution in 1911, an admission that I have never before heard made by any Japanese.

Saturday 28th April 1928
The long-awaited vote of censure on the Home Minister was presented this afternoon, whereupon the Government, fearing its inability to defeat it, prorogued the Diet for three days. Had a long talk with Zumoto up at the Club about the Diet proceedings. He attended yesterday's sitting as a spectator and said it was an extraordinary sight. The visitors' gallery was packed tight with men and women of all classes and large numbers had to be turned away for lack of space. People began queuing up before daylight in order to get a chance of watching proceedings, many of them coming up specially from the country to see it. Next to him, for instance, was a peasant from Fukushima, who had come up specially - a good example of the interest taken since Manhood Suffrage came into force, though Zumoto was inclined to think that most of the spectators were there from curiosity rather than for actual interest in party politics. He mentioned, however, that the keenness amongst the Diet members themselves was so great that two members who were ill were actually brought along on stretchers by their friends so that they might be present at voting time, and it was
even proposed that Professor Isoh Abe, who is seriously ill with typhoid, should be brought along!

The Proletarian members, he said, were the best behaved and the most dignified among those present, the more hotheaded of the Seiyukai and Minseito, on the other hand, spent their time reviling and taunting each other and were only prevented from coming to actual blows by the Diet police who held them apart. In order to stave off the vote of censure as long as possible, the Seiyukai resorted to obstructionist tactics, purposely urging on the Opposition to create an uproar. The Speaker could have rung his bell to call the House to order, but refused to do so. A bright bunch forsooth!

Tuesday 1st May 1928

Watched the May Day procession - as quiet a show as ever, with almost as many police as demonstrators! The day passed off particularly quietly, as most of the extremists are now in quod as a result of the recent roundup.

The Diet reassembled, but was promptly prorogued for another three days. Great precautions are being taken by the Minseito to see that none of their members are either bribed by the Seiyukai or beaten up by "soshi". With this end in view they are being "canned"; i.e. kept together day and night in hotels where they can keep an eye on one another, and are not even allowed to return to their homes.

Thursday 3rd May 1928

During [a lunch at the Imperial Hotel] I was called to the 'phone with the news that an urgent despatch had been received from Tsinan by the War Office to say that there had been a clash between the Japanese and Southern [Kuomintang] troops. I was inclined to think that it was probably merely a minor incident connected with a few individual looters, such as happened a few days ago, as the Japanese and Southerners have apparently been co-operating in a friendly spirit in maintaining peace and order in the city since its capture [by the Kuomintang from Northern forces] on the first.

Despatches received this evening, however, indicate that it is something more serious, and it may turn out to be a case of instigation by Chinese who are wanting to discredit Chiang [Kai-shek], as rumours that some such attempt might be made have been going about for some time.

Friday 4th May 1928

It seems that Fukuda, the Japanese Commander at Tsinan, had agreed to remove the defence works and barricades on Chiang Kai-shek's assurance regarding the life and property of the Japanese residents, as everything was going smoothly. Hardly had this been done, however, when looting started. The Japanese troops tried to suppress it, but were promptly attacked by superior numbers. Chiang apparently tried to stop the fighting, but his orders were not obeyed.

In view of the serious situation, the Government has ordered another 2,000 troops to proceed at once to Tsingtao from Dairen.

Suzuki [the Home Minister] has formally resigned.
Saturday 5th May 1928

Had a very interesting talk with Iwanaga, who tells me that Tanaka himself was against the despatch of troops [to Tsinan] at the outset, as he felt confident in Chiang if Chiang was left unhampered, and he feared that the presence of Japanese troops would only aggravate matters and serve to bring on just some such incident as the Tsinan affair. For party reasons, however, he was induced to agree, as it was pointed out that the Opposition in the Diet would be given a good weapon wherewith to attack the Government if no troops were sent. Iwanaga also tells me that all the Rengo news from Tsinan is being obtained from the Japanese military headquarters in Tientsin, where it is received by wireless, as all other means of communications are cut off. Rengo then sends it, and all other news about North China, by long-distance telephone to Mukden, from where it is cabled to Japan, thereby escaping the Chinese censorship.

Sunday 6th May 1928

Shortly before midnight I was rung up with the news that the Diet session had been brought to a close without the Opposition being given a chance to bring forward their vote of non-confidence, so the Government is presumably safe for the next five months.

Saturday 12th May 1928

Had a letter from General Hata in regard to the Tsinan affair. Some people would probably maintain that it was written for propagandist purposes, but personally I think it was written in all sincerity and I very much appreciate the spirit in which it is written - "from one soldier to another". Incidentally, it throws an interesting sidelight onto the Army viewpoint, and it is probably unprecedented for a Japanese Vice-Minister of War to write a private letter to a foreigner on a matter of this kind.

Captain M.D. Kennedy, May 12 1929

Nihon Shimbun Rengosha,
Uchisaiwai-cho, Koji-machi,
Dear Captain,

Will you read this letter as one from a fellow soldier, for it is in that spirit that I am writing it. A soldier's spirit only a soldier can fully appreciate, I have always believed. And I am taking this liberty.

We are infinitely sorry that Tsinan incident has occurred. There is certainly nothing more unfortunate than this. I hope I am wrong in saying this, but somehow I am under the impression that the cause of the Sino-Japanese friendship ............ has been sadly marred. We are quite appreciative of the sympathy shown us by the British and the American Press when we took such measures as we have though necessary to protect the persons and properties of the Japanese residents in this terrible crisis. We are fully convinced that all this we owe to your and other foreign correspondents' effort to represent Japan's case in the true light. Sincerely we deplore that we have been compelled to take such a step, but in the
circumstance the was no alternative. When you look at the hideous pictures of the mutilated bodies, you will find the most eloquent explanation of our motives. Our idea is to protect all alike, Japanese, Chinese and foreigners, irrespective of races and nationalities from the nefarious activities of the thugs, in handling whom we shall not be over sentimental though. I have begun this letter with the idea of expressing my purely personal appreciation of your honest labor for depicting Japan's position in the true light, but in spite of myself I am getting very long. I hope you will come and see me, as I am anxious to meet and personally thank you. Just let me know when you mean to come so that I may not be absent when you come. This letter is personal. Thanking you ever so much, I am, Yours sincerely, E. Hata Eitaro

Monday 14th May 1928
Had an interview with General Hata. He told me in confidence that the military authorities were much worried as to what steps to take in order to counter Chinese propaganda regarding the Tsinan Affair and he asked me to say what I thought was the best line to take - to say nothing or to refute the Chinese allegations. It is a rather knotty problem, as some people go on the principle that silence proves inability to deny, while others consider denial shows that the charges made are true. I told Hata this and suggested that, as he had been very frank with me, he might go one step further and ask the opinion of some of the other foreign correspondents in confidence, but he thought it inadvisable to do so, and emphasised that he had only asked me because he felt that I, as a former Army officer, would be able to appreciate the Japanese stand in the matter. He had a whole list of similar questions typed out and seemed very appreciative of such advice as I was able to give, while I for my part felt well pleased at the unusual confidence placed in me by him.

Tuesday 15th May 1928
Lunched with Wards and showed him my letter from Hata to see what he thought about it. He is convinced that, although it is probably a translation of a letter dictated by him, it was not written by Ide or anyone in the War Office, as their English is too good. That being so, I should not be surprised if it was written for Hata by Kumasaki, as the latter knew about it before I received it.

Wednesday 16th May 1928
[Marquis] Komura, whom I looked up at the Foreign Office in the morning, tells me that the Government is much worried about the possibility of the disturbances spreading to Manchuria
if Chang [Tso-lin] is forced to fall back to Mukden. A Cabinet Conference is therefore to be held, to consider what steps to take, and it will be guided in its decisions by the policy laid down at the time of the China Conference held in Tokyo last summer. Byas and Catto were also at the Foreign Office, and Komura showed the three of us a translation of the guiding rules laid down at that time (dated July 1st, 1927), the final one of which dealt with Manchuria and Mongolia and laid down most emphatically that Japan would never hesitate to take whatever action she considered necessary to prevent the outbreak of disturbances in those parts.

Although Komura professed that the paper he showed us was very confidential, he said we might quote the section on Manchuria word for word, provided no mention was made of the source from which it came. It seems pretty obvious therefore that he wants it to be made known abroad - a fact which seems to indicate that Japan is contemplating some very definite action in the near future.

Saturday 19th May 1928
Had a long and interesting talk with Iwanaga about Chang [Tso-lin] and Tanaka. He thinks Chang is hesitating to evacuate Peking and fall back to Mukden because he still hopes to get help from Tanaka, but that Chang will finally clear out when he realises that Tanaka is in earnest. The Japanese Government, on the other hand, is taking a big risk; for, if Chang elects to hang on till the last moment and falls back with the Southerners close on the tails of the retreating Fengtianers, Japan will be faced with the unpleasant task of disarming them in accordance with her warning - no easy task.

Monday 21st May 1928
[Colonel Furujo] is leaving for Tientsin tomorrow to act as mouthpiece for the Japanese Army to foreign correspondents up there. Interesting, as it affords yet another illustration of the Army's realisation of the importance of the Press.

Having noticed that the War Office was trying to account for the "Manchester Guardian's" criticisms of Japan by saying that it was due to the unfortunate misunderstanding with Timperley at Tsinan, I took the opportunity to point out to [Captain] Miyawaki that the "Manchester Guardian" was just as critical of the British action at Shanghai last year, so that Timperley probably had nothing to do with it.

Saturday 17th November 1928
Kuhara has come into the limelight once more by inducing the 7 members of the Kensei Isshinkai to support the Government's foreign policy, while he himself has intimated that the foreign policy towards China should be firmer - a rather untimely remark considering Yada and Wang seem to be getting nearer to an agreement.

Wednesday 21st November 1928
The Sino-Japanese negotiations have once more hit a snag. Japan wants to settle each of the outstanding issues separately, but Nanking is now insisting that all must be taken together and that nothing can be done till Japan withdraws her troops which, of course, she refuses to do without a proper guarantee.
The Press is now beginning to censure Coolidge's Armistice [day] speech, and no wonder. An interesting sidelight on it is seen by a visit I had from Romm [Tass correspondent] this afternoon. He seems convinced that Britain and America are about to fly at each others' throats, and no doubt this reflects the attitude of the Soviet generally and this is what they would like to see.

Thursday 22nd November 1928

Had an interview with Sir John [Tilley] [British Ambassador] on the subject of Count Uchida's [Foreign Minister] recent reference to the strengthening of Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the Far East. The papers have jumped to the conclusion that a renewal of the Alliance is contemplated, but, as Sir John emphasised, such a step is now out of the question. While admitting the desirability of closer co-operation, he flatly denied that any concrete plan had been put forward by either party, but rather hinted that some sort of talk had taken place, in which the two countries had recognised this desirability. This is rather confirmed by Komura [Foreign Office Spokesman] who remarked that reports of Uchida's alleged advocacy of renewal of the Alliance are exaggerated but "not groundless". He practically admitted, in fact, that Uchida, on his recent visit to London, had broached the subject of closer co-operation in China, though he emphasised that it was hoped that America and other Powers, would likewise co-operate.

Wednesday 28th November 1928

Babb tells me Mr. MacVeagh [U.S. Ambassador] told him that Count Uchida, on his way through the U.S., had broached the question of closer co-operation in China, but that, unlike the Foreign Office in London, the State Department had shown but little interest in the suggestion and had been rather cold towards it. He also tells me that McVeagh is returning to the U.S. shortly, probably for good, and seems rather fed up with the State Department, as they will not fall in with his views.

Sunday 2nd December 1928

Attended the Grand Military Review at Yoyogi. 35,000 troops took part, with representative detachments from every unit in the Japanese Army. The outstanding feature, as compared with others I have seen out here in the past, was the large amount of mechanised artillery, tanks, armoured cars etc. and the large number of aircraft.

Tuesday 4th December 1928

The Naval Review at Yokohama was a fine sight, more than 180 warships being drawn up in 8 lines. The newly-completed aircraft-carrier, "Kaga", was "on parade" for the first time, together with "Akagi" and "Hosho" - ugly, clumsy looking monsters, but no doubt very fine vessels.

Friday 7th December 1928

Had an interesting talk with Iwanaga about Tokonami, who left for China this evening. Tells me that he, Tokonami, worked behind the scenes in the early days of the Chinese Revolution with Mori, the present Parliamentary Secretary of the Foreign Office, who was then a Mitsui man, and Yamamoto (South Manchurian Railway) who was also in Mitsui’s at the time. The
three of them tried to engineer a meeting between Sun Yat-sen and Prince Katsura with the object of arranging for Japan to support the Southerners in return for their acknowledgement of Japan's paramount economic interests in Manchuria. Katsura, however, died before the meeting could be arranged.

Iwanaga doubts if Tokonami and his party will actually amalgamate his party with the Seiyukai, but seems to think that Tokonami will make suggestions to Tanaka on his return and that Tanaka will thereupon modify his China policy to some extent and thereby ensure himself of Tokonami's support. In other words, he thinks that the visit to China is all camouflage and that an understanding on this matter has already been reached.

**Thursday 13th December 1928**

Great celebrations in connection with the Emperor's progress through the main streets of the city to Ueno Park to receive the formal congratulations of the citizens of Tokyo on his enthronement. The police, with their usual uncalled-for nervousness, had ticketed everyone beforehand and allotted places to them along the route to be followed, so that no unauthorised person had a chance to see anything. Straw matting was laid on the pavements, and the spectators had to squat on these instead of standing up, and everyone had to remove their greatcoats as a sign of respect, though it was bitterly cold. It says much for the docility of the Japanese that they put up with such treatment.

**Friday 14th December 1928**

General Tanaka (Kunishige) was Military Attaché in London during the War and later became Commander-in-Chief in Formosa, and is now a Military councillor. A heavily-built, rather stern-looking old fellow, but a very good chap from all accounts.

General Minomiya has given up command of his brigade and is now at the General Staff. He tells me he is to be made Director of Military Intelligence shortly in succession to Matsui. Minomiya, who has just returned from a tour of inspection in China, was very outspoken about Admiral Bristol and General Smedly Butler, for neither of whom he has very much use! The American opposition to co-operation with Britain and Japan seems a very sore point with him and he expressed his surprise at finding, while at Tientsin, that the American troops were holding manoeuvres with the Chinese!

**Thursday 20th December 1928**

Had an interview with Mr. Matsudaira, who is leaving for England to take up his new post as Ambassador next week. I had heard he had become somewhat pompous and full of his own importance since becoming father-in-law to Prince Chichibu, so I was pleasantly surprised to find him so friendly and unassuming. I find he knows Colonel Piggott very well and was one of his examiners when he took his interpretership examination in London some 20 years ago!

**Friday 21st December 1928**

The long expected blow has fallen. The Government has ordered the dissolution of the Tokyo Municipal Assembly, as more than a third of its members, 34 out of 88, are under arrest in connection with various scandals revealed of late.
Attended banquet in evening at the Imperial given by Mr. Mochizuki, the Home Minister, to the Press as a return for their work at the time of the Enthronement. About 1,000 were present at the dinner and for some reason or other I was given a place at the main table at which, except for myself, there was no one but Cabinet Ministers and the Northcliffes and Rothermeres of Japan - Tokutomi of the “Kokumin”, Yanada of the “Chugai”, and Mitsunaga of the Nippon Dempo, and the like. [This] called forth comment from [the rest of] the foreign correspondents and others. The explanation given to Babb was that the Home Minister had asked the Foreign Office to name the leading British and leading American journalist in Japan, whereupon the names of Fleisher [Japan Advertiser] and myself were put forward. Fleisher, however, is ill, so could not attend. Major Ide, on the other hand, remarked that it was probably because they wished to do special honour to the British Press in order to show Japanese friendship for England. Much impressed by the Premier coming up to me and greeting me like a long lost friend! Each of us received a silver cigarette case as a memento of the occasion - a costly evening's entertainment for the poor old taxpayer!

Saturday 22nd December 1928

Looked up Komura at the Foreign Office for a talk on Japan's opinion of the newly signed Sino-British Treaty, which gives de jure recognition to the Nanking Government. He seems much impressed by our handling of the situation and said "I congratulate the British Government on their brilliant piece of diplomacy", and added that this is the sentiment not merely of himself but of Japanese officialdom in general and that there is no question of Japan feeling that Britain has been playing her own game at the expense of Japan.

I took the occasion of my visit to ask Komura to say quite frankly why I had been given a place of honour last night. His reply was that the Home Minister had asked the Foreign Office to submit the names of the British and American journalist considered most entitled to special recognition for their work, whereupon the names of Fleisher and myself were put forward, but as Fleisher was too ill to attend the dinner, I was the only one placed at the main table. He said it was done as a mark of recognition to Reuters as a leading news agency and to myself for my work as a student of, and writer on, Japanese affairs with long and close connections with Japan. It is certainly rather pleasant to feel that one's work is regarded as of some value, as there are times when, after a 16-hour day, I think to myself what a mutt I am to slave away as I do!

Komura's explanation is probably correct, but a talk I had with Kumasaki, who called in to see me later in the day, made me wonder if there was not something else in it besides what he said. Kumasaki told me confidentially that Iwanaga had complained both to the General Staff and also to the Foreign Office about my letters going astray, but both of them deny any knowledge of the matter, and Baron Tanaka, in his capacity of Foreign Minister, has ordered an investigation to be made. It seems that the Foreign Office is inclined to suspect the Home Office of knowing something about it, as even Foreign Office officials have sometimes found themselves the victims of the State Department. Hanihara, while Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, discovered that his letters were being subjected to censorship according to Kumasaki,
and Komura had to protest on one occasion of being shadowed by detectives on account of his liberal views.

**Monday 24th December 1928**

The police ordered the dispersal of the three-day session of Leftists, which has been in progress since Saturday for the purpose of organising a new Leftist party to take the place of the defunct Ronoto. Later in the day, the Home Minister also ordered the suppression of the Shinto Jumbikai, an informal radical organisation, which was formed as a rallying point for the former members of the Ronoto after the dissolution of that party on April 10th. This wisdom of this move is open to doubt, as it is likely merely to drive the radicals underground and make their activities less easy to detect.

**Friday 11th January 1929**

This afternoon's cables announce the death of Yang Yu-ting. Kawai told me confidentially over the 'phone that the official report shows that he was invited to dine with young Chang [Hsueh-liang] last night, together with Chang Hin-huai, and that they were suddenly seized and shot to death. A nice sportsmanlike crowd! Just what is behind it all is difficult to tell, though ostensibly his death was due to the discovery of a conspiracy to turn out Young Chang and take his place. Anyway, it opens up dangerous possibilities in Manchuria.

**Saturday 12th January 1929**

Looked up Komura at the Foreign Office for a talk about Yang's death. Rather reticent regarding the probable outcome "owing to the delicate situation". He rather hinted, however, that his removal from the scenes would probably make things more difficult for Japan, as Chang Tso-cheng, Governor of Kirin, who now appears to be the leading figure, is anti-Japanese and, into the bargain, Mukden is likely to come under Nationalist control more than ever. Yang Yu-ting was inclined to be anti-Japanese at times, but of late he had been far more friendly and, incidentally, had opposed the hoisting of the Nationalist flag over Manchuria.

**Monday 14th January 1929**

Up at the Foreign Office seeing Komura about the Chinese situation. He seems hopeful of being able to fix up the tariff question before February 1st when the new Chinese tariff comes into operation, and says that Yoshizawa [Japanese Minister to Peking], who is leaving for Shanghai on his way back to Peiping in a day or two, will probably seek to open fresh negotiations for the settlement of the Tsinan and other pending questions if a favourable opportunity presents itself. On the other hand, the Hankow situation is looking very ugly and the Nationalist authorities both in Nanking and Hankow have been warned that, unless they can keep the demonstrators under control, it may be necessary for Japan to land naval forces for the protection of Japanese lives and property.

Sorry to hear that Komura is being transferred from his present post and is to be succeeded by Saito, late Consul-General at New York. Saito is married to a niece of Iwanaga's, and Iwanaga is therefore worried lest Dentsu and others with axes to grind try to make out that he is being given inside information that is not available to themselves.
Tuesday 22nd January 1929
As expected, Baron Tanaka, speaking in his capacity as Foreign Minister, dwelt mainly on the Government's China policy in his speech to the Diet, but the keynote was his emphatic reiteration of Japan's stand regarding "Manchuria as distinguished from the rest of China". Nothing new in this stand, but a very definite warning that Japan is not prepared to stand any nonsense in those parts.

Monday 4th February 1929
Up at the Foreign Office and found Saito very optimistic of the outcome of the Yoshizawa-Wang conferences. Seems confident a solution of the Tsinan question will be reached within the next day or two.

Tuesday 5th February 1929
Saito's expectations appear to have been justified, as urgent press despatches from Shanghai report agreement reached early this morning after a conference lasting 11 hours. As the U.S. Senate has rejected the proposal to eliminate the time clause in the Cruiser Bill, I looked in to the Navy Office to see Captain Komaki about the Navy's attitude on the subject. He thinks it will make no difference to Japan's present programme, but says it may have some effect on construction plans after 1931, though much will depend on the outcome of the Arms' Conference, which is due to meet that year to revise the Washington Agreement. Shidehara today opened his attack on the Government's China policy, but there is nothing very new about the points adduced by him.

Friday 8th February 1929
The hint that Saito gave a day or two ago that rejoicings over the Tsinan question were rather premature, as there are still one or two vital points to be tackled, was repeated by him today even more emphatically than before. This, coupled with General Shirakawa's [War Minister] statement in the Diet yesterday that the Japanese Army acted solely in self-defence and that China alone was responsible for what happened, gives one the impression that things are not so bright as they appear to be.
It looks, in fact, as though Yoshizawa [Minister to Peking] had been given too much latitude and that the Government is now trying to pull him up a bit, or else he has exceeded his instructions [in conceding too much to the Chinese].
Had a visit from Colonel Furijo, who is leaving for England shortly on a 6-months' visit at his own expense. The suspicion that the military authorities are against withdrawal from Shantung appears to be unfounded, as according to him the General Staff is not at all worried at the prospect, as they consider no harm to Japanese interests will result - in fact, that, on the contrary, trade will be improved and Japanese businessmen will return to Tsinan accordingly, as the presence of Japanese troops there is hindering trade. As Furijo is in the General Staff, he ought to know what he is talking about and his remarks are therefore all the more interesting.

Saturday 9th February 1929
Saito's warnings that rejoicings were premature appear to have been justified, as yesterday's meeting between Wang and Yoshizawa to put the final touches to the agreement ended in a breakdown and things look very bleak again.

Sunday 10th February 1929
The Minseito's motion of non-confidence was defeated this evening by 249 votes to 185, with the Shinto voting in a solid block for the Government. The debate was opened yesterday and, after very turbulent scenes, the House was adjourned.

Thursday 14th February 1929
Had a most interesting discussion with Captain Robinson on the subject of Japan and naval armament limitation. He is of the opinion that Japan should have adopted a more positive attitude at Geneva instead of sitting on the fence and being so ambiguous. Both England and Japan, as he says, would welcome an opportunity to cut down expenditure on naval construction, but if the proposal comes from England, the U.S., owing to its present mood, might think it was simply a tricky on her part. He thinks they would be far more likely to listen to the proposal if it came from Japan.

Tuesday 19th February 1929
Very annoyed with Turner, who has written me an awful snorter for my failure to cable the "official" announcement appearing in the "[Japan] Advertiser" of the 9th re. Japan's intention of spending 766,000,000 on naval construction during the next 3 years. Of course the report was neither official nor correct. However, it has given me a chance to send a snorter back to Turner for accepting a newspaper report as gospel without first enquiring of his Tokyo Correspondent as to the truth thereof.

Thursday 21st February 1929
Learned at the Foreign Office that they do not regard the recent developments in Shantung as serious, as they do not consider Chang Tsung-chang has either the money or the men to do much harm to the Nationalists.

Attended a very interesting dinner this evening given by Tsurumi at the house of Dr. Hirota to Byas, Babb, Hedges and myself in order to introduce us to General Ugaki, whom he introduced as "the future Premier of Japan".

Ugaki, who is a pleasant-looking old fellow of about 65, a small but stockily-built rotund figure with a white clipped moustache, florid complexion and cropped hair (rather thin on top!), has the reputation of being a liberal and progressive, a fine administrator, extremely courageous, popular both with the masses and with politicians and statesmen in high places, and (an important asset) held in high esteem by Saionji, who is said to have great confidence in his abilities. Up to now, he has steered clear of politics, though his experience as War Minister in the Kato and Wakatsuki Cabinets from 1924-7, during which he brought about the reduction of the Army by four divisions, brought him into close touch with parliamentary affairs. Both the Seiyukai and the Minseito, according to Tsurumi, are striving to induce him to enter their party and he himself seems anxious to enter politics, though, having no party of his own, he is
apparently weighing the pros and cons of the two main parties with a view to entering one or the other.

Ugaki's own leanings appear to be toward the Minseito rather than the Seiyukai, as he has already served under a Minseito or, rather, Kenseikai Premier, and he has great respect for Shidehara who, though non-party, served with him in the same Ministry.

Hamaguchi, of course, ought by rights to be the next Premier if the Minseito come into power, but there is apparently a feeling in that party that, although he is personally popular and highly respected for his integrity, he is too weak physically to stand the strain of such an onerous position. For this reason, there has been a suggestion to induce Shidehara to come in and succeed him as President of the party, though the criticism made by both Ugaki and Tsurumi, as well, apparently, as others, is that Shidehara, though able and honest, is too negative in his outlook and that the Minseito, if they are ever to achieve success, must have a leader with a more definite policy. Of Tanaka himself they both have a high opinion, though they do not share his views. His great asset is, they consider, his extraordinary confidence in himself and his unquenchable optimism, but they point out that he is too apt to let opportunities pass. Kuhara, they both agreed, was a man of imperturbable calm and immense ability, whatever his moral integrity might be. His force of character, they observed, was well shown by the way he had succeeded in rising to so strong a position in the Cabinet despite innumerable obstacles and the personal enmity of many in the Seiyukai itself. (This is strikingly like Iwanaga's comments on him and his extraordinary business and organising ability). Asked how it was that Kuhara was now apparently so well supplied with funds whereas formerly he was bankrupt, General Ugaki asserted that Kuhara himself was never bankrupt, but that one of the companies in which he was interested went into bankruptcy. Kuhara's money, he says, comes mainly from the Hitachi copper mines which, by his own enterprise, he has made so profitable.

Regarding Kuhara's imperturbable calm in the face of so many accusations against him, he said that Kuhara has a knack of strolling up to the rostrum in the House [of Representatives] to answer his accusers, who make such an uproar as soon as he appears, that Kuhara can say anything he likes, in the full knowledge that his reply will be quite inaudible!

[When I questioned Ugaki] about his views on the Government's China policy, he said he thought they had made a mistake in despatching troops to Shantung but that, as things are at present, they ought to keep them there until they have satisfactory assurance regarding the protection of Japanese lives and property.

Regarding the Nationalists [Kuomintang], Ugaki professed entire sympathy with their aspirations and said Japan should do nothing to hinder their attainment, though she must, of course, insist on her own legitimate interests being respected.

At one point the conversation turned on the subject of whether, in the event of his entering the political field, it would be better for him to discard uniform. He rather intimated that he had discussed the matter with Saionji, and incidentally mentioned that he had just returned from a visit to the old Genro.
Tsurumi mentioned that one of Saionji's reasons for liking Ugaki was that he was not a member of the Satsuma-Choshu clique. Tsurumi said that he himself had a card up his sleeve for bringing about the present Cabinet's downfall, though he could not reveal what it was. He seems fairly convinced, however, that they will resign sometime in May or early June and for this reason he is anxious for Ugaki to get himself into the best possible position for availing himself of the opportunity to make himself a figure-head in the political world.

**Saturday 23rd February 1929**

*Zumoto* seems convinced that, in the event of the House of Peers throwing out the Tax Transfer Bill - as they are pretty well certain to do - the Government will dissolve the Diet and appeal to the country.

*Komura*, in contrast, seems to think a change of Government unlikely just now, though he told me in a very confidential whisper that there is likely to be a reorganisation of the Cabinet after April 1st, when the new Colonial Ministry comes into being, and that *Baron Hayashi* is likely to be made Foreign Minister. With regard to General *Ugaki*, he thinks he may possibly enter the Minseito, but certainly not the Seiyukai, and he says what he really wants is to be made either Chief of the General Staff or Governor-General of Korea, though it is unlikely that he will be given the latter post while *Tanaka* is in power, as Tanaka has absolute confidence in Yamanashi.

**Sunday 24th February 1929**

Few things delight me more than the increasing popularity of rugger in Japan.

**Wednesday 13th March 1929**

As a result of the riotous scenes in the Diet the last few days and the Minseito's adoption of American-style filibustering tactics, Motoda, the Speaker, resigned this evening on the grounds of ill-health though really on account of his inability to maintain order. The Japanese Diet seems to get more and more like a bear garden and the papers are becoming very worked up about it all.

**Friday 22nd March 1929**

Spoke to *Sansom* [Commercial Counsellor, British Embassy] about the memo I prepared for the Embassy the other day on the subject of a Press Attaché. He has not seen it yet and does not appear to fall in with my views, though his arguments against them struck me as very poor; and Ferguson, who listened in silence, remarked to me afterwards that he was "astounded" by Sansom's narrow outlook on the subject and only refrained from telling him so because he felt it would have been rather impertinent on his part to attack a leading member of the Embassy with many years of experience in Japan!

While I myself have great respect for Sansom's learning and scholarship, I much fear me that he has got into that terrible official groove - like so many otherwise highly-able officials - which makes him incapable of appreciating the need of moving with the times.

**Saturday 23rd March 1929**

Developments in China look bad, and a serious clash between Nanking and Wuhan appears imminent.
Monday 25th March 1929
News that a settlement of the Tsinan Affair has at last been reached came in, so went round to the Foreign Office to see Saito about it. No mistake this time apparently, as he says an official report has been received saying it was initialled yesterday.

Wednesday 27th March 1929
Went to Rotary lunch for last time, as I have sent in my resignation on account of the yearly subscription being raised from £100 to £150. Sorry to leave, but "shikata ga nai!" ["It can't be helped"]

Thursday 28th March 1929
The Tsinan Agreement has now been signed, and telegraphic instructions were therefore despatched this afternoon to Tsinan to start withdrawal of the troops, which is to be completed within two months.

Received letter from Charles telling me confidentially that Sir John Tilley agrees with my memo on a Press Attaché, though there is little chance of getting anything done about it just yet awhile.

Thursday 4th April 1929
Babb tells me both Date and Tokumitsu have resigned from Rengo. All honour to Iwanaga for standing out against them.

Saturday 6th April 1929
Gave a "stag" party, the guests being Davidson, Charles and Scott. Tsurumi and Iwanaga were to have come too, in fact the whole idea of the dinner was to introduce Tsurumi; but Goto's sudden illness made it impossible for them to attend, as Tsurumi has had to dash off down to Kyoto to be with him, and Iwanaga has been commissioned to take charge of the Goto household and Goto's affairs in general in Tokyo.

Much amused at Charles, in the course of discussing the "I'm Alone" case [the seizure by U.S. coastguards, on the high seas, of a British merchantman running alcohol into the United States during the prohibition period] and the question of the Freedom of the Seas, remarked, "I wonder who the fool is who has entered into a controversy on the subject in the [Japan] Advertiser?" "The fool", of course, was me! I would have told him so then and there, only I was afraid he might not quite like it, as I might have embarrassed him!

Monday 8th April 1929
At Foreign Office in morning and agreed to take on the writing of an article on Japan's Post-War Progress for the Premier. It seems that some big publishing firm in America has hit on the idea of bringing out a book, "Ten Years After", with chapter on each country. Tanaka has been asked to do the one on Japan, but, being pressed for time and being unable to write English himself had commissioned the Foreign Office to find someone to do it for him, in his name. On Dr. Baty's [adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office] recommendation, they asked me to tackle it and - I agreed.

While at the Foreign Office, Saito told me that the Chinese have definitely requested the Japanese to postpone their evacuation of Shantung, as they cannot now guarantee the safety
of Japanese lives and property if they do so, as further civil war seems inevitable. It confirms the message I sent some weeks ago to the effect that the Nationalists were not really so anxious to get rid of the Japanese as they professed.

Monday 15th April 1929

The Kellogg Anti-War Pact [Kellogg-Briand Pact] is causing considerable discord in Japan. The phrase [that] the Emperor signs "in the name of the people", is held by the Privy Council to be contrary to the Japanese Constitution. They are therefore taking the Government to task for having let this phrase go past, and want a reservation put in, though the Government is doing its best to get it ratified as it stands, as they maintain that the phrase is mere rhetoric.

Wednesday 17th April 1929

To lunch at the Batys. Dr. Baty was summoned to the Foreign Office in connection with the "in the name of the people" controversy. As the Foreign Office is presumably adopting their stand on this point of his advice, I asked him his opinion about it. His reply was to the effect that the Privy Council is making a lot of fuss about nothing, but that the Pact itself was the worst drafted one he had ever come across. An interesting commentary, coming as it does from a leading authority on International Law.

Iwanaga has asked me to see if I can get the [British] Embassy to help Rengo to get Kato, their Correspondent, permission to travel up from Hong Kong with Prince Henry on H.M.S. "Suffolk". Rengo wants to get one better [than its rival, Dentsu and the Mainichi and Asahi newspapers]. Sir Roderick [Jones], at Iwanaga's request, has promised to approach the Admiralty on the matter at London, but he wants me to get the Embassy to try from this end too.

Thursday 18th April 1929

Hear from Rengo that another country-wide round up of alleged radical took place on Tuesday night and netted about 300 in all, mainly students.

Wednesday 1st May 1929

Saito tells me final approval has been given to the drafts of the agreements for the settlement of the Nanking and Hankow incidents and that Yoshizawa [Japanese Minister to Peking] has been telegraphically instructed to sign them. The preliminary negotiations on the question of concluding a new commercial treaty to replace the one abrogated by China last July have likewise progressed so favourably that, according to Saito, all the misunderstandings and ill feelings engendered by China's action have now been removed.

With the Tsinan, Nanking and Hankow incidents successfully closed and with the treaty abrogation question cleared up, all the outstanding questions causing such strained relations during the past few years have now been removed and it looks almost as though a new epoch in Sino-Japanese relations is about to open.

Thursday 2nd May 1929

The Duke of Gloucester arrived on the "Suffolk". I am told that the Court officials were opposed to the Emperor's coming to Tokyo station in person to greet the Duke as they considered it lowering to his dignity to do so, as the Duke is only a younger son of the King.
He, however, is said to have insisted on coming, in order to show his appreciation of the Duke's visit.

Saturday 4th May 1929
This morning I had a visit from my gendarme friend, whose main object in coming to see me appeared to be to ask if I thought there was any danger of an attack being made on Prince Henry by Indians during his stay in Japan and to say that the police were keeping strict watch on the movement of Bose and a Hindu in the "Japan Times", who is apparently on the blacklist.

Sunday 5th May 1929
Went to see the rugger match between the "Suffolk" and a Japanese team. The [Meiji] stadium was packed, about 40,000 being present, and gave Prince Henry a great ovation.

Saturday 11th May 1929
Romm seems very excited about a remark made by the Duke [of Gloucester] in replying to the Premier's speech a few nights ago, as he regards it as signifying that there is still some sort of alliance between Britain and Japan. The words in question were to the effect that "in peace as in war" the two countries would always be friends. It was obviously no more than a rhetorical expression.

Thursday 16th May 1929
Had an interesting talk with Dr. Nitobe, in the course of which I asked him if he was thinking of writing any more books on Japan. He smiled and replied to the effect that, shortly before leaving Geneva in 1927, he had been asked by a London publisher to write a book on present day Japan. Thinking this would be a task of no great difficulty he promised to do so, but on returning to Japan he found such great changes had taken place during his 8 years' absence that it was impossible for him to carry out his promise until he had had time to study the changed conditions and the book is still waiting to be written.

Thursday 23rd May 1929
Attended ex-Service lunch to Duke of Gloucester and the members of his suite - a combined lunch given by the Tokyo branch of the British Legion and the Yokohama Ex-Service Association. As President of the former, I sat next to the Duke.
I took the opportunity to apologise to him for forgetting the names of some of the ex-Servicemen when I was presenting them to him at the Embassy Garden Party, but he laughed and said there was no need to apologise, as he himself, with far less excuse, forgot Lloyd Thomas's name when he was presenting the members of his suite to Prince Chichibu on the day of his arrival! He said he could not for the life of him remember anything but the nickname by which he was known on board, and he felt it would hardly be "comme il faut" to present him by such an appellation!

Saturday 25th May 1929
To a lunch given by General Sir Neil Malcolm, who is here on a visit with Wheeler-Bennett. The others at the lunch were the Robinsons, who knew him when he was G.O.C.-in-C Singapore a few years ago.
General Malcolm is out here partly in connection with Wheeler-Bennett's work, but primarily on business connected with the British North Borneo Co., of which he is now President - hence the inclusion of the Mitsubishi and Kuhara men at the lunch, as those are the two firms with the biggest interests in Borneo - rubber, copper etc.

General Malcolm has a bad limp, so what with Robinson's and mine the British members were verily composed of "the lame and the halt!"

Sent off my first cable to the "Handelsblad" of Surabaya, to whom I am from now on to send a weekly review of Japanese affairs.

Tuesday 28th May 1929

Cables report a raid on the Soviet Consulate-General at Harbin by the Chinese for the alleged purpose of obtaining evidence of Bolshevist activities and of proving their connection with Feng Yu-hsiang.

Wednesday 29th May 1929

Wheeler-Bennett tells me he was up at the Soviet Embassy this morning and that they expressed the belief that the British Government instigated the Chinese raid at Harbin in the hope of working off another "Zinoviev letter" coup on the eve of the General Election! An interesting commentary on the Soviet mentality!

Friday 31st May 1929

Furuno tells me the Soviet Embassy is demanding to know where Rengo got the story about their interpretation of the Harbin raid. The answer is, of course, that they got it from me, but I have asked Furuno to decline to answer, as I do not want them to know this, lest they trace it back to Wheeler-Bennett and possibly make things unpleasant for him in consequence when returning via Siberia to England. I have, however, no reason to doubt Wheeler-Bennett's assertions, as they are more or less born out by Romm's action this morning in intimating to Saito at the Foreign Office that the British Government was behind it all.

Had a visit from Nitobe. Tells me that certain members of the Privy Council took exception to Prince Chichibu's speech at the America-Japan Society dinner on Lincoln's Birthday Centenary, as it was considered too democratic! Apparently their suspicions fell on Nitobe's father [Dr. Nitobe] as the composer of the speech, but in actual fact it was Count Kabayama who wrote it for him. Nitobe tells me that conservative Japanese prefer Prince Takamatsu to Prince Chichibu, as they regard him as more dignified than his brother.

Also had a visit from Captain James, who told me of an incident regarding the Duke of Gloucester's visit which caused a certain amount of alarm and despondency. It seems that [the Duke] happened to remark at the Mitsui dinner that he was very fond of mangoes. Baron Mitsui therefore sent a great bale of them round to the Kasumigaseki Palace for him. On getting back to the Palace late that night and finding them there, [the Duke] and some of the members of his suite started bombarding each other with them and soon had the curtains and walls etc. messed up with ripe mangoes! Amusing in its way, but a great pity, as it must have created a very bad impression among the Japanese, not only in that so much damage was done to the furnishings of the Palace, but also in that Baron Mitsui's present was used in that
way, as mangoes cost about £4 apiece out here and are hard to obtain. I asked Edith Maud if
the story was true, and she admitted that it was so, but that the Embassy was trying to hush it
up!

Saturday 1st June 1929
Had a visit from Sashida of the "Nichi Nichi". He mentioned that votes are still bought freely in
Japan and that, whereas a Japanese vote can be bought for £1 or £1.50(?), the Korean vote
will fetch only 60 or 70 sen!

Monday 3rd June 1929
Cables from China tell of Yoshizawa presenting his credentials to Nanking and giving Japan's
de jure recognition. Another landmark in Sino-Japanese relations.

Wednesday 5th June 1929
Maeda Tamon I had not met before, thought I knew him well by name on account of his
writings on the Japanese Labour movement, he having been in the Labour Office at Geneva,
though he is now a "leader" writer on the staff of the "Asahi". Like Iwanaga, he was formerly a
protegé of Goto's and served under him as Deputy-Mayor of Tokyo. Seems a very pleasant
fellow and an interesting talker, though his appearance is rather against him! He accompanied
Goto to Moscow in 1927, and had some interesting things to tell of Litvinov, Karakhan etc., all
of whom he met there.

He told an amusing story about the visit of "Little" Hsu to Geneva. That doughty warrior's idea
of humour appears to have been of a somewhat crude nature, for, at a dinner given in his
honour by some of the leading lights of the League of Nations, he told them with pride of how
he had murdered one of his rivals. The rival in question had always been a great pal of his
and therefore, on receiving an invitation to dine with "Little" Hsu one evening, accepted the
invitation readily. The entertainment was of the most lavish description, and the guest of
honour, to show his appreciation, remarked towards the end of the repast that he would like
his host to say what he would like as a gift as a return for the dinner. "Little" Hsu's reply was
to the effect that the only thing he wanted from his guest was his head, and he thereupon
hacked it off! This "pleasing" little anecdote was told by "Little" Hsu with much pride and he
seemed quite surprised to find that the ladies and gentlemen of the League failed to applaud
him! (It was the son of the murdered man who finally murdered "Little" Hsu on his return from
Europe. Just retribution!)

Wednesday 12th June 1929
One hears a lot about industrial depression and so forth, but if Iwasaki can afford to build
himself a house for £2,000,000 and Mitsui can spend £35,000,000 on their new bank, as they
have just done, business conditions cannot really be so very bad!

Sunday 16th June 1929
Ferguson tells me that Simson is to succeed Hill as Military Attaché next year after all. Very
glad to hear it, as he ought to be a good man for the job, though he used to swear that
nothing would induce him to take it, as he is a soldier, not a diplomat!

Tuesday 18th June 1929
The special committee of the Privy Council, which interrogated the Premier and others yesterday about the wording of the Anti-War Pact [Kellogg-Briand Pact], has agreed to recommend its ratification without reservation, so the Government will presumably be spared the possibility of being forced to resign as it probably would have had to do if the Privy Council had insisted on a reservation about the much debated phrase, "in the name of their respective people".

**Wednesday 26th June 1929**

Plenary session of Privy Council in presence of Emperor finally approved ratification of the Anti-War Pact without reservation, though with an interpretive declaration attached. Uchida, however, has tendered his resignation as a protest against the Government agreeing to attach even an interpretation.

**Saturday 29th June 1929**

This morning's vernaculars were chock-a-block with reports of a sudden Cabinet crisis, so, I looked up Saito at the Foreign Office to find out just how much truth there was in what they said. He was evasive in his replies and professed to have no knowledge of the exact position, merely saying that the reports were "probably exaggerated"; but it was obvious from his tone that there was something pretty serious happening. Further questioning elicited the information that the publication of the findings about the Manchurian affair, which was to have been issued today, have been "postponed indefinitely", from which it may be inferred that there was some truth in the report that Shirakawa has threatened to tender, even if he had not actually tendered, his resignation as a protest against the punishment of officers on the grounds of negligence.

I ran into old Zumoto who told me in confidence that the crisis had arisen from the Emperor's complaint that Tanaka's reports to him on the Manchurian Affair were contradictory, and about half an hour after getting back to my office Kumasaki hurried in to tell me "in strict confidence", that he had just learned from Shiratori that the crisis had come about as a result of a hint from the Emperor that he was dissatisfied with Tanaka's handling of both the Anti-War Pact and the Manchurian Affair.

Kumasaki told me that Admiral Okada, the Navy Minister, being a non-party man, admitted quite frankly that the Government had already decided to resign and would probably do so on Tuesday next week, and he also intimated that, while the Manchurian Affair had brought things to a head and would probably be used as a pretext for resigning, it was really the accumulation of dissatisfaction over the Government's deeds and misdeeds since coming into office that was in the background.

**Sunday 30th June 1929**

According to Kumasaki Prince Kanin spoke very strongly against Tanaka for trying to throw all the blame for the Manchurian Affair on the shoulders of the Army, and that, as this reproof came from the lips of an Imperial Prince and was in conjunction with the Emperor's own attitude towards him, Tanaka was forced to take notice of it.

**Monday 1st July 1929**
The formal decision to resign en bloc was reached at this morning’s Cabinet conference.

**Tuesday 2nd July 1929**
Tanaka handed in the Cabinet's resignation this morning, Hamaguchi was summoned to succeed him. As expected, *Shidehara* returns to the Foreign Office, *Takarabe* to the Navy Office, and *Ugaki* to the War Office. *Inoue* is made Finance Minister and *Adachi* gets the Home Office.

**Friday 5th July 1929**
Looked up *Saito* at the Foreign Office to discuss the political situation and took the occasion to pull his leg about his evasiveness last Saturday about the Cabinet crisis. He admitted that he did, of course, know the seriousness of it at that time, but said that he knew nothing about it till the previous evening when Prince *Saionji* had him to dinner and told him confidentially about it.

*Tokonami* and the Shinto Club have amalgamated with the Seiyukai, thus giving the latter an absolute majority in the Lower House and making dissolution and a general election seemingly more essential than ever [because of the Minseito Cabinet].

**Tuesday 9th July 1929**
Government issued a statement setting forth its proposed policies, the main points being drastic retrenchment, friendship with China, and support for cause of disarmament, within limit of not impairing national defence.

**Wednesday 10th July 1929**
China appears to be looking for trouble and has now followed up her recent raid on the Soviet Consulate at Harbin by arresting all the leading Soviet officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway, seizing the telegraphs and telephones, and deporting a large number of those arrested, while Chinese officials have been put in their place.

**Thursday 11th July 1929**
Pending official confirmation of the latest coup at Harbin, *Saito* is withholding comment, but he admits that the Government is watching developments closely, as China, if she succeeds in ousting Russia from the Chinese Eastern Railway, may turn her attention to the South Manchurian Railway [Japanese-controlled].

Late this evening came the news that the Chinese have seized the whole Chinese Eastern Railway and are forcibly deporting all the Soviet officials. Ostensibly the reason is that those officials have been engaged in communist propaganda, but there seems little doubt that, whether true or not, this is no more than a pretext and that China is at present overcome with a sense of her own importance and thinks she can do anything she damned well likes. The dangers to be apprehended are obvious, as Moscow can hardly be expected to sit down under such an insult as this; but if she tries to assert her rights by force of arms, Japan is bound to loom very large in the picture - in fact, the whole thing puts Japan in a serious predicament. If China is allowed to retain her spoils, she will be so confoundedly swollen-headed that she will next start demanding the return of the South Manchurian Railway etc.; if, on the other hand, Russia tries to take back the Chinese Eastern Railway by force, Japan
may well find herself forced to take military action to protect her own interests in Manchuria, and then the fat will be in the fire.

Friday 12th July 1929

Looked up Saito at the Foreign Office about China's latest action. While, he said, no action by Japan is called for as yet, he made little attempt to conceal the anxiety felt or to minimise the dangerous possibilities. One remark that struck me as somewhat significant was to the effect that, although Harbin lies outside Japan's sphere of special interests, circumstances might conceivably arise necessitating adoption of measures to protect Japanese lives and property there.

Monday 15th July 1929

Large headlines announcing that Moscow had delivered a 3-day ultimatum to China. On getting to my office, got into touch with the Foreign Office and found Saito obviously worried over the latest turn of affairs, though not admitting undue pessimism, despite consular reports from Manchuli that Japanese travellers arriving there reported movements of Soviet troops and troop trains east of Karimska. Japan's policy, according to him, is still one of "closest watchful waiting" and strict neutrality, though ready to protect her own interests if menaced, and under no circumstances allow disturbances to spread south of Changchun.

The Japanese War Office, for its part, appears confident that the Soviet ultimatum is intended to force China to negotiate rather than as a hostile threat, and that the present trouble will be settled amicably without resort to arms. They also consider that, although available Soviet troops are inferior in numbers to the Chinese, they are far more efficient and can fully hold their own and dominate the whole situation if concentrated at Vladivostok, Manchuli and Blagoveshchensk. All things considered therefore, it seems unlikely that actual hostilities will break out, as, apart from anything else, both parties to the dispute have to take Japan into their calculations.

Tuesday 16th July 1929

Lunched with Hill [Military Attaché British Embassy]. Tells me he sent a copy of Colonel Kawamoto's very provocative speech on the way to deal with the Manchurian military clique to the War Office with a covering letter, in which he remarked that his words seemed rather to bear out the suspicions held in some quarters as to Japanese complicity in the bombing of Chang Tso-lin. Sir John [Tilley], however, on seeing his comments, said he failed to see how he could construe the speech in such a way. If, however, Colonel Kawamoto really said what he was reported to have said, I must admit that Hill's comments appear justified.

Had a talk with him about the proposed Army reorganisation. From what General Hata told me the other day, it would seem that the main points to be considered are a further reduction of colour service, further mechanisation and modernisation of weapons, and a possible expansion of the Air Force, while the disbandment of any more divisions seems doubtful. Hill agrees that this is probably more or less what is contemplated!
China has apparently decided to climb down at the last moment and has sent a conciliatory reply to the Soviet ultimatum. On getting back to the house, was called up on the 'phone about 11.30 p.m. with the latest news from Harbin, from which it looks as though the future is still far from certain - Trans-Siberian route suspended, Chinese troop movements, Mukden arsenal working overtime, more Russians kicked out, and Soviet officials saying Nanking's reply may pave the way to negotiations, but fails to cancel seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway and is therefore unsatisfactory.

Thursday 18th July 1929

Saito, who seemed more optimistic yesterday of a peaceful settlement, expressed great surprise at this latest turn, and when I asked him what he thought of it he replied, "It may mean war, as the Russians are reported to have recalled all their people from China", though he added hurriedly, "but don't quote me as saying that". It is all very disquieting and (most serious of all!) may put a stop to my getting away for the weekend!

The General Staff expresses belief that the Sino-Soviet rupture is unlikely to lead to war, but admits the concentration of Chinese and Soviet troops on the border might precipitate a clash.

Friday 19th July 1929

Following rupture of relations, Martial Law has been proclaimed in Harbin and the situation around Manchuli and Pogranichnaya is described as panicky, with civilians withdrawing, troops concentrating and Soviet aircraft patrolling the borders.

Saturday 20th July 1929

The latest development is that Stimson [U.S. Secretary of State] has drawn the attention of the two disputants to the desirability of avoiding war, as they are both signatories of the Anti-War Pact.

Sunday 21st July 1929

Got back to Tokyo 11 p.m. and went straight to the office, where I found Babb hard at it drafting cables, so stayed on myself till past midnight doing likewise. Found much had happened in my absence, so poor old Babb had been kept pretty busy covering my interests as well as his own and there is a huge pile of work awaiting my attention. I suppose I ought to have stayed down in Tokyo over the weekend, but as there is no other chance of a holiday, and as Reuters call this a "part time" job, it is pretty tough if I cannot even get away once in a while for a weekend!

Tuesday 23rd July 1929

Saito continues to deny that Japan was ever officially informed by the U.S. of Stimson's action, and Dooman told Babb confidentially that the U.S. Embassy is in the dark about the whole matter, so it looks as though there had been a diplomatic blunder somewhere, as it seems obvious that Japan is feeling hurt at seemingly being left out in the cold.

In order to try and find out just how things stood, I looked up Macrae at the [British] Embassy and was confidentially shown the cables from Sir Esme Howard and our own Foreign Office. Howard, in one of his, tells of his visit to the State Department on the 19th, when Stimson
expressed a desire for Britain to do what she could to remind China of her obligations under the Anti-War Pact, and intimated that he was making similar requests to Japan and France and that, as both of them were in diplomatic relations with Russia as well, they were to be asked to emphasise this point informally to the Soviet as well.

Dined in evening with Sington, who has a job at the Etajima Naval College with Churchyard. Find that after the War he was employed under M.I.1, nominally as a Passport Control Officer, in Vienna keeping an eye on the Communist movement.

**Wednesday 24th July 1929**

*Saito* continues to deny that Japan was ever asked to associate herself with the American demarche and that she knows nothing officially regarding any formal diplomatic action on the part of the U.S., though he admits that Japan was requested, through *Debuchi*, to contribute an expression of opinion as to the best solution of the Sino-Soviet trouble.

The long and the short of it seems to be that the Press despatches from abroad made it appear that formal action had been taken by America, whereas all that happened was that Stimson suggested to the various Ambassadors that their respective governments should do what they could, in an informal way, to remind the two disputants of their adherence to the Anti-War Pact. The Soviet, on their part, may have deliberately misconstrued French action as an offer of mediation, while as for China, she appears to have been doing her level best to get out of the hole into which she has got herself by trying to shelter behind the cover of the League and the Anti-War Pact - a pretty mean, low-down trick, though thoroughly typical of her.

Press despatches meantime indicate brighter prospects of a peaceful settlement.

**Monday 29th July 1929**

[Three young American journalists I met had] been touring around China and Mongolia and seem to have had a very interesting trip, as they made a point of going into the interior off the usual beaten track of the usual tourist. In consequence of what they have seen and heard for themselves, they confess to having been entirely disillusioned of the beliefs they formerly held regarding the good work of the Nationalists. They went to China prepared to sympathise and applaud. They have come back firm in the conviction that no greater liar or bully then the Chinaman exists anywhere.

The more one hears of the Chinese, the more utterly untrustworthy and unscrupulous they seem to be.

**Thursday 1st August 1929**

Had a Miss Poole to lunch at the Imperial. She is doing a semi-journalistic tour of the East.

**Thursday 15th August 1929**

Miss Poole having written to ask me to show her something of the night-life of Tokyo, Tennent and I gave her dinner at the house and then chartered a taxi to show her round. Was somewhat taken aback when she asked to be shown the Yoshiwara. Personally, although I know it is regarded as a sort of show-place by a great many tourists, both male and female, I myself had never been there before and it strikes me as rather disgusting that any woman
should want to see the place. However, the young woman of today does many strange things without necessarily being "vicious", so I suppose it is merely that my views on such matters are a bit out-of-date.

Historically, of course, there is a great deal of interest about the place [Yoshiwara] and, in a way, it was quite interesting to see it. The licensed system is pretty revolting in many respects, as it is virtually a form of slavery; but in so far as external appearance is concerned, the Yoshiwara is far superior to the crude vulgarity of the filthy brothels in Marseilles and other such places.

Truly a strange people are the Japanese, with their curious mixture of vice and decorum, immorality and refined taste. The Yoshiwara might, in fact, be described as a model of refined immorality.

**Tuesday 20th August 1929**

Have just finished reading Remarque's "All quiet on the Western Front" - a bit crude in parts, but quite the most vivid and thought-provoking book on the War that I have come across. Brilliant but ghastly.

**Monday 9th September 1929**

The Sino-Soviet trouble, which looked like being settled shortly, has broken out afresh, and each side is accusing the other of blood, murder, and sudden death!

**Tuesday 10th September 1929**

Am glad to see that Hoover looks like taking a strong stand on this case of the U.S. armament firms using Shearer, a paid propagandist, at the Three-Power Conference to ensure the failure of the meeting.

**Saturday 14th September 1929**

The MacDonald-Dawes conversations [on armaments] have reached a sufficiently satisfactory stage for a Five-Power conference to be called in December, according to Press despatches. Official confirmation of this has not yet been received in Tokyo, and Saito, whom I met at the Club at lunch time, seemed rather doubtful that sufficient progress had really been made to call a conference as early as that. However, the Navy Office seems much interested in the report, although, in so far as the proposal to extend the naval holiday for capital ships is concerned, a spokesman intimated that Japan was opposed to it in principle on account of technical and financial reasons, though probably some compromise might by reached.

**Tuesday 17th September 1929**

The Press continues to be very disappointed at the large allotment of cruisers proposed for America and insists that actual reduction in tonnage must be made - not mere limitation resulting in expansion. Official circles make no comment on the Anglo-American compromise, but there are indications that there will be no difficulties in the way of Japan's adherence. The Japanese Cabinet, at their conference this morning, are reported to have decided:

a) To consider favourably the proposal to extend the naval holiday for capital ships to 1936,
b) To take the U.S. 1st Class cruiser tonnage as the standard for her 70% ratio, which will mean building two more 10,000 tonners if America is allowed 18, and 4 more if 21,
c) To agree to scrap about 27,000 tons of destroyers, built or building, and reduce to 105,000 tons if the Anglo-American allotment is fixed at 150,000 tons,
d) To oppose either abolition or drastic reduction of submarines, as she regards them as essential for national defence.

Friday 20th September 1929
The Cabinet held another important conference this morning on the subject of disarmament and are said to have decided to ask for at least 3 months notice of the date the 5-Power Conference is to open and to intimate that, if the conference results in an expansion of armaments instead of a definite reduction, Japan may refuse to be party to the agreement.

It is also reported (Rengo assert they got it direct from Takarabe himself) that Matsudaira [Japanese Ambassador to Britain] has forwarded an invitation from the British Government for Japan to open preliminary negotiations similar to the Dawes-MacDonald conversations and that the Cabinet has agreed to accept the proposal.

Saturday 21st September 1929
Asked Saito about the truth of the report about the British invitation to Japan. He admitted that Matsudaira had asked for, and been sent, special instructions, but denied that preliminary negotiations between Tanaka committed suicide. This, however, seems highly improbably as, apart from the fact that his heart has been weak for some time past, he would hardly select the house of his concubine (which is where he died) as the place in which to be found dead! Moreover, Tanaka was no coward, and if he had committed suicide he would have done it "more Japonico" [Japanese custom] as an act of atonement for the sins of his subordinates and would have left letters to that effect, taking the responsibility for their misdeeds on his own shoulders. A suicide of this kind would, in the eyes of the Japanese, be regarded as highly honourable and as serving to expiate the offences both of himself and his party. The Seiyukai would therefore be sure to reveal the fact and make political capital out of it.

Tuesday 8th October 1929
As the invitation to the Five-Power Disarmament Conference was expected to reach Tokyo sometime today, I went along to the Navy Office in the morning to sound Captain Koga on the matter. As the terms had not then been given out, he was unable to discuss the invitation itself, but was unexpectedly outspoken regarding the general prospects of the forthcoming conference, though he asked me not to quote him. If his views coincide with the official views of the Navy Office (and I imagine from the way he spoke that they do), the Navy is none too optimistic regarding the outcome and is not too well-disposed towards the U.S., whom he described time and again as "egoistic" and self-centered. He maintained that the general feeling both in naval and civilian circles was one of sympathy for England, as it was felt that she was being made to sacrifice everything and America nothing.
During dinner, was rung up by Rengo with news of the contents of the British invitation to the Arms Conference. Starting off with a brief review of the Anglo-American conversations, it says that agreement has been reached on the following points:

1) The Kellogg Pact to serve as the starting point.
2) Anglo-American parity in all categories to be reached by the end of 1936.
3) Desirability of reconsidering battleship replacement programmes with a view to diminishing the amount of replacement reconstruction.
4) Total abolition of submarines to be suggested.

Willingness to continue informal conversations with Matsudaira on any points requiring elucidation prior to the Conference is expressed, so this ought to please Japan.

Friday 11th October 1929
Went to hear the "movie-talkies" for the first time. Was not very impressed by them.

Saturday 12th October 1929
Wakatsuki, after first refusing, has accepted the leadership of the Japanese delegation to the Arms Conference, and is to be accompanied by Takarabe and Matsudaira.

Tuesday 15th October 1929
[A.P. Scott of the A.P.C. Oil Company] told me of a conversation he had had some time ago with Admiral Takarabe. Admiral Takarabe, it seems, asked him what reserves of oil he thought the Japanese Navy ought to have. When [Scott] had expressed his opinion, Admiral Takarabe remarked, "I consider we ought to have enough for two years". [Scott] deduces from this that they aim at a reserve of 3,000,000 tons. He says that a present they are buying about 500,000 tons a year from abroad in addition to that they get from Sakhalin and elsewhere.

Announcement made this afternoon that the Government, in the course of their economy and retrenchment policy, intends to make an average cut of 10% from the salaries of all officials earning £100 a month and upwards. The total saving thereby is only expected to be about £8,000,000 a year. It seems pretty rough therefore on the officials, who are notoriously badly underpaid even as it is.

Wednesday 16th October 1929
The Government has raised a regular hornets' nest over their decision to reduce salaries, and the whole country seems to be up in arms against it. The Government apparently hopes that, if they led the way in cutting wages, the rest of the country would follow and the cost of living would fall accordingly, as overhead charges could then be reduced and prices of commodities drop. No one, however, shows any great wish to follow in their steps.

Friday 18th October 1929
The [favourable] Japanese reply to the British invitation was made public this evening.

Sunday 20th October 1929
Rengo rang up to say that the Government, in view of the strong country-wide opposition, has decided to revoke its decision to cut salaries. A wise move, though possibly a sign of weakness.
Tuesday 29th October 1929
To a lunch given by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs to some of the foreign correspondents. Admiral Yamanashi (Vice-Minister of Navy) and Admiral Hori, the Chief of Naval Affairs, were amongst those present, as also was Captain Koga. The last-named was again very outspoken with me regarding Japan's attitude towards America's proposal to build so many 10,000 ton cruisers.

Tuesday 5th November 1929
Police lifted ban on news of Communist round ups. According to the figures now published a total of 825 of those arrested have been formally indicted.

Colgrave looked in to see me and told me of talks he has had of late with some of his Japanese naval pals. One point on which he maintains they are definite is that, unless the 70% ratio in 8-inch gun cruisers is agreed to, Japan will walk out of the Conference. I have no doubt they will fight for it for all they are worth, but I wonder if they are really prepared to go to this length? He also tells me that the hope was expressed that we would never give up Hong Kong as a naval station, as Japan regards it as a help in keeping America from butting into South China unduly!

Saturday 9th November 1929
Met Shiratori at lunch at the Club and got talking with him about the report of the Government's intention to take some action to protest against the Japanese communists being supplied with funds from Soviet Russia. He says that some of the members of the former Cabinet, notably Nakahashi, the Minister of Commerce, were strong advocates of breaking off relations with Moscow.

Tuesday 12th November 1929
To the Imperial Chrysanthemum Party in afternoon with Maggie - held in the Shinjuku Palace grounds instead of the usual Akasaka Detached Palace. While attending it, Romm [TASS Correspondent came up to me and shook me warmly by the hand, saying, "I have to congratulate you that your country has at last recognised my Government"! I felt inclined to say that I saw no reasons for his congratulations and that, anyway, we have not yet exchanged ambassadors; but I did not want to hurt his feelings. He told me he had also offered similar congratulations to Lord Hailsham [on visit to Japan], and that Lord Hailsham's reply was, "Well, I congratulate you too, though I will say quite frankly that I did everything I could to oppose the restoration of relations with the Soviet when I was in the Government"!

To dinner at the Kaikan in evening with Maggie, given by the Japan British Society in honour of Wakatsuki, Lord Hailsham, and the British delegation to the Kyoto Conference [on Pacific Relations]. Medley, who was at our table, mentioned rather an interesting incident in connection with the dinner given by the same society to Prince Chichibu a year or so ago. It seems that a photograph taken at it while Dormer [Counsellor of British Embassy] was proposing the Prince's health appeared in some of the papers the following day and made it look as though he were speaking with on of his hands in his pocket. As a result, a number of
threatening letters were received by him from the Black Dragon Society and other reactionary organisations demanding an apology for his "insult" to the Prince!

Thursday 14th November 1929
The papers came out this afternoon with a report that Matsudaira had cabled to the Government to say that, whilst Macdonald was prepared to accept Japan's demand for a 70% ratio in 8-inch gun cruisers vis-à-vis Britain, he was absolutely opposed to Japan having this ratio towards America, as this would mean that, if the U.S. builds 18 cruisers of 10,000 tons, Japan's ratio to England would rise to nearly 86%, and if the U.S. insists on 21 such vessels, Japan would have to increase her strength to 147,000 tons, which would give her a slightly larger tonnage even that Great Britain (146,800). Babb was given this information this morning by n amount of pessimism was felt in some quarters, but considered that this was a good sign at this stage of proceedings, as over-optimism at this point might do harm and bring about an understandable reaction at the Conference itself if things do not turn out as well as hoped. As for the question of Japan leaving the Conference if her demands are turned down, he said he refused, at this early stage, even to consider the possibility of a breakdown until all possible avenues of approach to a solution had been thoroughly explored. He said that Japan sympathises with Britain in being more or less forced to concede to the American demand for so many 8-inch gun cruisers and realises the difficulty of adjusting cruiser ratios acceptable to all concerned. He seemed hopeful, however, that some way would be found to satisfy the various conflicting claims and emphasised quite frankly that one of Japan's main desires was to find a way by which to reduce the cost of armaments without sacrificing her requirements in regard to national defence.

The question of the Singapore Base, he said, might have to be brought up, but the naval authorities wish to avoid any discussion of it at the present time, as it is a very delicate question and whereas the naval authorities understand the position quite well, the man in the street fails to do so and is apt to get unnecessarily worked up about it.

He seemed to expect that the question of reducing the size of aircraft carriers would be brought up and mentioned that it was the British delegates at the Washington Conference who were responsible for fixing the high tonnage limit.

Babb tells me that Shiratori showed him confidentially a report from Debuchi [Japanese Ambassador in Washington] on his talk with Hoover on cruiser ratios, and that the report appears to indicate that America will be satisfied with 18 cruisers of 10,000-ton class. Incidentally I drew his (Babb's) attention to an article by Admiral Fiske, reproduced in the "Japan Times", and asked him if Fiske is taken seriously. It was simply a ridiculous rant against [President] Harding and others for "letting down" their own country at the Washington Conference and sacrificing America's interests without getting anything in exchange! It beats me how any man of his standing could write such rot and how any intelligent being could take it seriously, but Babb tells me that Ogan, the present American Naval Attache, holds similar views and I remember myself that Ogan's predecessor, at the time of the Geneva Conference, expressed somewhat similar sentiments to me. Possibly Colonel McIlroy's recent
outburst with Sano can be explained as being due to his being tinged with the same anti-British complex.

To a dinner at the Imperial in evening. Sir John Tilley [British Ambassador], who was also present, asked me about the report in this morning's "Advertiser" concerning Macdonald turning down Japan's demand for a 70% ratio in cruisers vis-à-vis America, so I told him what I knew about it. He seemed very surprised, but the point that apparently worried him most was the way in which the "Advertiser" wrote it up, as it made it appear as though American propaganda was at work, trying to make it appear as though England was trying to block Japan's wishes. ["Japan Advertiser" was American-owned]. Personally I doubt if this was done intentionally, though I quite see that it might be construed that way.

Saturday 16th November 1929

Had a private interview with Sir John Tilley at the Embassy in morning about last night's conversation on the cruiser ratio question and asked him not to mention anything about it to Baron Shidehara or any other Japanese official lest it got Shiratori into trouble. He promised not to do so, though said he was going to report it to our own Foreign Office. He still seems to think the "Advertiser" report was deliberate American propaganda and said that what he was afraid was that the Americans were out to make it appear as though it was England, not America, that was blocking the Japanese claims. He recalled the Shearer case and said he thought there might be another attempt of the same kind to make England the "goat". So far as the "Advertiser" is concerned, however, I very much doubt if there was any such intention.

At the same time, from what Japanese naval officers have said to me, there seems to be a real fear that the old traditional friendship between the British and Japanese navies may be sadly impaired at the coming Conference as a result of Britain's tentative agreement to let America have a larger force of 8-inch gun cruisers than herself, as this will make her bound to oppose the Japanese demand for 70% ratio with America.

Monday 18th November 1929

Soviet troops are reported to have assumed a strong offensive both in the eastern and western sectors, especially around Dalainor and Manchuli, with heavy air raids on Hailar. [Sino-Soviet dispute over control of Chinese Eastern Railway]

Tuesday 19th November 1929

Went on after dinner to the Hills to meet a Major Myles from Hong Kong, who has been over here attending Grand Manoeuvres and is returning to England to take over M.I.2.c [Japanese Section]. He and Hill have just returned from manoeuvres and say there was less than ever to be seen.

Thursday 21st November 1929

The papers are filled with revelations of scandals in high places brought to light by the judicial investigations now taking place. At the outset, it was the Seiyukai who were made to suffer by these revelations, but now it seems that certain leaders amongst the Minseito are likewise involved. Satake, who was parliamentary Vice-Minister of Railways under the Wakatsuki Cabinet in 1927 has now been indicted and even Wakatsuki himself is being accused of
having accepted bribes for party funds. It seems probable that this charge has been advanced against him and others - Adachi and Kobashi are likewise accused - for political purposes, to discredit the Minseito and damage their prospects at the anticipated general election; but even so, the opinion is now being expressed in some quarters that Wakatsuki ought to be replaced as head of the Japanese delegation to the Naval Conference, as it is considered derogatory to Japan's honour to have as its chief delegate a man accused of venality, unless the accusation can be definitely disproved.

Saturday 23rd November 1929
The news from Manchuria continues to indicate that the Soviet are really in earnest this time. They have been pressing their offensive since the 17th and the Chinese are reported to have started the removal of their military headquarters from Hailar to Buchatu and to have decided to fall back on the Khingan mountains as their main line of defence. See that my article on the Industrial Revolution in Japan has appeared in the November issue of "The Fortnightly Review".

Tuesday 26th November 1929
Emperor sanctioned instructions for the guidance of the Japanese delegation to the naval conference. Though details not divulged, the evening papers have come out with what are alleged, and what seem likely, to be the main points.

Official declaration to clear Wakatsuki of suspicion [of taking bribes] was made this evening. According to this, the investigations by the Procurator-General has proved that Wakatsuki wrote letters in 1927 to various people who were believed to be supporters of the Minseito, asking them to contribute to the party funds, but that it was all up and above board.

Wednesday 27th November 1929
In spite of the developments in Manchuria, the Foreign Office here remains outwardly unperturbed, but I cannot believe that they are as indifferent as they pretend to be, unless it is that the Soviet have given them some sort of undertaking not to press matters beyond a certain point. Meantime it seems that, in view of the violation of Kellogg Pact which the Soviet invasion of Chinese territory entails, the U.S. is contemplating taking action of sorts to remind both Soviet Russia and China of their obligations and that Stimson had a talk yesterday with Debuchi [Japanese Ambassador] at Washington on the subject.

Thursday 28th November 1929
Reports from Harbin appear to confirm earlier reports that the Soviet troops have now withdrawn from Chinese territory, though air raids continue. It would seem therefore that the recent offensive was primarily intended to bring pressure to bear on the Chinese in order to hasten them into coming to terms on the Chinese Eastern Railway question. Neville [Councillor of American Embassy] told Babb confidentially that he had been to see Shidehara [Foreign Minister] last night to propose some form of joint action with regard to the Sino-Soviet situation, in conjunction with Britain, France and Italy. Meantime it is reported that Mukden has expressed herself willing to accede to the Soviet's original demands and to enter into negotiations.
Friday 29th November 1929
Shortly after getting to office this morning, news came through that Saburi, who has just come back from China to discuss the question of the coming Sino-Japanese negotiations, shot himself late last night at the Fujiya Hotel. Apparently he has been very despondent ever since his wife's death three years ago, and last night was the 3rd anniversary of her death. He was looked on as one of the coming men and was Shidehara's right-hand man in carrying to his policy of conciliation with China, so his death is a bad blow just at this juncture.

Kobashi, the Minister of Education, resigned this morning owing to allegations of being involved in the railway scandals, it being charged that he accepted funds in connection with a bill for the Government's purchase of a private railway in 1927.

Saturday 30th November 1929
To Tokyo Station to see off the Japanese Delegation to the Naval Conference. Terrific crowds in and around the station to bid them "Bon Voyage", and much cheering and shouting of "Banzai". Met Admiral Kobayashi on the platform. "Looks like snow", he said, adding "It will help to keep our delegates cool-headed!" Couldn't help wondering what sort of reception will be accorded them on their return if they fail to get the 70% ratio. Some of the super-patriotic fraternity are likely to make things pretty hot for them if so, I fear me.

Monday 2nd December 1929
Apparently England and America are waking up to the difficulty of complying with Japan's demand for 70% ratio in 8-inch gun cruisers with America and are beginning to realise that an impasse is almost inevitable unless some way out of the difficulty can be found. They have accordingly suggested to Japan that, instead of saying what ratio she wants, she should state her minimum requirements in number of vessels and tonnage.

Tuesday 3rd December 1929
Japan has let it be known that, while she has no objections to it, she is unable to support the American demarche in calling the Soviet and Chinese to task for fighting instead of resorting to arbitration in accordance with their pledges under the Kellogg Pact. Shiratori, whom I went to see at the Foreign Office this morning on the matter, explained that Shidehara's view is that the demarche at this stage, just when the Chinese have intimated their readiness to negotiate with the Soviet, is uncalled for, and is likely to hinder rather than help on a settlement of the dispute. There are, in fact, already signs that the Chinese are interpreting it to their own advantage, for whereas a day or two ago, when they saw that Moscow was prepared to stand no more nonsense, the Chinese agreed to negotiate, they are now reported to have fallen back on their old old policy of procrastination, knowing that Moscow's hands have now been more or less tied by the American demarche. I have little love for the Soviet, but in this particular instance they have my sympathy, while as for China, the abject way in which she bullies one minute and whines and grovels the next, asking for the League to protect her and for the Kellogg Pact to be used in her favour and God knows what not- the whole thing is simply disgusting. How America and ourselves can be taken in by her, as we appear to have been done, is absolutely incomprehensible.
Monday 9th December 1929
Chiang Kai-shek's day appears to be over. The civil war seems to have been going against him of late.

Saturday 14th December 1929
Some friction has now arisen between Japan and the Soviet! Japan has been pressing for some time past to obtain information as to the safety of her nationals west of the Khingan Mountains since the Soviet offensive last month, as communications are still disrupted. There have been vague rumours of the Japanese Consulate at Manchuli being badly damaged by the Soviet bombardment, and other damage to Japanese property, but the Soviet has been inclined to deny all this. Now, however, it is learned that the Japanese Embassy at Moscow has informed the Soviet Government that Tokyo considers its general assurances given hitherto inadequate and insists on details. The Embassy has also drawn the Soviet's attention to the recent statement by their Ambassador in Tokyo to the effect that no Soviet troops remain in Chinese territory, a declaration which is apparently at variance with the facts, as there is now no doubt that a considerable portion of the Chinese Eastern Railway zone is still in Soviet occupation.

Friday 27th December 1929
Up at Foreign Office to see Shiratori. Seems a bit worried over China's refusal to accept Obata as Minister and hints that, if China continues to refuse, Japan may feel compelled to ask her to withdraw her Minister from Tokyo. Says Nanking has been asked to reconsider the matter on account of the serious possibilities involved and thinks she may finally agree to do so, as it is felt that Nanking's attitude is largely dictated by the internal political situation, which is always subject to sudden changes. Shiratori mentioned confidentially that Wang himself is in favour of having Obata, but that he has many enemies who are opposing Obata in order to put Wang in a fix. A pleasant bunch!

Wednesday 15th January 1930
The papers seem very disappointed at the results of the Anglo-Japanese preliminary conversations. From what was said in the British invitation to the Conference, they seem to have hoped that tentative agreements might have been reached before the Conference opened, but little more than an exchange of views seems to have taken place. The Foreign Office are somewhat reticent, but my impression is that the Press, in this case, reflects the official view. Shiratori, however, expressed the belief that Wakatsuki has anyway managed to impress Macdonald with the justice of Japan's claims.

Meantime, nationalistic elements have banded together and are trying to get a resolution introduced into the Diet supporting Japan's demand for a 70% ratio. If, however, this is done, the Government will be placed in an embarrassing position: for if it is passed it will tie the hands of the delegation in London, and if the Government tries to turn it down they will be accused of being unpatriotic and their prospects at the anticipated elections will be affected adversely.

Thursday 16th January 1930
Babb tells me Shiratori told him this morning in confidence that the Government now realises that Japan can only continue to insist on a 70% ratio in 8-inch gun cruisers at the risk of wrecking the Conference and that she cannot afford to do that. I wonder if it is true? Shiratori is always very outspoken, almost to the point of indiscretion at times, so it may be.

Friday 14th February 1930
According to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>150,000 tons</th>
<th>105,000 tons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>81,000 tons</td>
<td>77,900 tons</td>
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Alternatively:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>150,000 tons</th>
<th>108,400 tons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large cruisers</td>
<td>189,000 tons</td>
<td>107,700 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small cruisers</td>
<td>150,000 tons</td>
<td>105,000 tons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>81,000 tons</td>
<td>77,900 tons</td>
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If, however, America wants only 60,000 tons of submarines, (as she proposed on the 5th) Japan is willing to let her transfer 21,000 tons to her destroyer category, which would then become 171,000 tons, while Japan retains 77,900 tons of submarines.

Monday 17th February 1930
To annual general meeting of the British Legion at which, as I shall be leaving for home shortly, I resigned the post of President and was succeeded by Tennent. After the meeting we held a dinner as a farewell to Robinson [Naval Attaché] and Hill [Military Attaché] and a welcome to Legge [new Naval Attaché]. About 24 present.

Had an interesting talk with Captain Robinson about the Naval Conference. In view of the somewhat indifferent attitude he has seemed to hold hitherto on America, I was much struck by the emphatic way in which he spoke of the hypocrisy and unreasonableness of their claims at the present time. As he says, their actions are absolutely contrary to their professions. Robinson expressed the belief that Japan is the only country today with a real naval policy - a policy based purely on defensive requirements and carried out consistently - and he says he is continually urging his Japanese naval friends to continue their insistence on 70% with America. He considers it fully justified if Japan is to avoid the possibility of the U.S. ever trying to carry out a naval demonstration in Far Eastern waters with a view to hampering her policy in China or Manchuria. He is very disgusted with the way the Yankees are trying to make out that it is England that is blocking Japan's claims and he mentioned that, on reading Wiles's cables to that effect in the “Advertiser”, he wired the gist of them to London and received the reply that there was not a word of truth in them, as England has no objection to Japan getting
70% with the U.S., provided the U.S. will reduce her demands in the matter of 8-inch gun
cruisers to the same level as England. Robinson, in fact, seems to think that the U.S. will
have to do this eventually if the Conference is not to break up. "Why doesn't someone speak
straightly to the U.S.?", he remarked more than once, adding: "We can't do it, because our
hands are tied by the tentative agreement made by Macdonald at Washington". He seems to
feel too, that if we agree to the U.S. having more large cruisers than ourselves, it will only
whet their appetite for still further demands in the future, and that it is impossible to construe
their demands as being based on anything but plans for offensive action. He says he has tried
to get an explanation from Ogan, the American Naval Attaché, as to why they want so many
10,000 tonners, but all he can get out of him is: "We want them because we have no bases".
As Robinson says, however - that can only mean that they want them for use in distant waters
and therefore for aggressive action, yet they talk glibly of considering only defence. To this,
Ogan mere shrugs his shoulders!

**Thursday 20th February 1930**

Had a talk with Byas about America's insistence on so many 10,000-tonners. His explanation
is that they are considering the possibility of the Panama [Canal] being blocked in wartime, in
which case they would need ships of a sufficient cruising radius to take them round Cape
Horn without refuelling. It may be so, but they have never given any indication of this so far as
I am aware, and I don't think Robinson would have omitted this point if it afforded a
reasonable explanation.

Babb helped to throw some light on the U.S. stand against capital ship reduction. Japan, as
he says, was counting on all the Powers agreeing to capital ship reduction, even if an
agreement on auxiliaries could not be reached. Had this been done, she would have been
satisfied, as it would have saved her the immense outlay required for the replacement of
35,000-ton vessels. America, on the other hand, is anxious to make the reduction of capital
ships contingent on Japan accepting 60% in auxiliaries. If she agreed to the former without
any agreement being reached about auxiliaries, Japan would be free to use the money saved
on capital ships for building more auxiliaries, which is what the U.S. wants to prevent her
doing.

**Friday 21st February 1930**

First results of the elections are very favourable to the Minseito. This, however, is only to be
expected, as the results made known thus far are mainly those of urban constituencies, which
are generally Minseito strongholds. The main feature so far is the defeat of most of the
leading proletarians.

**Sunday 23rd February 1930**

Final returns for the election give the Minseito a sweeping victory, with 273 seats, over the
Seiyukai, who secured only 174 seats. The proletarians too have fared worse than expected,
returning only 5 candidates out of 93. Though violations of the Election Law, especially vote-
buying, shows an increase in the number detected, there appears to have been far less
official interference in the election campaign than usual.
Monday 24th February 1930
Had an interview with Sir John Tilley in the morning concerning the possibility of giving English lessons to Prince Takamatsu on the voyage home. Had a talk with him also about the Naval Conference, and was interested to hear him emphasise that Britain had no objections to Japan getting 70% and that he hoped they would get it. He seems to think that Wile and other American correspondents in London are using propagandist methods "with malice aforethought", and not merely through ignorance of the facts, and he told me he had spoken very strongly to Byas on this matter, when Byas asked him what he thought of the "Advertiser's" service on the Conference.
To the Kaikan in evening with Maggie [wife] to the Japan-British Society dinner to Prince and Princess Takamatsu Was presented to the Prince and had a short talk with him. He speaks English fairly fluently, I find.

Wednesday 26th February 1930
Had a visit from Kumasaki, who tells me the naval authorities, realising the bad effect of a breakdown of the Conference with nothing concrete agreed, want Britain to attempt to induce America to agree to the Japanese demands, or at any rate to bring about some definite agreement of sorts, leaving out all questions of ratios if necessary. If no agreement is reached, they consider it will not only do harm to the general international situation, but will also be damaging to British prestige (as the Conference was convened by Britain) and to Macdonald's reputation as a statesman. He also mentioned that Kato Kanji has threatened to resign on the grounds of inability to guarantee Japan's naval defence, if the delegates agree to less than 70% - and action which would, of course, endanger the present Government. He says the authorities are very "sore" at America's insistence on 60% for Japan. If 70% entailed a threat to America's safety, this would be understandable, but as it obviously does nothing of the sort, the only interpretation that can be put on her attitude is, that she is trying to dictate to Japan and this, very naturally, is resented very deeply.

Saturday 1st March 1930
Shiratori tells me the U.S. delegation has not made nay new proposals formally, but that Reed and Matsudaira [Ambassador in London] have started a new series of informal talks with a view to seeking some way out of the impasse. Great secrecy, however, is being observed with regard to this exchange of suggestions, as it is feared that, if anything leaks out, it may tend to rouse nationalistic sentiments and hamper the negotiations. One quite interesting point he told me was, that although Japan wanted 70% in total auxiliaries and in 8-inchers, and the maintenance of her present strength in submarines, he "believed" that many naval officers "might" be satisfied with merely the last two claims, as they were considered to be the most important of the three. I am wondering if this was meant as a hint that Japan may be willing to compromise to some extent after all.

Sunday 16th March 1930
The papers seem pleased at the reported compromise with America, the "Hochi" affirming that, as the moral and material results of a rupture of the Conference would be little short of
disastrous, Japan ought to accept the alleged terms [offered by the U.S.], even though they still fall short of her original claims. The Rengo [News Agency] man at the Navy Office tells that the proposal is as under:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>AMERICA</th>
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<tr>
<td>8-inch cruisers</td>
<td>108,400 tons</td>
<td>180,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small cruisers</td>
<td>101,500 tons</td>
<td>145,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>105,000 tons</td>
<td>150,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>52,000 tons</td>
<td>52,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>366,900 tons</strong></td>
<td><strong>527,000 tons</strong></td>
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Of the eighteen 10,000-tonners proposed for America, only 15 are to be complete by 1936, though the other 3 are to be laid down by then. Although the general impression seems to be that Japan will agree to this, my own opinion is that the Navy will not do so without a struggle, as 70% in 8-inch cruisers is one of the points on which they are particularly insistent [the proposal only gave them 60% in 8-inch cruisers].

**Tuesday 18th March 1930**

Looked up Captain Koga at the Navy Office to ask about the statement, alleged to have been given out by them, asserting that the Navy cannot agree to the terms of the proposed compromise with the U.S. According to him it was only a "semi-official" statement, merely expressing the individual views of certain naval officers. Byas, however, tells me it was handed to the "Advertiser" in type-written form, which seems strange if it was not official. Anyway, it seems pretty obvious that, despite assertions to the contrary, there is a strong difference of opinion between the Navy and the Foreign Office.

**Wednesday 19th March 1930**

The papers, which, at first appeared favourable towards the proposed Japan-American compromise, are getting very worked up at what they consider was American propaganda, put out to mislead the World in general. The American delegation, they maintain, was responsible for making it appear as though the U.S. had made great concessions to Japan and that the Japanese delegation in order to show its appreciation, was prepared to accept the proposed compromise.

**Thursday 20th March 1930**

Was interested to hear Rengo saying that the papers are continually complaining to them that Reuter sends too much from London on the British views on the Naval Conference - "Just British propaganda", they call it. There is a familiar ring about this complaint, as London [Reuters Head Office] is constantly complaining to me that the British papers are not much
interested in Japanese views on it! If no country is interested in the views of any but their own, it is little wonder that the Conference makes so little progress.

With Maggie [wife] in evening to dinner at Embassy given by [the British Ambassador] as a farewell to the Hills and ourselves. Davidson asked me about an alleged "dustup" between Rengo and the Foreign Office and seemed surprised that I had not heard about it. Apparently he got it from Dooman, so maybe it originates from the U.P. or other source hostile to Rengo, whom they are constantly trying to discredit [Rengo having an agency agreement with Reuters, U.P.'s rivals]. The story is to the effect that Rengo has complained bitterly to the Foreign Office owing to the indiscretion of Shiratori, who is supposed to have told some journalist or other that Rengo receives £200,000 a year from the secret funds as subsidy. As Sir Roderick [Shidehara's Diet speech throughout China.

Babb tells me in confidence that Mr. Castle [U.S. Ambassador] is very worried over Japan's attitude towards the Naval Conference, as he maintains that the Foreign Office officials are very evasive in their replies to his questions. Castle, he also says, has confided in him that he has hinted to Shidehara that a favourable reply by Japan might help towards a revision of the Immigration Law. He tells me also that the American delegation are prepared to postpone the laying down of the last three 8-inch cruisers by one year each.

**Sunday 23rd March 1930**

After tea had to go round to the Police Station to explain how it came about that I have now 58 rounds of .25 ammunition whereas formerly I had only 56! They seem to be scared stiff that someone is going to make an attempt on the Emperor tomorrow during his tour of the city [reconstruction work after the 1923 earthquake], and every few days a policeman turns up at our house to see that I have still got my automatic, my revolver, and my ammunition intact! One interesting point is that even princes are apparently not immune from these enquiries, as one of the reasons for the excitement about my two extra rounds of ammunition is that a similar increase has been discovered in the number of rounds held by the Prince just over the way!

**Monday 31st March 1930**

After two weeks of struggle between the naval authorities and the Foreign Office as to the acceptance or otherwise of the proposed compromise plan, it looks as though the Foreign Office view is going to prevail and Japan's reply is expected to be despatched tomorrow after the Cabinet Conference. Castle a few days ago, and that he understood from Castle that Macdonald had, in fact, communicated direct with Tokyo through Sir John [Tilley] at the same time. I questioned Shiratori, therefore, on the subject, and to my surprise he admitted that the story was, in the main, correct, and even authorised the publication of this admission as coming from the Foreign Office spokesman. Unofficially he intimated that he considered it a serious blunder on the part of Macdonald, though he asserted that it had not influenced the Japanese decision in any way. It seems that Sir John [Tilley] and Castle [British and U.S. Ambassadors] were each instructed to deliver their respective communications separately to Shidehara and leave it to his discretion as to whether or no they should be passed on formally.
to the Premier. Shidehara decided that it was inadvisable to do so, so the London denial of the story must be interpreted as a diplomatic subterfuge, meaning that no communication was sent directly to Hamaguchi, as it was short-circuited on the way! It is most unfortunate, however, that Macdonald ever tried such a trick, as it is simply playing into the hands of those who asset that the Anglo-Saxon Powers are co-operating against Japan. Macdonald seems to think of no one but America these days. First he gives way on the demand for a larger number of 10,000-tonners for the U.S. than for England, and now here he goes joining hands with the U.S. to bring pressure to bear on Japan to accept this compromise - in fact, in this case he seems to have allowed Britain to be used as a cat's paw, as it seems that the main communication came from him, as it was felt that, coming from England, it would carry more weight under the circumstances. Stimson's communication was apparently a very minor affair and free from anything strong-worded. It is probably just as well that the story did not leak out sooner, as it would have raised a storm of indignation at a very critical moment. As it is, Japan's reply to the compromise plan has now been decided, and was despatched to London this afternoon as soon as the Emperor's sanction had been obtained.

Wednesday 2nd April 1930

Byas tells me he went along to the Embassy yesterday to see Sir John Tilley about Macdonald's communication, and that Sir John was furious:
(a) with having had to deliver it;
(b) with the fact that the papers had got hold of the story;
(c) with Shiratori for admitting to it officially, and
(d) with Byas for asking him about it!

It seems that until Byas told him about it, he was blissfully unaware that it had leaked out into the papers, as no one at the Embassy had drawn his attention to it. The fact that they had failed to do so added still further to his annoyance. I had thought of going to see him about it myself yesterday, but in view of the reception accorded to Byas, I am glad now that I didn't!

Thursday 17th April 1930

To Embassy in morning to say goodbye. Had a talk there with Sansom on the growing seriousness of the economic situation in Japan. He seems to think the papers are unduly pessimistic. Fundamentally he considers that Japan is in a better economic shape than England and most other countries at the present time, though the Japanese love of speculation and the fact that the financial development of the country has failed to keep pace with the development of her industries makes Japan peculiarly susceptible to financial panics.

Monday 21st April 1930

[Returning to Britain on leave] Sailed at 3 p.m.

Saturday 18th October 1930

[Arrived Shanghai (on boat journey to Japan)]

Heard some interesting details of the Shanghai underworld from Cox. According to seemingly authentic information in his possession, Chiang Kai-Shek is in close league with the gangsters and is apparently subservient to one of the leaders, as he always makes a point of
seeking him out and making his kow-tows to him before anything else whenever he returns from Canton, Nanking or elsewhere.

Friday 31st October 1930
Yesterday a Rengo translation told of a resolution passed by the student body of Meiji University strongly condemning British rule in India and sympathising with the "poor, downtrodden Indians". This was after Rash Behari Bose had delivered a lecture on the subject. Today I tackled Pieres on the subject, and was surprised to learn from him that Bose has been lecturing all over the country since July against the British - apparently under the wing of the Black Dragon Society. Seems pretty disgraceful that he should be allowed to do so, but I suppose there is no way to stop it. He is married to a Miss Nakamura, the daughter of a wealthy member of the Black Dragon Society.

Monday 10th November 1930
After prolonged discussions the Navy and Finance Ministers have at last come to a tentative agreement about the conjectural savings arising from the London Treaty limitation of armaments. The savings are estimated at rather over £500,000,000 but the Navy put forward a replenishment programme that would have used up all these savings and left nothing over for the promised reduction of taxation. Finally, however, the Navy has agreed to a six-year programme of £373,000,000, which is a compromise between their original demands and the subsequent proposal of the Finance Ministry. What ships are to be built is not yet revealed, but £90,000,000 of the total amount is to be appropriated for the establishment of 12 additional air squadrons, making 29 in all.

Friday 14th November 1930
Arrived at office in morning to be greeted with the news that an attempt had just been made on the life of Hamaguchi, who has been seriously wounded with a bullet in his tummy. It seems he was just leaving for Okayama to attend Grand Manoeuvres when a young reactionary shot him on the platform. It seems to be the same old story - a self-styled "patriot" with a warped sense of patriotism trying to take matters into his own hands. The police have put a ban on any mention of the motive, but it is pretty obvious that the assailant committed the crime as a protest against the Naval Treaty, for which he considered the Premier responsible.

Friday 28th November 1930
To Reception at Embassy. Chappell and Wingate were also there, up from Yokosuka. Both speak very highly of the Japanese naval aviators, especially the fact that they never seem to get flurried.

Saturday 6th December 1930
Had an interesting talk too at lunch time at the Club with Booth of Sale & Co., whom I had not met before. It seems that he is closely connected with the Nichiro Gyogyo [Russo-Japanese Fishery] and therefore knows all the ins and outs of the Russian fishery auction trouble which cropped up a year or so ago in connection with Shima's speculations. The general outline of the whole thing was, of course, in the papers at the time, but there were certain gaps in the story which he was able to fill in. Apparently it all arose out of the railway scandals, though the
scandals themselves had not then come to light. The government had received bribes from
certain railway concerns to obtain sanction for the construction of private lines in various parts
of the country. As the Seiyukai, at that time, held a majority in the Diet, there was no difficulty
in obtaining the necessary approval of the Lower House. The Peers, however, refused to
sanction some of the lines, so the Govt. felt in honour bound to return the money they had
received. This money, however, had all been spent in the meantime, so they had to consider
ways and means of procuring an equivalent amount to hand back to the railway concerns.
Somehow or other, through Kuhara or one of his henchmen, it was suggested to Shima and
Inui that they should outbid the Nichiro people at the Vladivostok auctions and then force
them to buy back the fishery leases at fancy prices. An enormous profit would accrue to
Shima if the plan succeeded and, in return for the Govt.’s assistance in enabling them to bring
off this coup, Shima and Inui should hand over a portion of their profits to the Govt.
Under the terms of the Russo-Japanese Fishery Agreement, only certain recognised bona-
fide fishery concerns are allowed to bid at the yearly auction, so Shima was, in theory,
debarred from bidding; but the Govt. closed their eyes to this illegality so as to enable him to
carry out the transaction, and the Soviet, having had it made worth their while by Shima to do
likewise, the Nichiro people found themselves deprived of all concessions other than those
they had previously obtained on long-term leases. As their very existence depended on
getting these concessions, they were forced to buy them back from Shima & Co. at
exhorbitant prices, and, as Shima and his crowd had been rigging the market in the
meantime, Nichiro’s shares dropped from ? 120 to ? 20 and one way and another they
suffered a loss of about ? 8,000,000.
Shima’s plans, however, were only successful in part, as Nichiro already held 10-year leases
on 39 of the principal concessions, and when the facts began to leak out, Baron Goh
and a
man named Sugiyama were called in to act as mediators between the two, partly in order to
prevent a Govt. scandal and partly to help Nichiro.
I had not heard of Sugiyama before, but from what Booth tells me it seems that he is one of
those strange figures who exercise so much influence in Japanese political life by pulling
strings in the background. An ardent patriot of the best type, he is a great pal of Toyama
Mitsuru’s, but only comes forward to play his part when he considers it a matter of real
national importance and in the real interests of the country for him to do so. Presumably he
exercises his power in the same way as the ordinary reactionary bunch do - by threats to
expose persons in high places if they refuse to fall in with his wishes. Anyway, in this
particular case, he decided that his intervention was required, so he came up to Tokyo and
took a room at the Imperial for himself and posted a party of ten "soshi" in an adjoining room
in case their assistance was required. Then he sent messages to the leading actors in the
whole affair, intimating that they should come to see him or it would be the worse for them.
High Govt. officials and leading businessmen alike came along like sheep at his bidding,
fearful of the consequences if they failed to respond to his summons - and so the whole
matter was settled!
Sugiyama, according to Booth, is a charming old fellow to meet - a Fukuoka man of about 67. He is said to have been the man used to influence Schiff to raise the American loan for Japan at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. He poses as a sword-collector, and whenever he sets off to "mediate", he carries a short sword hidden under the folds of his ceremonial dress and, if persuasion is required, lays this sword before the other fellow and calmly offers him the choice between "hara-kiri" and exposure! Incidentally, he is said to be a great advocate of Anglo-Japanese friendship and co-operation. Commenting on the amount of intimidation that goes on in Japan, Booth mentioned that Shidehara is one of the few high officials who is proof against such methods.

Friday 12th December 1930

The papers are getting very worked up over the question of China's railway plans in Manchuria. Looked in to the Foreign Office for a talk with Shiratori, who asserted that the papers are unduly excited, though he admitted that the F.O., through the South Manchurian Railway, are about to take up the matter with the Mukden authorities. Protests against the Chinese violation of the railway agreement have, of course, been made in the past without avail, so it is considered that further protests would be useless, especially as some of the lines in question have already been completed. An attempt is now to be made, however, to persuade Mukden that there is plenty of room in Manchuria for both Chinese and Japanese development, and that it will be of mutual benefit to co-operate instead of competing.

Thursday 18th December 1930

Looked up Shiratori at the F.O. to enquire about the reports of the Soviet ordering the closure of the Vladivostok branch of the Bank of Chosen and the arrest of the manager and 3 clerks. The report of the closure is correct, the part about the arrests is apparently unfounded. Even so, the Soviet action is regarded in a serious light and the Govt. is expected to make a strong protest. Apart from anything else, their action is likely to have a serious effect on the Japanese fishery concerns which, on account of the difference between the Soviet and the bank's dealings in rouble exchange, will have to pay about £10,000,000 a year in royalties instead of £4,000,000 as at present.

Wednesday 7th January 1931

Bose and eleven other Indians held a dinner at which they passes a fiery resolution rejecting "the alleged conclusions of the so-called Round Table Conference" and urging the Congress leaders to fight on with "redoubled and intensified vigour" for complete independence. A nice conciliatory sort of spirit!

Wednesday 28th January 1931

Pieres, who was at Bose's dinner last night, tells me that Bose intimated that if Gandhi, Nehru & Co. showed any signs of coming to terms with the Govt. of India, they could soon be replaced by others who would carry on the fight. What a blighter the fellow is.

Thursday 29th January 1931

Iwanaga mentioned quite interesting point about Baron

Tuesday 10th March 1931
The Govt. has decided to withdraw the Electoral Reform Bill, proposing to reduce the age qualification to 20, on account of the strong opposition from the Privy Council. My sympathies are certainly with the Privy Council. Hamaguchi, who relieved Shidehara of the acting Premiership yesterday, attended the Diet today for the first time since the attempt on his life 4 months ago. It remains to be seen if he has recovered sufficiently to stand the strain. It seems rather doubtful if he will be able to do so, as they say he still looks pretty weak.

Friday 20th March 1931
The yearly farce of introducing a vote of non-confidence into the Diet was carried out today, the motion being duly defeated as expected. The Diet proceedings are really getting beyond a joke and the riotous scenes both inside and outside the Diet during the past four days have been simply disgraceful. A mass demonstration staged by the Seiyukai yesterday necessitated the mobilisation of 3000 police and led to violent clashes, in which 60 or 70 persons were injured. The previous evening a party of Seiyukai roughs beat up the unfortunate stenographers in the Diet building itself, and this evening, as a result of a proletarian mass demonstration, there was another clash with the police, who once more had to be mobilised in force. If the Opposition parties were sincere, there might be some excuse for these scenes, but the true interests of the country are about the last thing they have in mind, despite assertions to the contrary. Party interests are put above everything else, and their only concern is to try to seize power for themselves. A miserable, mouldy crowd of self-seekers, about on a par with the Beaverbrooke, Rothermere crowd in England.

Friday 27th March 1931
Diet session came to an end after an extension of two days - one of the rowdiest and most riotous sessions there has ever been - and that is saying a great deal!

Thursday 9th April 1931
Rung up by Rengo to say that Hamaguchi had had to be operated on a third time in order to remove a lot of pus that had gathered under his old wound. Other messages kept coming in, the final one being at 1 a.m. to say that the Cabinet and party leaders were reported to have decided that the Cabinet should resign as soon as a successor to Hamaguchi had been selected and that Wakatsuki is almost certain to be chosen to succeed him.

Friday 10th April 1931
After a day of conflicting reports as to the Govt.'s intention to resign, Wakatsuki told the Minseito leaders this evening that he was prepared to consider acceptance of the presidency of the party in succession to Hamaguchi. Seems practically certain he will accept and that, in consequence, he will become Premier once more within the next two or three days, with practically the same Cabinet as at present though Ugaki will probably be out of it and Matsuda too.

Saturday 11th April 1931
Wakatsuki has accepted the party presidency and the Cabinet is expected to resign on Monday, following which Wakatsuki will become Premier. There is no doubt that he is averse from coming into the arena of party politics once more and accepting the Premiership, as he
has little to gain and much to lose; but he seems to be the only one who can save the
Minseito from a serious shift, and the strong appeals made to his high sense of duty have
apparently had their effect.
Monday 13th April 1931
The Cabinet resigned this morning as expected.
Tuesday 14th April 1931
The new Cabinet, with Wakatsuki at its head, was installed this morning, the only changes
being in the portfolios of War, Overseas Affairs, and Commerce, Ugaki, Matsuda and Tawara
being succeeded by Minami, Hara, and Sukurauchi respectively.
Saturday 18th April 1931
Vernaculars very full of radical activities - alleged plots to create disturbances on May Day,
roundups of students and others by the police, anti-religion movements by leftists, and what
not besides. No doubt much of what the papers say may be discounted as mere
sensationalism, but there can be no doubt that discontent and general unrest is on the
increase and that careful handling of the situation is required if worse is to be avoided.
Thursday 23rd April 1931
Japanese getting very worked up over the fishery dispute with the Soviet, as the fishery
people are afraid of missing the fishing season if they don't start operation quickly, but they
can't get permission to leave for northern waters until the dispute is settled. They are losing
heavily as it is, as the ships are ready to sail and wages and charterage have to be paid while
they lie idle. They threaten to leave without permission if the dispute drags on much longer,
and then the fat will be in the fire, as it will be equivalent to poaching and the Soviet patrols
will be justified in trying to seize them. However, the F.O. professes to believe that they can
persuade the fishery concerns to hold themselves in check until the matter is settled.
Saturday 2nd May 1931
Called up on the 'phone at 1.30 a.m. to be told that someone had plugged a bomb at the
Finance Minister's house. No casualties, but some minor damage was done.
Thursday 14th May 1931
What with chimney sitters, hunger strikers, and miners who insist on remaining underground
by way of striking, Japanese employers are having plenty to worry about!
Friday 15th May 1931
Went along to the Imperial to meet Colonel and Mrs. Kelly, who are passing through Japan on
their way home from India. Col. Kelly is G.S.O. Intelligence at Simla, so I had a very
interesting talk with him. I asked him about Mahendra Pratap, who is back in Japan once
more, and he told me he is financed from Moscow and, as I thought, mainly out for his own
ends. Not a Communist, but quite prepared to play their game so long as they make it worth
his while, and not an altruistic Independence worker but ready to pose as such in order to
satisfy his love of intrigue. Col. Kelly's opinion of Gandhi is that he is an out-and-out humbug
but a very astute one!
Wednesday 20th May 1931
Police ban removed from the news of the Communist roundup of last year. Fuller details now revealed show that several police were killed and injured by those resisting arrest and that an attempt to set the Diet building on fire was frustrated. In all, about 170 have been indicted. This is less than in the two previous raids, but the fact that some of those arrested were armed and were prepared to use their weapons is significant.

Saturday 23rd May 1931
The Govt. seems to have stirred up a regular hornets' nest with its proposed salary cut. Their original intention was to cut all over £50 a month, but the outcry was so great that it decided a day or two ago to put the minimum at £85, thereby reducing the estimated saving from about £25,000,000 a year to a mere £8,000,000 or so. The uproar, however, continues and many of the papers seem to think it may precipitate the fall of the Cabinet. I met Shiratori at lunch at the Club and found him very outspoken in condemnation of the Government, which shows that even officials in responsible positions are full of resentment. Considering how poorly Japanese officials are paid, it certainly seems hard on them to have their salaries cut still further and it seems a case of penny wise and pound foolish if the Govt. in order to save such a comparatively paltry sum, is going to stir up active discontent amongst a class on whom the whole stability of the country may be said to depend.

Tuesday 26th May 1931
The salary cut question has more or less reached a climax, with officials, both high and low, in most of the govt. departments threatening to resign and threats of strike by railway men and others, who, though not directly affected by the coming reduction of pay, seem to think that the next step in the economy programme will be a reduction in personnel. The Govt.'s plan was referred to the Throne for sanction late this afternoon and is to be enforced as from June 1st. In a statement issued this evening the Govt. explained its reasons, namely the necessity of effecting economies in order to make good the anticipated deficit in revenue and the fact that, whereas the non-official classes have been suffering loss of income from the prolonged depression, officials have been receiving the same pay as in times of prosperity. What effect this explanation will have remains to be seen.

Wednesday 27th May 1931
The salary cut question, which looked like coming to a serious climax this morning with a railway strike, has suddenly come to an unexpected and peaceful termination and all the threats of resignation and strike have been withdrawn. It would rather seem as though the officials had got "cold feet" at the last moment lest their action should precipitate a dangerous national crisis which the radical element in the country would exploit. If so, their fears were probably not unfounded, for it seems to have been pretty well touch and go so far as the threatened railway strike was concerned, only prompt action on the part of the police in arresting a number of radical agitators preventing it from materialising.

Friday 12th June 1931
Sengoku has resigned and Count Kehida appointed to succeed him as President of the South Manchurian Railway. Sengoku's resignation is not unexpected, as he has been ill for some
time past, but Kehida's appointment has come as a complete surprise to everyone, as he has always been regarded as a Seiyukai man, and, moreover, is a statesman of international repute - far too big a man, one would have thought, for the post. It shows, however, what great importance is now attached to Manchuria, and shows, too, that the present Govt. is going to keep the S.M.R. Presidency out of the realm of party politics, a decision that is all to the good.

The Govt., incidentally, is plainly worried at the prospects of what will happen in Manchuria if Chang Hsueh-liang succumbs from his present illness. There is no one to succeed him, so his death would probably bring about an active struggle amongst those who would wish to take his place; but Japan cannot afford to see Manchurian torn by civil war. In this connection Shiratori tells me that Manchuria's present alliance with Nanking is a purely personal affair between Chang and Chiang, and that if Chang dies, Manchuria will probably break with Nanking and thereby add to Chiang's troubles, which now include communist bands and a revolting Canton.

Wednesday 17th June 1931

Ugaki appointed successor to Saito in Korea.

Sunday 21st June 1931

Received a copy of "The Chinese Nation", a Nanking propaganda organ, containing what appertains to be a review of my last book. They have the damned sauce, however, to say that I am "Japanese employed", "connected with the Japanese Army", and engaged in trying to "whitewash Japan's imperialistic actions." I should like to sue the blighters for libel. A miserable bunch, the Chinks, who try to judge the actions of others by their own degraded standards of morality.

Monday 6th July 1931

Called up early in the morning with the information that serious anti-Chinese riots by Koreans broke out late last night at Ping Yang, continuing till 4 o'clock this morning. It seems to have been a pretty bad show, the Koreans dragging the Chinese out into the streets and beating them to death. About 30 are reported to have been killed and 200 or so badly injured. There have been fairly serious disturbances at Seoul and Chemulpo the past few days in retaliation for the Wangpaoshan incident last week (July 1st), but this is very much worse than anything that has happened before and may possibly lead to serious developments with China.

Monday 27th July 1931

Received instructions to keep London "covered" on important developments in N. China, owing to the censorship in Shanghai. Heavy fighting reported this evening between Shih Yu-san's troops and the Mukdenites, the latter seemingly being the heavier sufferers. If Shih manages to get Paotingfu, as seems rather likely, Chang Hsueh-liang and his Mukdenites are expected to quit Peking and Tientsin and beat it back into Manchuria; but if this takes place, Chang's prestige is likely to suffer considerably and as his alliance with Nanking is anything but popular with some of his people, it may conceivably result in an open break between the
pro-Nanking and anti-Nanking factions and lead to serious disturbances in Manchuria, possibly necessitating action by Japan to safeguard the lives and property of their nationals there. The situation therefore requires careful watching.

The ins and outs of the Chinese situation at the present moment are truly amazing. In the south is the new Canton Govt. - in open rebellion against Nanking. In the Yangtze regions Chiang Kai-shek is engaged in trying to suppress the Communist uprising. In the north, Shih Yu-san is driving back the Mukdenites, while Shantung, Shansi, Feng Yu-hsiang and the like sit tight, watching developments before deciding on their own particular actions. Meantime, Eugene Chen has turned up in Japan in an attempt to seek aid for Canton; Shigemitsu and Wong have narrowly escaped death at the hands of assassins seeking to kill Wong in Shanghai; an anti-Japanese boycott has been launched in Shanghai and elsewhere "in retaliation" for the massacre of Chinese by Koreans; and Chang Hsueh-liang is reported to have sought America's aid to check Japan's policy in Manchuria, only to have his request turned down, quite rightly, by Hoover. Wheels within wheels with a vengeance, and no one can say what the final outcome will be; but it opens up dangerous possibilities.

Sunday 9th August 1931

Regarding the question of boycotting, Harris said that it is generally considered in high circles in India that, unless this social ostracism can be stopped, the morale of the Indian Police will become so affected that the whole Force must break up within two years at the latest - a pretty serious prospect.

Wednesday 12th August 1931

Private talk with Minami's speech to get excited about though certainly the question of Nakamura's wanderings seems to call for some explanation and it is unfortunate that the Kokusuikai have been brought into prominence in connection with the Tsingtao affair, as one might believe anything of them. Be all that as it may, the growing friction with China and the obvious signs of uneasiness with regard to Manchuria are disturbing features, and one cannot help wondering how the whole thing will develop eventually.

Wednesday 2nd September 1931

Had a talk with Shiratori at the F.O. about the choice of the head of the Japanese delegation to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, a subject that is much to the fore at the present moment. No one seems anxious to accept the responsibility, as the immense difficulties of the position and the strong criticism that is bound to be levelled at the leader, whatever the outcome of the conference may be for Japan, are fully realised. Shidehara would, of course, be the best man for the job, but his presence will be required in the Diet at that time to defend the Govt. policy towards China and the Soviet against the attack which the Seiyukai propose to launch.

There is, of course, the possibility of a change of govt. in Japan before the Conference meets, in which case it will be up to the Seiyukai to find a suitable head. The govt. is undoubtedly in a fix over a number of things - e.g. how to balance the budget and what to do about the proposed amalgamation of ministries and other administrative reforms and readjustments -
questions on which both the Cabinet and the Minseito are much divided in opinion. Wakatsuki himself is apparently by no means too secure, as something like two-thirds of the Minseito want Adachi in his place. In order to get out of their difficulties, therefore, Shiratori thinks it quite possible that they will look about for some excuse to resign and that, as the Army is at present none too popular with the people, they may use the Army's firm stand on the question of Army readjustments as the ostensible reason for doing so, thereby putting the whole blame on the poor old Army.

Had a visit from Kinney, who is over here on a business trip from Dairen. Had a very interesting talk with him on the subject of Sino-Japanese friction and possible developments in Manchuria. According to him, whereas there is always a certain amount of criticism on the part of Japanese traders and small businessmen against the Govt.'s failure to take strong action against Chinese misdeeds, the official classes and more responsible residents normally take little heed of their grumbles. He has noticed a distinct change of late, however, and says that even the higher officials are beginning to feel that something ought to be done if things are not to drift from bad to worse. There are said to be over 300 issues between Japan and China awaiting settlement at Mukden alone; and not only are the Chinese continuing their old game of constant procrastination but, puffed up with their own conceit and taking advantage of Japan's declared policy of conciliation and leniency, they are themselves resorting to a policy of constant irritation and pinpricks, much as they did towards the Soviet until the Soviet turned round. Kinney seems to think that, if the Chinese continue in this way much longer, they will find the Japanese turning round and rending them in the same way.

The Chinese thought they could safely bully the Soviet as: (a) the World in general was anti-Soviet and would therefore be only too glad to see the Soviet being hurt; (b) the Soviet would be afraid to resort to arms for fear of antagonising Japan and rousing her apprehensions in regard to Manchuria; (c) they would be afraid to fight, as it would give an opportunity for the peasants and "White" Russians to rise. On these assumptions, the Chinese thought they could do what they liked to the Soviet without fear of their hitting back. As subsequent events showed, however, their assumptions were proved quite unfounded, and there was a limit to Soviet patience. The Chinese were taught a good lesson and have not tried to meddle with the Soviet again; but they have failed to see that the lesson should be applied equally well to their attitude towards Japan. They count on the sympathy of America and the West to side with them against Japan in whatever issues arise, quite overlooking the fact that they have themselves forfeited and lost that sympathy by their actions since 1920. They consider that Japan would fear to fight, lest a revolution break out in Japan itself. If, however, they try Japan's patience much further, they are likely to find that they have miscalculated as badly as they did in the case of the Soviet. Japan may not need to resort to arms. All she need do is to foreclose on the various railways, which the Chinese have built in Manchuria with Japanese money, and bring them to their senses that way. She would be fully justified in taking this action, as the Chinese have paid back none of the capital they borrowed and, of late, not even the interest due.
Wednesday 9th September 1931
Had Kinney and Byas in to dine. Had an interesting talk, inter alia, about the Manchurian situation and Soviet penetration in Mongolia and western China. By their vigorous construction of roads and railways, the Soviet are now tapping the markets in outlying parts of China, according to Kinney, and giving the Chinese in those regions an outlet for their goods, cutting down the time taken in transit from several months to a couple of days.

Regarding the report that Chang Tso-hsiang had resigned, Kinney thinks it probable that he has done so by way of protest against Chang Hsueh-liang and the younger set in Manchuria, who are too hotheaded and irresponsible for his liking. He himself is of the old school and, though he has no particular love for Japan, realises - as did Chang Tso-lin - the value of keeping on good terms with the Japanese. The younger set, on the other hand, are so puffed up with conceit and with false ideas of their own abilities that they think they can flout Japan with impunity.

Thursday 10th September 1931
To dinner at the American Club. Americans - damned good fellows though there are among them - are queer fish, and never have I heard more filthy and obscene speeches anywhere that some of those made at this dinner. What surprised me even more was Neville's invitation to Byas and me to come down stairs afterwards to hear "The Bastard King of England", a so-called "comic" song beloved, I am told, by American Army officers. That a man in Neville's position - Counsellor of the American Embassy - should ask a couple of Englishmen (or Scotsmen, to be exact) to listen to a damned insulting song of that type is surely little short of amazing.

Monday 14th September 1931
Both the Premier and General Minami have been seeing Saionji, apparently reporting on the Manchurian situation. As I have often wondered whether Saionji really plays an active part or whether he is merely a convenient figure-head, I questioned Shiratori on the matter and was surprised to learn that, at any rate in so far as foreign politics are concerned, he still takes an active interest and is supplied constantly by the F.O. with copies of all their despatches. As a result, according to Shiratori, he is better informed on foreign affairs than even the Premier himself. I also took occasion to ask his age, as the various reference books all differ as to the year of his birth. According to Shiratori he is 84, which would make it 1847.

Tuesday 15th September 1931
Amongst other matters discussed was the question of journalistic ethics amongst foreign correspondents in China. There seems to be something about the general atmosphere in the neighbouring Republic that is very damaging to ethical standards in such matters, as the number of those whose consciences are sadly blunted seems to be extraordinarily high. Putnam Weale and Millard are, or rather were, of course, outstanding examples - together with Bronson Rea - of men prepared to change their views and twist news to suit the purpose of the highest bidders for their services; but from what Kinney, Vaughn, and other tell me, there are plenty of others like them. One man, Powell, apparently acted surreptitiously for a
time as censor for the Chinese, and, as such, was able to "lift" news from other correspondents by using the material contained in their cables (which came to him for censorship) and actually used to hold up their cables long enough to enable his own to get ahead of theirs. Another, Donald by name, did the same, while Daly did not hesitate to distort and invent news for sensational purposes. Gould's reputation, too, was not too savoury, while Abend's personal morals, from all accounts, are those of Sodom and Gomorrah. Reuter's Correspondent at Mukden, a Swede by name of Baron Taube, I am sorry to say, is apparently none too scrupulous, as he is in the pay of the Chinese and colours his messages accordingly. Kinney tells me that he puts out a lot of highly coloured propaganda for them and mentioned that he was openly distributing copies of Tanaka's alleged secret memorandum which was, in actual fact, concocted in the office of the "Peking Leader". A nice sort of bunch!

Friday 18th September 1931

Kinney looked in to bid farewell, as he leaves this evening for Dairen. He seems to think the Japanese have made a tactical error in making such a hoorooch about the murder of Nakamura and his pals, as it seems to have frightened the Chinese into taking action against the murderers but not sufficiently to make them mend their ways in other respects. It would have been better in the long run, he thinks, to give the Chinese enough rope to hang themselves.

Was surprised to hear my name called out by a fellow seated at one of the tables. His face seemed to be familiar, but I could not for the life of me "place" him till he mentioned his name. It was Steptoe, whom last I saw in Marseilles on my way out here in January 1925. He is on "special duty" in Peking and, I gather, is on a hurried visit over here in the same connection, though he could not say much in the hotel lest he was over-heard. He is coming round to my office for a talk tomorrow morning.

Rengo rang me up while I was in my bath that General Jung Chen, the Manchurian Army Chief of Staff, had informed Morioka, the Japanese Consul, that proof had been obtained of Nakamura being shot by regulars under Kuan Yu-han, though it is not clear whether Kuan carried out the shooting himself or whether he instructed his troops to do it. Nakamura and his party were arrested on June 26th, and shot the following day. Following discovery of this proof, Jung sent 50 cavalrymen to arrest Kuan, and 11 others and to escort them to Mukden where they are expected to be executed.

Saturday 19th September 1931

Awakened shortly after 5.30 a.m. by a telephone message from Fukuoka asking me to come down to the office chop-chop, as he cannot cope with the flood of work coming in. Seems that news came in about 4 a.m. that the Chinese had destroyed a section of the South Manchurian Railway line just outside Mukden and had thereupon clashed with the Japanese troops on guard duty. Heavy fighting then broke out. The long awaited clash. Fukuoka had already sent a "flash" and a couple of follow-ups to London for me before ringing me up, but on hearing what had happened I dressed and had a hurried breakfast and was down at the office by 6.30 a.m. where I remained without a break even for lunch until 8.30 p.m. working at
full pressure - then back to the house for dinner and on the 'phone receiving and dictating messages till past 1 a.m. by which time I was feeling so dead beat that I asked Rengo to carry on for me as best they could for the rest of the night.

Steptoe looked in about 10 a.m. but on learning what had happened (it was his first intimation of it) he excused himself as it meant that he would have to beat it back to China without delay. I rather suspect that his visit over here had something to do with possible developments in Manchuria, but that things came to this sudden head rather sooner than anticipated. I had hoped to get a talk with him on this and other kindred matters and to get some inside information from him about the whole situation, but he could not stop, though before leaving he gave me a warning - not to put too much trust in Col. Echaparre a White Russian whom he apparently thought might be trying to "put things across me". Seems that both Col. Echaparre and Impey were employed at one time by Steptoe, but were found unreliable. Steptoe is an interesting and quite pleasant sort of fellow, but he strikes me as being afflicted with a weakness that I have noticed in so many other "hush hush" men. He loves to weave a veil of mystery over his doings and whisper strange warnings. No doubt he has to be careful of what he does and says, but this pose is apt to defeat its purpose.

Sunday 20th September 1931

Yesterday, by the evening, the Japanese had occupied the Walled City of Mukden and seized, inter alia, the arsenal, the aerodrome with 60 or more planes and the principal banks without much opposition. On the outskirts of Mukden they had seized Putaying after heavy fighting and destroyed the barracks there. Heavy fighting had taken place around Changchun and Kwanchengtse, especially Nanling. Thanks, however, to the rapidity of the Japanese action, combined apparently with the fact that Chang Hsueh-liang had instructed his commanders to put up no resistance, the general situation was more or less quietened by the evening and large numbers of Chinese troops had been disarmed.

In the morning had come reports of reinforcements being sent from Korea, but, following an urgent Cabinet conference, orders were hastily despatched to cancel these movements and to do everything possible to localise the trouble and prevent further developments. The army had seemingly taken the bit between their teeth in the morning, but the Govt. had regained control by the afternoon.

General situation apparently quieter, but Japanese troops concentrating around Changchun for fear of attack by overwhelming numbers from Kirin. Harbin reports that Soviet troops are massing at Manchuli.

According to Shiratori, the Army is prepared to withdraw to railway zone as soon as circumstances permit, but fear attack if they give up strategic points without adequate guarantee.

Monday 21st September 1931

Main developments in regard to Manchuria are:

1) Occupation of Kirin by Japanese troops, partly to protect own nationals and partly strategic, after clash with Chinese troops on Changchun-Kirin line.
2) Brigade sent from Korea to Mukden as reinforcements but without sanction of Government. Cabinet strongly divided in opinion on whole question of trouble, and undoubtedly the Govt. has had its hands forced by the army.

3) South Manchurian Railway comparatively quiet, but Chientao situation increasingly serious.

4) Soviet showing anti-Japanese attitude.

Tuesday 22nd September 1931

Main developments are:

1) Detachment sent along the Ssipingkai-Changchiatun railway to protect the local Japanese.

2) Report that Japanese troops had started for Harbin, where alarm had been caused by bomb outrages last night, proved unfounded, though apparently some planes went there to reconnoitre.

3) Line between Mukden and Antung cut by Chinese.

4) Cabinet decided that no further reinforcements should be sent and to order the recall of the detachment of 50 men from Chientao - and no troop movements to be made north of Changchun.

Saturday 26th September 1931

Damn these Chinese! First they suppress my cables altogether, so that the Japanese version of the doings in Manchuria shall not be known abroad, and now they actually tamper with the wording of those they allow through. A pretty dirty trick, but typically Chinese!

JAPAN ADVERTISER, TOKYO, SEPTEMBER 27

(article by H.W. Kinney)

A comparison of the dispatch as printed in Shanghai and of the original message as sent out by Captain M.D. Kennedy, Reuter's correspondent in Tokyo, shows how this dispatch was changed to convey an exactly opposite meaning.

"Regarding Chinese action destroying line which precipitated whole affair spokesman intimated official circles inclined belief was merely act bravado on part hot-headed juniors who were angered at what they considered weak-kneed policy their superiors in agreeing punish those responsible murder Nakamura."

And this is how the dispatch appeared in The Shanghai Times and other newspapers throughout China:

"Tokyo, September 20. Official circles now seem inclined to the belief that the action taken by Japanese troops was merely bravado on the part of the hot-headed junior officers who were angered at what they considered the weak-kneed policy of their superiors over the alleged murder of Captain Nakamura."

While it is not possible off hand to determine exactly the circumstances which led to this twisting of the meaning until the matter has been investigated in Shanghai, it is perhaps sufficient to point out that the telegraph in Shanghai is in the hands of the Chinese.
Wednesday 7th October 1931
The anti-Japanese agitation in China, which has been becoming increasingly serious of late, appears to have quietened a bit as a result of report of stern note from Japan and the appearance of Japanese warships for protective purposes.

Strong rumours of a Cabinet crisis, partly in connection with the Manchurian situation, but largely the outcome of the financial situation. Replacement of the gold ban is being demanded in some quarters and may possibly be carried out.

Thursday 8th October 1931
Late in afternoon came news that Japanese Army planes had bombed Chinchow. I was at the F.O. seeing Shiratori when the first news - a Nichi-Nichi "special" - came, and his first comment was: "That means the resignation of the Cabinet if true, as it shows that the Army is openly flouting the Govt.'s instructions." Subsequently came news that the bombing was not premeditated and that the reported preparations for an attack on the city by land forces were unfounded. The planes apparently were reconnoitring when they were fired on by the Chinese, so they proceeded to retaliate by dropping bombs. Still, I'm afraid it will have a bad reaction abroad.

Friday 9th October 1931
Shiratori seems to think that, in view of the Army's explanation of yesterday's bombing, there will be no need for the Govt. to resign, though I gather that foreign diplomatic circles consider that Shidehara is almost sure to do so.

Saturday 17th October 1931
Looked up Zumoto in morning for a talk on the Manchurian situation. Inter alia he maintained that neither Minami nor Kanaya carry much weight with the army and that none of the more senior army leaders of Today do, but that there are several very promising men just coming to the fore, particularly General Araki, whom he seems to think may replace Minami before long as War Minister.

On returning from seeing Zumoto, was told confidentially by Watanabe that the War Minister has sent for the heads of Japanese news organisations, to impart certain secret information and that it is supposed to be concerned with Japan's intentions to seize important points in China - if the League tries to invoke Article XVI of the Covenant - in order to ensure control of sources of supply.

It seems that the scheme has been freely discussed of late by officers of the General Staff, together with one for extending control over the Malay Peninsula and other parts of the Far East, but I can hardly believe that they can have discussed the latter part seriously.

Later heard confidentially from Furuno that the War Minister's talk had been about the arrest of ten officers - all subalterns, except one major - of the General Staff for being connected with some sort of plot, in conjunction with certain reactionaries - to assassinate Shidehara, Makino, Inoue, and Wakatsuki, as they were considered to be acting contrary to the country's interests by being too moderate! General Minami, however, asked the Press leaders to refrain
from publishing anything about the matter on account of the serious reaction it would create abroad.

In this connection I hear that Saionji and Makino are the two who are considered to have brought the most pressure to bear on the Army in the direction of modernisation.

Monday 19th October 1931

I was interested to hear H.E.'s (British Ambassador) view on the whole situation. His sympathies are obviously with Japan, I was glad to find, and he thinks, as I do, that the League made a bad mistake in inviting American participation at the Council meetings. He (said) that the British Govt. ought to understand the position, as it had been fully explained by cable by the Embassy.

Friday 23rd October 1931

Was to have lunched with Kasai, who has just returned from Manchuria, but had to cancel the engagement as too busy. However, he came in to see me, and we had quite an interesting talk, in the course of which he mentioned that the actions of Lord Reading and Lord Cecil at Geneva and of Lampson in China are causing a great deal of resentment and suspicion, and giving rise to an anti-British sentiment.

Saturday 24th October 1931

Anti-British sentiment seems to be spreading - a great pity, but I cannot help feeling that Shiratori has had something to do with it, as he has been very outspoken to the foreign correspondents in his criticism of Lampson and Sir Eric Drummond r people are assured.

Wednesday 28th October 1931

Count Soyeshima came along, and said, half jokingly but with frank reproach: "You British! You have stabbed Japan in the back at Geneva and in China, and are likely to lose your best friends in Japan". Poor Soyeshima! He has always been such an admirer of Britain and so keen on fostering Anglo-Japanese friendship that it has come as a sad blow to him to find Britain seemingly slighting Japan and siding with China at Geneva while Lampson appears to be as thick as thieves with Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang and hob-nobbing with them to the detriment of Japan. Personally I feel convinced that Britain is not as machiavellian as she is painted, but the Japanese interpretation of her actions is understandable and it is certainly most unfortunate that such a veil of mystery has been drawn over the settlement of the Thornburn case, as it naturally arouses suspicions in this country. It certainly does not help matters to have it cabled here that the terms of settlement are to be kept secret (at China's earnest request) even from our own House of Commons, and to follow this up an hour or two later with a request to suppress this news, especially as the first cable had been passed on to the Japanese papers in the meantime.

The (British) Embassy still seems to think the (anti-British) sentiment is only surface deep and ephemeral, as they are too far removed from the general public of Japan to realise how deep
and widespread it is. I, on the other hand, am sufficiently in contact through the men in Rengo
and elsewhere to sense the atmosphere of suspicion and resentment and to evaluate it.

Saturday 31st October 1931
Various sensational rumours continue to circulate, one being that the reason the Emperor
may decide not to attend Grand Manoeuvres in Kyushu in person is that the Premier and
Shidehara have to remain in Tokyo on account of the present situation and therefore fear that
the Army may influence the Emperor to agree to various military projects to which the Govt. is
opposed. Another report has it that Hayashi, the Consul-General in Mukden, has been
arrested by the military authorities for treason, in that he is alleged to have given protection to
certain Chinese leaders of the Chang regime who are "wanted" by the Army; but that appears
to be made out of whole cloth, though it may be true that Honjo and Hayashi do not see
entirely eye to eye.

Meantime Iwanaga tells me confidentially that all the officers detained two weeks ago in
connection with the alleged plot to "remove" Makino, Shidehara etc., have now been released
with a severe reprimand after being more or less "bound over to keep the peace". Seems
there were 12 in all, 2 of whom were released almost immediately and the other 10 today. All
are said to belong to the Chinese and Russian sections of the General Staff - including two
"han-cho" [heads of General Staff Sections] who are lieutenant colonels - so presumably their
services are urgently required!

(Soyeshima's) assertion that he has never known anti-British sentiment to be so widespread
or deeply grounded as at present may, I'm afraid, be accepted at its face-value. Meanwhile
the "Nichi Nichi" professes to have learned that Lampson has signed a secret agreement with
China whereby Britain agrees to support China at the League Council in return for economic
privileges in the Yangtze Valley; and this, together with the numerous other allegations of
British intrigue at the expense of Japan, is simply adding fuel to the fire.

On my return to the office after the talk with Soyeshima, I invited Watanabe and one or two
other Rengo men in one at a time for private talks to try and fathom the real depth of the
suspicions and resentment against Britain still further, and everything they tell me seems to
bear out what Soyeshima said. They all agree that, unless an official denial of the alleged
secret agreement etc. is forthcoming, the suspicions and resentment are likely to increase. I
have therefore cabled London fairly strongly on the subject, as it seems essential that they
should know how strong the feeling is.

Tuesday 3rd November 1931
Japanese decided send repair party under military escort to repair the Nonni River bridges on
the Taonan-Anganchi Railway, as Ma Chan-shan, who destroyed them recently in order to
prevent Chang Hai-peng's advance to Tsitsihar, has failed to carry out his promise to repair
them himself. The railway was built for the Chinese with Japanese money, but not a cent has
been repaid, so the Japanese naturally are interested in keeping it intact, especially as it is of
special importance at this time of year for the transportation of beans etc. I don't blame them,
therefore, for taking action, though it opens up dangerous possibilities when a small force is sent off so far afield, especially to a point so close to the Chinese Eastern Railway in which Soviet interests are involved. Personally I do not put much faith in all the reports circulated of late about the Soviets' alleged help to Ma Chang-shan, but they probably contain an element of truth and one cannot afford to discount them or their significance entirely.

Wednesday 4th November 1931
Although both Ma Chang-shan and Chang Hai-peng agreed to the Japanese request to withdraw their respective forces 10 kilometres from the Nonni River bridge during the work of repairs, Ma's troops are now reported to be trying to prevent the work and have even opened fire on the Japanese patrols. Further complications appear foreshadowed.

My cables to London stressing the importance of easing Japanese suspicions against Britain seem to have stirred things up, as Reuter now cables from London that the rumours of a secret agreement with China are baseless.

Thursday 5th November 1931
Serious clash reported on the Nonni River as a result of Ma Chan-shan's troops firing on the Japanese when they started to repair the bridges, despite Ma's previous promise not to hinder that work in any way.

Friday 6th November 1931
Consular reports indicate that yesterday's fighting at the Nonni River arose from the refusal of one of Ma's subordinate commanders at Tahsing, a strategically important point within 10 kilometres of the river, refusing to obey Ma's orders to withdraw, as the instructions were delivered orally and not in writing. He therefore opened fire when the Japanese began to throw out a protective screen.

By a curious irony of Fate, the "Morning Post" and the Soviet appear to have been taken in simultaneously by the same piece of Chinese propaganda! (the Tanaka Memorial) Characterising it as a "patently blatant forgery", Shiratori authorised me to cable an official denial of its authenticity.

Saturday 7th November 1931
The Nonni River situation seems to be more or less stabilised for the time being, as the Japanese refrained from pursuing Eliot suffered similarly when he tried to urge the folly of giving up the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Friday 13th November 1931
Iwanaga very disgusted - and rightly so - as Vaughn has cabled to the U.P. (agency) that the F.O. spokesman had admitted that Rengo is subsidised by the Govt. but had described it as unreliable. It is true that Shiratori (rather ill-advisedly I thought) spoke to this effect yesterday, but his remarks were made in confidence by way of explanation and Vaughn had no right to cable his remarks abroad. A typically U.P. trick to damage Rengo's reputation by hitting below the belt.

Saturday 14th November 1931
Rather amused (and pleased) by Lady Lindley declaring most emphatically that she was whole-heartedly in favour of Japan and wanted Japan to win!

**Sunday 15th November 1931**

One interesting point brought up by Iwanaga was that, as early as March this year, he, Iwanaga, tried to urge Shidehara to take up the question of China's constant violations of treaty agreements and general provocation with the League or in some other such way in order to force China to carry out her pledges. He warned Shidehara that, unless some such step was taken, national sentiment in Japan, which was already becoming aggravated and charging Shidehara with being "weak-kneed" towards China, might become inflamed and force his hand. Shidehara, however, replied that he was simply following the tactics of Japan's greatest Foreign Ministers, Mutsu and Komura, who were abused in like manner by their countrymen but nevertheless continued the policy of patience, forbearance, and conciliation up to the point at which they were assured of the World's moral support of whatever action they took. Iwanaga saw his point, but nevertheless warned him of the possibility of an explosion of national sentiment if this policy was carried too far, and Shidehara admitted that such a danger existed, though he was determined to make concessions to the limit of endurance so that, when finally the time came to take action, his hand would be all the stronger. Poor Shidehara! He waited too long and his hand was forced in such a way as to nullify the policy he had carried out with such amazing patience and self-control.

Latest developments include a very strong Soviet protest against Japan for spreading what Moscow calls false reports of Soviet assistance to Ma Chan-shan; an admission by Shiratori that Mr. "Pu Yi", the Chinese "Boy" Emperor, has "fled" to Manchuria, having landed at Yinkow; and Shiratori's admission that the Govt. does not anticipate that much will be achieved in the coming League Council session. Questioned as to Japan's policy in the event of Pu Yi being proclaimed ruler of Manchuria, he asserted that the question had not been seriously considered, as such a contingency was not anticipated.

**Wednesday 18th November 1931**

The long-anticipated clash, after a week or two of "false starts" and "incidents", north of the Nonni River has at last come about and Ma's troops have been driven back across the Chinese Eastern Railway and routed, and the Japanese were reported to have reached Tsitsihar by this evening. Artic conditions are said to prevail, but despite them the Japanese seem to have pushed ahead with extraordinary rapidity and with their usual thoroughness. Fortunately, the Chinese Eastern Railway is apparently unharmed and no signs of the Soviet taking action are reported, though 5 Soviet soldiers are said to have been found among the Chinese casualties. May be true, but, on the other hand, the bodies are just as likely to have been those of "White" Russians.

**Thursday 19th November 1931**

Japanese reply to Soviet, though drafted before yesterday's operations, was only sent off last night. It denies that Japan manufactured the allegations of Soviet assistance to Ma, and
suggests that these reports were manufactured by the Chinese in order to encourage Ma's troops with the belief that they could depend on Soviet support. Japan also says Moscow must be held in part responsible if a serious clash occurs in Northern Manchuria, as the Soviet allowed the Chinese Eastern Railway to be used for the transportation of reinforcements for Ma. Recalled that, in the Sino-Soviet trouble of 1929, Japan was strictly neutral and refused to let Chinese reinforcements use the South Manchurian Railway.

Following this reply to Moscow yesterday, instructions were sent to Hirota today, telling him to warn Litvinov of possible complications if Soviet troops are sent to protect the Chinese Eastern Railway and to assure him that no harm has been done to the railway.

Friday 27th November 1931

As for the apparent advance by Japanese troops on Chinchow, Shiratori professes complete confidence that the Army has no intention to attack it (despite very convincing Press reports to the contrary), as the Govt. has pledged itself to refrain from such action and the Army heads concurred with the Govt. in giving this assurance to the Powers. If, however, the Army really has launched an attack on the city, he says, it means that the Army has got out of hand and the Govt. will promptly resign - but he seems most convinced that no attack is intended.

Saturday 28th November 1931

About noon, on my return from seeing Shiratori at the F.O., I found a cable from Washington containing a most damning indictment of Japan (for yesterday's advance on Chinchow) by Stimson, who, if correctly reported, used very undiplomatic language and accused Japan of breaking her pledges and letting the Army run amok - and so on and so forth. As was only to be expected, Shiratori, at this evening's conference with foreign correspondents at the F.O., was very worked up about it and spoke in equally undiplomatic terms of Stimson for making such accusations and for revealing confidential information about Japan's assurances that no advance on Chinchow was contemplated. Apart from very understandable indignation, Shiratori is afraid to stiffen Chang's attitude and lead him to revoke his proposal to evacuate Chinchow now that he knows of Japan's assurances not to initiate an attack to drive out his troops. He is also much afraid of the effect on the Japanese military authorities, as they are naturally furious and will be all the more difficult to hold in check.

Sunday 29th November 1931

Official despatches from Washington denying Stimson's alleged outburst against Japan have served to soothe the wave of indignation aroused by the A.P. report to Rengo. With mutual expressions of regret that misquotations gave rise to misunderstandings, the incident, therefore, is now considered closed in so far as the F.O. is now concerned. Shiratori, however, told us confidentially that although Stimson denies his alleged denunciation of Japan, he admitted to Debuchi that he had inadvertently revealed that Japan had given assurances that no attack on Chinchow was contemplated, a matter that was meant to be kept strictly confidential. Shidehara is the man who has to suffer - in fact, he is now being accused of giving away "strategic secrets" and is being attacked more strongly than ever by the "super-patriots" in Japan accordingly.
Howe tells me that his people have been bombarding him with enquiries about the text of the Stimson interview and maintaining that the A.P. cables must have been mis-edited by Rengo. Both Howe and I, however, have compared the originals with the text as extended by Rengo, and there is no mis-editing. Presumably the A.P. are being jumped on by Stimson for sending out such a sensational and unfounded account of what he said, and they are now trying to lay the blame on Rengo. I must say that the more I see and hear of American press ethics, the more contemptible and irresponsible they appear to be. The American public wants sensation (and I fear that the British are nearly as bad!) and their press correspondents see to it that they get what they want. Facts are quite a secondary consideration. The harm that such reports do is well seen by this case of Stimson's interview. It was equally well seen in the case of the recent reports of Briand's alleged intention to invoke Article XVI and of the League's alleged intention to bring about the withdrawal of Ministers an Ambassadors from Japan, both of which reports proved to be without foundation.

Sunday 6th December 1931
Honjo is reported to have despatched a final warning to Chang, insisting on the withdrawal of the Chinchow troops to within the Great Wall - or take the consequences, as the continued massing of these troops keeps the situation in a state of constant tension and unrest. Shiratori, however, is still hopeful that Chang will be induced to reconsider a voluntary withdrawal, though he frankly admits that the Army is determined to use force if Chang fails to withdraw of his own accord - and, while the military authorities are prepared to let the Chinese carry on with the local administration, they insist that Chang must withdraw both his troops and his govt. from Chinchow, as the Chinchow Govt., they assert, is inciting and assisting the bandits and irregulars against the Japanese. The Chinese, they point out, have occupied all the points evacuated by the Japanese on the 28th and, regard their withdrawal, not as a concession but as a sign of weakness - in other words it is the old, old story, that the Chinese respect nothing but force and regard anything in the nature of conciliation as a proof of weakness.

Monday 7th December 1931
Gen. Ninomiya has just returned from Manchuria and, in the course of a press interview, more or less confirmed the report that Chang & Co., realising that their troops are no match for the Japanese in proper fighting, have decided that the best way to cause trouble to the Japanese is to resort to guerrilla warfare in co-operation with the bandits which infest the regions west of the South Manchurian Railway.

Thursday 10th December 1931
Received another cable from Shanghai on the U.P. report of a sensational "lengthy statement" issued by the F.O.. Apparently, despite my denial, the U.P. has reasserted what they said, so Shanghai asked me to obtain a statement from Shidehara confirming my denial. This I have now done; but it beats me how Vaughn - who admitted to me yesterday that no statement had been issued and that his people in Shanghai had probably touched up his original cable a bit - can have the face to reaffirm the issuance of this mythical statement. I
tackled him on the subject again this evening when I met him up at the F.O., but he gave a very evasive reply to my questioning and was obviously simply trying to bluff it out. A curious mentality.

Friday 11th December 1931

Resignation (of Govt.) took place about 5.30 p.m. The crisis was brought to a head yesterday afternoon by a visit from Tomita urging the Premier to consider the formation of a coalition cabinet. Wakatsuki promptly called an urgent Cabinet conference, which was still sitting when I rang up the office about 11.30 last night. The resignation of the Cabinet followed a final unsuccessful attempt to persuade Adachi either to resign or to cease active advocacy of a coalition cabinet. On the face of it, Adachi appears to have played a pretty low-down game, being actuated primarily by self-seeking interests and personal friction with Wakatsuki and Inoue; but according to Shiratori this view does him an injustice. Adachi, he contends, advocated the formation of a coalition cabinet in order to forestall the possibility of a military dictatorship, as he feared that the riotous scenes which he anticipated in the coming Diet session if the Wakatsuki Govt. remained in power, might sicken the country at large (which is already disgusted with the antics of the political parties) that the people might welcome dictatorship as a preferable alternative to the continuance of party government. Incidentally, according to Shiratori, Adachi in advocating the formation of a coalition cabinet had the support of Count Makino.

Saturday 12th December 1931

Talking to Col. Simson, who had just returned from Manchuria. Was much interested to hear from him that, in his own opinion, the assertion that the operations on the 27th were for the purpose of rushing help to the garrison at Tientsin was justified. When this explanation was given out by the War Office at the time, it struck me as a rather poor attempt at propaganda, as reinforcements could be rushed to Tientsin far quicker by sea; but from what Col. Simson tells me, it seems that the War Office may have been right after all. The troops, he said, were thoroughly aroused by the reports of Tientsin, as it really looked as though the situation there was pretty desperate. Momentarily, therefore, they "saw red" and decided that the best way to help was to blast their way through via Chinchow, as this would serve the double purpose of sending reinforcements and of easing the pressure on Tientsin by diverting the attention of the Chinese. Judging by the way they set about it, Col. Simson considers they could have broken through without much difficulty and got reinforcements to Tientsin just as quickly as by sea, as they had quantities of bridging material and the like to effect rapid repairs if the Chinese had tried to hinder their advance by destroying bridges etc. (Col. Simson) was very annoyed with the foreign military observers (in Manchuria), as they had taken up their quarters in the building housing the Chinchow Govt. for the express purpose of embarrassing the Japanese, who would naturally hesitate to bomb the building for fear of killing these foreign observers. Simson considers it a gross breach of neutrality and apparently spoke very strongly on the subject to Badham-Thornbull, who was one of them.
As for the much-discussed bandit menace he says the bandits are there alright, but he rather doubts if they are instigated by Chang & Co. as much as the Japanese think they are. In his report on his findings he tells me he has strongly advocated the appointment of a British representative at Mukden with a proper understanding of, and sympathy with, the Japanese, as he considers a great deal could be done to further British interests in Manchuria if only we had someone there who would work in with the Japanese and win their confidence and respect. Unfortunately, as he says, the British Consul-General at Mukden is always chosen from the Chinese Consular Service and is invariably prejudiced against the Japanese from the outset.

Rengo rang me up to say that Inukai, whose appointment as Premier to succeed Wakatsuki had been announced about 5.30, has decided to form a straight Seiyukai Cabinet, thereby finally disposing of the reports that he would head a coalition ministry.

Sunday 13th December 1931

Replacement of the gold ban was announced. Is there any truth in the rumour that (Adachi) was bribed by Mitsui's or someone to hasten the replacement of the gold ban in order to enable speculators to rake in their millions? What will be the reaction, especially amongst the millions living on the margin line, when they think of the fortunes made by the speculators on the yen exchange at their expense? As Abrikosov aptly observed to me yesterday, the shot fired at Hamaguchi 13 months ago has brought about a succession of mishaps and seems likely to culminate in a national crisis of the first magnitude. The Manchurian crisis and the serious economic and financial situation might have been avoided by Hamaguchi but Wakatsuki was too weak and undetermined to cope.

Learned two quite interesting things today from Nagi. One is that Shiratori is a son-in-law of Count Makino, so that his explanation about Adachi's advocacy of a coalition cabinet being backed by Makino may have been based on inside information. The other is that the German correspondent who turned up at the F.O. Press conference a day or two ago goes by a Spanish name, Don Gata, and poses as a Hitler agent, but is unknown (anyway professedly so) by the German Embassy and - so Nagi maintains - confided to him that his own leanings are to the Left. This he confided on learning that Nagi was the Tass Correspondent. Possibly, however, Nagi's story is not wholly correct, for, if it is, I cannot see why he should have passed it on to me!

Thursday 17th December 1931

Conflicting opinions appear to be held about the Manchurian situation. With Chiang's resignation, Chang's allegiance to Nanking, according to Shiratori, is now only nominal, as it was purely a personal connection with Chiang that served to link Chang with Nanking. It is thought, therefore, that Chang is now prepared to offer almost any terms to Japan and he has already expressed readiness to open direct negotiations. Japan, however, does not feel inclined to bargain with one like Chang, as she wants to ensure a permanently peaceful and prosperous Manchuria and the recognition of her treaty rights, and she has no faith in Chang keeping his promises if he is allowed to return. While, however, Shiratori seems hopeful of
Chang withdrawing his troops, the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria are reported to have decided to start a fresh bandit drive shortly on account of the increasing activities of Chinese bandits and irregulars in the vicinity of the South Manchurian Railway.

Friday 18th December 1931

Howe tells me he learns "on good authority" that the much talked of plot that led to the arrest of a dozen or so officers a couple of months ago was frustrated by General Araki, the War Minister in the new Cabinet. Apparently the plotters wanted to set him up as dictator, but he himself was strongly opposed to anything in the nature of a military coup, and on hearing what was in the wind, he promptly took action and put a stop to it.

Thursday 24th December 1931

The British and French ambassadors called on the F.O. yesterday and the American Ambassador to present notes from their respective governments expressing apprehension regarding the possibility of a clash between the Japanese and Chinese regulars at Chinchow. Although Shiratori asserts that the F.O. does not regard this as a "warning", but merely as an expression of "friendly" concern, it is quite obvious that the action is resented. It smacks too much of the triple intervention of 1895. (Shiratori) emphasised that the difference between Chinese soldiers and bandits in Manchuria is increasingly small, which makes it difficult to promise not to clash with Chinese "regulars", especially in view of the fact, whose attention I drew to a very vitriolic resolution passed yesterday by the "Indian community of Tokyo" and circulated by Rengo in their English service. It was obviously written up by Pieres and circulated at his instigation and gave a totally false impression, as the so-called "Indian community of Tokyo" was, of course, Rash Behari Bose & Co. - a dozen or so at the most and all extremists. Iwanaga promised to look into the matter and to see that Rengo did not lend itself any further to propaganda.

Friday 8th January 1932

On my way back from the Embassy, I noticed a largish crowd around Sakuradamon, but thought nothing of it till I got back to the office, where I was greeted with the news that a Korean named Rikosho had thrown a bomb at the Emperor as he was passing by on his way back from the Rikugun Hajime review of the troops at Yoyogi. Fortunately he missed his mark. Rikosho apparently obtained his bombs from the so-called Korean Provisional Govt. Headquarters at Shanghai.

Following this morning's outrage, the Premier tendered the resignations of himself and his whole Cabinet in accordance with the precedent set in Dec. 1923 after the Toranomon Affair. Speculation is consequently rife as to whether the resignation will be accepted and, if so, who will form the new Cabinet. Presumably it will be some kind of national Cabinet this time, as Wakatsuki's return to power is all but impossible. As, however, the Emperor has told Inukai to carry on in the meantime, there is still a bare possibility that the resignations will be refused, though a change of War Minister and Home Minister is regarded as virtually certain, as these are the two ministers technically responsible for the Emperor's safety. Meantime, Admiral Litvinov had sounded him on the subject but that the proposal has not yet been submitted to
the Cabinet. The general belief seems to be that Japan will decline, as she considers the
Kellogg Pact sufficient for the purpose.

Monday 18th January 1932
Had a talk with Shiratori at the F.O. in the morning about the Soviet proposal for a non-
aggression pact. According to him, if Moscow was really sincere, she blundered badly by
making the proposal public before the Japanese Govt. had had time to consider it and
prepare the ground for its favourable reception. He seems doubtful of the Soviets’ sincerity,
as he says they must have realised what the reaction would be if the matter was not handled
with sufficient care.

Saturday 23rd January 1932
According to the vernacular Press, drastic measures are being considered if the Japanese
demands in connection with the recent assault on the 5 Nichiren priests at Shanghai are
rejected, although Shiratori continues to emphasise that Japan is anxious to localise the
affair. No time-limit, he says, has been set for Chinese acceptance of the demands; but if they
are definitely rejected, bluejackets will probably be ordered to occupy certain Chinese military
establishments in and around Shanghai.

Monday 25th January 1932
The papers are hinting at some scheme of sorts being on foot to bring about closer co-
operation between Britain and Japan. Davies tells me in confidence that, although the papers
are rather exaggerating the importance of the matter, the fact is that the two countries are
working in together regarding steps to be taken in the event of China trying to carry out her
threat to abolish extrality extra-territoriality. It is certainly noteworthy, anyway, that London’s
action in declining to join Washington in the recent Note on Manchuria has helped immensely
to restore Japan’s friendship towards England, which was sadly impaired for a time as the
result of our attitude at the time of the League session in October.

Tuesday 26th January 1932
The troubles foreseen by Troyanovsky in his talk with Inukai a couple of weeks ago appears
to have materialised. Harbin despatches late this afternoon reported that Ting Chao’s troops
have broken out and looted the Chinese section of the city. Seems that Ting took action on
learning that arrangements had been made by Hsi Hsia to have him replaced.

Wednesday 27th January 1932
Fighting between Ting’s and Hsi Hsia’s troops broke out this morning and news from Harbin
increasingly serious. Shiratori seems to think it will not be necessary to send troops there for
the protection of the 6,000 or so Japanese residents, but according to reports received during
the evening they are seriously endangered, two Japanese and 16 Koreans having lost their
lives during the past 24 hours, while several others are missing.

Half-jokingly remarked to Colonel Simson in the evening that this latest development would
seem to indicate that Colonel Doihara must be somewhere in the background, to which
Colonel Simson replied that he is in Harbin now! It would be hardly too much to say that a
knowledge of Doihara’s whereabouts is the best guide as to where trouble is to be expected.
Thursday 28th January 1932
Two battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery are being sent to Harbin and Hirota at Moscow has been instructed to explain the reasons to the Soviet Govt. and to reassure them that Japan has no intention of seizing or damaging the Chinese Eastern Railway and that she will pay all transportation costs.

Friday 29th January 1932
On arrival at office in morning learned that fighting had broken out in Shanghai; Chinese regulars having fired on Japanese bluejackets when the latter were taking up their positions in the defence sector. Shiratorii was plainly worried when we went to him for the usual morning Press conference at the F.O. and admitted that although the possibility of trouble with Chinese students and irregulars had been foreseen, the unexpected participation by Chinese regulars aroused very grave apprehensions, as there were some 30,000 concentrated around Shanghai at the moment so that, if they take concerted action, they will be able to overwhelm the small Japanese force of 2,000 or less bluejackets. If this happens, Japan will be compelled to despatch a strong military force.

While the situation at Shanghai is causing so much anxiety, developments in Northern Manchuria are none too reassuring either, as the Soviet are hindering the despatch of Japanese troops to Harbin by refusing the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway and even, according to press despatches, going so far as to cut the line at several points and destroying part of a bridge over the Sungari. Ohashi, the Japanese Consul-General at Harbin, has tried to persuade Kuznetzoff to permit the use of the line from Changchun, and has even gone the length of telling Kuznetzoff that Japan will regard refusal as an "unfriendly act" and will hold the Chinese Eastern Railway authorities responsible if, as a result of the delay caused in the arrival of Japanese troops, the Japanese residents suffer any loss. Kuznetzoff, however, merely replies that Moscow has given him strict instructions to observe strict neutrality and deny the use of the railway to Japanese and Chinese troops alike.

Late this evening came the report that the Japanese have decided to take temporary control of, and operate, the southern extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway as both the Soviet and Chinese operatives refuse to work - 400 South Manchurian Railway employees have therefore been sent to take over the work.

Saturday 30th January 1932
The Shanghai situation continues to occupy the centre of attention, and reports from the U.S. talk of joint Anglo- American protests against Japan; but although Sir Francis Lindley visited the Foreign Ministry yesterday and again today, both his visits were independent of any action taken by America and neither of them are regarded in the nature of warning or protest. Yesterday's visit was apparently to request Yoshizawa to instruct the Japanese naval commander at Shanghai (Admiral Shiozawa) not to act independently in so far as the International Settlement is concerned. Meantime, the combined fleet operations which were to
have started on the 4th of next month, have been cancelled and the whole fleet of some 60 vessels is being concentrated at Sasebo to await further orders. Looks serious. A tacit agreement appears to exist, whereby the Navy deals with China Proper and the Army confines its activities to Manchuria. (Shiratori) hinted that it would require less to make Japan withdraw from the League now than it would have done before the present Govt. came into power, as the Seiyukai passed a resolution a couple of months or so ago advocating withdrawal "if the League persists in adopting an unreasonable attitude."

Sunday 31st January 1932

On going down to the office I found that several very sensational cables from America, hinting at war with Japan, had - very rightly - been suppressed. I spoke to Iwanaga about the matter, and about the way some of the American Press despatches appeared to be trying to make it seem as though Britain and America were determined to act in concert against Japan - and he admitted that the situation had been rendered extremely delicate by American suspicions of Anglo-Japanese co-operation.

Soviets have now agreed to the Japanese making use of the southern extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Ting Chao's troops, however, are apparently doing their best to hinder the Japanese advance, and this morning launched an attack on the station at Shuangchengpu, which the Japanese were defending, and inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese - 21 killed and 38 wounded - before being repulsed.

At 6.30 p.m. all the foreign correspondents gathered at the Foreign Ministry for the interview with Yoshizawa. A small, thin, rather delicate figure, he spoke terribly slowly and laboriously in English that left much to be desired - and he puffed incessantly at a cigar. If he spoke no better or quicker at Geneva, it is little wonder that some of the delegates lost patience with him and that the Japanese case was presented so poorly. The real "guts" of the whole talk, however, was his solemn assertion that, unless the Chinese stop sending reinforcements or withdraw to a safe distance, not only will the position of the Japanese marines, but also the whole International Settlement itself, be exposed to danger of the gravest nature. For this reason, he said, he had summoned the (British, French and American) ambassadors and requested them to ask their respective govt. to take up the matter and use their influence to persuade the Chinese to withdraw. He declared that the Army would probably be compelled to despatch troops if the Powers failed to induce the Chinese to withdraw, as Japan was not prepared to risk the annihilation of her naval landing parties. All things considered, it looks as though there had been a sad miscalculation somewhere. Both the Japanese themselves and the municipal authorities at Shanghai apparently thought that a display of force on the part of the Japanese Navy would be sufficient: the Chinese, instead of climbing down, have just sat tight and metaphorically said: "and what are you going to do about it if we don't!" As a result, the municipal authorities have quite understandably got "cold feet", as they don't want to be dragged into what is primarily a Sino-Japanese dispute. It is perhaps but human nature, therefore, to start blaming Japan for the serious predicament in which Shanghai now finds itself as a result of Japan's failure to make the Chinese climb down by a mere display of force.
- and so far as the denunciation of Japan appearing in America are concerned, real blame, to my mind, rests on the press, with its huge misleading headlines and its love of sensation, and on the Yankee correspondents in Shanghai, so many of whom are so anxious to file a good "story" and to file it without delay, that the bare truth and the explanatory background receive but secondary consideration or none at all.

Monday 1st February 1932

Had a visit from Legge to enquire about the latest developments at Shanghai. His sympathies are plainly with the Japanese whose main mistake, he considers, is failure to use sufficient force to teach the Chinese a lesson! I asked him if the rest of the Embassy held similar views, but he replied "Simson, I think, does; but the diplomats seem rather upset at the measures adopted!"

Shiratori was critical of the American Press getting so excited. He frankly admitted, however, that there had been some instances of excesses committed by Japanese "roughs" and that apprehension was felt lest these disorderly elements should aggravate the situation. Everything possible is being done to control them, and about 2 dozen have been deported already.

Both Lindley and Forbes (U.K. & U.S. Ambassadors) presented formal protests this afternoon, contending that the Japanese action at Shanghai had gone further than necessitated thereby endangering the lives of British and Americans in the International Settlement. Yoshizawa, in reply, asserted that the Japanese action had not exceeded the minimum required.

Late this evening it was announced that Araki, Osumi, and Yoshizawa had decided amongst themselves to seek Cabinet approval for the despatch of one Army division to Shanghai to replace the naval landing parties.

Tuesday 2nd February 1932

One unexpected development this morning was the sudden announcement that Prince Fushimi has been appointed to succeed Admiral Taniguchi as Chief of the Naval Staff. The real motive seems to be to stifle any criticism that might otherwise be made against the Army or the Navy General Staff. Criticism against an Imperial Prince might entail a charge of lèse majesté! Another reason reported for the change is that Taniguchi is said to have been strongly opposed to the Army taking a hand in the Shanghai situation.

(Shiratori) said that the decision to seek Cabinet approval for the despatch of troops was the outcome of yesterday's Anglo-American protests against the use of the International Settlement as a base of operations. The only way to avoid all question of using the Settlement was for the Army to despatch a strong enough force to drive back the Chinese.

(The British Ambassador) was very worried at the way things were developing, and was very critical both of the Japanese for "seeking trouble with the Chinese", and of the Americans for being "so damnably swelled-headed and itching for a fight in the belief that their interests in China required it." Fundamentally his sympathy still seems to lie with the Japanese, but he is very fed up with them for going out of their way to aggravate the situation and for refusing all attempts at mediation and conciliation. He showed me confidentially some instructions he had
just received from London, consisting of a set of 5 proposals to be made to the Japanese Govt. and the Chinese Govt. simultaneously. The American Ambassador had received identical instructions and the French Ambassador too. The Italian Ambassador was to have received them likewise, but apparently failed to get them. Briefly the proposals are: (1) cessation of acts of violence. (2) cessation of all warlike preparations and mobilisation. (3) withdrawal of troops. (4) creation of a neutral zone. (5) immediate opening of negotiations for the settlement of all outstanding disputes, with the participation of neutral observers. As (the British Ambassador) says, rejection of the final term by the Japanese is inevitable as they will never agree to any outside intervention of any kind in so far as the settlement of the Manchurian dispute is concerned.

An interesting sidelight on the situation in Shanghai is given in an official despatch to the F.O. from the consul at Nanking, who says he has learned that the Canton clique has been manipulating the 19th army (which is Cantonese) with the object of causing Chiang's downfall. Chiang, who had intended to relieve this army with fresh troops, therefore decided to leave it in the Shanghai area in the hope that the Japanese would annihilate it, while he himself removed the Govt. to Loyang so as to escape responsibility. If this report is true - and Babb, who is very well-informed on Chinese internal affairs, thinks it highly probable - it looks very much as though poor old Japan was being made the victim of Chinese internal politics. Yoshizawa went off down to Okitsu to seek Saionji's view on the matter (of the 5 terms presented by U.K. U.S. & French Ambassadors), and the reply is to be given tomorrow.

Thursday 4th February 1932

(The British Ambassador) had me to lunch at the Embassy and after lunch he asked me to his study, and there remained closeted with him till 3.30 while Simson, Legge, Snow, Butler, and others came in to discuss the situation at Shanghai and to report and advise. (The Ambassador) himself was very grave and serious, as he fully recognises the dangerous possibilities and feels his responsibility lest a single false step on his or anyone else's part should precipitate a world war. (The Ambassador) has strongly warned our Govt. at home of the danger of bringing further pressure to bear on Japan as it will only play into the hands of the reactionaries and, if economic or military sanctions are applied, they will very possibly insist on a forlorn gamble rather than throw up their hand in surrender. This would probably consist of seizing important strategic points in China in order to control sources of supplies for the food and raw materials required in Japan. No doubt Japan would lose in the long run, but she could play merry hell for a time. She could probably get Hong Kong itself, too, for that matter, by means of a sharp, swift stroke, as the garrison is greatly under strength at the moment.

Simson's advice is that all the Powers should agree to shut their eyes for a week or two while the Japanese drive back the Chinese from around Shanghai.
During this talk, a private letter was brought in to (the Ambassador) who opened it, read it, and then carefully burned it after having noted its contents and drafted a cable to be enciphered and sent to London. The letter was from Baron Hayashi and to the effect: "What I told you this morning that I feared, has taken place. One division has already sailed."

(The Ambassador) is very worried as to the effect that this message will have when it gets abroad, though he is hopeful that his warnings will serve to check any action that might otherwise be taken. (The Ambassador) inclines to agree with Col. Simson about the desirability of the Powers adopting a policy of "masterly inactivity" for the time being and trusting to it that, in the meantime, the Japanese will be able to clear up the whole mess.

The ambassador mentioned that Lampson wrote him a private letter some time ago upbraiding him for his advocacy of a policy of non-interference on the part of Great Britain in the Manchurian dispute. According to Lampson, such an attitude is grossly immoral.

Japan's reply to the five-point proposal was handed by Yoshizawa to the three ambassadors this evening at 6 p.m. and constituted an acceptance of the 3rd and 4th points, a conditional acceptance of the 1st, and a rejection of the 2nd and 5th.

Friday 5th February 1932

(Shiratori) expressed regret at the embarrassment caused to Mr. Debuchi in Washington by western correspondents in Japan evading censorship of news of despatch of Japanese troops to Shanghai, as Debuchi, in all good faith, had categorically denied to Stimson that Japan was sending any troops. The fact was, as Shiratori explained, that Shigemitsu had urged so strongly that the matter be kept strictly secret for the time being (as he feared that mention of it might induce the Chinese to attempt to annihilate the Japanese naval landing parties before the arrival of the troops), that the Govt. had refrained from informing even their representatives abroad.

Shiratori told us (though not for publication) that two mixed brigades of the Kurume Division at peace strength are being sent over as a start while the Kanazawa Division which is to relieve them, is being mobilised.

(The British Ambassador) said to me: "You must do your best to emphasise the Japanese viewpoint as favourably as possible in your cables in order to remove the possibility of the British public demanding further pressure on Japan, as it is more than ever essential now to avoid any action that might arouse national sentiment in Japan to the extent of challenging the World. They would have our people at Shanghai at their mercy if that happened." One interesting point he mentioned was that the decision to send troops was apparently taken during Yoshizawa's absence at Okitsu on Wednesday seeing Saionji.

After attending afternoon Press conference at F.O., was standing outside talking to Byas when a taxi drew up and out jumped Takahashi who said he had just been along to my office to say that the Navy Minister would like to see me. Admiral Osumi, whom I had not met before, is a clean-shaven, rather corpulent old gentleman - a pleasant-spoken old fellow.

Without beating about the bush, he told us quite frankly that very disquieting reports had been received regarding the change in Britain's attitude towards Japan since the outbreak of the
present trouble in Shanghai. One such report, which he said came from a very reliable outside source (neither British nor Japanese), was to the effect that the British Govt. had decided to take drastic action if Japan despatched any land forces. In view of the fact that Japanese troops were already on their way, this report, he said, had naturally caused grave anxiety to Japan, so he wanted us to do our best to remove the suspicions as to Japan's motives and to make it quite clear that, in deciding to send Army reinforcements, Japan has no other aim than to relieve the handful of bluejackets and to drive back the Chinese troops from the vicinity of the city. Japan, he emphasised, has absolutely no intention to carry out anything in the nature of a permanent occupation or to menace British interests in the Yangtze Valley, but will withdraw her armed forces as quickly as possible as soon as their immediate task is completed. If Britain would only recognise that Japan regards the Shanghai trouble in an entirely different light to the Manchurian affair, she would recognise that there is no need to question Japan's intentions, he declared, adding "Manchuria is a matter of life and death to Japan. Shanghai is only a passing incident, which we are anxious to close as soon as possible."

Meantime press messages from Manchuria this evening tell of the arrival of a Japanese military train at Harbin this afternoon and that the main body is expected to enter tomorrow. Heavy fighting yesterday on outskirts of city, but Ting Chao & Co. are now fleeing, some north-eastward and others along the Chinese Eastern Railway to the east.

(Iwanaga) tells me of rumours to the effect that America is trying to induce Britain to join with her in bringing drastic pressure to bear on Japan and has offered to wipe out Britain's share of the war-debts if she will do so. He says it has gained wide credence amongst the Japanese, who are convinced that America is out to smash Japan and wants Britain to help her do it, but that Britain is opposed to anything of the kind although she may be forced to join America willy nilly.

Saturday 6th February 1932
Told the (British Ambassador) about our interview with Osumi, including his remarks about the report of Britain's intention to take drastic action if Japan sent land forces to Shanghai. (The Ambassador) was much interested but said the report was quite unfounded. He seemed to think that the informant was probably Majoni, the Italian Ambassador.

Sunday 7th February 1932
The Japanese Consul-General at Vladivostok reports wholesale arrests of White Russians, large numbers of whom are being deported as the prisons are full to overflowing. The despatch says that the movement of troops and transportation of munitions are much in evidence "imparting a wartime atmosphere", but the Consul-General is apparently satisfied that these activities are purely a precautionary measure against the White Russians, and that there is no question of massing troops against the Japanese.

Monday 8th February 1932
Heard that Forbes, the U.S. Ambassador, got very worked up when he went with Sir Francis (British Ambassador) and Martel (French Ambassador) to see Yoshizawa at the F.O. the other day. He practically called Yoshizawa a liar and started thumping on the table.

Tuesday 9th February 1932
Iwanaga tells me General Sugiyama sent for him and 4 or 5 other leading Press men and gave them a confidential explanation of the Army's attitude towards Shanghai. One interesting point emphasised by Sugiyama was that the Army has no intention of going further afield than 20 miles or so at the most, and that they are anxious to withdraw from Shanghai as soon as possible on account of the expense involved and because any money available is wanted for Manchuria.

Just finished dinner at the house in the evening when Rengo rang me up on the 'phone to say that Inoue had just been assassinated.
Iwanaga is very upset about (the assassination) and told me confidentially that he felt particularly worried because Inoue, who was a great pal of his, upbraided him once -and the Japanese Press in general - for failing to reveal all the facts about military action in Manchuria and to try to and put a check on the Army - from which one may infer that Inoue did not see entirely eye to eye with the Army!

Wednesday 10th February 1932
Babb tells me he had a talk with Col. Furiyo on the general situation. He admitted to Babb that they can't send as many reinforcements as they wanted to send, as they do not have the money to spare. (News blackout on reinforcements to make Chinese think forces are larger than they really are).

Thursday 11th February 1932
Iwanaga had me along to the Club to lunch with him and Matsuoka, who is leaving for Shanghai in a day or two as the personal representative of the Premier and Mr. Yoshizawa, in order to effect better liaison with the British, Americans, etc. Matsuoka himself seems to be of the opinion that Japan must choose one of two alternatives in regard to her China policy - either co-operation with Britain and America, or else with the Soviet. She can't afford to try acting on her own.

Sunday 14th February 1932
Had a talk with (the British Ambassador) outside Church. He seems very worried lest the Japanese meet with a setback at Shanghai, as the results would be serious for everyone, the Chinese becoming more arrogant and impossible than ever. I am quite convinced that he is right, and it is a pity that our "bloodthirsty pacifists" in England fail to recognise that side of the question. (The ambassador) is very critical of Lampson, as he considers his attempts to dissuade the Chinese were very halfhearted. Verily is your ultra-pacifist a greater danger to world peace at the present time than your much-abused "militarist"!

Monday 15th February 1932
Had an interesting talk with Babb on the subject of Col. Doihara. According to Babb, however, the real "brains" behind Doihara is Col. Itagaki. Subsequently, talking with Iwanaga on the
same subject, Iwanaga maintained that Lt.Col. Ishihara is the real moving spirit behind the scenes. Be that as it may, it is Doihara who figures most prominently in the news and generally seems to appear in the role of a stormy petrel!

Tuesday 16th February 1932

Increasing anxiety is being felt lest the troops sent to Shanghai prove insufficient. The F.O. is clearly worried, as the Japanese appear to be between the devil and the deep sea. On the one hand they recognise the serious consequences if the Japanese troops meet with a reverse through insufficiency of numbers; on the other, they are anxious to avoid the despatch of further reinforcements on account of the expense and of the liability to increase misapprehensions abroad.

Wednesday 17th February 1932

Following Shigemitsu's intimation that hope has been abandoned of persuading the Chinese to withdraw voluntarily, the Govt. - so Shiratori says - has authorised the presentation of an ultimatum warning the Commander of the 19th Army that the Japanese will be compelled to use force if he fails to withdraw 20 kilometres N.W. of the International Settlement within a specified time. Shiratori was in one of his most sarcastic moods this morning and, after mentioning that Debuchi had advised the F.O. that Stimson was preparing a fresh protest against the landing of Japanese troops in the Settlement at Shanghai, he remarked: "If Stimson considers that Japan has no right to send troops to Shanghai to protect her own nationals, how can he tolerate the presence of American troops there!"

Thursday 18th February 1932

(The British Ambassador) emphasised that it is the small Powers that are urging strong measures against Japan and that Britain and the other big Powers in the League are doing everything possible to prevent the application of further pressure. As an example, he mentioned that he gave a very straight talk the other day to the Cuban Minister in Tokyo. The Cuban Minister, it seems, had been trying to urge on him that the League ought to "put Japan in her proper place". When (the ambassador) pointed out that this would mean that it would be Britain's Army and Navy and Britain's money and so on that would have to do the main work, the Cuban replied: "Oh yes! But you would have the moral support of Cuba and all the small powers."! That was too much for (the ambassador) altogether, and he proceeded to say exactly what he thought! News came in after lunch that the much-discussed independence of Manchuria has now been proclaimed. (The British Ambassador), when I saw him in the morning, had expressed the hope that no such move would take place. Autonomy, he said, would probably pass muster all right, but not independence, as it would run counter to the pledges to preserve the integrity of China, and moreover, would bring about all kinds of international complications.

Friday 19th February 1932

According to Press reports, Araki today warned the Cabinet that the situation at Shanghai is threatening to assume more serious proportions, as large numbers of troops under Chiang Kai-shek are proceeding to Shanghai to reinforce the 19th Army. The Cabinet is reported to
have agreed to do its utmost to prevent the situation from developing in such a way as to necessitate the declaration of war. Indications are that the Cabinet decided to seek Imperial sanction for the despatch of reinforcements.

(The British Ambassdor) has written a letter to the "Japan Times" and has asked me to send it in for him under a pseudonym, as he does not want them to know that it came from him. It is a reply to a "leader" they published yesterday, in which they blamed Britain and America for bringing pressure to bear on Japan and accused them of hypocrisy.

Saturday 20th February 1932

Shiratori appears more optimistic today. Chiang, he thinks, may pretend to assist the 19th Army, but in reality is unlikely to participate actively, as he would like nothing better than to see them annihilated owing to their being Cantonese!

Iwanaga confirmed the report that the "Asahi" circulation dropped heavily on account of the Zaigo Gunjinkai [Army Reservists' Association] circulating its members to boycott the paper because of certain criticisms contained in it about military action in Manchuria. According to Iwanaga, the prime mover in this boycott was General Terauchi, and the circulation dropped by over 200,000 or roughly 10%.

Sunday 21st February 1932

Election results coming in all day, and looks as though the Seiyukai will have a sweeping victory.

Monday 22nd February 1932

Makino has gone off to Okitsu to see Saionji - which appears to indicate the grave anxiety in official circles, where there are, apparently, conflicting opinions on the question of despatching reinforcements. Whether reinforcements are sent or not, the Army, according to Shiratori, expects to drive back the 19th Army to the 20 kilometres line within a week or 10 days.

A lot of talk about America and/or the League imposing an economic blockade on Japan. Little short of criminal folly if they do, as the cure would be a thousand times worse than the disease. As this does not seem to be properly appreciated abroad, I have cabled strongly on this to London.

Recent articles in Japanese papers and magazines leave little room for doubt that Japan would take up the challenge to her national existence by occupying strategic points on the mainland, in order to secure sources of supply, while the Navy would ensure the safety of maritime communications in Far Eastern waters. The only alternatives, in fact, would be surrender - which is inconceivable - or to stake everything in a vast gamble in which, even if she finally lost, Japan would make the world pay dearly before she gave in. Much, of course, would depend on the attitude of the Soviet.

The Seiyukai victory appears to have taken everyone by surprise in so far as its huge majority is concerned. While, however, this bids fair to stabilise the political situation at least temporarily, it is doubtful if it reflects as much confidence in the present Govt. as it appears to do. Apart from the undoubted tampering that there has been with the electorate, the two main
factors in bringing such a sweeping victory appear to be the psychological effect of the Seiyukai slogan "Depression or Boom", and the feeling that, at a time of national crisis as at present, patriotism demands support for the Govt. irrespective of its political complexion. Both these factors are likely to prove somewhat ephemeral.

Had a long talk with Iwanaga, who seems rather worried about the question of Manchurian Independence. Even in Army circles, he says, there is a certain amount of conflict of opinion regarding the advisability of such a development, whilst business circles, though fully supporting the Army in Manchuria up to a point, never intended to advocate the establishment of independence, Autonomy, yes; but not independence, as all they wanted was that the Army should teach the Chinese not to disregard their treaty obligations or hamper legitimate business in any way. Saionji, Inukai, and Yoshizawa, he says, take this same view, although Matsuoka has always favoured independence.

Pu Yi, apparently, is trying to insist on a crown and is supported in this by Hsi Hsia, whereas Yuan Chin-kai, Tang etc. are absolutely opposed to the idea. Iwanaga seems to be afraid that Col. Itagaki may have committed himself to having Pu Yi crowned, just in order to induce him to accept the post - in which case, further complications will arise!

Regarding the Shanghai situation, Iwanaga interprets Suetsugu's remarks as a reflection of the friction between the Army and Navy, as the Army formerly criticised the Navy for starting the show at Shanghai with too small a force, so now it is the Navy's turn to have a dig at the Army for sending too few reinforcements!

Tuesday 23rd February 1932

Rung up at 1 a.m. with the news that the military authorities have decided to seek Cabinet approval for the despatch of reinforcements immediately in order to prevent the situation becoming aggravated and to complete operations as soon as possible, as Chiang's troops have reinforced the 19th Army. Subsequently, about 3 p.m., it was learned that the Cabinet had sanctioned the despatch of reinforcements.

As an indication that the Seiyukai's great victory does not necessarily imply a stabilisation of the political situation, Shiratori mentioned that Mori Kaku, the present Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, speaking last night at a public meeting urged that the Minseito and the Seiyukai should bury their differences for the time being in order to pull through the serious crisis facing the nation. This, of course, is practically a repetition of Adachi’s advocacy of coalition - an advocacy which precipitated the Cabinet crisis in December.

Although Col. Simson returned from Shanghai is sympathetic with the Japanese in their methods of dealing with the Chinese, he says their reputation has been badly damaged by the activities of the "ronin" volunteers. Having, however, had experience himself in Ireland during the Sinn Fein troubles, he fully recognises that the alleged summary executions etc. of Chinese civilians are unavoidable, as it is difficult to distinguish between peaceful inhabitants and plain-clothed soldiers - and when men are fighting for their lives in narrow tortuous streets, they cannot afford to take risks.

Wednesday 24th February 1932
According to Press reports, Takahashi is likely to resign before the special session of the Diet in April. It is rumoured to be due to his being opposed to sanctioning expenditure on Shanghai.

Saturday 27th
The F.O. has received a despatch from Hirota at Moscow, setting forth a number of queries put to him by Karakhan. These include an accusation that Japan is assisting the White Russians in Manchuria to plot against the Soviet, an accusation which the F.O. flatly denies. Shiratori, in fact, maintains that the Japanese military authorities complain of the White Movement being a nuisance and an embarrassment. To Karakhan's request for an explanation as to why General Tamon has asked the Chinese Eastern Railway to supply him with 17 trains of 50 carriages each to transport troops to Imienpo and Pogranichnaya, both the F.O. and the W.O. profess to be ignorant of the request and express doubt that any such request has been made, as there is no intention of sending troops beyond Imienpo or, at most, Hailin, and only a limited number are to be sent even so.

Hear from Shiratori that, although the general purport of the requests made by the four ambassadors yesterday was virtually the same, the American Ambassador omitted the expression of appreciation for the Japanese efforts to confine the fighting to outside the Settlement, and moreover, requested that all Japanese warships be withdrawn from the vicinity of the waterfront whereas the British and French requested that, if this was impossible, the Japanese should at least move the flagship "Izumo", as it is apparently drawing most of the Chinese shelling.

Monday 29th February 1932
According to a Japanese consular report from Vladivostok, approximately two army corps of Soviet troops have been concentrated around Vladivostok and about 100,000 troops in all in the Ussuri District, large numbers having arrived from European Russia since December. Work on fortifications, transportation of food and munitions, and other similar activities are also reported, and the consul asserts that local Russians consider a clash with Japan inevitable sooner or later over either the Manchurian or the fishery question. My own opinion is that the Soviet are far too anxious to complete their 5-year plan to engage in war with Japan or with anyone else at the moment, and that these alleged preparations are purely defensive. Meantime Moscow has sanctioned the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway for Tamon's troops.

Regarding Karakhan's recent accusation that Japanese troops are concentrating on the Korean-Soviet border, it is now declared that the allegation is unfounded, although Shiratori admits that it may be necessary to despatch troops to the Chientao area to quell disturbances which are endangering Japanese lives and property.

Saturday 5th March 1932
On returning from the F.O. in the morning, was received with the news that Dan Takuma had just been assassinated, shot by a young reactionary in front of the Mitsui Headquarters as he was getting out of his car. The police examination has revealed that Dan's assassin is a
personal friend of Inoue's assassin and that the two murders are apparently connected in some way. It is significant, therefore, that Saionji should have arrived in Tokyo today; for, although his visit has nothing to do with this latest tragedy, it is generally believed that he has come up here to discuss the present crisis at home and abroad and to consider how best to deal with it. It is particularly unfortunate that this (assassination) should occur just while the League Commission is here, as it will make a very bad impression on Lytton and the others. As it so happens, Dan was one of the principal hosts to the Commission yesterday at a meeting of leading industrialists and businessmen.

Incidentally, the Chinese at Hong Kong, Singapore, and even at Shanghai itself have been receiving reports of great Chinese victories over the Japanese and have been holding great celebrations accordingly! A wonderful people, the Chinks!

Monday 7th March 1932
The speeches by representatives of some of the small Powers at the League Assembly are causing considerable irritation and tending to revive criticism of the League. It must be very galling to have Guatemala, Panama, San Salvador, and the like mouthing platitudes and demanding stern measures against (Japan)!

Tuesday 8th March 1932
Lunched with Walton who tells me it is now being rumoured that Dan's assassination was engineered by the Army in retaliation for his refusal to assist in raising a loan to cover the cost of operations at Shanghai. However, there are so many wild rumours in circulation that one cannot put much faith in any of them, though it certainly looks as though there were some influential wirepullers behind the scenes. It is significant, for example, that Ono, the Chief of Police, is reported by the "Mainichi" to be threatening to resign, because "wholly uncontrollable factors have made and are making it impossible for the police to carry the investigation further." To anyone knowing the workings of the Black Dragon and other kindred organisations, the inference is obvious.

Wednesday 9th March 1932
I should have thought the higher officials at the Zaigogunjinkai [Army Reservists' Association] Headquarters could have put a stop to the agitation against Dr. Nitobe, but apparently they can't, as the organisation is technically a civilian body, so the higher officers have no definite authority over even the most junior reservists in so far as the organisation itself is concerned. The prime-movers of the reactionary movement amongst the reservists are apparently Yobisho-shii, who, after completing their service with the Colours, are apt to blossom forth as local "bosses" in the rural communities and lord it over their fellows. They are apt to develop a somewhat narrow form of nationalism and, in times like the present, they are inclined to take the lead in denouncing the big capitalists and land-owners and the political parties for being responsible for the serious economic distress in the rural districts. The more senior officers on the reserve take little part in such movements, but, having been brought up in the Army to despise both wealth and politics, they have a great deal of sympathy with the movement.
The "Japan Times" came out this afternoon with a full-page advertisement by the Shinuso, denouncing Shidehara, Yoshizawa and even Inukai for weak-kneed policy towards foreign countries and warning America not to irritate Japan further. As the Shinuso is constantly bursting forth in this way, I asked Iwanaga as to what exactly it is and where does it get its money. From what he tells me it appears to be an organisation of the more reactionary elements in the Seiyukai, the money being provided by Kuhara, who has never forgiven Inukai for failing to recompense him for bringing about the fall of the Wakatsuki Cabinet in December - hence the denunciation of both Inukai and his son-in-law Yoshizawa!

Friday 11th March 1932

Further developments in the plot which led to Inoue's and Dan's assassinations. Furuichi, another of the five who signed the death-pact was arrested shortly before dawn. This was followed by the voluntary surrender of a priest named Inoue Nissho, whom the police believe to be one of the wirepullers. Nissho, it was reported, had previously been traced to his hiding place, but as this was the house of "a certain influential personage", the police had been unable to force an entry. This personage is generally believed to be Toyama Mitsuru, or else Uchida Ryohei. If so, it simply goes to confirm the extraordinary influence that these two, more especially Toyama, are able to exert in that they are able to defy the police in the execution of their duties. The main instigator of the two assassinations is said to be Suzuki Zenichi, Secretary-General of the now defunct Dai Nippon Kokuminto. Suzuki is said to have incited the youths to sign the blood-pact with the object of bringing about a reformation of the country by the removal of "the corrupt political parties and their capitalist allies."

Saturday 12th March 1932

Indications that the new Manchurian State is not by any means firmly established are contained in reports of an uprising at Heiho, where apparently some of Wan Fu-lin's men have refused to acknowledge the new Government. (Iwanaga) seems to think that either Araki, Hiranuma or Kuratomi will be invited to head the proposed National Govt., though it seems that Araki has lost much of his popularity with the Army by his conciliatory attitude since assuming the post of War Minister. Ugaki, of course, is said to have lost his influence with the Army in much the same way. As I had a cable from London today asking if the Japanese recognised "the gravity of foreign criticism", I asked Iwanaga what he thought about it and was glad to hear that his opinion coincided with what I expressed in my reply to London. The trouble, as he put it, is that so much of the criticism levelled at Japan - especially in the early stages - has been of an uninformed nature and dictated more by the heart than by the head, that the Japanese no longer trouble to take proper heed of such bits of sound, constructive criticism as may be interspersed with it. He thinks, however, that the visit of the League Commission has done some good, as Lord Lytton made a very favourable impression by his calm, dignified bearing and by his open-minded, impartial attitude.
Heard that Admiral Otani, whose brother is private secretary to Pu Yi, has recently become President of the Zaigo Gunjinkai [Army Reservists' Association], and that he is reputed to be exerting a moderating influence.

Wednesday 16th March 1932

Contrary to expectation, Inukai has taken over the portfolio of Home Affairs himself and no other changes have been made in the composition of the Cabinet. Apparently this change in the former decision was made at the very last minute as a result of Kuhara warning Inukai that an open split in the Seiyukai ranks would be precipitated if Suzuki was made Home Minister. This seems to bear out what Iwanaga told me the other day about the internal dissension in the Seiyukai. Tokonami and Suzuki, of course, have long been at logger-heads, and apparently Kuhara is with Tokonami in this respect. The end of the present Ministry appears in sight.

Latest developments in the murder plot are that Goh, Wakatsuki, and Tokonami were all marked out for assassination.

Thursday 17th March 1932

While Moscow has to some extent recognised the new Manchurian regime by agreeing to accept its nominees for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the new Govt. does not yet appear very firmly seated in the saddle, as disturbances have occurred at Manchuli, Payen, Petuna?, and elsewhere in addition to the trouble at Heiho last week. Minor outbreaks, of course, are more or less inevitable at the outset, but a more serious feature is the friction that is already reported to have broken out between Ma Chan-shan, Tsang Shi-yi, and Hsi Hsia. Unless these leaders in the new Govt. can compose their differences and work together in harmony, the future is by no means reassuring.

Friday 18th March 1932

The Diet Session opened this morning, and Saionji returned to his villa at Okitsu after just on two weeks in Tokyo conferring with the leading figures on the political stage. Whether he has succeeded in arranging for a National Govt. to replace the present Ministry remains to be seen.

Tuesday 22nd March 1932

Looks now as though Inukai is determined to carry out his original intention of making Suzuki Home Minister as soon as the Diet Session is over, though whether this will precipitate the downfall of the Cabinet or not remains to be seen. Baron Hiranuma is being widely mentioned as the most likely candidate for the Premiership if a national cabinet is formed, and Suzuki is very close in with him, so it seems likely that Suzuki will be made Home Minister in any case. Hiranuma appears to be something of a dark horse, although, like Suzuki, he is a bit of a reactionary and is President of the Kokuhonsha, a reactionary organisation connected, apparently, with the Zaigo Gunjinkai to some extent. He is said, too, to have close connections with the Army.

Thursday 24th March 1932
Fleisher tells me he had a long talk with Shiratori this morning about the fascist movement in Japan, and that according to Shiratori the real leader of the movement is Baron Hiranuma.

Friday 25th March 1932
Griffith looked in to say goodbye, as he is returning to Kobe. Tells me a Japanese friend of his in the porcelain business told him his firm recently received orders for equipping a new chemical munition factory on which work is being rushed, although it will take from 6 to 9 months to complete. Apparently the order was placed a month or so ago, as the authorities were getting worried at the possibility of war with America and wanted to make sure of "gas" and other similar "pleasantries" in sufficient quantities!

Cabinet reorganised with Suzuki as Home Minister.

Saturday 26th March 1932
Learned confidentially from Shiratori that the Cabinet yesterday decided to withdraw from the League if the League Assembly insists on applying Article XV to Manchuria. Seems that the decision was reached as a result of Drummond having informed Sato a few days ago that the Assembly intends to do so.

According to Iwanaga, Hiranuma exercises immense influence in the Ministry of Justice as a result of his former connections with it, and a large proportion of judges and other officials and ex-officials of that Ministry are members of the Kokuhonsha, the reactionary organisation of which he is President. A number of Toyama’s disciples are also members of that body, and Suzuki, the new Home Minister, is one of Hiranuma’s principal lieutenants in it, according to Iwanaga.

Thursday 31st March 1932
Looked up old Zumoto in morning and had a long talk with him on the present situation in Japan. He seems to think that the present Govt. will stay in longer than most people believe and considers anything in the nature of a fascist coup most unlikely. One interesting thing he told me was that, as far back as the summer of 1930, a certain influential but unnamed Japanese fascist approached General Ugaki, who was then War Minister, to ask if he could ensure that, if at any time there was anything in the nature of a fascist coup, the Army would refrain from firing at the fascist demonstrators. By "fascist", however, I gather he really meant "reactionary".

On my asking him about the Shinuso he said that, although Kuhara is supposed to be its principal financial backer, this does not necessarily mean that Kuhara himself is a very ardent supporter. The prime mover, in fact, is a Seiyukai man named Nagashima (Ryuzo), a son-in-law of the late Prince Katsura.

According to Zumoto, it was the Shinuso’s violent attack on Inoue, whom they denounced in a manifesto as a traitor, that was largely responsible for inciting Konuma to assassinate him.

Saturday 9th April 1932
Had a long pow-wow with Chancellor about my position out here. In reply to my criticisms of the sensation-mongering which Reuter seems so anxious to encourage now, he admitted that several of the older Reuter correspondents in different parts of the World have made similar
complaints and some have even resigned, but that Rickatson-Hatt, the new Chief Editor, considers it necessary to compete with the U.P. and others in this "Americanisation of the Press" or else go under financially, as it is what the "popular" papers demand and they are Reuters' best customers. He was very sympathetic with my view-point and admitted that even Sir Roderick [Jones] himself was very upset at having to change the old Reuter policy.

Wednesday 13th April 1932
Thirteen officers and men killed and about 50 injured last night at a point some 12 miles east of Harbin, when a Japanese troop train was blown up.

Monday 18th 1932
Met young Nitobe on way to office and had an interesting talk with him on developments in Northern Manchuria. According to him, one section of army opinion advocates bringing matters to a head with the Soviet now in connection with the Manchurian situation, as they consider war with the Soviet inevitable sooner or later and that, therefore, it is as well to bring it about now before the Soviet completes its economic and industrial reorganisation and becomes stronger. While there are said to be indications of Soviet complicity in the recent dynamiting of the Japanese troop train, the Soviets action in requesting the Manchukuo to replace the Chinese Consul at Blagoveshchensk for despatching coded messages on behalf of Ma Chan-shan has created a favourable impression in Japan, as it helps, inter alia, to dispel reports that Ma had fled to Soviet territory for protection and, at the same time, prevents further broad-casting of anti-Japanese propaganda to the League Commission. Ma, it seems, has been double-crossing the Manchukuo, and is reported to have bolted with 3,000,000 yuan and to have communicated by radio to the League Commission to the effect that he joined the Manchukuo Govt. for the sole purpose of learning its secrets and its connections with the Japanese.

Tuesday 19th 1932
The fact that General Tamon is leaving Harbin tomorrow with the 2nd Division for Liaoyang would appear to indicate that the military authorities, too, are satisfied that there is little danger of a clash with the Soviet at the moment. On the other hand, the situation in N. Manchuria in regard to banditry and insurgency seems to be getting decidedly worse, and outbreaks are reported in various districts.

Shiratori threw some light on Japan's increasing hostility towards the Committee of 19 at Geneva, as it seems Sato was very much humiliated by being made to sit at the bottom of the table, when he attended the Committee meeting instead of being given his customary place as a member of the League Council. Such treatment is considered as an intentional slight to Japan and very derogatory to her prestige.

Wednesday 20th April 1932
Had an interesting talk with Alsot, who has been obtaining statements from various reactionary organisations and their leaders as to their views. If they can be taken at their face value, the indication seems to be that an immediate change is not contemplated, but that some kind of "National Cabinet" is likely to be formed within the next six months and will be
followed eventually - probably some time next year - by a nationalist "Revolution", which will strengthen the power of the Emperor and bring him nearer to the people - whatever that may mean! It all seems a bit nebulous as yet, but the part to be played by the prospective "National Govt." and moderate reactionaries of the Hiranuma type seems to be rather akin to that played by the Mensheviks and Kerensky in paving the way for the Bolsheviks!

Alsot tells me that Don Gata, the Hitlerite press man, pays daily visits to Uchida Ryohei - an interesting sidelight on the whole reactionary situation.

The War Office this evening issued a statement emphasising the desirability of friendly relations with the Soviet and flatly denying any aggressive intentions towards the Soviet.

Thursday 21st April 1932

Looked in to the Consulate in morning to see Butler, who asked me about a reactionary named Sawada, who is said to have been the man who revealed the October plot to Makino, as, despite his reactionary leanings, he was opposed to violence.

Nagi tells me the new Soviet Military Attaché has just come from Kabul, where he has been stationed some time in a similar capacity - and where, no doubt, he has kept pretty good tab on India!

Friday 22nd April 1932

The papers give great prominence to a speech made by General Araki yesterday at Osaka at a meeting organised by the Kokuhonsha. In effect he warned both Moscow and Geneva to keep off Manchuria.

Saturday 23rd April 1932

Abrikosov asked General Pabst the other day why it was that the Dutch Foreign Minister, who was formerly Minister to Peking and is well-acquainted with the real conditions in China, avoided all reference to the true state of China and, instead, spoke of China as though it were everything that a country should be. Pabst replied that this was quite natural, as he had to consider his own countrymen's interests and these interests were profiting greatly in China at the moment at the expense of Japan. If, however, he revealed, at Geneva, the true state of things in China, the Chinese would very likely retaliate by making things uncomfortable for Dutch traders in China!

Wednesday 27th April 1932

Large scale operations against the insurgents in N. Manchuria by Japanese troops have been started.

Thursday 28th April 1932

According to Manchukuo's findings, the recent acts of terrorism on the Chinese Eastern Railway are due to communists under Soviet orders. Fortunately, however, Japanese officdom seems anxious to avoid being hustled into a clash with the Soviet and, according to Shiratori, even if Japan's own investigations into the recent dynamiting of the Japanese troop train prove communistic complicity, it is unlikely to strain Japan's relations with the Soviet, as the outrage is believed to have been merely the act of individuals and not the result of a plot instigated by Moscow. From what I hear, it looks very much as though certain civilian
elements of the Ronin type are doing their best to bring about a clash with the Soviet, but that both the Govt. and the Army are determined not to be hustled, as they realise that it was largely due to similar elements that they were forced into untimely action at Shanghai. In digging around for data for an article on Toyama Mitsuru, I came across the interesting fact that Nakano Seigo, who resigned from the Minseito at the same time as Adachi and who is now looking for a chance to organise some sort of nationalist party of his own, was formerly one of the organisers of the Genyosha, the parent body of all the present reactionary organisations, along with Toyama and Uchida Ryohei. It explains a lot!

Friday 29th April 1932
Rung up by Rengo just after finishing lunch with the news that, during the Emperor's birthday celebrations at Shanghai while the Kimi-ga-yo [Japanese National Anthem] was being played, a Korean hurled a bomb, which landed and burst between Shigemitsu and Shirakawa, both of whom were severely injured together with Generals Ueda, Murai, the Consul-General, Admiral Nomura, and Kawabata, President of the Japanese Residents' Association. Ye gods, what a "bag". The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Admiral commanding the naval forces, the Minister, the Consul-General, and the Divisional Commander, as well as the principal, non-official member of the Japanese community. Several Chinese, it is true, have been arrested as suspects; but so, too, have some Russians - from all of which it looks rather as though it were the work of communist elements, working in with the Korean Independence bunch, which have their so-called Provisional Govt. Headquarters at Shanghai.

Saturday 30th April 1932
Yesterday's bombing has caused an immense sensation abroad and has aroused great anxiety lest it lead to further bitterness between Japan and China and postpone indefinitely the conclusion of the truce agreement just as it was about to be signed. The Japanese Govt., however, is taking a very broad-minded and wise view of the whole affair. Not only has it decided to treat the truce negotiations and the bombing incident as entirely separate questions, but it has also decided to expedite the signing of the truce agreement. Hear there is a ban on all mention of yesterday's bomb-thrower, Hokichi In, being leader of the Korean Independence movement and, allegedly, connected with the Sun Fo clique through a so-called Sino-Korean alliance.

Tuesday 3rd May 1932
Rumoured that Doihara, who is being transferred to a post in Japan after some 20 years on "Special Service" work in Manchuria, has been recalled because he failed to ensure Ma Chan-shan's loyalty to the Manchukuo and failed, also, to win over Ting Chao to the Manchukuo fold. This may, of course, have something to do with it; but the main reason seems to be that, as he has just been promoted Major-General, he is now too senior to continue in his former capacity.

Thursday 5th May 1932
Shanghai truce agreement finally signed.

Friday 6th May 1932
One interesting sidelight which Davies has been able to give is that Hirota, the present Ambassador to Moscow, was assisted in his early education by the Genyosha.

Tuesday 10th May 1932
Ban removed on news of transfer of 14th Division from Shanghai to Manchuria and official announcement made of the reasons for sending it to Manchuria, i.e. the need of reinforcements owing to extension of area of operations and to increasing activity of bandits and insurgents, who are able to conceal their movements better now that the Kiaoliang is springing up. This gives Japan four whole Divisions in Manchuria plus Yoda's 38th Brigade and Mori's independent garrison battalions, together with 2 or 3 stray battalions from Korea in the Chientao area - a total strength, I reckon, of fully 40,000.

Thursday 12th May 1932
Had a talk with Shiratori about the present political situation here in Japan. He seems to think it quite possible that the Cabinet may quit after the coming Diet session and that Hiranuma & Co. may then step in. If they do so, he thinks that either Nagai (who has just been succeeded by Arita as Vice-Minister) or Yoshida, the present Ambassador to Rome, may become Foreign Minister - an interesting forecast if well-founded, as it would seem to indicate that, even if Hiranuma does come into power, no great change need be expected in Japan's foreign policy. Honda, who has generally been regarded as the most likely candidate for the post, is considered too reactionary even by Hiranuma's supporters and is strongly opposed by all F.O. officials on account of his speeches and writings, according to Shiratori. Shiratori himself seems to favour Matsudaira, but thinks he would decline to serve under Hiranuma. In view of Hirota's former connection with the Genyosha, I took occasion to question Shiratori about that body, and to ask if Hirota was a possible candidate. He thought not, though he said Hirota has been regarded by some as a possible future Premier. He added that, so far as he is aware, Hirota has no longer any connection with the Genyosha and that, to all intents and purposes, the Genyosha is now extinct and will die out completely as soon as Toyama and Sugiyama are dead.

Sunday 15th May 1932
Was greeted with the news that a series of outrages had been carried out about 5.30, bombs being thrown at Count Makino's house, at the Police Headquarters, and at the Seiyukai Headquarters; and just as I was speaking on the phone came the news that the Premier had been shot and seriously wounded. Soon after getting to the office, reports of two other bomb outrages came in, bombs being hurled at the Bank of Japan and at the Mitsubishi Bank, although, as both were closed on account of its being a Sunday, these incidents would seem to be more in the nature of a demonstration than of anything else - in fact, except for the attack on Inukai, the whole affair seems to have been mainly a form of demonstration. The attack on Inukai, however, was a bad show altogether, four policemen, a maid servant, and a visitor all being wounded by the party of military cadets who broke into his residence, one of the police fatally. Shortly before midnight came the news that Inukai himself had succumbed to his wounds. All these outrages were carried out by men in uniform and, on completion they
all motored off to the Gendarmerie Headquarters and voluntarily surrendered themselves, in much the same way as the bunch of reactionaries who slaughtered the lawyers at Okayama four years ago - a typical example, in fact, of the 47 Ronin cult, which condones the most cowardly outrages, provided sincerity of motive is shown by self-immolation or voluntary surrender for execution. Eighteen in all surrendered themselves, 13 of them being military cadets and the other 5 young naval subs.

In addition to all this, a number of attempts were made to damage electric transformer stations, apparently with the object of adding to the confusion, though this part of the business appears to have been done by young farmers and only minor damage suffered. The fact that young officers and farmers should co-operate in this way, however, is significant.

Monday 16th May 1932

The Cabinet tendered its resignation en bloc, but the Emperor commanded it to continue in office till a new one had been appointed. Prince Saionji has been summoned to Tokyo to advise the Throne on the question of a successor, and the Seiyukai are hopeful that the choice will fall on them once more. A coalition or super-party Govt., however, appears more likely, as there can be little doubt that half the trouble is that the country has lost its faith and confidence in party Govt., as the party politicians are simply out for themselves and their party interests.

Tuesday 17th May 1932

Tokonami having agreed to waive his claims to the presidency of the Seiyukai, Dr. Suzuki Kisaburo has been chosen president in succession to Inukai. Following this decision, which became known early this morning, the belief spread that Suzuki would be recommended by the Genro to succeed Inukai also as premier, but the army has now made it quite clear that it insists on the formation of a national Government which, it considers, is essential for bringing the situation under control. It therefore refuses to support a purely party Cabinet - which means that no War Minister will be forthcoming, as the constitution requires a General Officer for that post and the army will see to it that no such officer will enter the new Government, unless it is a super-party Ministry. The prospects of Baron Hiranuma becoming Premier are, therefore, greatly increased though from what I hear I gather that Hiranuma and the Kokuhonsha group are rather embarrassed by the events of Sunday as: (1) the violent methods adopted for the overthrow of the Inukai Cabinet are likely to hinder rather than help the cause of the nationalist movement, which the Kokuhonsha has been doing so much to foster, and (2), although Hiranuma and his friends had hoped to replace the Inukai Ministry, they had anticipated several more months in which to complete their preparations and had counted on effecting it by constitutional means.

Following rigorous examination of the priest, Nissho, who was arrested on 11th March in connection with the murders of Inoue and Dan, it is reported that he has admitted that all the eighteen assailants who surrendered on Sunday were connected with the Blood Brotherhood. Gondo, the scholar of ancient Japanese classics, is also figuring once more, and a certain Tachibana Kosaburo, a farmer of Ibaragi-ken who conducts a small private school at which he
expounds similar doctrines as Nissho and Gondo (i.e. ultra-patriotic and of the "47 Ronin cult" persuasion), has also come into the picture, as the arrest of some of those who attacked the power stations on Sunday has revealed that they were peasant disciples of his. Tachibana, it seems, conducts farming on a collective basis and advocates the fair distribution of land among the tillers of the soil. He is said to have a small but devoted following. He has disappeared, however, and is believed to have escaped to Manchuria, where he is now being sought. While there is no reason to believe that either the Army or the general public approves the methods of the youthful terrorists, it is noteworthy that the leading papers - as well as a number of leading personalities in Japan - are expressing sympathy with their motives and are recalling that similar acts of terrorism occurred in Tokugawa times when corruption was rife.

It seems that the Kokuhonsha group, sympathising with the motives but recognising the dangers of the more extreme teachings, are trying to put on the brake and encourage a more moderate form of nationalism. The extremists, on the other hand, seem to be hoping that Hiranuma and his Kokuhonsha will serve as a stepping-stone to the revolution. In view of the fact that the farmers are the most radical elements in certain respects, and that the Army - both officers and men - are largely recruited from the rural districts, it is by no means lacking in significance that Sunday's manifesto was signed "Kairikugun Seinen Shoko Nomin Doshi" ["Junior Army & Navy Officers and Farmer Comrades"]. I still think, however, that the Army as a whole is not prepared to risk a revolution and will, if necessary, step in and take control of the situation if ever it looks like developing too fast or too far. Possibly the terrorists on Sunday wanted the Army to step in. Certainly the abortive plot in October seems to have had some such idea in mind; though in that case their plans appear to have been upset by Araki, whom they apparently expected to fall in with their ideas. There was a report that a group of young officers had visited Araki's house on Sunday night with a view to assassinate him; but according to Shiratori the purpose of their visit was to urge him to take over the Premiership. Araki was out at the time, but General Mazaki spoke to them and dissuaded them.

Wednesday 18th May 1932

The Army's sympathy towards the farmers and small merchant class, and the conviction that the alleviation of economic distress in the rural districts is essential, seems likely to play an important part in deciding on the new Cabinet. According to Shiratori, the Army has not yet definitely refused to participate in a party Cabinet, but is strongly urging the formation of a national govt. The Army, he says, is ready to recommend a War Minister in a Seiyukai Cabinet headed by Suzuki, provided the Govt. pledges itself to support the Army's economic programme, which is said to include a change in the taxation system aiming at the relief of the farming population and the application of a moratorium on debts contracted by farmers and small retailers - debts estimated at ?5,000,000,000 or more at the present time.

Thursday 19th May 1932

It was widely reported this morning that Suzuki and Araki, on behalf of the Seiyukai and Army respectively, had reached an understanding regarding the nature of the new Cabinet, while
Saionji, who arrived in Tokyo this afternoon, was said to have agreed to give full consideration to the Army's opinion. Consequently it was expected that Suzuki would form a Cabinet tomorrow based on the Seiyukai but containing a proportion of non-party members, including Prince Konoe. It came as rather a surprise, therefore, when Shiratori, at our interview with him at the F.O. this afternoon, asserted that the reported understanding was premature, as the Army is insisting on a drastic purging of party evils and the relief of small merchants whereas Suzuki is unable to commit himself to promise such far-reaching reforms immediately. The point at issue thus appears to be one primarily of domestic concern but of fundamental importance. The army being traditionally scornful of wealth, and both officers and men being largely recruited from the rural districts, are naturally sympathetic towards the poverty stricken farmers, who are bled by taxation for the purpose of assisting the big industrial and commercial interests. The army consequently recognises that the removal of abuses connected with the Japanese party system and the betterment of the condition of the agricultural communities are essential if worse developments are to be avoided whereas the politicians are unable to pledge too far, as their power is largely dependent on the party spoil system, which is closely allied to the big business interests.

Friday 20th May 1932
Had an interesting talk with Nagi [TASS correspondent] about possible developments. He, of course, is convinced that the country is headed for Bolshevism, basing his belief largely on the programme of the Seisanto and on the manifesto of Sunday. His own theory seems to be that the people of Japan regard Makino and others near to the throne as standing between the Emperor and themselves, and, therefore, they must be removed - as in the case of Rasputin in Russia. Similarly, the extremists look on Hiranuma in much the same light as the Bolsheviks regarded Kerensky. If the situation develops in such a way as to necessitate action by the troops, and the troops are called upon to fire on the people, the present "monarchical communism" will promptly change to anti-dynastic revolution, as it did in Russia after the events of 1905.

The police appear to be satisfied that the Blood Brotherhood, which murdered Inoue and Dan, the Junior Officers' Group, which murdered Inukai, and the Farmers' Death Band, which tried to wreck the transformer stations on Sunday, are three entirely separate organisations, but co-operating with each other. Their memberships are reported to be 320, 120, and 300 respectively.

Saturday 21st May 1932
The seriousness of the present situation is indicated by the fact that Saionji, for the first time, appears to lack confidence in his own judgement to decide whom to recommend to the throne as Premier. Even Togo, Marshal Uehara, and others who normally steer clear of politics, are being consulted.

Shiratori mentioned one quite interesting point at this morning's interview, namely that Yamagata and Nozu held different views as to the relation between the Army and politics.
What may be called the Yamagata school of thought - represented by the late Baron Tanaka and General Ugaki - advocated active participation, a view which is now discredited. Nozu's followers - represented today by Araki, Muto, and Mazaki - advocate standing strictly aloof from entangling alliances of any kind with party politicians.

Alsot tells me that Suzuki, the Seisanto Secretary, seems a very able and active man, and is opposed to some extent to the Army as well as to the capitalists, as he is afraid of their getting too much control. The Seisanto Headquarters, he says, are now closely watched by the police, their inmates being virtual prisoners, as they are not allowed to leave the place. The object of this strict guard is that the police are afraid of the Seisanto organising an attack on Saionji while he is in Tokyo.

**Sunday 22nd May 1932**

Admiral Viscount Saito selected as Premier, much to everyone's surprise, though the "Asahi" seems to have had an inkling. While liberal-minded, he is a strict disciplinarian and absolutely straight, so his appointment should do much to restore the faith and confidence of the nation.

**Tuesday 24th May 1932**

Had a talk with old Zumoto and was surprised to find him by no means satisfied with the choice of Saito as Premier. Saito, he considers, is only second-best man for the post, and that the only man capable of bringing the present situation under control is Admiral Count Yamamoto. I pointed out that Yamamoto is even older than Saito, being just on 80. He admitted it, but asserted that, in spite of his age, he is the more active of the two and has far greater prestige with the Army. According to him, one reason for Saito's choice was that he personally called on Saionji as soon as the old Genro arrived in Tokyo. Yamamoto was urged to do the same, but refused to do so. On the other hand, it is rumoured that Yamamoto purposely refrained from putting forward his own claims for the Premiership once more, as he has hopes of receiving an Imperial Rescript appointing him Genro now that Saionji, the last survivor, is getting on in years. Zumoto's remarks about Saito not having sufficient prestige in the Army appears to be born out by what Alsot tells me. It seems he sent his secretary round to sound the views of some of the Zaigo Gunjinkai [Army Reservists' Association] officials on the subject, and they said quite frankly that they had no great confidence in his ability to steer the country through the present crisis.

**Wednesday 25th May 1932**

By 8 p.m. organisation of new Cabinet completed, except for the Foreign Ministry, which Saito himself will therefore hold pro tem., and the War Ministry which is likely to be taken over by General Hayashi on his arrival in Tokyo tomorrow. For a time, the success of Saito's efforts to form a representative National Govt. hung in the balance, as much depended on whether he could induce Yamamoto to accept the Home portfolio in order to counterbalance the retention of the Finance Ministry in the hands of the Seiyukai. Yamamoto at first declined, but finally, about 6.30 p.m. agreed - and the rest was easy.
Sir Neil Malcolm expressed surprise at the calmness with which the Japanese have taken the withdrawal from Shanghai, as, according to him, it is generally regarded in China as an acknowledgement of defeat.

Thursday 26th May 1932

The new Cabinet was installed this afternoon, with Araki remaining as War Minister, as Hayashi declined the post. Araki’s retention of the post came as a surprise to most people, as it was known that he himself wished to resign, but apparently the Army heads are convinced that with the situation as it is, he is the best man for the post and have brought pressure to bear on him to stay on accordingly.

It is generally expected that Count Uchida will be made Foreign Minister, although Shiratori revealed confidentially that Uchida had been approached with the offer but had declined. The Army apparently wants Uchida to remain on as President of the South Manchurian Railway, as he works in very well with them in Manchuria.

Friday 27th May 1932

Hear there is a ban on troop plans in Manchuria and on the negotiations that are alleged to be in progress between Tokyo and Moscow regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Monday 30th May 1932

Shiratori showed us a manuscript copy of a book named “Nihon Kaizo Hoan” [“Plan for the Reform of Japan”], which has been banned but which, he says, is very popular among the younger Army officers, who have more or less adopted it as their “Bible”. The author is a man named Ikki Kita, who wrote a book on socialism about 31 years ago, when he was only 22. The present book was apparently written about 1920, but has only recently been taken up by the Army. It preaches the economic and social reconstruction of Japan and advocates, inter alia, that no individual is to be permitted over ?1,000,000 or to own land exceeding ?100,000 in value, and no enterprise is to be capitalised at over ?10,000,000. Even the Emperor himself is to come under this ruling.

Tuesday 31st May 1932

Split in the Cabinet narrowly arrested by Seiyukai agreeing to leave Saito a free hand to decide on the question of who is to be Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Home Affairs. Also tells me he has had an interview with Uchida Ryohei, who predicts that the present cabinet will last about six months and will then be succeeded by a "Kokuhonsha" one under Hiranuma. This, he expects, will last about a year and will pave the way for the "Showa Restoration", which will be brought about in 1934 by the "Ronin" elements! One quite interesting point mentioned by Uchida - presuming it is true - was that Araki was doing his utmost to urge the capitalists to make sacrifices in order to stave off a revolution, but so far without effect.

The Soviet papers are getting very worked up about an alleged anti-Soviet campaign that is being waged in Japan. It seems the "Nihon" has been more or less urging war with the Soviet. As, however, "Nihon" is said to have a circulation of not more than 2,000, and as the paper is
equally inflammatory against Britain, America and other "white" powers, its ravings need not be taken very seriously.

Monday 6th June 1932
Voicing the growing spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction among the agricultural communities, a delegation representing 120,000 farmers in Northern Japan is threatening to make a direct appeal to the Throne for immediate relief. The farmers’ patience is now exhausted, they declared, as conditions have become desperate. This evening the Diet's Petitions' Committee passed a petition submitted by 45,000 farmers asking for a 3- year moratorium on debts, a subsidy of ?60,000 for fertilisers, and ?50,000,000 for emigration to Manchuria.

Tuesday 7th June 1932
The urgent necessity of relief for the agricultural districts especially in North Japan, where conditions are said to be desperate, with thousands on the verge of starvation, is occupying the attention of the Diet, while the War Office is reported gravely concerned with the effect on the morale of the troops, over 80 per cent of whom are recruited from the agrarian population. The authorities are said to be seriously worried, as reactionary and radical organisations are apparently exploiting the farmers' bitterness for the purpose of starting a movement aiming at the overthrow of the existing political order.

Wednesday 8th June 1932
Agrarian distress and unrest and various relief measures and being discussed. Meantime Mitsui's have plunked down ?3,000,000 for relief work.

Thursday 9th June 1932
Hear that Nishida, who was shot by Kawasaki on 15th May was a great friend of Ikki Kita, the author of the book "Nihon Kaizo Hoan", which is now so popular with the younger Army officers. Kita, incidentally, was one of the two civilians arrested in October in connection with the abortive plot.

Whether the peasant delegations now in Tokyo are acting independently or in conjunction with one another is not quite clear. According to the "Yomiuri", the present agitation is being directed by an organisation of provincial farmers and ex-Service men known as the "Jichi Nomin Kyogikai", or Farmers' Autonomous Council, which is connected with the Aikyojuku, a private school reportedly involved in the "Blood Brotherhood". The Council is said to have a membership of about 100,000 farmers in 14 prefectures near Tokyo, and was organised last year under the leadership of Shimonaka Yasaburo (who broke with Akamatsu on the 29th of last month), Kato Kazuo, Kazami Sho, and Murobusa Takanobu. At the outset it was known as the Rural Administration League, but subsequently changed to the present name, and is now led by Nagano Ro, a retired Army officer noted for his study of things Chinese and also for his recent socialistic and Fascist leanings.

Question of recognising Manchukuo is being increasingly pressed, but according to Shiratori the Govt. is not likely to accord recognition before the League meets in September, when much will depend on the attitude of the Powers towards Japan. If the attitude at Geneva - as a
result of the report to be submitted by the Lytton Commission - is unfavourable, Japan, he says, will probably withdraw from the League and recognise the Manchukuo.

Friday 10th June 1932
Nagi mentioned an interesting thing about the reasons of

Monday 13th June 1932

Questioned Shiratori on the "affair of March last year" about which Kamiyama Mannoshin questioned Araki in the Diet on Saturday. It was the first I had heard of it. He professed to know nothing about other than unconfirmed rumours, according to which a plot - to seize the Diet and overturn the Govt. on account of its "weak-kneed" policy towards China and towards Disarmament - had been discovered. General Ugaki was said to have been mixed up with it in some way or other, but had got "cold feet" at the last moment and declined to participate. It was his complicity in this harebrained scheme that lost him his influence, according to Shiratori, who also mentioned that Okawa Shumei's influence, which was very strong at one time in reactionary circles, has also diminished of late. It is curious, though, that nothing appears to have leaked out about this "plot" of more than a year ago till now.

Friday 17th June 1932
Hear that Okawa Shumei has been arrested again, apparently for examination in connection with the events of 15 May. Also hear that he and Ikki Kita who were formerly as thick as thieves, have fallen out with one another.

Saturday 18th June 1932
Takahashi denies his intention to resign. Curious that all the papers reported his coming resignation as pretty well authoritative. Looks rather as though someone was deliberately spreading false rumours for ulterior motives. Prior to the denial, I questioned Shiratori about the report and he seemed to think it was true all right, and he remarked that the Seiyukai was trying to undermine the Cabinet and that Hatoyama might resign too. Possibly the Seiyukai themselves started the report.

Tuesday 21st June 1932
The F.O. has received a communication from Stimson through Debuchi making representations about the Manchurian Customs. Drawing attention to reports that the Manchukuo planned customs autonomy and to establish its own customs service under a Japanese Inspector-General, Stimson intimated that it would destroy the integrity of the Chinese Customs Service and violate the spirit of the 9-Power Treaty, in the maintenance of which the U.S. is vitally interested. There is a report that the British Govt. has also raised a protest, but (the British Ambassador) says he has never been instructed to say anything about the Customs question.

Wednesday 22nd June 1932
Another letter from Angus telling about Chittagong. From what he says in this (May 1st) and previous letter, he has no very great opinion of the Indian police and their methods. After telling of his sending a couple of platoons to raid some houses about 10 miles away, which
were reported to be harbouring some absconders, he says: "As usual, either the information was wrong or they'd got wind of the raid. Anyway we got nothing. The police are hopeless. Their agents and informers are mostly liars, and the police themselves are incapable of doing anything secretly. Even the Superintendent, Hicks, starts talking over the 'phone to me about these things, and most of the operators are in sympathy with the terrorist party. No wonder they never catch anyone!"

**EXTRACTS FROM ANGUS KENNEDY'S LETTERS FROM CHITTAGONG.**

11th June 1932

I've just finished the reading of the judgement on this armoury Raid Case. Two or three things stand out. One, that there was sufficient good evidence to hang all the leaders. The reason none were condemned was that the English judge wanted a unanimous verdict and sentence, and the 2 Indian judges with him refused to pass the capital sentence, from fear of the consequences - they said it was alright for an Englishman, who could clear out of the country, but they had to live in it, and daren't pass the capital punishment!

Second - the absolute uselessness of the police. Sub-inspectors and constables alike, bolted at the first sign of trouble, every time. When the raiders raided the police armoury - one sentry of the guard ran 4 miles, and hid for 2 days! The commander of the guard ran down to the fields and hid for the rest of the night, though there were 70 constables in the barracks just above him. Evidence doesn't relate what they did! Later on, when 6 of the raiders were being chased by Mahomedan villagers, 2 police sub-inspectors who were out trying to catch them too, heard firing, and promptly hid in a ditch till next morning!

The third point, is the youth of these wretched terrorists- most of them students, many of them schoolboys 16 and 17. Everyone is so frightened of them. They knew nothing of firearms - they looted the armoury, didn't even know how to load the rifles, and didn't know the difference between ball and blank cartridges, and fired more of the latter than the former. Poor little devils - and these swine of leaders - schoolmasters etc. get off the death penalty, having murdered 15 people in their raid. Its rotten.

19th June 1932

We had got information late Sunday night that that particular house was being used as a shelter by absconders, and Cameron took out this party to search it on Monday night - the job we are here to do, and which we do on an average of 3 times a week, from each outpost. Cameron, of course, acted contrary to all instructions and orders as to how to conduct these searches. It is not his job to do it personally - the police sub inspector and escort are meant to do it, while they are covered and protected by the cordon of our men outside. Poor Cameron - it was plucky, but very foolhardy. Death was instantaneous, as he was shot through the throat and chest. The little recruit rifleman too who bagged the murderer of Cameron showed great coolness and pluck. At present, we can't fire till we're fired at, and it means that if one does corner an armed terrorist, who is determined to sell his life dearly, he will bag at least one loyal Govt. servant, soldier or policeman every time. We're asking that we may be allowed to
fire into the house first - after all the usual procedure of calling out the inmates and questioning them has been gone through, of course.

Saturday 25th June 1932
Had a talk with Alsot about Adachi's attempt to form a new party. He tells me that both the Seisanto and the Kokuhonsha people have expressed a high opinion of Adachi to his (Alsot's) secretary - which seems to bear out the rumour that Adachi, in attacking the two existing parties, is hoping to win support from the reactionaries. It may be, in fact, that he is trading on his own reactionary leanings in his youthful days in Korea to attract reactionary support and, at the same time, counting on his long record as a party politician to win favour with the constitution-loving Genro in the event of the present Cabinet falling before the crisis has been weathered.

Sunday 26th June 1932
The "Japan Times" has come out today with a special four-page supplement devoted to eulogising Toyama Mitsuru. If the eulogies were contributed by irresponsible hotheads, such fulsome praise might be understandable; but they are not. The contributors are, in fact, leading Japanese statesmen and politicians - Takahashi, Mitsuchi, Tokonami, Adachi, Sekiya, Inukai (posthumously, oh irony!), Hirota, Nagai (Ryutaro), and others. The last two are, in some respects, the most amazing, as their main subject of praise is Toyama's openflouting of his own and the British Govt. in the matter of Rash Behari Bose. True, Hirota was educated at Toyama's expense, so is naturally grateful to him, but for a distinguished diplomat such as he is, holding office as Ambassador to Moscow, it seems almost incredibly undiplomatic to give tongue in such strain. As for Nagai, the fact that he is Minister of Overseas Affairs, and therefore personally concerned with such matters as the suppression of Korean terrorists, it seems the absolute height of indiscretion (to put it mildly) to express open sympathy with the illegal protection of Indian terrorists like Bose.
It certainly does not help to enhance Japan's prestige to have supplements of this kind issued, some of the eulogies even going so far as to praise Toyama for planning the murder of Ito if he had failed to fall in with the wishes of those demanding war with Russia in 1904, and praising him, too, for his connection with the bombing of Okuma. Eulogies of this kind in a paper intended for foreign consumption are really all but incomprehensible.

Tuesday 28th June 1932
Had an interesting talk with a German named Gunther Stein, correspondent at Moscow for the "Berliner Tageblatt", who is in Japan on a short visit. He tells me that in Soviet Russia everyone is convinced that a war with Japan is a certainty within the next 3 or 4 years, if not sooner, and that the Japanese ambassador at Moscow, Hirota, is perfectly outspoken about it! According to Stein, the Canadian wheat recently shipped to Vladivostok has been sent there, not so much because of wheat shortage in Russia but because the Soviet are anxious to accumulate large reserves of wheat there, owing to the difficulty of transporting large quantities from European Russia in the event of war with Japan.
The (British Ambassador) visited Arita, to convey Britain’s concern over the Manchurian Customs question owing to its bearing on the payment of foreign loans. The French, Italian, and Soviet Ambassadors subsequently did likewise.

Friday 1st July 1932

According to young Nitobe, Sheba apparently fixed the Japan Times supplement off his own bat without telling him anything, though the actual idea came from one of the advertisement solicitors employed by the paper. As Sheba is always at his wits' end to make both ends meet, he is willing enough to take almost anything that comes his way - hence this supplement and the Shionso outbursts. In the case of the Toyama supplement, it seems that one of these solicitors had the bright idea of suggesting to the Black Dragon crowd that foreigners ought to be enlightened regarding Toyama's great personality (?). To my query as to how Takahashi etc. were induced to contribute eulogies, Nitobe replied that in all probability they were requested to do so and, in order to avoid trouble - which might very likely come to anyone who declined to extol him - they simply took the line of least resistance and complied. As for who paid the cost of this strange form of advertisement, Nitobe intimated that Toyama's crowd can always obtain funds by blackmail, and that doubtless the cost was met by this expedient.

Nitobe told me, incidentally, that there are others beside himself who would like to see Sheba ousted and to have someone really competent put in his place in order to raise the paper's prestige and improve it. Without money, however, there is little that can be done, so the War Office was approached for a subsidy; but in return for a subsidy, the War Office demands control of editorial policy. A tailor named Uehara, who is an ex-naval man and a personal friend of General Araki’s, apparently took the matter up and the War Office was quite interested in the idea, but with the proviso mentioned. They even went so far as to suggest that Tokutomi and Honda, the former Ambassador to Berlin, should be made joint editors; but the suggestion was turned down on account of their being too nationalistic for a paper intended for foreign consumption.

Saturday 2nd July 1932

The F.O. has instructed Matsudaira to reject the Hoover proposals. It looks very much as though Hoover had made a bad tactical error and has hindered rather than helped towards a settlement of the disarmament problem, as, intentionally or not, his proposal of an all-round cut of one-third simply amounts to suggesting that America, by a shortcut, would attain the goal of actual naval parity instead of, as at present, theoretical parity with Britain, and an actual 10-10-7 ratio instead of a theoretical one by the simple process of getting Britain and Japan to make real reductions and sacrifices while she herself simply scraps blue prints and little else.

Monday 4th July 1932

Had a long talk with young Astor, who arrived here this morning with the rest of the League Commission. Astor confirmed to me the stories of spying and other petty annoyances to which the members of the Commission were subjected while in Manchuria. A most
shortsighted policy on the part of the Japanese, as nothing could be better calculated to prejudice the Commission against them. He seems to think that Japan will be making an awful mistake if she accords recognition to Manchukuo - but the trouble, of course, is that, having gone so far as she has done already, it would be difficult for Japan to back out altogether and leave Pu Yi & Co. to their fate.

Tuesday 5th July 1932

Nagi looked in to see me - very worried. Seems he has noticed, in the personal columns of the "Japan Times", on two occasions recently that Snow and Abrikosov have been dining together at the same dinner party! The Soviet Embassy has construed this as indicating that the Counsellor of the British Embassy is intriguing with the former Chargé d'Affaires of the Czarist Embassy! I did my best to explain that Abrikosov is everybody's friend and excellent company - hence he is a regular attendant at dinner parties - and that he does not mix up in plots and ploys; but whether I convinced him I know not. The Soviets must be extraordinarily suspicious and jumpy if they draw such deductions from such trivial happenings.

Wednesday 6th July 1932

The papers are strongly criticising Arita for telling Sir Francis (British Ambassador) that Japan will not recognise the Manchukuo till the League Commission has left the Far East. Although, according to Shiratori, Arita made it clear that this was merely his personal opinion, the F.O. is very embarrassed at Arita's remarks having leaked out. As Shiratori was inclined to blame the British Embassy for the leakage, I thought it advisable to let the Ambassador know, so I rang up Snow, who was very naturally indignant at the imputation. I also told him that young Fleisher had told me he had cabled the news two days ago and, as Fleisher is very close in with Martel (French Ambassador), I suggested that he might have heard it from the French Embassy, in which case the leakage may have culminated from there.

LETTERS FROM ANGUS KENNEDY

Chittagong, 4th April 1932

This is a curious place. It is very big and scattered, and is a mass of little hills, obviously old sand dunes left by the receding sea. It is a biggish port, headquarters of the Clan Line, and is the ght, unescorted into the bazaar to investigate a noise - a job for a police sergeant and patrol. We should have looked pretty fools, if we had run into trouble, and got the Commissioner shot! I told them what I thought of them afterwards, and asked them to refrain from doing it again.

Friday 8th July 1932

According to an official report received at the F.O., Karakhan has informed Hirota that the Chinese have made an informal proposal for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Moscow is prepared to consider the proposal. The F.O. here seems to think that China is playing a double game and is planning to hold out the threat of Sino-Soviet rapprochement if Japan declines to negotiate an
amicable settlement of the Manchurian question on China's terms; but it is intimated that
Japan will probably insist on China's recognition of Manchukuo independence as a sine qua
non in any settlement of the question.

Saturday 9th July 1932
Sir Francis Lindley seems very worried at the way things are developing and told me in
confidence that he had spoken very frankly to Arita about the way Japan is damaging her
reputation in the eyes of the World and that she will soon be left without a single friend if she
continues on her present course of flouting everyone, and putting up everyone's backs by
insulting their intelligence by professing that Manchukuo is the outcome of self-determination
and that Japan has had no hand in its formation.

Monday 11th July 1932
See by the papers that Don Gata, the so-called Hitler representative out here, is
correspondent for the Nazi organ, "Volkischer Beobachter". We had a talk with Nakano Seigo has had a talk with him, the outcome of which is kept
secret. From my personal knowledge of Tanaka, who has been a good friend of successive
British Military Attachés here - (he himself was Military Attaché in London during the War, and
holds both the K.C.V.O. and the C.B.) - I should say he is absolutely sincere and straight
forward - no sabre-rattling "militarist" (how I hate the word!) or fanatical reactionary. It may be, therefore, that he is aiming to organise a body that will serve as a sort of barrier between the
corrupt politician crowd and the revolutionary reactionaries in the event of a show-down.

Tuesday 19th July 1932
The possibility of serious developments in the direction of Jehol is reported as a result of
Ishimoto, a liaison official of the Kwantung Army, being seized and carried away on the 17th
by Jehol troops. Captured documents are reported to reveal that the orders for Ishimoto's
capture were issued by Chang Hsueh-liang, apparently with the object of obstructing
negotiations between Manchukuo and Tang Yu-lin, Governor of Jehol Province, on the
question of opium revenue.

Wednesday 20th July 1932
Looked in to see Zumoto for a talk on the general situation, questioning him especially on the
subjects of Ugaki, Tanaka and Adachi. Ugaki, he thinks, would probably accept the Presidency of the Minseito if it was offered him,
as he is now far more a politician than a soldier and would rather take on one of the existing
parties than join Adachi or anyone else in organising a new one. Zumoto seems interested in General Tanaka's movement, but thinks that Tanaka himself is
by no means heart and soul in his task, but rather that he was jockeyed into accepting the
leadership and would like to give it up. Tanaka, he says, is a typical Satsuma man - a good
leader, but inclined to be muddle-headed. He exercises considerable influence among the
Zaigo Gunjinkai who, however, are far more interested in their work as farmers, peasants, or
small tradesmen than in any Army programme. Regarding Nakano's talk with Tanaka,
Zumoto thinks it possible that the outcome may be that the party now being formed by Adachi
(with Nakano's help) may link up with Tanaka's Meirinkai. Adachi, according to Zumoto, is a clever parliamentarian and vote-manipulator, but he is not cut out for a leader. Nakano, he says, is the real motive force and, therefore, will very likely replace Adachi eventually as head of the party now under formation, whether it joins with the Meirinkai or not. Nakano, he thinks, has a big future before him. Young and active (46), he is sincere and ambitious, with a clean record so far as politicians’ records go in Japan! He has always inclined towards socialism and was even accused of Bolshevist leanings because he opposed the intervention in Siberia in 1918. He is now a keen advocate of State socialism.

Discussing the subject of Manchuria, Zumoto made the rather surprising remark that the Army's opposition to Kajiwara as President of the South Manchurian Railway was justified, as he is not a sufficiently big man for the post now that it entails the management of all the railways in Manchuria - the Chinese Eastern Railway included. To my suggestion that this is purely a temporary phase he replied: "No! Permanent. The Chinese Eastern Railway and all other railways in Manchuria will henceforth be under Japanese control indirectly if not directly, permanently, and the Soviet are now resigned to it."

Thursday 21st July 1932
Shiratori was unable to see us today, but gave Tsutsui permission to let us see, in strict confidence, the stenographic reports of Uchida's two interviews with the League Commission. In the main, the gist of the talk was much the same as reported in the papers at the time; but there was some very straight speaking on the part of Lytton and the others, and a very marked brusqueness and stubbornness in Uchida's replies to their queries. One interesting point revealed is that the Japanese have already entered into agreement with Hsi Hsia about the construction of certain railways, including one from Changchun to Talai and the one from Tunghwa to Kainai.

Friday 22nd July 1932
Rather alarmist reports circulating about possible developments in the Jehol situation. The F.O. here, however, appears unperturbed and Shiratori professes to anticipate no serious trouble.

Monday 25th July 1932
See the Meirinkai platform announced on Saturday includes "Asia for the Asiatics" and repudiation of the London Naval Treaty. The amalgamation of the Social Democrats and the Rono Taishuto took place yesterday, thereby unifying the proletarian front for the first time. The name of the new party is Shakai Taishuto or Social Masses Party. Unity should mean strength, but it has only been attained as a result of constant secessions to the ranks of the reactionaries. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the strength of unity will prove greater or less than the depleted strength in numbers. In any case, with national sentiment as it is at present, the most the proletarians can hope to do is to mark time and conserve such strength as is left to them.
See Matsuoka is to be sent to Geneva for the League Assembly, so there is likely to be some pretty straight talking! He is said to be in favour of Japan quitting the League, so maybe his appointment indicates Japan's intention to withdraw.

Tuesday 26th July 1932

The administration unification scheme in Manchuria has at last been decided on, the Cabinet having decided that a Commander-in-Chief (probably Muto) shall be appointed to act as special envoy with plenipotentiary powers and will be ex-officio Governor of Kwantung with control over the South Manchurian Railway. As envoy he will be under the direction and control of the Foreign Minister and will take charge of foreign affairs and supervise the Japanese consuls in Manchuria.

Wednesday 27th July 1932

The "Advertiser" publishes a translation of an article by General Araki from the "Kaihosha Kiji" [newspaper], and Shiratori seems rather annoyed about it, as he considers the translation may give a false impression about Japanese "Imperialism". The article itself is very long-winded and verbose, though there are one or two interesting points - notably an emphasis on the necessity of providing protection for Koreans in Eastern Siberia and of clearing up the ambiguous situation in Mongolia so as to make clear whether it is really independent or under the Soviet! One wonders if this is an indication of a contemplated clash with the Soviet.

Thursday 28th July 1932

Shimada has brought me a report of an interview he had at the Seisanto headquarters about the Meirinkai, from which it seems that there is no love likely to be lost between the two, the Seisanto spokesman referring to the Meirinkai as another "bourgeois fascist organisation like the Kokuhonsha and Adachi's party" and predicating that, on account of its military character, it is likely to become the Seisanto's "most inveterate enemy in the political chaos that is expected when the present system collapses"!

Monday 1st August 1932

A general shakeup in the Japanese diplomatic service shortly is indicated. Hirota is returning from Moscow, Yoshida from Rome and Debuchi from Washington, while Obata is expected to ask permission to return from Berlin and a number of other diplomats are being shifted.

Wednesday 3rd August 1932

Following simultaneous bandit attacks at various points in the South Manchurian Railway zone centring around Yingkou and Tashichiao, a destroyer flotilla and a cruiser have been sent to Yingkou and landed bluejackets, who are co-operating with Japanese and Manchukuo troops in repelling the bandits, who are believed to be acting under Chang's orders.

Friday 5th August 1932

Heavy fighting around Yingkou and Haicheng continues and unusual tension is reported at Mukden, following instructions from Tokyo to deal drastically with those disturbing law and order. Looks rather as though serious developments are contemplated, as the War Office issued a statement to the Press last night, hinting at drastic measures being taken against Chang and his subordinates if they continue to stir up trouble.
Monday 8th August 1932
The Chinese political situation seems to be getting more chaotic than ever, and both Wang Ching-wei and Chang Hseuh-liang have resigned. The former, in resigning, issued a strong denunciation of the latter, criticising him for his failure to do anything against the Japanese and for demanding funds, ostensibly for use against the Japanese but actually for his own use.
The Adachi group has decided on the name of Kokumin Domei for the new party they are about to form.

Tuesday 9th August 1932
The "Nichi Nichi" and the "Hochi" are playing up a story to the effect that the nonagenarian Count Tanaka Mitsuaki (or Koken), who recently renounced his title on the 20th anniversary of the Emperor Meiji's death, has urged Count Makino and Ikki to resign, holding themselves responsible for certain unspecified but, allegedly, serious occurrences of some while back, as failure to do so is likely to bring about grave developments. It may be coincidence, but it is noteworthy that the "Asahi" says nothing about this matter and it was the "Asahi" that was raided by the reactionaries in April 1928 for refusing to publish a manifesto demanding the resignation of these same two statesmen, Makino and Ikki. Tanaka, who is a retired major-general and fought on the Imperial side both in the Restoration War of 1868 and in the Satsuma Rebellion, served the late Emperor Meiji for 20 years as Minister of the Imperial Household. As he is a Tosa man and Makino is Satsuma, it looks rather as though certain of the reactionaries, with their own axe to grind, have purposely instigated the old gentleman to take this step by working on his old clan prejudices and patriotic sentiment.
The reactionaries, of course, are all out to get rid of Makino on account of his liberal and pacific outlook which, of course, influences the advice which he tenders to the Throne. Hence the attempt on his life in May and his being marked out for assassination in the abortive plot last October, and also by the "Blood Brotherhood".

Wednesday 10th August 1932
Shiratori very wrathly with Stimson for virtually referring to Japan as an aggressor.
A propos of the Makino-Tanaka affair, Nagi tells me that, shortly before it occurred, Count Tanaka visited the Aikyojuku at Mito, the "school" run by Tachibana, who is supposed to have played so important a part in the affair of May 15th. He went there, moreover, with Prince Higashi Kuni, who, it is said, was to have been made Dictator if the October plot had come off.

Friday 12th August 1932
All in all, Tanaka seems to be spiritually akin to the reactionaries of today, and it is even said that he contributed funds to Nissho and the Aikyojuku. Another interesting point in the report is that the Dowager Empress, who is said to have always been a good friend of Tanaka's, is said to have been very displeased of late with the conduct of Princes Chichibu and (2) Tanaka is a friend of Toyama's.
There is much "going and coming" of Seisanto men between Japan and Manchuria, though the object is not quite clear, unless it is to further the work of the Kokuryukai (Although the Kokuryukai continues, all its members are said to have joined the Seisanto as well).

Thursday 18th August 1932
According to Alsot, the upshot of the Tanaka-Makino affair and of his subsequent visit to Saionji is that Makino has decided to resign sometime next month.

Friday 19th August 1932
Hear from Shimada that Imamaki's friend, whose name is under ban, is Okawa Shumei. President of the Jimmukai, and that his name is purposely kept from mention, as he is a personal friend of General Araki’s. He also tells me that the Jimmukai is really an offshoot of the Gyochisha, and that the Gyochisha's only object is to destroy the present political system in Japan and to leave it to others to carry out the rebirth of the nation, as it has no political ambitions of its own!

Saturday 20th August 1932
Sir Francis Lindley seems rather worried at a report received from the French Military Attaché to the effect that all the Japanese arsenals are working at full pressure night and day, though he agrees with me that it is probably simply a precautionary measure in case of a clash either with the Soviet or China Proper.

Monday 22nd August 1932
From what Shiratori told us at the F.O. this morning it is apparently only a question of time before strong action is taken to make Jehol definitely a part of Manchukuo and that favourable autumn weather is likely to see determined action there with the object of ending the unsatisfactory situation arising from Ishimoto's prolonged captivity and Tang Yu-lin's doubtful allegiance to the Manchukuo.

Tuesday 23rd August 1932
Shimada mentioned that the "Asahi" office was to have been bombed along with the other buildings on May 15th, but the raiders desisted on learning that the auditorium was packed with women and children attending some sort of entertainment there.

Wednesday 24th August 1932
Formal recognition of Manchukuo is probably to be given about the 20th of next month, Shiratori told us at the F.O. this morning.

Saturday 27th August 1932
Meantime, the anti-Japanese movement in China, which has come into such prominence once more during the last few weeks, is taking on an increasingly serious aspect, with almost daily bombings and intimidation of those who refuse to take an active part in it.

Thursday 8th September 1932
Kumasaki dropped in for a confidential talk, as he says it is rumoured that Reuters considers I am too pro-Japanese and is therefore going to get rid of me! On the strength of this rumour, he came in to sound me out as to whether I would take on the editorship of either the "Japan Times" or "Contemporary Japan", as apparently both the F.O. and the War Office want to get
rid of the Sheba regime from the former, while the latter are dissatisfied with Redman. I thanked him, but explained that I had no reason to believe the rumour - in fact, letters both from London and Shanghai have been particularly complimentary of late.

Saturday 10th September 1932

The papers are very excited over the fact that the National City Bank has been taking photographs of the principal buildings in Tokyo, Osaka, and elsewhere. The bank people say they have been simply acting on instructions from their head office in New York, who, for business reasons, want visual proof of the commercial and industrial progress and development in Japan. The Gendarmerie, however, appear unconvinced and suspect the real motive to be a scheme to identify the most important buildings and landmarks for American airmen to bomb in the event of a war!

Tuesday 13th September 1932

Following unanimous approval by the Privy Council this morning, Imperial sanction was obtained for the formal recognition of Manchukuo.

Babb tells me he has had another query from New York about "news" cabled by Junius Wood. Wood's latest effort is to quote Shiratori as accusing the U.S. of negotiating with the Soviet to establish an air base in Kamchatka! Shiratori, of course, made no such accusation, as I was present at the interview in which he was alleged to do so. What he did say - and he only said it jokingly - was that, according to a newspaper report, negotiations of this nature were reported to be in progress. Wood seems to be bent on sensation and twists all his news accordingly - a curious sort of mentality. I don't blame Shiratori for getting so damned annoyed with him at times, though some of the verbal duels between the two at the Press conferences are very embarrassing.

Friday 16th September 1932

At the very last moment, China was apparently prevailed upon to forego despatching her intended note yesterday to the Powers, invoking the 9-Power Pact after Japanese recognition of Manchukuo. Possibly the League brought pressure to bear, as apparently the League fears that its own prestige would be badly damaged if the 9-Power Pact is invoked, as it would be equivalent to showing that China has lost faith in the League's ability to help her and has therefore turned elsewhere for assistance.

Saturday 17th September 1932

To the Embassy in morning for a talk with the Ambassador on the situation arising from Japan's recognition of Manchukuo. He frankly admitted his inability to visualise what the next development will be, though his own personal opinion is that, as there is nothing effective that can be done by any of the Powers, the best thing will be to recognise that fact straight away and make the best of the existing situation.

One quite interesting point he mentioned was that, whereas, in the official English translation of the Japanese Govt.'s statement of the 15th, only Manchuria was mentioned, the original in Japanese refers all the time to Manchuria and Mongolia.
Although he has little love for the Soviet, he expressed the opinion that the Soviet might very possibly agree to recognise Manchukuo if Japan would agree to the proposal for a non-aggression pact with Moscow, and that a mutual agreement of this nature would probably do a great deal of good, as it would have a very quietening effect on the whole Manchurian situation.

Tuesday 20th September 1932

Another fanatic who has proved a sore thorn in Britain's flesh is once more in the limelight, Gandhi having started a hunger strike as a protest against the Govt.'s recent communal award regarding the untouchables.

Friday 23rd September 1932

Had a visit from Penlington, who gave me a most graphic and interesting account of the recent bandit attack on his train, when he was on his way from Changchun to Harbin. Both he and Kinney, who was with him, were stripped of everything but their shirts and were on the point of being marched off for ransom, when the bandits took fright on hearing the sound of firing in the distance and, in the darkness and general confusion, the two of them managed to escape. It seems the bandits had removed a section of rail, as a result of which, the train was wrecked and the bandits then poured in a close-range rifle fire before assaulting it. Some wounded Japanese soldiers had been taken on at a station a short time before and one of these, who was lying helpless, was simply slashed all over and mutilated by the bandits.

Saturday 1st October 1932

Had Col. Homma to lunch at Club. He has just returned from England and has succeeded Furiyo at the War Office with Tani as his chief.

He is obviously a keen supporter of Anglo-Japanese friendship and co-operation. He questioned me on the reports, which the Japanese Press is playing up so much just now, about Britain's alleged support of the Tibetan independence movement, and I think I managed to convince him of their ridiculousness and of the harm done to Japan's own cause by the present Press campaign. As, however, his own knowledge of the Tibetan situation gained while he was in India appeared to make him pretty sceptical of these reports, I do not think he required much convincing and I think he will now do his best to put a stop to them.

Sunday 2nd October 1932

To the Club at 5 p.m. for an interview with the other foreign correspondents with

Monday 17th October 1932

I must say it rather disgusts me the way I am thanked and congratulated for anything of a sensational or "human interest" nature, while serious matter is at a discount. I suppose it is simply a question of what "the great British public" want, but it is a pretty damning indictment of their standard of intelligence and serves well to explain their extraordinary ignorance on matters about which they presume to pass judgement. It is very riling, too, to find London dating my mail items in such a way as to make them appear cabled. Rank dishonesty, I consider it, and often very misleading.

Thursday 20th October 1932
To Embassy in morning to see British Ambassador. He told me he had just had a visit from Ohashi, who rather emphasised Chang Hsueh-liang's alleged instigation of the bandit activities in Manchuria and Pu Yi's own ambitions, an emphasis which the Ambassador feared might forecast an attempt on the part of the Manchukuo to launch an expedition (with Japanese troops) across the Great Wall against Chang in order to put an end to his instigations and, at the same time, help on Pu Yi in his dreams for the restoration of the monarchy.

All in all, Sir Francis Lindley seemed to be in a somewhat pessimistic mood, as he remarked - when I told him of what Homma had said yesterday about Japan depending on British support at Geneva - that Britain, unfortunately, was not a free agent, as she has to keep in with America on account of the Debt question. He seems to think that a head-on collision between Japan and the League is almost inevitable.

James, who has just returned from Manchuria, seems to have been particularly struck by the amount of organised resistance put up by the bandits and irregulars. It is not just a case of sporadic and isolated raids on undefended points by small bodies of unorganised bandits. Most of the attacks, he says, appear to be definitely concerted and organised and are frequently made against Japanese troops behind strong defence works.

**Friday 21st October 1932**

The question of a rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet is much to the fore at the moment, but it does not seem to ring quite true, and, according to a report just received at the F.O., the Soviet Consul-General, in a recent talk with a member of General Muto's staff, made it quite plain that the Soviet is unlikely to recognise the Manchukuo in the immediate future, as Moscow wishes to avoid any step likely to impede the restoration of relations with Nanking.

**Monday 24th October 1932**

Had lunch with Brennan. He sails for Home on the 1st before returning to India. Showed me a long report he has written up for Simla on the Fascistic trend in the Army. Much of it is based on data that I gave him some months ago, but there are two quite interesting points that I did not know before. One is that the so-called Kinki Kakumei (Imperial Standard Revolution)- the plot that was nipped in the bud in March last year and aimed at seizing the Diet rather à la Cromwell (vide my diary 13.6.32) - was suppressed by General Ugaki, not assisted by him, and those concerned in it were sent to Manchuria by way of punishment and apparently had a lot to do with the subsequent outbreak there. Ugaki, according to Brennan, wished to deal more drastically with the offenders, but was prevented by Araki & Co., and it was largely because of his attitude on this occasion that Ugaki's influence in the Army was so badly hit. Taken in conjunction with the account given in the recent Kokuhonsha article (vide my "mailer" of 7/10 on the "Young Officers' Movement"), this helps to explain a lot that, up to now, has been far from clear.

The other point of interest is that General Okamoto's resignation last autumn(?) was due to the discovery of a plan by officers of the Guards' Division to petition the Emperor for certain drastic measures, including, apparently, the abolition of the Diet and the removal of certain
high officials. Being Commander of the Guards' Division at the time, Okamoto wanted drastic punishment to be meted out on the ringleaders, but once more Araki & Co. intervened, so Okamoto sent in his papers and resigned.

**Wednesday 26th October 1932**

Reports of a rapprochement with the Soviet continue, and it is even reported that Karakhan is coming to Japan shortly to negotiate a non-aggression pact. Shiratori, however, denies it all, and I imagine the denial is justified, certainly in so far as Karakhan's visit is concerned. Nagi assures me that the Soviet, so far as he knows, has made no fresh overtures of late - in fact, he asserts that Troyanovsky has only twice broached the subject officially, the first time being in January, when he approached Inukai on the subject of a non-aggression pact two or three days before Yoshizawa's return from Europe, and the second being in July, shortly after Uchida's assumption of the Foreign Ministry. On that occasion he reminded Uchida that Moscow was still awaiting a reply to her proposal of January and Uchida promised to look into the matter as soon as he had properly settled in to his new office. That, Nagi, asserts, is where the matter still rests so far as the Soviet are concerned.

**Thursday 27th October 1932**

Another assassination plot is reported to have been unearthed as a result of police investigations into the recent distribution of inflammatory circulars among young officers, attacking a certain high Court official and a high colonial administrator, a former military officer - presumably Makino (or Ikki) and Ugaki. The attempts on their lives, according to Press reports, was to be made while they were attending the coming Grand Manoeuvres.

**Friday 28th October 1932**

Apparently the Army is beginning to have its doubts as to Ma Chan-shan's death, as Araki is reported to have told the Cabinet that instructions have been sent to the Kwantung Army to do its best to make certain whether he is alive or dead, as radio messages, professedly from Ma, asking Chang for military funds, have frequently been intercepted of late.

**Sunday 30th October 1932**

Rung up by Rengo with the news that 120 Japanese women and children, who have been held captive at Manchuli by Su Ping-wen since the uprising of September 27th, have been released through the good offices of the Soviet and sent for refuge to Matzevskaya in Soviet territory.

**Tuesday 1st November 1932**

According to Press reports, whose accuracy the Navy Office denies, but which seem likely to be based on "intelligent anticipation", the Navy is seeking sanction for ? 460,000,000 for a four-year naval replenishment programme, the details of which are said to be two cruisers of 8,500 tons, an aircraft-carrier of 8,000 tons, seven destroyers, six submarines, a mine-layer of 5,000 tons, and five more air squadrons, thereby bringing the total number of naval air squadrons up to 36.

**Wednesday 2nd November 1932**
Had a visit from Shimada, who brought me an account of an interview he had a few days ago with Suzuki of the Seisanto. Suzuki, he says, told him that a number of police are coming to sympathise with the aims and objects of his organisation. He also said that the Seisanto seem to be getting a little tired of the Army and losing faith in them in so far as internal affairs are concerned, though they still back them up in what may be called their overseas and general national policy.

Saturday 5th November 1932
Police this morning arrested Toyama Mitsuru's third son, Hidezo, and three associates, all members of a reactionary body called the Tenkosha, or Heaven-going Association (or Heavenly Conduct Association), in the course of a raid which was said, at first, to be connected with the revelation of "a serious intrigue", though the arrests were apparently made partly in connection with an attempt to blackmail a man named Asanuma. Six other reactionaries were also arrested - members of the Independent Youths' Association - allegedly in connection with a plot to destroy some power stations and, having plunged Tokyo into darkness, assassinate certain high officials during the ensuing confusion. That one of Toyama's sons has been arrested is, in a way, the most interesting point of all, as it would seem to indicate that the authorities are beginning to realise the folly of leaving Toyama immune. Kimura tells me that six of the pistols used in the 15th May affair have been traced to young Toyama, and that the police have been looking for a chance to arrest him for some time past.

Monday 7th November 1932
Further details appearing in the papers about Saturday's arrests show that Toyama Hidezo is head of the Tenkokai and that Kodama Yoshio, who managed to evade the police, is head of the Independent Loyalist Youths' Association. Two members of the latter who were arrested are Okada Rikei and Chiba Masao, both of whom, like Kodama, have figured before. Okada, it seems, is the man who gained some notoriety, at the time the American Immigration Law was enacted, by cutting down the U.S. flag on the American Embassy flag-pole. Kodama is the fellow who presented a direct appeal to the Emperor a few years ago, opposing the formation of the Labour-Farmer Party. He was then a member of the Kenkokukai and was given six months imprisonment. Chiba is said to be the man who scattered handbills reading "Defend Manchuria and Mongolia" from the upper windows of Tokyo Station Hotel on the arrival of the Lytton Commission in July.

According to the papers, all these reactionaries are likely to be prosecuted on the charge of "attempting rebellion against the existing government", and that the heads of the Aikyojuku (House of Love), Shizanjuku (Purple Mountain), and Jimmukai will have similar charges preferred against them. The names of these three heads are still under ban, but actually they are Tachibana, Homma Kanichiro, and Okawa Shumei.

Wednesday 9th November 1932
All interest absorbed in the American elections, which have resulted in a sweeping victory for Roosevelt and the Democrats over Hoover & Co. The German elections held on Sunday have
resulted in a stalemate again, the Nazis remaining the strongest numerically, though diminishing in strength, while the Communists made big gains; but neither Nazis nor Communists have anything like an absolute majority, so von Papen & Co. remain in power.

Thursday 10th November 1932

Following a heated wrangle between the Army and the Navy over the division of the additional $95,000,000 which Takahashi has agreed to allow between them, the defence services finally agreed that $50,000,000 should go to the Army and $45,000,000 to the Navy. The total of next year's Budget estimates therefore amounts to no less than $2,235,000,000 expenditure against an estimated revenue of only $1,300,000,000, the deficit of over $900,000,000 to be met by bond issues - a pretty dicey state of affairs. The Army is to be allowed $447,000,000 and the Navy $372,000,000 as against their original demands for $561,000,000 and $614,000,000 respectively.

Monday 14th November 1932

Had an interesting talk with Alsot, who tells me that Koiso and Onodera, the Chief of Intendance, are said to have fallen out with Araki on the subject of expenditure, the two former apparently appreciating the seriousness of the financial situation and therefore counselling restriction. He also tells me that Koiso was apparently sent to Manchuria as Chief of Staff to Muto to get him out of the way, and that an attempt is apparently being made to discredit both him and Minami, as General Hata, Chief of Gendarmerie, recently persuaded the "Kokumin" or some such paper, to print a report linking their names with some alleged attempt to manipulate opium revenue in Manchuria - merely in order to discredit them. If these reports of friction between Araki and Koiso are true, they are certainly very significant, as Koiso is generally regarded as "the brains" of the Army and was formerly Araki's right-hand man. It looks rather like the beginning of a split between the moderates and extremists in the Army; and as there are already signs that the country is beginning to question the increasingly heavy costs and the lack of anything much to show for them, it seems possible that the more moderate elements in the Army will, from now on, come to the fore, in which case Ugaki, who is once more figuring prominently in the political limelight, may yet be able to recover sufficient of his lost popularity and prestige in the Army to win him the necessary support as a candidate for the Premiership.

Alsot also tells me that Bao, the Manchukuo representative, is very thick with the Seisanto crowd - and that the Seisanto told Shimada a day or two ago that young Toyama is not likely to suffer for his actions, and that certainly the police will never dare to touch his father. According to Fleisher, however, the police are doing their level best to get evidence to convict the old man. The Chief of Police, he says, told him this himself and told him also that the trouble is that, although there is little or no doubt that old Toyama has been behind all the recent outrages, the cannot obtain definite proof.

Sent another remonstrance to Reuter about their damnable habit of dating up "mailers" so as to give them the appearance of having been cabled.
Increasing criticism and apprehension are being voiced in the Japanese papers and elsewhere regarding the financial situation if the Cabinet persists in its present budget policy of unlimited borrowing and filling the huge deficit by issuing bonds. The general feeling, however, seems to be that nothing should be done to overturn the Saito Cabinet, as it would be difficult to find one more competent to steer the country through the present crisis.

Wednesday 16th November 1932

The latest casualty figures for Tokyo and 6 neighbouring Prefectures in typhoon show 53 dead. Some ass of a correspondent, however, has been resorting to sensation rather than truth report of 1,000 deaths. Irresponsible idiots who cable stuff like this ought to be horse-whipped or boiled in oil - as it causes unnecessary anxiety abroad and is apt to affect exchange etc. Reminiscent of the cabled enquiry I received in 1925 about an alleged earthquake: "Opposition reports thousands of dead. Why have you sent nothing." The fact was that there was not a single casualty!

Looks as though the Army had decided at last to take drastic action against Su Ping-wen, now that he has definitely refused to negotiate. Up to now, the Army has refrained from real action lest the 250 Japanese civilians, whom Su has been holding hostage at Manchuli, Hailar etc. since 27th September, suffer. Shiratori, however, remarked rather significantly this morning that it may be necessary to risk sacrificing them, as something must be done to clear up the situation in those parts.

Shimada brought me a translation of a very interesting, and rather significant, article by Suzuki Zenichi, the Seisanto chief secretary, in the October issue of the Seisanto organ, "Kaizo Sensen". In it, he rebukes both those who advocate war with the Soviet or U.S. in order to divert the people's attention from their own grievances at home, and those who advocate such a war on the grounds that it is inevitable sooner or later and that therefore Japan should strike now before it is too late. He points out that, in the event of victory, the capitalist class would be the only one to profit and their position would become firmer than ever, while a defeat would bring ruin to the whole country. The masses therefore would have nothing to gain either way. Consequently, if Japan is really threatened seriously by either the U.S. or U.S.S.R. this is all the more reason, he contends, for hastening on with the Showa restoration that is, inter alia, to rid the country of the hated capitalists, so that, when war comes, there will be no capitalists to profit by it. Another interesting point he brings out is the close connection between Manchurian independence and the revolutionary activities of "Earnest young officers and civilian patriots". They, and not any of the army leaders, he boasts, have brought about the "success" in Manchuria and had "independence for Manchuria" as their slogan long before 18th September last year.

The cleavage between Koiso and Araki, Alsot thinks, is personal rather than on question of principle, though differences of opinion nd 15-20 minutes before we got there. The place was in an awful mess. It was crowded with Europeans and Anglo-Indians, mostly railway people, playing cards, when they chucked the bombs in, and then started firing. One woman killed, 4
wounded and 8 men, including 2 police sergeants, wounded. The show was planned, I imagine, by Prithi Waddadar, a Bengali girl, whose photo was found in Dhalghat where Cameron was killed, and who is said to be Nirmal's lover - anyhow a red-hot terrorist, who has been missing from her home since early July. She was lying dead, in boy's clothes, about 100 yards from the Institute, and was found to be poisoned, probably suicide, when she found she couldn't keep up with the others bolting.

It's a problem, as it's impossible to put guards on every bungalow, and these terrorists may try again somewhere else. Thank the Lord, my family is at Home.

Friday 18th November 1932
Young Ogawa gave me some quite interesting information about the various reactionary societies. The Genyosha, it seems, split into the Roninkai under Toyama and the Kokuryukai under Uchida over some minor difference of opinion, but have now joined together again in the Seisanto. The Rosokai under Kita Kazuteru (Ikki) and the Yuzonsha under Okawa Shumei were formed during the Taisho era to combat the growth of socialism and democracy, though the Yuzonsha also aimed at a fundamental reconstruction of Japan on the so-called principle of "the greater empire of Japan". Kita and a man named Mitsukawa (Kametaro) also belonged to this body, but it broke up owing to internal differences, and Okawa thereupon formed the Kochisha, which was mainly composed of young members of the East Asian Economic Investigation Board of the South Manchurian Railway, in which Okawa served many years. Kita, he tells me, was 12 years in China as a Shina Ronin. The Kokuhonsha, according to Ogawa, was formed originally during the war(?) by university students, but after the big earthquake of 1923, it was reorganised on a nation-wide basis, with Hiranuma and others in it, to tide over the crisis that arose at that time.

Thursday 24th November 1932
Commenting on Karakhan's request for the withdrawal of the Japanese mission from Macehvska, Shiratori remarked that he considered it very significant that Karakhan had intimated to Amau that he knew from the outset that Su Ping-wen would never agree to negotiate with the Japanese, as this appears to bear out reports that the Soviet were implicated in Su's uprising. Shiratori asserted that the Soviet hold the predominating influence in Northern Manchuria westward of the Khingans and that they could probably persuade Su to negotiate, therefore, if they wished to do so. The fact that they have not done so, he considers, appears to indicate that they do not want to clear up the situation and that possibly they are hoping to utilise it as a lever to induce Japan to enter into the proposed non-aggression pact. If this is so, he says they are making a great mistake and such an attitude is incompatible with the friendliness hitherto assumed towards Japan.

To dinner at the Soviet Embassy. Had a long talk with Weilschott [the Italian Chargé d'Affaires]. Like most of the leading diplomats here, he is very critical of, and cynical about, the League. Apparently the home governments practically ignore the recommendations of their representatives in Tokyo and insist on keeping up the fiction that China is as well-
organised and competent a state as any in existence and a faithful observer of all her international obligations and agreements instead of being absolutely the reverse in every respect. Yet no one has the courage to get up and say so, lest it damage their trade with China. Trade and money! That's all they think of; yet they try to disguise the fact by mouthing platitudes and altruism.

Friday 25th November 1932

Young Ogawa gave me some quite interesting details of what may be called the rival factions of Ugaki and Araki. Ugaki's principal follower is General Abe, now Commander-in-Chief Formosa, the other leading members of his group being Lt.Gen.s Katsura, Hayashi, Minami, Kanaya, Sugiyama and Ninomiya, and Maj.Gen.s Umezu and Furiyo Mikio. Hayashi, who is now Seibi-kyokuchu at the War Office, was at one time in Berlin as M.A., while Furiyo has also been to Germany. Araki's chief followers are Muto, Mazaki, Koiso, Tatekawa, Hata and Maj. Gen.s Nagata and To the War Minister's official residence for an interview with General Araki. Declaring that the reports of Soviet aid to Su Ping-wen were apparently unfounded, he went on to say that he saw no reason to fear friction between Japanese and Soviet troops in spite of their present close proximity at Manchuli, though he asserted that no special agreement had been reached either for the purpose of avoiding friction or for co-operation for the maintenance of peace and order in the border districts.

Saturday 10th December 1932

After reading an anti-British outburst in the "Kokumin" - the third day in succession - I wondered how any self-respecting paper could write such nonsense, as it was full of mis-statements of fact. Subsequently, in came a cable from London quoting an anti-Japanese tirade by the "Manchester Guardian", and it made me realise that, however idiotic some of the Japanese papers may seem at times, they are no more so than some of our own. The fact that the "Manchester Guardian" is undoubtedly a great paper only makes it all the worse, as people take it seriously. One of its assertions is that China is as good and loyal a member of the League as Britain. What arrant nonsense!

Learned that the Government on the 8th, formally requested the Soviet to extradite Su Ping-wen, but Karakhan flatly refused, whereupon the Soviet was asked on the 9th to ensure that Su does not leave Soviet territory or engage in propagandist activities.

Tuesday 13th December 1932

Two main bits of news today are the announcement of the restoration of Sino-Soviet relations and the British Ambassador's visit to Uchida yesterday to urge Japan to agree to the Conciliation Commission, with the inclusion of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as proposed by Simon. The former has come as a great, and decidedly unwelcome, surprise, though it has been known for some time past that China has been trying to negotiate for a resumption of diplomatic relations. The hitch hitherto has been the precautionary conditions stipulated by China, but in view of the possibility of the Soviet participating in the proposed Conciliation Committee, China has apparently decided to make a special bid for her friendship and has withdrawn all conditions. Result, the Soviet has agreed to resume relations. What the result
will be for the rest of the World remains to be seen, as there is nothing in the new agreement to prevent Moscow from doing its utmost to sovietise the whole of China. That, of course, is what Japan fears more than anything else; and the other Powers, remembering Borodin's activities in the past, can hardly regard the prospect with equanimity.

Looked in to the Embassy for a talk with the British Ambassador about his talk with Uchida and about the Sino-Soviet agreement. According to an "Asahi" despatch (allegedly from Geneva, though the Ambassador suspects it of having been concocted in Tokyo from a "leak") the Ambassador, on instructions from Simon, threatened that Britain would invoke paragraph 4 of Article XV if Japan refuses to agree to the proposed Conciliation Committee with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. included, but the Ambassador confirms what Shiratori said, namely that, far from having uttered any threat, he had strongly urged, as a friend, that Japan should agree to this proposal, as Simon is doing his utmost to avoid the application of paragraph 4 and fears it may be applied automatically if the dispute is not settled by conciliation. The Ambassador himself, however, thinks Simon made a mistake in suggesting the inclusion of the Soviet on the committee, as it provides the Soviet with an excellent opportunity for making mischief. Moscow's sudden resumption of relations with China, in fact, he considers is merely the first outcome of the Simon proposal.

Thursday 22nd December 1932
Adachi's "Kokumin Domei" formally inaugurated with 33 seats in the Diet. With a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine, Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc, and the abolition of the present Cabinet system amongst its principal aims, the new party seems a sort of mixture of fascism, socialism, anti-parliamentarism, and various other -isms, and aims especially at attracting the youth of the nation. Nakano Seigo is, of course, its prime mover.

Saturday 24th December 1932
Matsukata told me quite an interesting thing about Sun Yat-sen à propos of Manchuria. Matsukata, it seems, hid Sun in his house for about a month, on one occasion when Sun fled to Japan for refuge. According to Matsukata, Sun, on that occasion, proposed to Japan that she should scrap the Alliance with Britain and that, in return, China would let Japan retain Manchuria - i.e. if Sun himself got back into power again. Incidentally, I see by Rash Behari Bose's new book, "Indo no Kakumei" ["The Indian Revolution"], which he has just had published in Japanese, that it was Sun Yat-sen who put him up to seeking Toyama's protection when he fled to Japan in 1915.

Tuesday 27th December 1932
Diet to meet again January 20th, when the real work will begin. Generally expected that Govt. will receive its main attacks from the Seiyukai, though that party seems rather divided in opinion as to the advisability of overthrowing the Government.

Reuters have at last agreed to raise my pay. In his letter telling me of London's authorisation, Chancellor tells me the increased rate will be continued till July 25th 1934 and intimates that Reuter will probably then exercise their right to terminate my contract. Provided I can find a job at home, this will suit me better than if I had to stay on till 1935.
Thursday 29th December 1932

Had a visit from Yang of the Chinese Legation - very worried about the Jehol situation and seems convinced that the Japanese are about to launch major operations to seize the whole province and even strike at Peking and Tientsin. Did I think that Britain would take action against Japan if Japan did so, he asked me, and seemed very crestfallen when I replied that, if he meant naval or military action, most certainly no!

Homma rather indicated that, unless a peaceful settlement of the Jehol situation is reached within the next 3 or 4 months, it may be necessary to resort to force in order to clear up the whole matter before the rainy season sets in in June.

The real danger at the moment, as Homma said, is that both the Japanese and the Chinese are so convinced that the others are about to attack, that a serious conflict might break out more or less spontaneously.

Nagi seems much worried about Abrikosov's visits to the Embassy, as he seems to imagine that his friendship with the British Ambassador is merely a veil wherewith to hide some terrible plotting and scheming between the White Russians and Britain against the Soviet!

Monday 2nd January 1933

Tokyo looking very picturesque with its New Year decorations of waving bamboo and pine outside every house and shop; flags flying; everyone, young and old alike, playing shuttlecock out in the streets; and all the small girls in their brightest and gaudiest kimono.

Had a visit from Colonel James, who came to ask my advice regarding a report he has been asked by our War Office to draw up on the situation out here and possible developments, including question "is Japan bluffing?" (Most emphatically "no!", I say) and what would happen if League urged sanctions.

Tuesday 3rd January 1933

There has been a serious clash between the Japanese and the Chinese at Shanhaikwan and this morning it looked rather as though the situation might develop into something really serious, as the Japanese were reported to be launching a combined offensive on the city by land, air, and sea. However, the British Ambassador told me that Col. James had been to the General Staff this morning and had been informed that instructions were being sent to Tientsin and Mukden that everything possible must be done to localise the fighting and prevent its spread into N. China.

Wednesday 4th January 1933

With the fighting at Shanhaikwan halted, official circles here seem hopeful that the conflict will be localised.

Had another visit from Yang of the Chinese Legation, who seems convinced that Japan is about to seize Peking and Tientsin and then attack Jehol from the south, as he asserts that, on account of topographical and strategic considerations, this would be the easiest way.

Thursday 5th January 1933
Contrary to reports in the papers, the object of the British Ambassador's visit to Count Uchida yesterday was to urge him to get Japan to adopt a more conciliatory attitude at Geneva, as the British Govt. is apparently afraid that, unless Japan is prepared to compromise to some extent, it will be difficult to ward off the application of paragraph 4 of Article XV and a head-on collision between Japan and the League may then be unavoidable. Uchida, however, made it quite clear that on two points Japan is inflexible, these being her recognition of Manchukuo as an independent state and her refusal to consider third-party interference in the settlement of the Manchurian question.

The British Ambassador also told me that China contemplates the withdrawal of her Minister from Tokyo shortly, and, in strict confidence, that Troyanovsky has threatened that Moscow proposes to publish all the correspondence with Japan on the proposed non-aggression pact, despite Japan's objection to its publication. Latest cables from Manchuria report the occupation of Pogranichnaya by Japanese troops, which means that they now control the whole Chinese Eastern Railway from Manchuli to Pogranichnaya - some 1,200 kilometres in a direct line, and 1,800 kilometres or so in actual rail distance.

Tuesday 10th January 1933
With the twofold object of preventing the encirclement of the Japanese forces at Shanhaikwan and of cutting off and thereby reducing the offensive powers of four of Chang's brigades in E. Jehol, which are considered to menace the Japanese lines of communication between Chinchow and Shanhaikwan, a Japanese cavalry detachment occupied Chuimenkow, a pass on the Chinese side of the Great Wall just north of Shanhaikwan, this morning. The Japanese claim that it is necessary to hold this pass in order to prevent the further entry of Chang's troops into Jehol.

Wednesday 11th January 1933
Had an interesting letter from Angus, in which he mentions that he carried out a field firing exercise with ball ammunition in the presence of about 10,000 of the local malcontents etc. by way of impressing them with the powers of the rifle and machine gun.

Friday 13th January 1933
Yunganpao, on the Manchurian-Hopeh border a few miles north of Shanhaikwan, reputedly the headquarters of one of the Chinese leaders of "volunteers" operating in Jehol, is the latest point to be occupied by the Japanese in their attempt to quieten the Jehol situation. Acting on instructions from home, the British Ambassador called on Count Uchida at the F.O. this morning to call attention to the threat to British interests in N. China due to the tense situation following on the Shanhaikwan affair.

Saturday 14th January 1933
Had another interesting letter from Angus, in which he mentions catching a couple of terrorists red-handed making bombs, one of the two being killed while trying to escape. He also mentioned that, the terrorists have agents in the Post Office, who open and read letters written by anyone who might give useful information.

Monday 16th January 1933
According to Shiratori, 45 American Army airmen are helping to train the Chinese Air Force for use against Japan. Babb confirms that there are about this number of American aviators so engaged, though ostensibly they are only training them for civilian flying.

Tuesday 17th January 1933

Troyanovsky's threat, about which the British Ambassador told me in confidence on the 5th, has materialised, and Moscow has published the exchange of correspondence between Japan and the Soviet on the question of a non-aggression pact. Whether by coincidence or not, the "Shiunso" has come out with another full-page pronunciamento in the "Japan Times" (previously appearing in the Japanese press on the 14th), this time strongly denouncing Stalin's recent speech and his reference to the necessity of increasing the Soviet's armaments on account of "a certain country which is hesitating to become a party to a non-aggression pact". The "Shiunso" strongly opposes the conclusion of such a pact with the Soviet and, in the course of its argument, asserts that: "sensational indeed are the orders given by the Soviet Communist Party to the Japanese Communists recently. It ordered our communists to assume reactionary ultra-patriotism, pointing out that a right-wing upheaval should precede a left-wing revolution."

In view of the number of former left-wing leaders who have flocked to the Seisanto, and the very radical aims of that body - in spite of the lip service it pays to the throne - there may be something in what the "Shiunso" says.

Wednesday 18th January 1933

Press ban removed this afternoon from the news of the big communist roundup at the end of October. About 2,200 alleged communists were netted in it in different parts of the country, and, according to the official announcement, no less than 6,900 radicals were arrested in the course of last year within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police Board alone.

Apparently the examination of those arrested in connection with the Omori bank raid on October 6th gave some important clues about communist activities and, as a result, police raided a house in Atami shortly before day-break on 30 October and nobbyd eleven of the leaders, who had assembled there for a conference. One of these leaders put up a stiff fight and wounded 4 of the police with an automatic. According to the police, the communists were planning a revolutionary uprising on the supposition that Japan would be plunged into a foreign war over the Manchurian question, and that then would be their chance. The great majority of those arrested are youngsters in their early twenties, many of them coming of wealthy families.

Friday 27th January 1933

Had a long talk with Homma about the Jehol situation and the despatch of recruits to Manchuria. He seems to think now that operations in Jehol are inevitable before long and says that commanders have been warned that, if and when the operations take place, they are to do their best to keep the troops under them from pursuing the Chinese beyond the Great Wall.
Had an interesting talk with Metzger, the Hungarian correspondent, who is anxious for me to meet a man named Yamada Kozo, who, he says, is working with Admiral Arima, General Oshima and others to bring about closer relations with Britain and, if possible, a virtual resumption of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Apparently partly with this object in view, they have formed a society called the "Shingi Doshikai" ("New Spirit Friendly Association?"), and are said to wield considerable influence in the background. According to Metzger, they recommend offering the mandate islands to Britain in return for her co-operation in the Far East, and are anxious to interest British financiers in a scheme for constructing a railway from Peking to Changchun! Both ideas, however, seem rather strange!

Metzger himself, I find, acted as secretary to Col. (then Major) Ando after Ando's departure from England (on account of his unfortunate lapse from sobriety in Oxford Circus!) to serve on the Frontier Limitation Commission in 1922. He tells me he was drunk half the time, so apparently failed to learn his lesson. It seems extraordinary that he should now be back in England as Military Attaché.

See that Prince Konoe is said to have accepted the Presidency of the newly-formed "Dai Asia Kyokai", and that Hirota, General Matsui, and other well-known figures are amongst its leaders. As, however, Shiratori denies the report that he himself is one of the sponsors of this latest phase of Pan-Asianism, and as all kinds of prominent Japanese, whose names appeared on the list of promoters of the Pan-Asiatic Conference at Nagasaki 6 or 7 years ago, denied all connection, it seems possible that the present reports are equally unfounded!

Sunday 29th January 1933

The British Ambassador tells me his call on Uchida yesterday was made on his own account, without any instructions, and that, contrary to Press reports, he made no new proposals. He simply wished to find out if there was any change in the Japanese attitude towards Geneva and was told quite definitely that the Govt. could make no further concession.

Told me also that Bishop Heaslett has been refused permission by the Japanese to visit the Bonins, a refusal which would seem to indicate that something is being done there which the Japanese wish to keep quiet - probably a new naval air station, the British Ambassador thinks.

Tuesday 31st January 1933

Indicating that the time has now come when Japan must make a decision of vital importance to the nation, Uchida went to Okitsu this morning to see Saionji about the final instructions to Geneva, the draft of which was submitted to the Emperor yesterday after a special Cabinet meeting.

Wednesday 1st February 1933

Instructions cabled to Geneva this morning after Uchida had submitted them once more to the Emperor. Shiratori somewhat reticent about their nature, but indicated that Asahi’s conjectures were pretty near the mark. According to that paper, the delegation has been instructed to exert final efforts for conciliation, but to stand firm on insisting on the elimination or modification of the 9th paragraph in the exposé de motifs concerning recognition of
Manchukuo and to insist on the competence of the proposed conciliation committee being limited in accordance with Japan's fixed policy on direct negotiations with China. If conciliation fails, the delegation is not to oppose the application of paragraph 4, but is to wait and see what recommendations are made under it. Then, after the Govt. has examined these recommendations, the final step will be decided.

It seems generally believed that, if the recommendations are too strong for Japan to stomach, she will either withdraw from the League or merely withdraw her delegation from Geneva.

Had a talk with the British Ambassador about his visit to the F.O. this afternoon. He told me in confidence that Uchida had sent for him and had shown him a copy of the instructions just cabled to Geneva.

*Saturday 4th February 1933*

With Metzger in evening to dine at the Hoshigaoka with him and his friend Yamada. Yamada, it seems, was formerly an army officer. His main work now appears to be connected with the "Shingi Doshikai", an organisation with Kiyoura as its President, which was formed after the London Naval Conference - to the results of which it is opposed - with the object of studying the political, financial, and economic problems confronting the country.

*Monday 6th February 1933*

Following their submission to the Throne for approval, instructions were cabled to Geneva in evening, reportedly intimating that the Govt. was not entirely satisfied with the Japanese delegation's latest draft proposals, but that there was no objection to them in principle. While, however, the delegation is still free to seek a solution by conciliation within the limits of its instructions last week, the F.O. seems to have practically given up hope of agreement by conciliation being reached.

*Wednesday 8th February 1933*

Byas, who is leaving for Manilla tomorrow on a short visit, has asked me to act for him as "Times" Correspondent during his absence.

Another visit from Yang - this time to enquire about the press report of Makino's visit to the Embassy last night, so I was able to reassure him that Makino was merely one among 40 guests and that the story of 2 hrs. private talk with the British Ambassador was ridiculous! He also wanted my opinion as to whether Japan was bluffing or not on the non-recognition of Manchukuo question, and seemed rather depressed when I replied most decidedly "No!".

*Friday 10th February 1933*

Shiratori very indignant at League for demanding unequivocal reply as to whether Japan accepts the statement that the present regime in Manchukuo does not constitute a solution to the dispute. Shiratori regards it as a studied insult to Japan that the League should ask her such a question after all the pains she has taken to explain her position. While, however, Japan's reply will presumably be in the negative, the Govt. realises that the situation is now so extremely delicate that the greatest caution is necessary in framing the reply. Matsuoka has, therefore, been instructed to submit a draft to Tokyo for approval before communicating it to the League.
Monday 13th February 1933
Japanese reply to League despatched this evening. Earlier in day Shiratori indicated it would contain an emphatic negative to Geneva's query, while according to press reports it holds the League responsible for the failure of conciliation under paragraph 3 and expresses the intention to submit, under paragraph 5, a refutation of the charges against Japan if paragraph 4 applied. Though reticent as to whether the League's projected recommendations would lead to Japan's withdrawal from the League, Shiratori gave it as his personal belief that withdrawal is now a foregone conclusion.

Thursday 16th February 1933
Nearly lost my temper with Raymond on the subject of the League's handling of the Sino-Japanese dispute, he being a keen supporter and admirer of the League, which he seems to think can do no wrong - and he talked the most utter tosh about Dr. Benes (his own countryman!) and the Czecho-slovaks acting purely out of altruism whereas Britain, he asserted, acted purely from self interest. Damned sauce and utter drivel.

Friday 17th February 1933
Had a visit from Wada, the gendarme, to sound me out about foreign reaction to Japan's possible withdrawal from the League and its likely consequences. When Wada comes to see me, it is always a pretty sure sign that the authorities feel worried!

See that

Monday 20th February 1933
Although no official announcement made, Shiratori leaves no room for doubt that the Cabinet today decided on Japan's secession from the League if the Assembly adopts the recommendations.

The British Ambassador is very disgusted with the British policy at Geneva towards the Manchurian trouble and dubbed the Govt. "asses". He seems to think their policy is partly dictated by a desire to court American favour and expressed a fear lest the U.S. should drag us into trouble with Japan.

Tuesday 21st February 1933
Rung up on the 'phone at 4 a.m. with the news that fighting broke out at 10.30 p.m. at Chaoyanssu on the Jehol border. About 30,000 Chinese are reported concentrated in the triangle Peipiao, Chaoyang, Nanling, facing 2,000 Japanese at Chaoyanssu.

The Reactionaries' influence is once more on the increase as a result of the irritation of national sentiment over the League of Nations.

Had along talk with the British Ambassador on the subject this morning. He, of course, is furious with our own Govt. for what he calls its "slavish adherence to impractical League principles", and fairly gave tongue to his feelings about Lord Cecil and Lord Cecil's letter to "The Times" on June 14th(?). Lord Cecil seems to overlook the all-important fact that the Japanese are far more like ourselves than like other Asiatics in their attitude to threats and
pressure from outside. Incidentally he tells me he has written an absolute snorter to our F.O. re. Lord Cecil whom he UP>rd February 1933

Received cable from London asking me to "get exclusive message to World from Emperor Japan!" London must be mad to make such a request. I cabled back "impossible unthinkable." As, however, London obviously wanted something reassuring, I asked Shiratori if he could get me a brief statement of sorts, either from the Premier or Count Uchida. To my surprise, he rounded on me with the curt retort, "We have no intention to give special favours to Reuters! Our only wish is to break them and drive them out of China, and we shall one day!" He then let forth a string of invective against Reuter whom he accused of being in the pay of the Chinese and of being nothing more nor less than an anti-Japanese propaganda agency.

Sagara tells me that the Japanese Minister to Turkey queried the F.O. on my cable of the 16th re. the prospects of Japan withdrawing from the League. Apparently my cable was sent on from London in such a compressed form that the sense was changed. Very annoying, but obviously due to the necessity of economising words rather than to malice! My "niatelead" sums up the main developments today and serves to interpret them, it reads:"While the intimation that a frontier commission composed of representatives of Japan, Manchukuo and the Soviet is likely to materialise shortly indicates a desire to minimise the dangers of a clash with the Soviet, the announcement that the navy will never agree to give up the Mandate Islands, and that it is prepared to take whatever steps may be deemed necessary if the League attempts to apply an economic boycott, provides a clear warning that Japan is in no mood to be brow-beaten. Meantime, the general concensus of opinion concerning the (British Labour) proposal for an arms embargo is that it would merely irritate, but not seriously inconvenience Japan, who is largely self-supplying."

Saturday 25th February 1933

The League yesterday passed the report and recommendations by 41 votes to 1, namely Japan. Several small countries abstained from voting, among them being Siam, which pleases the Japanese greatly. "At a time when Japan is faced by the unfriendly nations of the West, it is doubly gratifying to find a fellow-Asiatic friend, and the Govt. ought to pay special attention to this when drawing up its future Far East policy," one member declared in the Diet this afternoon. The operations in Jehol have been launched under almost Arctic conditions in raging snow storm with the temperature about 30 degrees below freezing point. With extreme climatic conditions and difficult mountains to contend, it will be a real test of endurance for the Japanese troops and their training in "setchu kogun" [marching in the snow] should stand them in good stead.

Monday 27th February 1933

According to Shiratori, actual withdrawal from the League will probably not take place till the latter part of March, as the Cabinet will require another 10 or 12 days to complete the necessary preparations, after which the Privy Council will have to consider the details proposed. Meantime, opinion favouring continued participation in other international
conferences under League auspices appears to be growing, though no final decision has yet been reached.

With the combined Japanese and Manchukuo forces continuing their rapid advance from various points, organised resistance appears to have crumbled already in a large part of Jehol, and Homma seems well satisfied with the comparative ease and rapidity with which success has so far been achieved. He admitted, however, that a tougher proposition probably lies ahead when the Japanese bump up against the Chinese regulars, who are reported preparing stiff resistance along the line iff engagements en route.

Friday 3rd March 1933
Bad tidal wave and quake along N.E. coast. 1,535 dead, 948 missing.

Meantime the operations in Jehol seem nearing completion. Leaving the Chinese no time to recover, the Japanese are continuing their customary tactics of keeping the enemy on the run and pressing forward relentlessly in pursuit. The Kawahara vanguard has already entered Pingchuan.

Saturday 4th March 1933
In addition to the capture of Jehol City, the Japanese also reached the Great Wall at Lingkou today and, having driven the Chinese through the pass, closed it and made no attempt to pursue into N. China. True, there are 3 more passes to close yet; so there is still a chance that they may be unable to break off the operations at those points.

Friday 10th March 1933
Looks rather as though the Japanese are having a tougher job than they expected in the final stages of the main operations in Jehol and it may be necessary after all, according to Shiratori, to enter N. China. The Japanese Legation in Peking, he told us this morning, has been instructed to attempt to negotiate with the Chinese for the withdrawal of their troops that are being concentrated around Kupeikou, as otherwise the Japanese may be compelled to send troops into N. China in order to take the pass from the rear. One difficulty, however, is to find some responsible Chinese with whom to negotiate, as Chang, holding himself responsible for the Jehol debacle, has resigned. Shiratori indicated that, in return for Chinese withdrawal, Japan will attempt also to negotiate for the creation of a neutral zone along the Great Wall from Shanhaikwan.

Yurenev, the new Soviet ambassador, arrived at Tsuruga this afternoon and, according to Rengo, told the press that one of his main tasks on assuming his post in Tokyo would be to try to negotiate the non-aggression pact.

Saturday 11th March 1933
Babb tells me that Homma, whom he went to see this morning about the situation in N. China, remarked in all seriousness: "The question of peace or war in N. China hangs in the balance." Homma's personal opinion was that Chiang Kai-shek's visit to N. China was intended for the purpose of controlling the domestic situation there, lest some of the other Chinese "war-lords" attempt to seize it now that Chang has resigned, rather than for the purposes of making any serious attempt to win back Jehol.
Sunday 12th March 1933
Had a long cable from Chancellor about my letter of the 8th. It has fairly stirred him up, as he says he takes a "serious view" of the cutting I sent him and offers to issue a "strong denial" of the accusations it makes against the Japanese. The message in question, he says, was sent by W.H. Donald - one of Chang's advisers - and was released by error in Shanghai by a junior member of the staff, who thought it was from our own correspondent. Incidentally, he mentions that Yorke is an amateur, who has only been 3 months in China and is "no longer in our employ".

Monday 13th March 1933
Homma thinks the possibility that the Japanese may have to cross the Great Wall has decreased over the weekend, though he emphasised that future developments are dependent on whether Chiang really intends to continue fighting. The fact, however, that he has accepted Chang's resignation and appointed a one-time pro-Japanese Chinese as Mayor of Peking is considered a hopeful sign.
Regarding the requisition of motor trucks in Japan, Homma tells me (not for publication) that only 200 are being requisitioned and that they are to be used purely for transportation of provisions and material for the troops in Jehol, as there are no railways or other means of transport or communications there - and many of the trucks employed in the recent operations have been damaged and require replacement.
I told Chancellor of Shiratori's confirmation of Homma's recent admission that much of the "information", accusing Reuter of being in Chinese pay, came from foreign sources, Shiratori even going so far as to say "American journalists". Obviously therefore the U.P. or someone with an axe to grind, is trying to discredit Reuters.

Tuesday 14th March 1933
Britain has now given up the arms embargo, as no other country has followed her example. It seems extraordinary that we ever proclaimed the embargo without first sounding out other countries as to the likelihood of their doing the same.

Wednesday 15th March 1933
Some of the Japanese papers are making somewhat critical remarks about Britain, to the effect that she "places monetary considerations before justice". This is, of course, à propos of the way in which our policy towards the questions of Manchuria, arms embargo etc. are seemingly dictated more by a desire to keep in with the U.S. on account of the question of War Debts than by a purely disinterested judgement. It is very riling to have such aspersions cast at us, and it is even more disgusting to feel that they are seemingly not wholly unmerited. This is quite clear from what the British Ambassador has told me a different times.

Friday 17th March 1933
The F.O. according to Shiratori, is rather peeved with Matsuoka for his outspoken advocacy of a non-aggression pact with Holland over the Dutch East Indies and for his remarks in England about the necessity of some sort of Anglo-Japanese-U.S. alliance to take the place
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as he points out that Matsuoka has no authority to speak on such matters.

Saturday 18th March 1933
Had a talk with Iwanaga on the general situation and learned from him that, not only are the various Japanese ambassadors abroad complaining of the embarrassment constantly caused to them by Shiratori's provocative remarks to the press, but that Arita rang up Furuno a day or two ago to ask him to refrain from inserting Shiratori's "irresponsible" comments in the Rengo radio broadcasts. It is truly amazing that, in spite of this, Shiratori continues to hold his post as F.O. spokesman! Iwanaga himself is at a loss to explain who exactly is the powerful influence behind Shiratori, but presumably the General Staff has something to do with it.

Iwanaga also told me that Matsuoka was chosen as Japan's chief spokesman at Geneva because he himself has always been a keen advocate of Manchurian independence as the best guarantee for peace and order in the Far East, and could therefore speak with conviction when putting forward Japan's case - which none of the Japanese career diplomats in Europe could.

Friday 24th March 1933
The "Japan Advertiser" carries another very interesting instalment of an article on Komai Tokuzo. He is described as "one of the lineage of proud Ronin"; he did not always see eye to eye with those in authority; he "connived" with Kuo Sung-lin in his revolt against Chang Tso-lin and was bitterly disappointed that there was no far-sighted man in the saddle in Japan at the time to realise the advantage of backing Kuo.

Saturday 25th March 1933
I must say that the more I see of press work, the more I become convinced that the majority of papers in all countries do far more harm than good where international politics and understanding are concerned - greater breeders of international friction and discord, in fact, than even the League.

Monday 27th March 1933
Japan notified the League of its intention to secede.

Received a further batch of sensational clippings. The "Daily Express" seems only equalled as a mischief-maker by the "Mainichi". The latter seems bent on stirring up ill-feeling against the U.S. and seems to scent out a fresh "plot" about every other day.

Friday 31st March 1933
See Sir Edmund Ovey, British Ambassador at Moscow, has been recalled in connection with the Anglo-Soviet dust up over the arrest of the Metropolitan Vickers' men.

Monday 3rd April 1933
To dinner with Count Soyeshima.

Soyeshima was very outspoken in his criticism of the Army in general and Araki in particular concerning the way they have taken things into their own hands. He was even more critical of Count Uchida and Shiratori, and asserted that not only is the latter disliked and distrusted by the whole F.O. (except Uchida), but that the Imperial Household officials are up in arms
against him because of his alleged discourteous attitude when making his weekly report to the Emperor and because of his alleged failure to interpret correctly when called upon to interpret for foreign diplomats at audiences with the Emperor. It is because of the embarrassment caused them by Shiratori's indiscreet remarks to the Press, so Soyeshima says, that Debuchi, alone of all the Japanese ambassadors returned to Tokyo during the past year or so, has agreed to return to his post. The others have all refused to do so, so long as Shiratori is left so free a hand.

Incidentally he said that Shiratori is now trying to get Matsudaira removed from London, though so far without success. Matsudaira, however, is apparently very upset with the way things are going and is constantly writing privately to Soyeshima, who, however, has to burn all his letters lest they get him into trouble!

He, Soyeshima, is apparently - or anyway was - on the blacklist with the Army on account of his outspoken criticisms in the course of an address he delivered some time back. According to Soyeshima, the Cabinet was more or less forced into agreeing to withdrawal from the League, though all but three of the ministers were opposed to secession, Saito himself being very opposed to it. Matsuoka, too, was against withdrawal, according to Soyeshima, and was very upset about it. He is very critical, too, of the police, especially over their "heresy hunts" for "Reds". According to him, the police themselves are trying to discredit leading peers and millionaires by trumping up charges of Communism against their sons and daughters. One of his own sons, it seems, was recently arrested with six other students and locked up for 24 hours on the grounds of "dangerous thoughts". It so happened, however, that he had a letter from Prince Takamatsu in his pocket, and, on finding who he was, the police hurriedly released him with a warning that he should say nothing about what had happened.

Tuesday 4th April 1933
Dined at Club in evening with Dr. Baty, the others present being a number of young F.O. men, and Medley, Patterson, and Julian Grande. The last named has been "Daily Telegraph" Correspondent at Geneva ever since the League came into being and is a most interesting old fellow. "The plotting ground of Europe", is his description of Geneva, which he says is run by Jews, Jesuits, and Jezabels! It is, he asserts, the happy hunting ground of cranks and hypocrites. One reason, according to him, for the League's championship of China is the Secretariat's wish to ingratiate themselves with China in order to obtain more jobs there and to retain the jobs they have already got by justifying the existence of all the "experts" lent to China. These "experts" - Rachmann, Haas etc. - are consequently nothing more than Chinese propagandists, with axes of their own to grind. Walter Young, who accompanied the Lytton Commission, is likewise a Chinese propagandist pure and simple.

The pre-War methods of "secret diplomacy" doubtless had defects, but the more I see and hear, the more I am inclined to believe they were less pernicious in the long run. "Open diplomacy" requires that the public be kept fully informed of all that is going on, and mob psychology is promptly brought into play.

Thursday 6th April 1933
Julian Grande has an immense admiration and liking for Sir John Simon, and was very amusing about the way in which he, Simon, refused to fall into the trap set for him by Stimson, who hoped to use Britain as a cat's paw in bringing pressure to bear on Japan. Stimson, he says, has never forgiven him for it.

Of Lord Cecil he said the extraordinary thing is that, so long as he is at Geneva, there is no greater defender of British interests, but as soon as he gets back to England he promptly degenerates into an internationalist crank. Ramsay Macdonald apparently recognises this, for he remarked to Grande on one occasion that if only Cecil could be induced to remain permanently in Geneva, it would be the best thing for England, as he is invaluable there but an out-and-out nuisance in England!

One interesting yarn he told us about Ramsay MacDonald was that when MacDonald was in Geneva in 1919, both he and Henderson - and Bernard Shaw - were strongly suspect as traitors and were closely watched by our Secret Service agents. Grande himself and his wife had been doing "hush hush" work in Switzerland during the War but both of them were convinced that the suspicions about MacDonald & Co. were unfounded and they disliked having to assist in watching them. Finally a secret report on them, which was intended for Sir Horace Rumbold, who was at that time our Minister to Switzerland, somehow or other fell into MacDonald's hands. MacDonald & Co. thereupon passed it on to Rumbold with the remark, "I am keeping a copy of this document for my own information!" Rumbold, of course, is now ambassador to Berlin, with Ramsay MacDonald as premier - a strange turn in the wheel of fate!

Of the much-vaunted Benes, who poses as a great and altruistic statesman, Grande remarked: "He is the greatest crook in Europe"!

Saturday 8th April 1933

It is all wrong that Americans should be made correspondents for British papers, when British journalists are available and looking for jobs. With the exception of "The Times", there is not a single British paper represented in Tokyo by a British subject.

Latest development in Soviet-Manchukuo dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway is that the Manchukuo have disconnected the line at Manchuli in order to prevent any further transference of rolling stock.

Sunday 9th April 1933

Spoke to Vivian [Naval Attaché] on the question of Americans being appointed as correspondents for British papers in preference to British. He seemed much interested and surprised, and, off his own bat, said he would write to the D.N.I. [Director Naval Intelligence] about it to see if some pressure could be brought to bear on the people at home about it.

Wednesday 12th April 1933

Learned from Shiratori that Simon yesterday handed Matsudaira six months’ notice of intention to abrogate the Indo-Japan Commercial Convention of 1904, presumably so as to leave the way open to permit the passage of the Anti-Dumping Act by removal of "the most-favoured-nation" clause. A bad blow for Japan.
Takahashi, rather surprisingly, informed the Press this evening that he intends to resign as soon as the preliminary examination of those concerned in the May 15th outrages is completed - probably early next month. His intention to resign has, of course, been rumoured for some time past, but he had hitherto declined to confirm the report. As he is really the mainstay of the present Cabinet, it will be interesting to see if he can be replaced without bringing about the resignation of the whole Cabinet and thereby precipitating another serious political crisis.

Commenting on the fighting in N. China, Homma told Babb this afternoon that the Japanese want to drive the Chinese across the Lwanho, but will withdraw to the Great Wall again as soon as this object has been accomplished.

Friday 14th April 1933

Shiratori revealed the possibility of Japan's withdrawal from the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, following secession from the League.

To Embassy in morning to say goodbye to the British Ambassador, who leaves for home on 6 months leave tomorrow. Tells me Uchida seems rather worried at the signs of the boycott spreading in China once more and at the possibility of Japan being compelled to take steps if it does. Also told me that Makino and Saionji are hoping to keep Saito in power, though a Cabinet reorganisation will probably be necessary. The Ambassador says Uchida took the notification of the abrogation of the Indo-Japanese Convention very calmly and seemed to understand the position.

Wednesday 19th April 1933

Feeling, in fact, is running pretty high, the Japanese being apparently convinced that Lancashire was responsible for the Indian Govt.'s decision to abrogate the treaty with Japan and that it is also all part and parcel of the League's scheme to bring economic pressure to bear on Japan. The Japanese are also very sore that the Treaty should be cancelled as soon as the balance of trade with India turns, for the first time, in favour of Japan.

Commenting on reports that the Soviet is prepared to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway for $100,000,000 Shiratori revealed that Hirota, when Ambassador to Moscow, broached the question of its sale to Karakhan without authority from Tokyo, thereby compelling the Govt. to disavow his action. Karakhan has now intimated to Ota that "if the Chinese wanted to purchase the railway", the Soviet would be prepared to consider its sale. The F.O. seems inclined to interpret this as meaning that the Soviet would be prepared to sell to Manchukuo.

Thursday 20th April 1933

The famous Kirin-Tunghwa Railway has now been extended to the Tumen and is to be opened to traffic shortly, so Japan's dream, which Chang made impossible of realisation, will soon materialise now.

Tuesday 25th April 1933

Was interested to meet Komai Tokuzo, as I had never met him before, and he was very frank and outspoken. His most interesting assertion was that the promise contained in the
Manchukuo's declaration of independence regarding the Open Door and Equal Opportunity presupposed reciprocity; consequently the promise hold good only in the case of countries formally recognising Manchukuo. Such an interpretation is, of course, perfectly logical, though it is likely to call forth strong criticism. He said that, in practice, they were quite prepared to accord equal opportunity to individuals and firms friendly to Manchukuo, even though they represented countries withholding recognition. His remarks arose out of our questioning him about the projected formation of a Japan-Manchukuo economic bloc, which would accord favoured tariff treatment to Japan. Incidentally, as the nations of the World seem set on raising both immigration bars and tariff barriers against Japan, it seems essential to let her have a favourable outlet somewhere, and where better than Manchuria? To keep both her people and her goods bottled up is simply asking for trouble in years to come.

Had an interesting talk with Komai on the Kuo Sung-lin revolt, in which he himself was concerned. Both C.T. Wang and Feng Yu-hsiang, he said, were behind Kuo, who planned to rid Manchuria of the corruption and maladministration of the Chang regime and to establish an autonomous govt. at Mukden, guaranteeing to respect Japanese rights and interests. Komai himself did his best to persuade the Japanese authorities to back Kuo, morally if not actively, as he felt convinced of both Kuo's and Wang's sincerity, and felt certain that a well-administered autonomous Manchuria friendly to Japan would be of immense benefit. The Japanese authorities - Kodama, Shiratori, Ugaki etc. - however, rejected his advice and adopted a neutral attitude which, in actual fact, helped Chang and severely handicapped Kuo. Chang, in the meantime, had made all kinds of promises in the extremity of his distress, but forgot them all as soon as the danger was past. By then, of course, it was too late to do anything, though Kodama subsequently went to Komai and apologised for the mistake he had made in rejecting his advice.

Other interesting points brought out by Komai included that even after the kiaoliang has grown up again, bandit attacks on trains will be far harder than last year, owing to the growing of kiaoliang being prohibited within 500 yards of the railway on either side.

Friday 5th May 1933

Shiratori revealed that there had been some pretty plain talking at Moscow on 24 April, when Karakhan told Ota that it is futile for Japan to pretend that the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute is no concern of hers and that it is a matter for settlement between the Soviet and Manchukuo. The Soviet, he said, is anxious to settle the question as soon as possible and to settle it direct with Japan.

Meantime, Yurenev has informed Arita that the Soviet is unable to accept the Japanese version of the recent frontier incident at Pogranichnaya, when Japanese troops are alleged to have entered Soviet territory. Following the revelation of this exchange of asperities, it was disclosed this evening that Arita had proposed to Yurenev a conference between Japan, the Soviet, and Manchukuo in Tokyo to seek a solution of outstanding differences arising from the Soviet's interests in Manchuria e.g. the Chinese Eastern Railway situation, Pogranichnaya incident and rights of navigation on the Sungari.
Saturday 6th May 1933

To Embassy in morning for talk with Sansom about the proposed Anglo-Japanese trade talk in London. He seems to think that the resentment against Britain over the abrogation of the Indo-Japanese Commercial Convention etc. is largely bluster and need not be taken too seriously, though he seems rather bitter about it and thinks it time that we took a strong stand and told Japan a few home truths. Japan fails to appreciate the favourable treatment she has received from us up to now by our former Free Trade policy and by our allowing her ships to trade between our ports - benefits and privileges which she has never attempted to reciprocate. Moreover, hitherto there has been no Empire preference, and Japan was free to compete with British goods in any British possession, whereas Japan has always had favoured treatment in Korea and Formosa, by making them into a single economic bloc with herself. Incidentally, when Britain complained about rice and pig iron from India being kept out from Japan, Japan admitted that this action might be contrary to the spirit of the Indian-Japanese Agreement, but said it was within the letter and that, in any case, she didn't mind if the Treaty was scrapped. Now, only a few years later, she expresses great indignation because it is to be abrogated.

Snow seems very worried over Matsuoka's broadcast, in which he asserted that "Britain's sudden change of front against Japan" was due to her fear of an anti-British boycott in S. China. He says that Matsuoka knows perfectly well that this is false, as Simon explained the whole position to him while he was in London.

Rung up by Rengo in evening with news that the Soviet has offered to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan.

Monday 8th May 1933

Shiratori confirmed Litvinov's offer to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway and said Litvinov intimated to Ota that the offer was open either to Japan or Manchukuo. Ota pointed out that this would be tantamount to Soviet recognition of Manchukuo, to which Litvinov replied he was well aware of this, but didn't mind, as the Soviet was not a signatory of the League resolution against recognition. Moscow's proposal appears to indicate the Soviet's anxiety to clear up the situation and to liquidate their interests in Manchuria so as to remove the main source of future friction. It is possible, too, that it may be a bid for Japanese friendship, in the hope that Japan, which is seemingly hovering between a desire for friendship with Britain or with Russia - like in 1900 - may be induced to try out Prince Ito's old suggestion of friendship with the latter; as, with the Soviet military menace thus largely removed, there will not be the same fear of a clash as before.

The Japanese have launched a new offensive South of the Great Wall as per their recent warning, and it looks as though they really intend to teach the Chinese a lesson this time; though, as Homma remarked: "The Chinese hope to lure us into advancing into Peking and Tientsin in order to cause complications with the other Powers, but we are jolly well not going to fall into the trap"!
According to information reaching the War Office, **T.V. Soong** has cabled from Washington urging Nanking not to conclude an armistice, as he hopes to persuade the U.S. to intervene if the Japanese can be drawn into Peking.

**Thursday 11th May 1933**

Colonel James rang me up to see if I could tell him anything about the new offensive south of the Great Wall.

It certainly looks as though the Japanese intended to drive on over the Luanho and swing westward along the old mandarin road to Peking.

**Homma**'s comment is: "I should like to let Britain and America know that we are not going to seize Peking, but I can't say so, as we don't want the Chinese to know it"!

**Saturday 13th May 1933**

News that **Yurenev** had called Uchida at the F.O. this evening with the intimation that the Soviet is prepared to recognise Manchukuo if they purchase the Chinese Eastern Railway.

**Monday 15th May 1933**

**Arita** unexpectedly resigned and **Shigemitsu** is to replace him as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Two possible explanations are current. One - the more probable - is that it is the outcome of friction with **Shiratori** who, it seems, has been complaining bitterly of Arita keeping him in the dark about various matters (cf. also **Iwanaga**'s remarks vide 19/3). The other is that, as Arita is a brother of Yamamoto Teijiro, one of the leaders of the Seiyukai, it may be in part due to the present rather delicate situation between the Cabinet and the Seiyukai.

Meantime, affairs in Europe are none too reassuring, and Germany is breathing threats of rearming for a war of revenge and continuing her anti-Jewish campaign.

**Tuesday 16th May 1933**

Fukuoka tells me **Arita** told **Iwanaga** personally that his resignation was the outcome of friction with **Shiratori** and **Tani**, head of the Asiatic Bureau. Shiratori's blunt comments and indiscreet remarks, it seems, have long been a source of embarrassment to Japanese ambassadors abroad as well as to Arita, and both Shiratori and Tani worked hard for withdrawal from the League and more or less forced the Govt.'s hands in a number of ways, advocating policies contrary to those advocated by Arita and others. Finally, therefore, Uchida was persuaded to remove Shiratori from his post and offered him the Ministership to Sweden. Shiratori, however, took the line that it takes two to make a quarrel and therefore induced Uchida to move Arita too; so Arita was offered the ambassadorship to Turkey. It was done in such a way, however, that he flatly declined and handed in his resignation from the Service.

Alsot tells me that last year, when he jokingly reproved young Fleisher for exaggerating the seriousness of Soviet-Japanese friction (apparently he cabled that war between the two was imminent), Fleisher frankly admitted that he himself did not consider the friction likely to come to a head, but that his paper in America like stories to which sensational headlines could be put, so he purposely made his cables as sensational as possible.

**Tuesday 23rd May 1933**
Although Press despatches appear to indicate the virtual investment of Peking by the Japanese, the War Office asserts that these reports are very inaccurate and exaggerated. Meantime the Cabinet is said to have decided that although the Soviet's right to control the Chinese Eastern Railway is incontestable, Moscow's claim to actual ownership is open to doubt. Consequently Japan will offer her own good offices if the Manchukuo wants them for negotiations to purchase the right of control over the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Wednesday 24th May 1933

Shiratori confirmed the Chinese proposal for a truce agreement and revealed the main details of it as he said it was all right to cable abroad.

About 5.30 or so, along came Col. Aoki from the War Office, very upset about the whole matter, as the Army had apparently promised the Chinese to keep the negotiations "hush hush" until completed.

Wednesday 31st May 1933

Sino-Japanese truce signed at Tangku.

Meantime, however, Feng Yu-hsiang and others are trying to capitalise the truce by raising "patriotic" cries against Nanking for having agreed to it. Canton is doing likewise.

Looked in to see Kurusu about the progress of the proposed Anglo-Japanese trade conference and was surprised to learn from him that the reported British reply appearing in the Japanese papers is purely fictitious, as no reply has been received as yet, owing to Simon's absence at Geneva. The whole thing had been concocted by one of the Press reporters, who got tired of waiting for the British reply.

Had a long talk on this subject of Press ethics with Chancellor. If Reuters refused to supply the kind of stuff the papers want, they would simply go elsewhere for it and Reuters would have to "shut up shop".

Saturday 3rd June 1933

Later went to Embassy and was tackled by Snow and the others about the Rengo-A.P. contract, about which they appear much concerned, as they seem afraid it may mean the substitution of the American A.P. for the British Reuter as the medium for news entering Japan through Rengo.

I was rather surprised to hear that our own F.O. has instructed the Embassy to use its influence with the Japanese F.O. to prevent the Rengo-A.P. contract being concluded.

Monday 5th June 1933

Amau, who recently returned from Moscow, where he had been Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy, took over from Shiratori as F.O. Spokesman, Shiratori having been appointed Minister to Sweden - much against his will!

Tuesday 6th June 1933

Had another very blunt talk with Iwanaga, who told me he had learned from the F.O. that Sir Roderick [Jones] had asked both Mr. Matsudaira and our own F.O. to use their influence to prevent the signing of the A.P. contract. He spoke very bitterly of this action, and said that not only did he regard it as a slight on Rengo's management of its own affairs, but that he had
made it quite clear to the Japanese F.O. that Rengo would brook no interference in such matters from them. I rather curse myself for not having tried to dissuade Chancellor from suggesting to Sir Roderick that he should see Matsudaira. I would, of course, have known nothing about it if it had not been that Chancellor asked me to help him code the cable in which the suggestion was made.

Had an interesting talk with Sansom about the unfortunate growth of anti-British feeling in Japan. Sansom agrees that the future potentialities of the situation are really serious. Incidentally, a despatch just received from our own Consul General in Abyssinia, which he showed me, provides an interesting commentary to his assertion, for it says that British merchants there are continually complaining of Japanese competition but that their complaint is hardly justified, as Japanese success is primarily due to the efficiency, hard work and initiative shown by the Japanese traders in those parts.

Wednesday 7th June 1933

Learned from Langley that the Canadian Legation is intensely interested in the outcome of the Rengo-A.P. contract, as Mr. Marler is fearful lest, as a result of the new agreement, Canadian news might, in future, be filtered through an American instead of a British agency.

Thursday 8th June 1933

In evening dined at Nagi's house, where also were Byas, Alsot, Golkovitch and Jelezniaoff. The latter seemed much interested in the havoc wrought by the series of explosions that occurred last night at the Hamamatsu military air base and seemed to think it might even serve to modify Japan's attitude toward the question of air bombing, as, he contends, the damage to the technical schools and workshops, as well as to the bombing machines, is a matter of vital concern to Japanese air-power. Personally I think he greatly over-rates the extent of the damage done, though there seems little doubt that the War Office is purposely minimising the press reports on the subject.

Friday 9th June 1933

F.O. very worried at the tariff barriers being raised against Japan in India and other British possessions. Amau asserting this morning that, with Britain owning 1/5th of the World's surface and of its population, it raises a question of life and death for Japan. It is now the most serious problem facing the country, he declared.

Tuesday 13th June 1933

Had another talk with Iwanaga on the A.P.-Rengo contract, in which he explained the seriousness of Rengo's financial position was such that it was impossible to pay the former heavy service charges to Reuter without the danger of going bust.

Metzger tells me there was a bit of a scene yesterday when the members of the German community forgathered to discuss what attitude to adopt toward Hitlerism, as Don Gato, whose real name is apparently Zahnder, was taken to task for assuming a foreign name and for using foreign words when addressing such a meeting on German nationalism! He was also taken to task for slanging the German Consul-General at Yokohama.

Saturday 17th June 1933
Had a visit from Kinney, who is over here on a short visit. Gave me some very interesting
t sidelights on the Lytton Commission, especially on Lord Lytton himself. Apparently he was
terribly overbearing and put up everyone’s backs, including even those of his fellow members.
When he declared he would refuse to enter Manchuria without Wellington Koo, he spoke on
behalf of the whole Commission, though in actual fact the other members were fully prepared
to enter either with or without Koo.

Friday 23rd June 1933
Drew Nagi’s attention to the appearance of new posters stuck to telegraph poles etc.
demanding severance of relations with Soviet Russia. On my drawing his attention to this,
Nagi laughed one of his cynical, caustic laughs, and told me that, only a few days ago, some
of the Osaka businessmen were suggesting to him that Japan and the Soviet should join
hands against the common enemy, Britain, and seek to save the Indians from British tyranny!
Curiously enough, America, which was, until recently, the main butt for abuse, is now Japan’s
"blue-eyed boy"!

Saturday 24th June 1933
In course of talk with Nagi about Soviet aircraft, he asserted that at Vladivostok there are 5-
engined bombers which could come over to Tokyo or Osaka, spend 3 hours in operation over
Japan, and return to their base without difficulty. He reckoned that, if a fleet of 40 came over,
they could pretty well blow either Tokyo or Osaka to pieces at a cost of not more than half
their number brought down.
Regarding the negotiations, which are to open on Monday in Tokyo, for the sale of the
Chinese Eastern Railway, he remarked that the Japanese are likely to find themselves sadly
deluded if they imagine they are going to get the railway at a cheap figure. Incidentally he
mentioned that the Soviet delegates, Kazlovsky and Kuznetsof, had a great sendoff from
Vladivostok and were given an aerial escort at the start.

Monday 26th June 1933
Latest Editorial Log to hand records the fact that the "Daily Mail" had rung up Reuter to ask
how far Peiping was from Peking. A pretty good query for a paper boasting of a 2,000,000
circulation!

Wednesday 5th July 1933
Following publication last night of Soviet memorandum on the Chinese Eastern Railway
negotiations with offer to sell railway for 210,000,000 gold roubles plus 40,000,000 for
property, the Manchukuo delegation this afternoon made public their own proposals, which
include an offer of 750,000,000 for the purchase i.e. only one-tenth of the price asked by the
Soviet! A further statement was issued this evening by the Manchukuo refuting the Soviet’s
claim to ownership of the railway!

Tuesday 11th July 1933
On the way to office, noticed a number of police around the Premier's residence, and on
going down to the office learned that about 50 members of the Seisanto had been arrested
over night on suspicion of being concerned in a plot to assassinate the Premier and a number
of other Cabinet Ministers etc.. As the British Embassy is one of several buildings placed precautionarily under special police protection on account of the suspected plot, Sagara thinks the police fear that the Seisanto, who, thanks to Bose & Co., are apparently behind the present anti-British campaign, might have planned to attack it as well. Cunningham, however, to whom I mentioned this, seemed somewhat sceptical!

Monday 17th July 1933
See that yesterday's Japan Times reproduces a very ill-informed, anti-Japanese tirade on the tariff question from the "Daily Herald".

Tuesday 18th July 1933
Was interested to hear that Snow had sent a despatch to the F.O. in London calling their attention to the gross distortion of facts and anti-Japanese bias in the Daily Herald article.

Friday 21st July 1933
It disgusts one to read, time and again, in the Reuter Editorial Log, how Reuter "leads the field" in obtaining intimate details of this, that, or the other spicy bit of news. Of course the unfortunate Lindberghs provide the most classic and tragic examples of bad taste and utter heartlessness on the part of reporters. A truly pestilential crowd.

Tuesday 25th July 1933
Court martial of military cadets concerned in the 15/5 outrages opened this morning. In line with these trials, the police are continuing to press their investigations into the Seisanto's Tuesday 11th plot and seemed to have proved pretty conclusively that the "Shimpeitai", or "God's Soldiers", were definitely planning further acts of murder and outrage.

Wednesday 26th July 1933
Yesterday's naval court martial brought forth the curious revelation that the plotters, having learned that Charlie Chaplin, who was then on a visit to Japan, was to call on Inukai, seriously considered the assassination of both together! His murder, it was contended, would serve to bring about a war with America.

Learned from Amau that Japan may perhaps contest France's claims to the islands she has just occupied between Indochina and the Philippines. It seems that on three occasions since 1918, Japanese business enterprises have petitioned their own Govt. to claim them, but no action has ever actually been taken. Their main - if not their only value - lies in the existence of phosphate deposits.

Friday 28th July 1933
Kobe Chronicle contains translation of article in Hi-no-de by a Rear-Admiral Inji Sosa, bitterly anti-British, full of distortions, and discussing the possibilities of an Anglo-Japanese War.

Saturday 29th July 1933
Snow spoke to me about Inji's article, on which he is sending a despatch to London.

Sunday 30th July 1933
Returned to Tokyo in evening, travelling back with von Etzdorf and a German artillery colonel, Oetz(?) or some such name, who is now attached to an artillery regiment in Nagoya and speaks very highly of their efficiency. He is, I believe, the first German officer to be attached
to the Japanese Army since the War, and expects to go on later to the Staff College in Tokyo. There is also a German major-general, Kestering (?) by name, out here just now, but apparently he is no longer on the active list. Von Etzdorf tells me that a German Naval Attaché is to be sent out here shortly - the first since the War.

**Tuesday 1st August 1933**

Dr. Baty has just been recalled from Chusenji in connection with the question of disputing France's claims to the islands between Indochina and the Philippines.

**Friday 11th August 1933**

Air defence exercises ended with a final "air raid" shortly after 4 a.m. after a night disturbed by successive raids, with their accompaniment of screeching sirens and clanging bells warning the good people of Tokyo of the approach of "invading" aircraft. On the whole, the exercises have been carried out very realistically, with flares dropped by the raiding aircraft to represent bombing, with smoke screens, mimic gas attacks, and even artificially controlled fires and explosions, while lighting control etc. at night time and the plunging of the whole city into darkness left little to be desired. Add to this the machine gun and A.A. gun firing, the collection of "casualties", the "panic control" etc. by organised bodies of reservists and Y.M.A.'s, and the ready co-operation of the whole civilian population - and you get probably as near an approximation to the real thing as is possible in peace time.

**Tuesday 15th August 1933**

Statements made at the court martial of the naval officers concerned in the 15/5 Affair continue to provide matter for amazement! At today's trial it was revealed, inter alia, that plans to assassinate the American Ambassador and Consul-General were considered by the plotters, who, in addition to planning the assassination of Ugaki, Takarabe, Okada, Taniguchi and several other high naval officers, also conceived the idea of seizing some naval planes at Kasumigaura and carrying out an air raid on Tokyo in order to create panic and necessitate the application of Martial Law!

**Wednesday 16th August 1933**

Wards tells me the British garrison in Shanghai is to be reduced to only one battalion shortly, the other one being transferred to Hong Kong, which is eventually to have five. Confidentially he said it has been decided to scrap Shaforce entirely in the near future. Had a great discussion about the standard of the Japanese army compared to others. Its value as a fighting force has apparently been marked down very considerably in England and elsewhere as a result of somewhat superficial observations by British and other officers in the Shanghai operations last year.

Col. Gressit, D.M.I. Simla, who was over here on a short visit last week, apparently tried to gauge the standard at which they should be rated by asking how a Japanese division would compare in military value with an Indian or Bulgarian division; but as Wards aptly put it, you might just as well try to compare an orange with an apple!
Another remark giving food for thought is one by Dr. Nitobe at the opening of the Banff Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Monday. "Nations in danger of economic strangulation," he warned, "would eventually resort to force in order to improve their positions". This is certainly a point that cannot be emphasised too strongly.

Monday 21st August 1933

Amau revealed that the Chargé d'affaires in Paris, under instructions from Tokyo, presented a communication to the French Govt. on Saturday objecting to the French occupation of the islands off Indochina.

Wednesday 23rd August 1933

Amau revealed that, in the communication handed to the French Govt. on Saturday, Japan definitely claimed "sovereign rights and interests" over the islands in question.

Friday 25th August 1933

Had a talk with Kimura about the proposal to amalgamate Rengo and Nippon Dempo. The suggestion, it seems, was first broached by Shiratori, who also favoured the formation of a single news agency.

Tuesday 29th August 1933

To dinner at Soviet Embassy, given by Yurenev, to the principal foreign correspondents with the object of introducing us to the Soviet delegates negotiating the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Sat next Yurenev, who certainly improves on acquaintance and has made wonderful progress in English since his arrival here in the spring, when he know only a few words. He was very outspoken in condemning the somewhat high-handed way in which the Manchukuo delegates are conducting the negotiations and seemed particularly bitter against Okashi. On the other hand, he had no complaint to make against Count Uchida, who, he said, was always very courteous and reasonable in his talks with him, and moderate in his views. He rather indicated that, unless the Manchukuo showed some spirit of compromise within the next two months, the Soviet would break off the negotiations - and if the Manchukuo then proceeded to take over the Chinese Eastern Railway by force, the Soviet would make no attempt to stop them, but would make a strong protest and reserve all rights, with a view to taking whatever action necessary in the future. Although this would seem to indicate that the Soviet have no intention of risking a war just yet, I was struck by the rather contemptuous comments of Golkovitch and others about the Japanese army and air force. They seem to have got the same idea that some of our own people have, namely, that the Shanghai operations proved the Japanese to be of far lower military standard than previously reckoned. If they discount their ability and efficiency as much as they appear to do, they are likely to suffer for it, like in 1904-5, if ever they come to blows.

Golkovitch, incidentally, admitted quite frankly that the Soviet troops in Eastern Siberia have been strongly reinforced of late, though he emphasised - quite truthfully I imagine - that this was purely a precautionary measure, partly made possible, moreover, by the easing of anxiety over her western borders as a result of the recent conclusion of non-aggression pacts with Poland etc.
Wednesday 30th August 1933
Had Ikeda to lunch. Told me one quite interesting thing about the local characteristics of Japanese troops. Kyushu men, he said, are regarded as the best fighters for rapid attacks and hard hitting, but they lack the patience and "Sticking power" of the Tohoku men, who, though slower of movement and lacking the dash and high spirits of their Kyushu brethren, are far more tenacious and better fitted to withstand reverses and long-drawn fighting. The Osaka men are considered the poorest fighters, whilst the guards - on account of their being recruited from all parts - are the best all round.

Thursday 31st August 1933
Brennan tells me you can now get from Bombay to Shanghai in 12 days if you take the Italian line, and from London to Yokohama in under 3 weeks, if you travel overland to Trieste and go from there to Shanghai by this same line.

Friday 1st September 1933
Col. Marsden is now C.R.E. Hong Kong. Talking of the murder of a Japanese family just outside Hong Kong by a Chinese mob in the autumn of 1931, he confirmed what Bolt, and others who were there at the time, have told me - namely that the authorities were largely to blame for not acting in time, and that the Argyles, when brought into action, were so revolted at what they saw that they "saw red" and inflicted considerable slaughter on the Chinese mob with cold steel. Col. Marsden also confirmed what I had always imagined to be malicious anti-British propaganda - that the culprits were treated with excessive leniency and that, although the Chinese mob had been caught red-handed, those arrested were released almost immediately on the grounds of lack of evidence. An absolute travesty of justice, he said - and primarily due to the strongly pro-Chinese sentiment among the civil officials for whom he seems to have very little use!

Had a query from London re. a report that Japan is carrying out mass production of submarines in secret! Rang up Leggatt to see if he could throw any light on the matter; but, as expected, he merely ridiculed it.

Thursday 7th September 1933
War Office announced this afternoon the withdrawal of the 6th Division. This will leave only 3 divisions in Manchuria. The reduction in the number of divisions would seem to show that the General Staff is not very perturbed about the Soviet concentrations in Eastern Siberia. As it was reported a few days ago that this "special army of the Far East" is now equal in strength to more than half of the whole Japanese army, I asked Nagi about it. He said it was constituted a "special" army in 1929 at the time of the Sino-Soviet clash over the Chinese Eastern Railway and frankly admitted that it had been strongly reinforced of late, though he only shrugged his shoulders and professed inability to reply when I asked if it really is as big now as the recent report averred. He did, however, say that whereas the Soviet would have been placed in a very serious position if the Japanese had tried conclusions with them 18 months ago, the intervening period has enabled them to strengthen themselves and make preparations to such an extent that all cause for anxiety has now been removed. Eighteen
months ago, he maintained, the Soviet was quite unprepared to face the prospect of war with Japan, but today they can face it with equanimity, confident, in his opinion, that Japan would be the loser. I wonder?

He himself, however, seems to consider a clash in the very near future extremely likely, as the Japanese, according to him, recognise that it is now or never, as every year from now on will see the Soviet position strengthened and the Japanese position weakened. Time, in other words, is all in the Soviet's favour - which perhaps gives a significant turn to Yurenev's recent remark about merely protesting and reserving action "for the future" if the Manchukuo decides to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway. While it is, of course, true that certain reactionary elements have always dreamed of wrenching the Amur Provinces from the Russian grasp, I personally doubt if war with the Soviet in the immediate future with this end in view finds much support in responsible army circles - even though Nagi may be right in asserting that it is now or never.

Thursday 14th September 1933
Uchida's resignation suddenly and unexpectedly announced. Hirota, late Ambassador to Moscow and protegé of Toyama Mitsuru, appointed his successor. There are rumours that Uchida has not, of late, been able to see eye to eye with others in high places. Nagi, who knows Hirota intimately, seems well pleased with his appointment, as he says his ambassadorship in Moscow made him thoroughly conversant with the Soviet situation.

Saturday 16th September 1933
Hirota's English appears very limited; and although he seemed to understand the questions we put to him, he replied to them in Japanese. With his friendly smile, he gives a by-no-means unfavourable impression, though he has the reputation of being somewhat silent and uncommunicative. Certainly he gave nothing away today, as he hedged off most of the questions put to him by saying he had not had time to study them since his assumption of the Foreign portfolio - an evasion probably justified under the circumstances.

Sunday 17th September 1933
See by the papers that Togo has seen fit to address an appeal to the Fleet through the Navy Minister, urging the necessity of calmness over the trial of the naval officers concerned in the May 15th Affair. The fact that Togo himself has come into the picture would seem to indicate a pretty serious state of affairs.

Monday 18th September 1933
Very interesting article from the China Press by Hollington K. Tong on the prospects of a war between Japan and the Soviet. The Siberian Railway, he points out, with its deficiencies in equipment and personnel, and its incomplete double trackage would hardly be able to bear the burden thrust upon it to enable the Russians to meet the Japanese in Eastern Siberia on approximately equal terms in the important matter of transport, but he considers there are two new factors that might compensate for the Soviet handicap, namely aviation and gas warfare, in both of which the Soviet have made tremendous developments of late. He ends by quoting the very significant reply of a Russian friend to whom he broached the question of what the
Soviet would do with their air forces in the event of war with Japan. "We would make any use of them that would give victory to the Red Army", was the blunt reply indicative of air raids on Japanese cities, to which the Japanese would have little chance to retaliate with any great effect, as there are no Soviet cities of any very great value within range.

Incidentally, according to the "Asahi", the Soviet now have "about" ten divisions, all at war strength and excellently equipped, concentrated along the northern boundary of Manchukuo and at Vladivostok, where, also, twelve submarines are said to have been constructed for use in hampering communications between Japan and Korea and Manchuria. The Soviet air forces in the same vicinity are reported to include "more than twenty" heavy bombers.

Saturday 23rd September 1933

To Embassy for talk with Vivian about naval construction etc.. Although the 2nd replenishment programme was drawn up some time ago, he considers it was purely tentative at the outset and that the decision to carry it out was entirely due to Swanson's announcement in June. He has lent me a copy of one of his reports on it, showing that it will enable Japan to build absolutely up to treaty limits by 1936 - which, he says, was never expected. Tells me that the Japanese are now, he believes, able to construct all the machinery etc. required, without any outside assistance, and that they are able to turn out all their own aircraft, engines, etc., with the possible exception of the very highest grade of the Rolls Royce type for long distance flying. Exact details of aircraft factory capacity, however, he said are difficult to estimate, as the Japanese are very reticent and give patently false information on the subject. At one factory, for instance, which he visited with Evington, they were glibly told "about 60 a year", but Evington overheard one official whisper to another that this figure was so obviously an understatement that it would not be believed! Vivian himself estimated that 60 a month was much more likely. Vivian considers the decision just reached, giving the Chief of the Naval Staff the final say as to the naval strength required for national defence, is very significant.

Had a talk with Col. James after seeing Vivian. He puts the present strength of the Japanese Army in Manchuria at about 62,000, allowing about 15% for "Army troops" outside the main formations, though he says the French Military Attaché puts it as high as 40%. I told him Nagi's estimate of between 80,000 and 100,000 with 8,000-10,000 for the Dokuritsu Shibutai. Hen(?), who has just returned from a visit to Hsinking, tells me he came back by the new line via Kainei. Both the train before his, and the train immediately after his, were attacked by bandits; and owing to banditry being rife in the thickly-forested area traversed by the new line, trains are only run by day, he tells me, and each train carries an armed guard of about 20 Japanese and Manchukuo troops.

Monday 25th September 1933

Received very interesting report from Shimada of a talk he had had with a Mr. Saito of the Foreign Section of the Metropolitan Police Board about Bose and Pratap. The last-named, it seems, had visited Saito on the 22nd with six other Indians to ask for protection from Bose and his followers who, with some ronin, were threatening them with physical violence. The
split between the two groups is said to have been brought about by the fact that whereas Bose & Co. aim at Indian Independence pure and simple, Pratap & Co. after "ridding India of British thraldom" by means of an "Allied Asiatic Army" backed by Japan (!), plans to keep India thereafter under the permanent control of the A.A.A. Pratap, after his recent visit to Manchukuo with General Matsui, is said to have got in touch with General Araki and the General Staff and to have obtained from them a promise of support! On learning this, Bose, who had for long tried in vain to gain support from the Japanese Army, was furiously indignant with Pratap - and so the fight was on! Sounds a bit far-fetched, although, knowing Pratap's grandiloquent schemes, there is quite possibly some truth in it.

Wednesday 27th September 1933

Rengo received a report in the afternoon from the Moji Water Police alleging that a British submarine tender, "Medway", had been observed taking photos and soundings while passing through the Moji Straits yesterday.

Charged with attempted murder and incendiarism, six members of the Shimpeitai, arrested in connection with the Meiji Shrine meeting in July, have been formally indicted. Aiming at the fundamental reconstruction of the State, they - together with others - are alleged to have planned to wipe out the whole Cabinet, by attacking the Premier's official residence while the Cabinet was in session there on 11 July. Simultaneously, Makino's house was to have been attacked and set on fire, and Makino himself murdered. Arrests are still taking place, and the police are now said to be hot on the trail of a Col. Yasuda (retired), adopted son of the late General Fukuda of Earthquake Martial Law fame. He, together with a former director of Matsuya's, Naito by name, and several others, is reputed to have helped to finance the plot with the object of creating a panic which would enable Naito & Co. to rig the market and reap large profits.

Friday 29th September 1933

The War Office has issued an amazing statement - presumably intended primarily for internal consumption for obtaining the necessary appropriations for their replenishment programme - asserting that the Soviet now possesses a peacetime army of 1,290,000 with the most powerful and up-to-date arms and equipment, and that it has been increasing its military preparations in the Far East to such an extent that large appropriations are urgently required for modernising the Japanese army in order to protect the Japanese empire and Manchukuo from this serious menace. The Soviet army, the statement declares, now consists of 75 infantry divisions, 13 cavalry divisions, 2,500 aircraft, 1,500 tanks, large numbers of armoured cars, and chemical units - of which 10 divisions with 300 tanks are now stationed in the Far East, together with several hundred aeroplanes, including scores of heavy bombers with "power to attack the Japanese capital as soon as war breaks out between the two countries".

Saturday 30th September 1933

Had an interesting talk with Amau on sundry subjects, including the report that Hirota has decided to make a special bid for U.S. friendship by arranging for an interchange of unofficial "envoys" to explain and study the situation in their respective countries. The report, he said,
was quite true, though he frankly admitted that it had been put out as a balon d'essai to see what the U.S. thinks of the suggestion. If put into effect, Amau mentioned Kagawa, Yoneyama, and Matsukata as likely candidates for Japan - Kagawa for appealing to the churches, Yoneyama for financial circles and Rotary clubs, Matsukata for the oil interests and industrialists. There seems little doubt that, in considering the making of a bid for American friendship, Hirota & Co. have been influenced to no small extent by anxiety over the Soviet's intentions and development as a great military power. The Japanese, in fact, are apparently beginning to tumble to it that they cannot afford to antagonise both the Soviet and the U.S. at the same time, nor can they afford armament races with both, the one on land and the other on sea. They profess not to be worried by the reported imminence of U.S. recognition for the Soviet, but indications are that they are seriously perturbed about it. This, perhaps, is hardly surprising if the recent U.P. despatch from Peking is correct. The despatch in question tells of a recent interview on the subject with Bourgmalov, the Soviet ambassador, who was quoted as declaring that the Soviet would never go to war with Japan so long as the U.S. withheld recognition of the U.S.S.R.; as, in the event of such a war, Japan would be free to flood America with Japanese propaganda, while the Soviet would be debarrd from counteracting it effectively. True he added that, although recognition by the U.S. would enable the Soviet to get on equal terms with Japan in the matter of propaganda, he did not mean to infer that recognition would, in itself, lead Moscow to plunge into war with Japan. Nevertheless, the inference was that recognition would make the chances of a Japan-Soviet war far more likely. Regarding this report, Amau asserted that it was all part of the U.P. policy to jockey the U.S. into recognising the Soviet. Recognition of Moscow and a "bigger and better navy" are, in fact, two of the U.P.'S pet ambitions according to Amau, who appears to have very little use for the U.P.

I asserted my belief that the army as a whole was not particularly anxious for a war with the Soviet at the moment: Amau remarked - rather significantly I thought - "Yes. But that depends on who you mean by the army!"

Monday 2nd October 1933

Dined with Clive, who also had Kato, Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy in London with him. Kato, who has just returned to Japan on a hurried visit, frankly admitted that Matsudaira had sent him to Tokyo to find out what was the true state of feeling towards Britain and what was really behind the recent outburst of anti-British sentiment in Japan, as he is very worried about it. As a result of his investigations on the spot, Kato himself appears to have become more reassured that anti-British sentiment is not as bad as it appears and that, both in England and Japan, the misunderstandings that gave rise to so much mutual recrimination have already been dispelled to a large extent.

Wednesday 4th October 1933

Sudden removal of Vice-Admiral Terajima from command of the Training Squadron, to which he had been appointed less than 3 weeks ago, has given rise to various rumours of internal
dissension in the Navy and of Admiral Osumi being about to resign. Terajima is reported to have got into bad odour, especially with the younger element, for having influenced the Procurator in demanding stiff sentences for the naval officers on trial in connection with the 15/5 Affair.

Sunday 8th October 1933
Long cable from Moscow giving text of four alleged confidential Japanese documents about plans to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway after arrest of Soviet officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway on trumped up charges. The F.O. is naturally peeved and has denied the authenticity of the alleged documents. More will doubtless be heard of this case. Meantime, as Rengo has declined to handle the news Nagi is sending copies of the cable to the papers direct.

Had an interesting talk with Dr. Oka, President of the "Nichi Nichi", on the general situation in Japan. In view of the chauvinistic outpourings of the "Nichi-Nichi" and its sister paper, I was surprised to find him expressing somewhat anti-military views in connection with the Budget and regretting some of the "foolish and high-handed" actions taken in Manchuria and elsewhere. I am inclined to think he was perfectly sincere and that his paper's chauvinism is due to policy rather than conviction; although, if so, it shows a deplorable lack of moral courage - a failing all too common in Japan.

Tuesday 10th October 1933
War Office and F.O. very indignant over Moscow's publication of the alleged documents. The War Office is demanding that Hirota should protest strongly, and back the protest with a demand for complete retraction adding a warning that sterner action will be taken if the Soviet declines. "Sterner action", it is explained, envisages discontinuance of the railway negotiations with the possibility of severing diplomatic relations as a last resort. Meantime the F.O. is awaiting reports from Ota in Moscow before deciding on a definite line of action, Amau intimating that the continuance of Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations depends on the Soviet's response to some form of demands that Japan will make shortly in this matter.
Sagara tells me the F.O. is considering the possibility of having Nagi expelled from Japan for sending copies of the TASS cables to the papers after the official denial of the authenticity of the alleged documents.
Clive tells me that Sekino(?) recently hinted to him that the Manchukuo might build a number of cruisers and destroyers. This would, in effect, enable Japan to increase her naval strength without ostensibly violating the London Naval Treaty.

Wednesday 11th October 1933
The Soviet's motive in publishing the alleged documents seems to be puzzling the F.O., which is awaiting receipt of Ota's report before deciding - in consultation with the War Office and possibly the Cabinet - what action to take. Advancing the opinion that the Soviet may possibly be trying to bring Russian-Japanese issues to a head either for peaceful settlement or a definite clash, Amau referred to a recent boasting, bellicose article in the Soviet papers, which, he said, led him to think that the Soviet is possibly trying to jockey Japan into war by
instigating Japanese nationalist sentiment. Quoting from a Japanese proverb that "coward dogs bark a lot", he jokingly remarked that, as brave dogs do likewise, it was necessary to await developments before deciding in which category to place the Soviet. Other possible motives suggested were that Moscow hoped to turn world opinion against Japan and to appeal to moderate elements in Japan for sympathy in order to cause a division of opinion and thereby cause confusion. He revealed that Sokolnikov last month informed Ota that the Soviet had the alleged documents and intended to publish them if necessary. By "if necessary" was meant, that if the Soviet officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway, who were arrested last month by the Manchukuo, were not released. The Manchukuo, of course, claim that the arrests were made for criminal offences and that therefore the Soviet has no right to interfere. The Soviet, however, refutes this contention and, according to Nagi, the Soviet has intimated its refusal to continue the railway negotiations until this matter is satisfactorily settled.

Wakatsuki, the first authoritative defender in the past two years, has come out hot and strong in defence of the London Naval Treaty. The speech, made last night at Nagoya at a Minseito rally, is significant in that it is the first reply to the bitter denunciations of the Treaty and its signatories at the recent naval court martial and also to Dr. Suzuki's recent condemnation of it at the Seiyukai meeting.

Thursday 12th October 1933
The Navy Office has come out with a statement strongly attacking Wakatsuki's speech.

Friday 13th October 1933
Received cable from London damning me for sending too much on the Russian-Japanese crisis and Wakatsuki's speech, adding that not a single paper has published any of it. The "strafe" just received emphasises "imperative confine cables big spot news and British angle stories". One wonders what the devil the papers do want, apart from sensation and sex. There is certainly much truth in the remark credited to Chancellor in a Press interview on his return to Shanghai - that the British Press is becoming increasingly provincial in its news requirements. Craddock, in his "Dilemma in India", comments ruefully on the British public being far too absorbed in cricket and sports in general to spare any time to trouble about the vital problem of India. I myself recently received cabled instructions to restrict to utmost as "all interest absorbed in Test matches." Interest in sport is all to the good, if kept within reasonable limits; but when it becomes so all-absorbing as to blot out all else - well, it results in the people living in a fool's paradise.

Babb tells me the private dinner given last night by the U.S. Ambassador to Mr. Hirota and the four leading American Press correspondents - Babb, Byas, Vaughn and Fleisher - with a view to discussing frankly the relations between Japan and the U.S., went off very well, and he himself came away more convinced than ever that Hirota is honestly trying to improve relations between the two countries. One remark of Hirota's was of particular interest. Wakatsuki's speech on naval limitation, he feared, had been delivered two months too soon.
Had he waited till about the time the Diet session opens, it would have been more effective, he considered.

Babb also tells me that Hirota, on succeeding Uchida last month, is said to have had a frank talk with Toyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryohei, and other leading reactionaries and after explaining the real situation, asked them to support him in carrying out his policies. The story may not be true, but it seems very likely that it is so, as there is no doubt that Toyama & Co. would listen to Hirota (on account of his reactionary connections in bygone days), when they would never think of heeding any other diplomat. If the story is true, it may help to account for Hirota's strong stand on the side of Saito and Takahashi against Araki and Osumi (as reported in the press) in the series of secret conferences between the five ministers over the relative values of finance, diplomacy and armaments in the matter of national defence.

Latest development in the Japanese-Soviet crisis is a protest by the Soviet Embassy here to the F.O. against "the insulting" language used by Amau on Wednesday in comparing the Soviet to "barking dogs!" The F.O., however, explained that Amau was merely quoting a proverb and that no insult was intended. Nagi is very "wrathy" about the matter, as it seems that to call anyone a dog is particularly insulting in Russia, though Amau, on the other hand, pointed out that dogs are held in great respect in Japan, as a dog was said to have led all the other animals who went to mourn when the Buddha died!

Saturday 14th October 1933
Had a long talk with Amau about the latest developments in the Japanese-Soviet crisis. I received the impression that a pretty stiff attitude is likely and somewhat serious developments possible. A demarche will probably be made early next week after full investigation of the Soviet's motives has been completed, but whether it will go beyond a strong protest has not yet been definitely settled.

Learned this evening that a press ban has been placed on reports of troops concentrating at Harbin, Hsinking, and Mukden. Ostensibly large-scale anti-bandit drives are being planned, but the fact that the news has been banned would seem to indicate that precautionary measures against possible developments are being taken.

Sunday 15th October 1933
See that Ishii, speaking at a luncheon given in his honour yesterday by the Japan Economic League, emphasised his surprise at finding, during his recent visit to Europe and America, that Japan's trade, not her actions in Manchuria, worried the World most. He therefore stressed the necessity of Japan, in future, controlling her exports and standardising prices of manufactured goods.

Monday 16th October 1933
Ridiculing London's fears that Germany's action in leaving the League of Nations will increase the tendency towards a Japanese-German rapprochement, Amau emphasised that the fundamentals of Japanese foreign policy were laid down in the Imperial Rescript issued 27 March on the occasion of Japan's withdrawal from the League and would not therefore be
affected by any change in the European situation. The report that Germany consulted Japan before taking action he branded as "too absurd to merit denial".

Hear that the new Afghan Minister, Habibullah Tarzi, is apparently as thick as thieves with Mahendra Pratap, who accompanies him everywhere, including to the Pan-Pacific Club luncheon last week. Let's hope he will not follow Pratap's example of trying to stir up mischief between Britain and Japan.

**Tuesday 17th October 1933**

Had a talk over the phone with Col. James about the recent announcement of sanction obtained for the creation of two Tank Regiments. Although he could say nothing for certain, he said the general belief is that each regiment will consist of 3 battalions, each of 3 companies of 12 to 15 tanks each - a total of roughly 130 tanks per regiment, all of Japanese make and up-to-date design. The Kurume Regiment, he believes, is already nearly completed, having been expanded from a single company of tanks of obsolete foreign patterns. The Nakashima Regiment is apparently to replace the experimental tank organisation hitherto maintained at the Chiba Infantry School.

Nagi tells me that, according to his own information, tanks as well as armoured cars are being used in Jehol, but that both have proved defective in mechanism and that, although the tanks were to have been tried out experimentally in the operations in February, they were unable to move.

Col. James emphasised that the expansion and modernisation of the tank force is obviously the answer to the Soviet's strength in this particular arm, just as the projected expansion of the Army Air Force is an answer to the Soviet's air strength. "If we were in Japan's position, we would do exactly the same", he said.

**Thursday 19th October 1933**

Sagara tells me that according to private information from a friend in Manchuria, about 10,000 Japanese and Manchurian troops have been concentrated at Pogranichnaya in addition to those concentrated at Harbin, Changchun, and Mukden.

Cox queried me about the assertion in the "China Times" that Japan has decided to abolish the Manchukuo and annex Manchuria, probably on January 1st. Replied in form of mailer emphasising extreme improbability, though suggesting that Doihara's re-appointment as head of the Special Service Bureau of the Kwantung Army naturally conjures up possibilities of something being in the wind. Seems more likely, however, to be connected with the projected establishment of constitutional monarchy [in Manchukuo] which Chao Hsin-po, chief of the Legislative Yuan, spoke about when he arrived in Japan in July to study the Japanese constitution etc. prior to drafting a permanent constitution for Manchukuo. Chao succeeded Doihara as mayor of Mukden in October 1933, so they are old friends.

Dined at "A1 Cafe" with Walden and Kirkwood, and afterwards dropped into the Imperial, where we found Pratap in earnest converse with Tarzi, the Afghan Minister. Noticed him showing a handbill, printed in English and headed "Asiatic Allied Army". Subsequently they
moved off, leaving a copy of the handbill on a chair, so Walden went across and picked it up. Just the usual "Asia for the Asiatics and to Hell with Britain and the other White races"!

Friday 20th October 1933
Moscow has issued an indignant denial of a report appearing in the Daily Express that Soviet planes had bombed Changchun and threatened Jehol! Where the "Express" and the "Herald" obtain all their sensational fabrications, heaven alone knows! London has sent me another scarist clipping from the Daily Herald of 21 September with great headlines - "Emigrants Will Be Sent in Thousands". Then follows a highly spiced version of a report appearing in Japanese papers a couple of months ago about some Japanese businessmen having obtained a concession of 1,600,000 acres in Abyssinia for cotton growing, plus a monopoly in opium. According to the "Daily Herald" Japanese immigrants are already swarming there in thousands and offer a serious threat to Britain, France and Italy. Good old "D.H."!

Dined in evening with the Jameses, where also were the Masons and Brown. Yarning with Colonel James about the growing friction between Japan and the Soviet. Baron, he tells me, forecast before he left that war would break out between the two before his (James') time was up in Japan, and Colonel Mast, Baron's successor as French Military Attaché, has expressed similar views. Col. James himself, however, is not so sure, though he considers the rapidity with which the Japanese are pushing on the construction of the three railways in Northern Manchuria rather significant. Had an interesting talk with him about Araki, for whom he seems to have considerable admiration. He doubts he is as fanatical as people make out, and regards him as being sincere.

Saturday 21st October 1933
Incoming cables report an exchange of telegrams between Roosevelt and Kalinin, resulting in Moscow accepting Roosevelt's invitation to send someone to Washington to carry out preliminary negotiations with a view to the U.S. and Soviet entering into diplomatic relations. The F.O. in Tokyo expressed surprise on learning of it, but professed to feel no concern about the prospect of American recognition of Soviet Russia, despite assumptions to the contrary.

Tuesday 24th October 1933
Debuchi, at his own request, is returning from Washington shortly, and will probably be replaced by Nagai from Berlin. Sato Naotake from Brussels is to replace Nagaoka in Paris.

Friday 27th October 1933
To Embassy for talk with Snow about possibilities of a job in the F.O. Press Section described by Sir John Tilley in his book on the F.O. just published. Snow seemed to think it well worth trying, and promised to do whatever he could about it.

Saturday 28th October 1933
Chancellor tells me that Rachmann, who is back in China once more, is still up to his old games of intriguing and is very anti-British. Seems that Britain tried to persuade the League not to let him return to China, but failed. Chancellor also tells me that Yorke, who was sent into Jehol as special correspondent for Reuters to cover the operations in February, wrote up a very interesting report of about 100 pages, but it was so damning to the Chinese in
exposing their hopeless inefficiency, intrigue, scandalous corruption, treachery etc., that Reuters could not publish it without risk of expulsion from China. On his recent visit to England, however, he showed a copy of it to both Lord Lytton and Lord Cecil in order to show them how little their sympathy for the Chinese was merited. Both of them were very upset about it.

Monday 30th October 1933
Chancellor sounded me out this morning as to whether I would like him to get his father to recommend me for a job at Chatham House in the Royal Institute of International Affairs - worth about ?600 a year. Very good of him; and I have asked him to do so, as it is just the kind of work I should like. He has advised me to write personally to Sir Neill Malcolm and Wheeler-Bennett as well, as I know them both. Cox, he tells me, is to succeed me in Tokyo, while Henry will be sent to Osaka.

Tuesday 31st October 1933
Had Webb, a Major in Angus’s regiment, who has just fetched up here on a visit, to lunch at the house. He is on the staff at Simla and tells me that colonel Gressitt, on his return from his Japan trip, expressed his conviction that, militarily, Japan could not be regarded as a first-class nation and that her army could definitely be marked down a peg or two. Seems to indicate that he accepted the views of our people in Shanghai rather than those of Colonel James and Wards here in Tokyo.

Wednesday 1st November 1933
Went with Chancellor in afternoon for an interview with Hirota. The one point of definite interest was his harping on the need for a return to closer bonds of friendship between Japan and ourselves, and his suggestion that, as America would never agree to an alliance between herself, Britain, and Japan, and would kick if a new Anglo-Japanese Alliance was brought about, the best thing would be to arrange for a round-table conference between the three Powers in order to arrange for some kind of alliance between Britain and Japan with American support.

Thursday 2nd November 1933
Metzger dropped in to see me about a proposal made to him by Yamada, who is a great pal of Araki’s and is said to belong to a group of Japanese who advocate a return to an Anglo-Japanese Alliance. According to Metzger, Araki has asked Yamada to get hold of someone to act as a go-between to indicate to Snow that he, Araki, would appreciate it very much if Snow could arrange a meeting with him for an informal talk with the object of a frank discussion on Anglo-Japanese relations and on the possibilities of a return to the old alliance or something like it.

To dinner in evening with Shigemitsu. Sat next to Kurusu, Chief of the F.O. Commercial Bureau, who spoke very bitterly against Mody, who, he considers, is hampering the talks at Simla and Delhi by talking too much. He also mentioned that the leading cotton men in Japan are getting very annoyed with Yamamoto, the Osaka cotton merchant who runs the news
sheet in which, some months ago, the demand for Japan to assist the Indians to expel the British from India was published.

Iwanaga has promised to lend me "The Secrets of Crewe House" to read. In doing so, he referred to its account of Sir Roderick Jones's activities in propaganda work during the War and remarked somewhat ruefully that he could sympathise with Sir Roderick having been forced by circumstances to resort to such work, as he, Iwanaga, had, very unwillingly, been forced to utilise Rengo for similar purposes in the early stages of the Manchurian troubles.

Friday 3rd November 1933

Spoke to Snow about Araki's proposal through Metzger (see 2/11), but he did not seem to treat it very seriously and remarked that Metzger himself had been in to see him about it a few days ago.

Saturday 4th November 1933

Metzger dropped in for another talk about Araki's desire to see Snow, one reason for his anxiety to improve Anglo-Japanese co-operation and relations in general being, that Britain and Japan are the only remaining monarchical empires and that the Emperor himself is said to be very fond of the British Royal Family and anxious to improve relations between the two countries.

Sunday 5th November 1933

Colonel James has just returned from Grand Manoeuvres in Fukui, and seems very much impressed by a new infantry gun of about 3" calibre, carried on pack-pony, that he saw, and also with the bridging work. The light collapsible boats used for this purpose, he said, seem far less clumsy than ours, and the rapidity and efficiency of the sappers engaged in the job struck him greatly.

Vivian has just returned from a naval inspection in S.W. Japan and seems very impressed by the friendly attitude of the Japanese naval authorities wherever he went and by the fact that he was allowed to see all over the Hiro Arsenal, a privilege never accorded to any other Naval Attaché according to him. He seems to have a great admiration for Admiral Osumi and regards him as having the best brains in the Japanese Navy. He also mentioned that the naval authorities are very annoyed with Commander Ishimaru's book, "The Inevitable War Between Britain and Japan", and assert that it should not be taken too seriously, as Ishimaru was turned out of the Navy shortly after the War on account of his views.

Monday 6th November 1933

Had talk with Kurusu about the negotiations at New Delhi. Seems the report about which London queried me in the wee hours of yesterday arose through misinterpretation of a despatch filed by Byas to "The Times" about a recent interview in which Kurusu remarked that some of the Japanese cotton men were inclined to doubt Indian sincerity on account of their proposal to divide the Japanese quota of piece-goods into four periods, under separate classifications and subdivisions with fixed percentages for each, thus making it virtually impossible for Japan to export her full quota in practice. Japan, he said, was now merely trying to ensure greater flexibility in order to ensure that the quota allowed her in principle
would be attainable in fact. He emphasised that the Govt. has never cast any doubts on the Indian Govt.'s sincerity and strongly deprecated all talk of such doubts. He also spoke very highly of Sansom's work in India and of the close co-operation between the Japanese F.O. and the British Embassy in doing everything possible to bring about a mutually satisfactory agreement. The difficulty, he said, was that the cotton men of each of the countries concerned were out to get as much for themselves as they could and required very careful handling.

Wednesday 8th November 1933

Yesterday's celebrations, in Moscow, of the 16th anniversary of the revolution, appear to have been marked by fiery denunciations of Japan. The whole city, according to press reports, was plastered with provocative slogans against Japan, and Molotov, inveighing against Japan, came out with the statement that the Soviet intended to destroy Japan completely in the event of war. Curiously enough, the Japanese press seems very little interested, and both the F.O. and War Office profess inability to regard it seriously, as they consider it to be intended primarily for home consumption, aimed to divert the attention of the people - especially the farmers - from their own troubles and discontents.

I remarked to Nagi that it seemed foolish of Molotov & Co. to act in this way, as it was likely to aggravate the situation. He, however, thought otherwise and asserted that the charges made against Japan were well-founded, as it was beyond dispute that Japan was preparing to make war on the Soviet without warning. Nothing that I said would shake his belief on this score.

Thursday 9th November 1933

Sentences on the young naval officers connected with the 15/5 Affair were pronounced this morning - all far lighter than demanded by the Procurator on 11 September. Owing to the intensity of feeling aroused by the trial, extreme precautions were taken, the Court room being surrounded by armed guards, while the whole port of Yokosuka was under special guard. Over a million letters, including over 1000 written in blood, urging leniency, are said to have been received by the authorities.

Vivian seemed very surprised at the lightness of the sentences and remarked that the higher naval authorities will be annoyed, as they wanted heavy sentences for the sake of discipline. It certainly is extraordinary, and one can only imagine that Takasu and the other judges feared to pass death sentences and life imprisonment lest the defendants be regarded as martyrs and fresh trouble arose.

Friday 10th November 1933

With Metzger in evening to dine with his friend Yamada of the Shingi Doshikai at the Kagetsu in order to find out more about Araki's alleged desire for an informal talk with Snow on closer Anglo-Japanese relations. From Yamada's replies to my questioning, it seems perfectly genuine, as he says Araki will send a written invitation to Snow, as soon as I let him know, through Yamada, that Snow is agreeable to the proposal. According to Yamada, Araki has become convinced that closer friendship and co-operation with Britain is essential for the peace of the Far East, as, without it, China will continue to play the one country against the other (to the disadvantage of both), while Soviet Russia will
remain a constant menace to both so long as she thinks she can deal with one at a time i.e. that neither would go to the help of the other if one of them was attacked.

According to Yamada, the present Cabinet is likely to go out of office in February or March next year, as there is a growing feeling that Saito is getting too old and, in consequence, is too inactive and negative in carrying out necessary reforms. In that case, either Araki or Prince Konoe will succeed him, and closer friendship with Great Britain will then be the main aim of Japan's foreign policy. To my query as to whether, in the event of Araki becoming Premier, this would mean a military Cabinet, Yamada replied in an emphatic negative. I asked if Araki would have the Army behind him in this policy of friendship with England. He asserted that he would and that, although there was a certain amount of anti-British sentiment amongst Japanese officers, it was confined almost entirely to regimental officers, who had nothing to do with foreign relations and national policy. Another negative was given to my query as to whether Matsuoka was likely to become Foreign Minister in the event of Araki being made Premier. Araki, he asserted, distrusts Matsuoka, as he regards him as nothing more than an opportunist, out for himself. Incidentally Yamada rather hinted that Araki would be prepared to see Japan re-enter the League if the Covenant was revised in such a way as to ensure assistance to any country suffering from an economic boycott or from violation of treaties or agreements, and that it is in part due to the League's failure to ensure any such assistance that he aims at closer relations with Britain who, in common with Japan, has already suffered in both these respects from China and who, like Japan, is always liable to suffer again for so long as China feels she can act with impunity against one or the other without fear of having to face a united front of the two together.

Two other points were mentioned by Yamada. One was, that Araki feels the necessity of closer relations with Britain on account of its being the only remaining monarchical nation among the great Powers other than Japan and because, also, of the Emperor's great respect for, and love of, the British Royal Family. The other point was, that Araki himself is very grateful to Snow for assistance given to his son in England.

Saturday 11th November 1933

Papers very full of Hirota's anxiety to remove the growing tension with Soviet Russia and of a suggestion, put out by him through Amau, for the two countries to apply the demilitarisation principles of the Portsmouth Treaty (prohibiting concentration of troops along the Russo-Korean frontier and the demilitarisation of Sakhalin) to the Russo-Manchukuo border. As this proposal is in the nature of a "Balon d'essai", it will be interesting to see how it is regarded in Moscow.

How the deuce the Japanese can turn out goods of this kind is a mystery. Aline [younger daughter] recently bought a box containing a fountain pen, a purse, a toy watch, and a ring - all for 10 sen[100 Sen = 1 Yen]! No wonder our people in England complain of the cheapness of Japanese goods and of the impossibility of competing with them.

Sunday 12th November 1933
There was a report that Soviet troops had brought down 6 Japanese military planes in Siberia and that two Japanese warships had been blown up off Kamchatka. Subsequently came a TASS report from Moscow carrying an indignant official denial of the U.P. story. The curious part of it all, however, is that the Soviet censor, who is very strict, even allowed such a message to be cabled. It looks, in fact, as though the censor let it pass on purpose. Vaughn suggests that this "purpose" was based on a belief that it would serve to hasten the negotiations now going on in Washington between Roosevelt and Litvinov for U.S. recognition of the Soviet. In view of Moscow's recent provocative words and actions vis-à-vis Japan, it would almost seem as though Moscow was trying to precipitate war.

Monday 13th November 1933

Amau professes - probably in all sincerity - complete perplexity about Moscow's present provocative attitude and asserts that the F.O. is unable to fathom the Soviet's real intentions. First came the publication of Hishikari's alleged documents; then Molotov's speech, which was followed by instructions issued by Borisovitch, Vice-Commissar of War & Navy, along the lines of Molotov's speech, declaring that Japan was planning to take Siberia and the Maritime Provinces. This was followed by similar statements by the Comintern, and by similar reports in the Soviet papers, most of which published editorials on the 7th endorsing both Molotov and Borisovitch. Amau laughingly referred to the latest report about the destruction of Japanese planes and warships as being possibly akin to Bismark's famous "Ems Telegram", which precipitated the Franco-Prussian War.

Tuesday 14th November 1933

Hergel, who has just returned from Peking, dropped in to see me for a talk on Russo-Japanese relations and on the situation in general. Tells me the Russians are said to be building a new railway to Vladivostok, some way north of the Amur Railway, lest the Japanese try to cut it.

Wednesday 15th November 1933

The anticipated naval changes took place this morning, Nomura being succeeded by Nagano at Yokosuka and Koyabashi by Suetsugu as C-in-C Combined Fleet and 1st Fleet. Nomura and Koyabashi both become Councillors. Yonai gets Sasebo. Takahashi goes from Vice-Chief Naval General Staff to C-in-C 2nd Fleet, being succeeded by Matsuyama. Viscount Kato becomes Chief of Naval Aviation and is succeeded by Inoue Kaimatsu as Commandant of the Naval Staff College. Taken all in all, a pretty big shakeup and well calculated to put the "Big Navy" advocates in key positions - presumably in order to quieten the unrest among the younger naval officers.

To Embassy in morning to see Snow about Araki's wish to meet him. Snow is naturally a bit hesitant lest he run up against a snag in the diplomatic field, but he seems quite interested in the matter and will, I think, carry it through.

General Sato was very critical of General Tanaka and his Meirinkai. Says the Meirinkai is financed by a narikin [nouveau riche], who made his fortune in the South Seas and that the man would not finance it unless he expected to make something out of it.
Saturday 18th November 1933
News that the U.S. has announced recognition of the Soviet. Amau professes to welcome the news, as the countries are on terms of friendship with Japan. Babb seems to think that the recent action of America in withdrawing the fleet from the Pacific has served to reassure Japan in this respect. Matsukata seemed highly elated about it. He, of course, has oil interests with the Soviet!

Monday 20th November 1933
Cables from Moscow recently played up the fact that Ota, alone among the foreign diplomats, failed to attend the military review and other functions in celebration of the 15th anniversary of the Revolution. This was interpreted as indicating the tenseness of the strain between the two countries. Ota, however, has now explained to the F.O. here, who queried him about it, that his non-attendance was simply due to the fact that he has been suffering from some kind of leg trouble and, as the functions would have entailed a great deal of standing about, he had to decline!

Questioned Nagi about the report of the Soviet laying a new railway north of the Amur railway. He admitted that such a railway was under contemplation, and that the work of prospecting may have been started already, but he asserted that no actual construction has yet been commenced and that it has nothing to do with Soviet fears of attack on the Amur railway. Its main purpose, he said, will be to open up the northern territory and it will probably run from Leningrad to Nikolaevsk and form part of Moscow's third five-year plan. From an engineering point of view, however, there is one great difficulty. The ground is permanently frost-bound, except for about 3 months in the year, when it thaws to a depth of about 18 inches. Bose and Pratap have a letter in this afternoon's "Japan Times" berating me for cabling abroad that they had split.

Press ban raised this afternoon on wholesale arrests of alleged Communists, which started on 27 February with a raid on the headquarters of the Zenkyo, a Left Wing Labour organisation. In all, 1696 were arrested, including 926 Koreans. 145 have been indicted.

Tuesday 21st November 1933
Attempt to assassinate Wakatsuki at Ueno Station. Usual old reason - "indignation" over the London Naval Treaty. All the youth of Japan seem to have gone dippy on this question.

Metzger dropped in again about Araki's wish to see Snow. According to what Yamada had told him, Araki's wish to work for closer friendship with Britain is due to the Emperor having intimated to him through Prince Fushimi that it is his, the Emperor's, earnest desire that he should do so. For this reason, according to Yamada, even if Araki himself goes out of power, Yanagawa or Mazaki or whoever it may be who replaces him as War Minister, will work with the same object in view, as the Emperor has willed it. In this connection, Metzger said that Yamada had recalled that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been brought about, contrary to Ito's own predilections, by the expressed desire of the Emperor Meiji.

Thursday 23rd November 1933
Shimada looked in to tell me of an interview he had had with Pratap. Seems Pratap admitted to him that he and Bose had had a difference of opinion over some question of religion and of Pan-Asia, resulting in Bose sending him a wire severing his connection with his scheme of "World Federation". Bose had also differed with him, he said, on the subject of relations with the Japanese Army. Pratap, however, maintained that they had now patched up their quarrel and he was very upset on finding that I had come to hear of it and had "cabled" it abroad, as it might endanger his position with his financial supporters abroad!

According to Shimada, Pratap is very dissatisfied with the Army authorities here, as they have cooled off towards him and Koiso ridiculed his offer to raise an Asiatic Allied Army to protect Japan if Japan went to war with Soviet Russia!

Saturday 25th November 1933

Amau showed me a whole stack of clippings from London and provincial papers, some of them with huge and sensational head-lines, playing up Conroy's accusations against Japan. Even responsible papers like the "Morning Post" and "Daily Telegraph" appear to have been gulled by him and Bernard Shaw seems to have taken him under his wing. It is a damned shame. An out-and-out rogue, capitalising the present unfortunate friction between Britain and Japan over the cotton question by indulging in the most unscrupulous lies in order to gain publicity for himself and his beastly book.

Tuesday 28th November 1933

Had a private talk with Snow about the proposed talk with Araki. Snow now seems quite interested in the matter, and tells me he has cabled to London for the latest news of Araki's son, so that he can use this as the ostensible reason for wanting to see Araki. He is also going to cable London about Yamada's intimation that the Emperor himself is in the background in Araki's efforts to bring about closer relations with Britain. He seemed particularly interested when I told him of this, as, naturally, he considers it a very important point if true, though of course, I have only Yamada's word for it. Personally I am inclined to think it is true, and so does Snow. Snow explained that his reason for not having gone to see Araki yet is that, as the negotiations at Simla are still uncertain as to the outcome, he is hesitating as to the most appropriate time to call on Araki. If the negotiations are completed satisfactorily, he feels that the psychological moment for his talk would be when success is announced. On the other hand, in case the negotiations fail, he feels it might be better to call now, as it might help to counter unfavourable reaction to some extent. He asked my opinion, but it is a difficult point to decide, and we discussed the pros and cons of the two alternatives without coming to any definite decision.

Thursday 30th November 1933

Goto, the Minister of Agriculture, was reported to have intimated his intention to resign on account of the big cuts made by the Finance Ministry in the appropriations asked by his department. The report, however, was subsequently denied by Goto himself, but there is no doubt that the Cabinet is faced by a serious crisis, as Goto, Osumi and Araki are all demanding the restoration of the drastic cuts made by Takahashi in their estimates for the
coming fiscal year. Takahashi has conceded to some extent, but appears adamant against further concessions. Personally I do not think that any of them want to bring about the downfall of the Cabinet, but it is difficult to see how any of them can climb down in the matter of their demands; yet, unless they do so, the Cabinet seems doomed.

Monday 4th December 1933
To Navy Office in morning for talk with Iwamura about the 2nd Naval Replenishment Programme. He confirmed the main figures of types regulated by treaty, but said that the details of others reported in the Press are pure guesswork, though "fairly near the mark". The former comprise 2 "B" class cruisers, 2 aircraft carriers, 14 destroyers, and 4 - not 6 - submarines, together with 8 new air squadrons, to give a total of 39 by the end of 1937.
Spoke to Snow about Yamada's wish to have him to lunch to talk over Araki's anxiety for closer Anglo-Japanese relations. Snow seemed glad to accept and told me he had already fixed up tentatively to call on Araki with Col. James when James returns from Manchuria.

Wednesday 6th December 1933
Had a visit from Metzger, who came with a message from Yamada, allegedly originating from Araki, intimating that the War Office would gladly offer me a worthwhile job if I would stay on out here after leaving Reuters. The nature of the job was unspecified, but as, presumably, it would be of a propagandist nature, I returned word thanking them for the complimentary way in which the message was worded, but that I felt I could be of far better service both to Britain and Japan by steering clear of any taint of paid propaganda.

Friday 8th December 1933
Issuing a manifesto advocating the abolition of political parties on the grounds that they stand in the way of national unity at this time of national crisis, Matsuoka formally announced his secession, this morning, from the Seiyukai and resigned his seat in the Diet. His idea appears to be to rally the country around him and to become a sort of Mussolini, but the general impression seems to be that both his popularity and his influence have slumped too heavily, since his return from Geneva, to enable him to do very much.

Monday 11th December 1933
With Snow to lunch at the Hoshigaoka with Yamada. Snow and Yamada conversed together in German, Snow and myself in English and Yamada and myself in Japanese!

Tuesday 12th December 1933
Had an interesting talk with Col. James about his trip to Manchuria, from which he has just returned. Seems very struck by the extraordinary vitality and energy of the Japanese in pushing on the work of construction and organisation. Magnificent new buildings going up in Changchun and elsewhere, excellent roads being laid in the leading towns and cities and constructed in all directions, and railway construction likewise going full speed ahead.
Wooden railway bridges, which were constantly being burnt down by bandits a year ago, are now rapidly being replaced by strong bridges of concrete, and over the Nonni he saw them building a huge ferro-concrete bridge. Tsitsihar, which, when he visited it last year, was a dead-and-alive sort of place and somewhat lawless, is now a thriving business centre with
excellent policing and traffic control; and although the military authorities frankly admit that the bandit problem is still a very big one, the railway zones have been practically cleared of bandits and trains are running to schedule on all lines. Immense activity, he said, is to be seen in the construction of the ports and harbours at Yuki, Rashin, and Seishin, where the Japanese are literally blasting away great mountains.

It is perhaps significant, though, that one of the finest new buildings of all, according to Col. James, is the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army! The appearance of a Manchukuo regiment and its barracks also made a very favourable impression and he was very taken by both Koiso and Lytton in preparing his report and by De Valera as President of the League during its consideration of the Sino-Japanese dispute, it is little short of scandalous.

Monday 18th December 1933

Amongst the clippings received this morning is one from the "News Chronicle" of Nov. 28th, in which a brief message, in which I quoted the F.O. as declaring that Japan would not interfere in the Fukien trouble unless Japanese lives and interests were endangered, is twisted around with a large heading "Japan's Invasion Threat" and the statement (entirely unfounded) that "a descent upon the coast by Japan at Amoy or Foochow should cause no surprise."

Even a reputable paper like the "Observer" has seen fit to add to a message of mine, about the export of cotton textiles from Japan, a hopelessly one-sided statement about "Japanese primitive labour conditions", while my cable of Nov. 25th quoting the Embassy, the Consulate, and the F.O. and exposing Conroy has been erased completely, except for the last eight words telling of the police being requested to investigate the whereabouts of Mrs. Conroy. These few words have been tagged on to a highly sensational interview with Conroy in the "Sunday Despatch" of Nov. 26th.

I had a visit from Kumasaki this afternoon and learned from him that Conroy, while living in Tokyo, was employed by Police Headquarters as an informer against resident British and Americans. The main object of Kumasaki's visit was to urge me once more, on behalf of the War Office, to stay on in Japan and to offer me the job of instructor in English at the Staff College if I would do so. Somewhat ingenuously he added that, as they recognised that the post would not give me a sufficient income, they would arrange with either Mitsui's or Mitsubishi's to pay me a regular honorarium in addition and they would see to it that I would have plenty of time to carry on with my writing. I asked him to convey my thanks, but to explain once more that, apart from having to go home for the children's education, I preferred to remain independent in the matter of writing and considered I could be of far more use if I continued to write from conviction without the stigma of being a paid propagandist.

In the course of conversation, Kumasaki spoke to me about Walden and confirmed what I had already heard from other sources re. the way he is putting up the backs of the big Japanese firms by the aggressive way in which he tries to get money out of them for advertisements. They also seem to resent the fact that a Pole is sent out instead of a proper British representative, as the whole object of his mission is to help on Anglo-Japanese relations by means of "special numbers" to be issued by the "Daily Telegraph" and "Asahi". As Kumasaki
much as we appreciate the friendly attitude shown towards Japan by the ‘Daily Telegraph’ since the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble we can not regard it as a compliment when they send out an unknown Pole, especially of Walden's type."

**Wednesday 20th December 1933**

Kimura showed me a translation he had made of the novelette on a supposed war between Japan and the U.S. in 1936 in the "Hi-no-de", which has come into much prominence as a result of the action of the Honolulu authorities in confiscating all copies of it on arrival. Apparently the U.S. authorities fear its effect on the large Japanese-American population on the islands.

With M. [wife] in evening to dine at the Soviet Embassy. A most sumptuous affair, with the Premier, Araki, Kato Kanji, Hatoyama, and other leading Japanese figures - including the new French and Italian ambassadors, Pila and Auriti - among the 60 or 70 present. Met Jean Rink, the Soviet Military Attaché, for the first time and was very much taken with him. A most jovial fellow, with a most attractive twinkle in his eyes, a keen sense of humour, and frank, open, straightforward appearance. I was much amused with his remarks on Manchuria and India (he was Military Attaché at Kabul 1927-9). He said he had been to neither. "Won't the Japanese allow you to visit Manchuria?" I asked him. "They couldn't stop me if I wanted to go, as they tell everyone that they preserve the Open Door there," he replied, with a merry twinkle in his eye and fairly chortled with delight. I also met Kovaleff, the Soviet Naval Attaché, for the first time.

In view of Araki's trenchant remarks about the Soviet from time to time, it was interesting to see how well he seemed to get on with them individually. In fact, he seemed to be thoroughly enjoying himself and was in very good form, especially with Mme. Yurenev and Rink, with both of whom he was cracking jokes and laughing away as though nothing was further from his mind than the possibility of a war between the two nations in years to come. A propos of which, Rink amused me by remarking - as though it were a great joke - that although he had never been in Manchuria and was not contemplating asking the Japanese for permission to go there, he presumed that, sooner or later, he would know all about it at first hand - meaning on active service!

**Friday 22nd December 1933**

The Manchukuo Legation has announced a ?70,000,000 contract to the South Manchurian Railway for the construction of 3 new railways in Manchuria, one from Tumen to Mutauking, crossing the Chinese Eastern Railway between Hailin and Aiho, another from Peianceheu to Erhchau (continuation of line from Tsitsihar northward, eventually to Heiho, near Blagoveschenschensk), and the third from Koupeiyingtzu to Lingyuan - the extension of the Chinchow-PEipiao line into Jehol. In actual fact, construction on all three has apparently been in progress for some time, though no mention has been allowed hitherto - another example of a very foolish, suspicion-raising, censorship.

**Saturday 23rd December 1933**
Had just got up when two long-drawn siren blasts announced the glad tidings that the Empress had given birth to the long-awaited son and Heir to the Throne, thus removing the threat of a serious dynastic crisis.

Thursday 28th December 1933

Kobe and Osaka merchants greatly indignant over the new Indian tariff on sundry goods, which they declare is prohibitive and contrary to the understanding reached when Japan agreed to make concessions in the matter of cotton goods. Threaten to order withdrawal of delegates from Delhi before year end, though Govt. is urging patience and is reported to have instructed the delegation to urge suspension of the new tariff, pending settlement by negotiation.

Saturday 30th December 1933

I was much struck by the anxiety Sagara appeared to feel lest the ultra-nationalists should plunge the country into serious trouble with the Soviet. He seems to fear that the Manchukuo, with the support of the Kwantung Army - or of elements connected with it - intend to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway before long, using the recent bandit attacks on the international train as a pretext. He seems also to think that the military may be forced to take over the administration of the country (Japan), as the people are getting tired of the way in which the military are working in the background and pulling strings all the time. There is a growing feeling, therefore, that the military should either come out into the open and accept full responsibility or else leave the Govt. free to act without interference behind the scenes. The military themselves, according to Sagara, would probably be only too glad to come out into the open if they were sure of popular support, but they lack confidence of getting this support if they do so and fear the consequences to national unity if support is not forthcoming.

Incidentally, he tended to confirm that Araki himself is on the side of moderation and is therefore losing favour with the young officer group.

Meantime, Litvinov has come out with another blast against Japan, declaring that Japan is "feverishly preparing for a war which cannot be otherwise than offensive" and urging that Japan will "act according to the sensible advice of her sensibly-minded patriots, not the rash counsel of her military adventurers".

Wednesday 3rd January 1934

On receipt of cable from Delhi intimating Indo-Japanese agreement, with ending of boycott and lowering of tariff, likely, I rang up Macrae, who told me in confidence that Kurusu, Wakamatsu, and Yoshino are going down to Osaka for a conference with the cotton people tomorrow, when they expect to agree on the removal of the boycott.

Saturday 6th January 1934

To Embassy for talk with British Ambassador. He seemed worried as to the possibilities of a rapprochement between Japan and Germany, leading, incidentally, to German recognition of Manchukuo and thereby complicating the question of recognition. He himself, of course, has always been opposed to the League resolution against recognition, and says the more conservative elements at home fully recognise the folly of that action, but that we were
compelled to vote with the others in order to uphold the League. British Ambassador also worried over the exchange of Ministers between Japan and Afghanistan on account of the Pan-Asiatic angle, and, though he admits that the satisfactory conclusion of the Indo-Japanese negotiations at New Delhi has come as a pleasant surprise, he is somewhat pessimistic about the Anglo-Japanese trade negotiations in England and the whole question of Anglo-Japanese trade rivalry.

Had a talk with Macrae on the news from New Delhi of the agreement to lift the boycott in return for reduction of the tariff. He, of course, is well pleased with the outcome and gives much credit to the Japanese Govt. for inducing the Osaka cotton men to agree, as he considers that, without Govt. intervention, an agreement would never have been reached.

Hear that General Pabst Dutch Ambassador has passed on a report to the effect that serious banditry has broken out all over Manchuria and is causing serious trouble. In view of James's recent observations, the report seems unlikely to be correct.

Had Amau and Iwanaga along to lunch at the Club. Amau, of his own accord, brought up the question of a German-Japanese rapprochement, which interested me in that he commented on the report in the same way that I had commented to the British Ambassador. The exchange of radio broadcasts, he asserted, had nothing political in it - a purely "cultural rapprochement", as he put it and on the same lines as those exchanged between Japan and the U.S.

Sunday 14th January 1934
Spoke to British Ambassador about Yamada's wish to see him on behalf of Araki, in order to maintain the contact made through Snow. The Ambassador seems to think Araki too visionary to be of much practical use, but agrees that it is just as well to keep up contact.

Tuesday 16th January 1934
Suetsugu Commander-in-Chief of 1st and Combined Fleet has been figuring prominently the past few days on account of somewhat indiscreet and outspoken comments on America appearing in an interview which he is alleged to have given to the "Gendai", a popular magazine, copies of which have found their way to America, where they have called forth equally outspoken criticism by Admiral Stanley, American Chief of Naval Operations.

Dined at the Canadian Legation, a dinner to the Snows, who have just returned from Peking and are in Tokyo for a day or two prior to leaving for Madrid. Had a long talk with Snow on the feeling in China on Pu Yi becoming Emperor. Among the diplomats in Peking, he says, the general feeling seems to be a philosophical resignation to the inevitable - neither glad nor sorry, but mildly interested as to its ultimate effect in and on China.

The only diplomat who seemed worried at the prospect of Pu Yi becoming Emperor and of its possible results was Nelson Johnson, the American Minister, who asserted that if Pu Yi extended his sway to the Yellow River, circumstances would compel him to extend it further and further, until the whole of China returned to him eventually - and this would mean the extension of Japanese influence as well. To which Snow replied that he thought this might be
a good thing for everyone, as the Japanese would probably see to it that law and order was established!

While in Nanking, he met Salter and found him bitterly anti-Japanese, though Snow considers this attitude is largely due to personal considerations, as Salter apparently fears that the Nanking crowd may replace him with a Japanese as adviser.

As Kolb was at the Marler’s dinner, I tackled him on the subject of the "Jiji" report that Knoll's visit to Manchukuo was a preliminary step to German recognition. He laughed at the idea and asserted that, in actual fact, Germany would probably be one of the last of the big Powers to recognise the Manchukuo, as she could not afford - in view of her not having extra[territorial]ity rights any longer in China - to take such a step, lest the Chinese retaliate in such a way as to damage her important trade interests in China. Another interesting thing he told me was that a few months ago Yurenev was constantly expressing to Voretsch his belief that war with Japan was a virtual certainty by the spring of this year. Of late, however, he has apparently altered his opinion and now seems to think that the danger of war has been averted, at least for the present. As Kolb said, it would be interesting to know if Yurenev really did feel so sure about the imminence of war, or whether he had some ulterior motive in trying to frighten Germany, through their ambassador, into this belief. Whichever may have been the case, Soviet denunciations of Japan appear to have eased down a bit - possibly indicating, as Kolb laughingly remarked, that they felt it safe enough to inveigh against the Japanese while the spring was still far off and the winter lay between, but that now, with spring drawing near, they consider it inadvisable to goad on Japan lest it goad her into action.

Friday 19th January 1934

F.O. instructed their Ambassador at Rome to make representations against certain anti-Japanese remarks, credited to Mussolini, appearing in the "San Francisco Examiner" and other American papers a few days ago.

Iwanaga tells me that Takahashi’s age - he is now over 80- is beginning to tell on him and he tired very easily. He considers its will be a bad day for the Cabinet if he, Takahashi, has to resign, as it is his prestige, even more than Saito's, that keeps the Cabinet together.

Saturday 20th January 1934

The long-anticipated announcement of Pu Yi’s coming accession to the throne as Emperor of Manchukuo was given out, at last, this afternoon.

Monday 22nd January 1934

With the object of silencing talk of a probable war between Japan and the Soviet, Amau came out with a very outspoken statement at this morning’s press conference, taking Molotov, Litvinov.

Very unexpectedly came the news that Araki had tendered his resignation on account of his illness preventing him from taking part in the coming Diet session. Apparently Saito tried to dissuade him from resigning, but without success, so Hayashi Senjuro is to take his place. Owing to Araki’s recent tendency towards moderation, he is said to have been losing his influence among the younger officer group of late.
Tuesday 23rd January 1934
Another blast from Moscow! Kaganovitch, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in a fine old tirade against Japan, declares dramatically: "we can expect an attack at any moment!" Meantime Hirota, in his speech this morning at the reopening of the Diet session, has emphasised Japan's desire to follow out a policy of peace and to strive for better relations with both the Soviet and the U.S.A., as well as with Britain and with China. While stressing desire for settling differences with the Soviet by peaceful means, however, he did some pretty straight speaking about the recent series of provocative speeches etc. by Soviet leaders. Taken all in all, the tone of his address was one of moderation, possibly due, as some observers remark, to the resumption of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Wednesday 24th January 1934
At this morning's press conference at the F.O., Amau revealed that Ota had spoken to Litvinov about his recent harangue against Japan and had also drawn Sokolnikov's attention to recent tirades by Litvinov and others, Litvinov having declared on December 29th that Japan was preparing to seize the Maritime Provinces, while Molotov, early in November, had spoken in similar vein. The explanation given by Sokolnikov, however, was "not very satisfactory", according to Amau.
Went for talk with the British Ambassador before the arrival of Yamada, for whom I had arranged a meeting with him. Metzger had previously told me that, according to Yamada, Araki is by no means out of the picture for good, as he will now bide his time and make the necessary preparations for taking over the Premiership, if possible when Saito resigns - as he is expected to do sooner or later on account of old age. Metzger also professes to have learned that Araki was persuaded to resign at this moment - as his illness provided a good opportunity for him to do so - because the Ministers of Commerce and of Railways are to be attacked shortly (verbally!) on account of certain transactions involving some Seiyukai men on the charge of bribery and corruption. The revelation of these scandals, according to Metzger, is likely to cause the downfall of the present Cabinet, and Araki would become indirectly involved - as a Cabinet member.
Metzger also told me, in confidence, that some kind of agreement had been fixed up by the German Consul-General in Yokohama, between Japanese and German interests over what he calls "stifling gas", but he seemed a bit vague as to whether it concerned its use, its sale, or its prohibition! Still, it is interesting if true, as also is his information that large contracts for bridge-building material have been fixed up just recently between Germany and Japan. As the British Ambassador is specially interested in such matters, I mentioned them to him in strict confidence and also discussed the question of Russo-Japanese relations. He agrees with me that, although it would be unsafe to rule out the possibility of war between the two, neither of the two are wanting war at the moment. He tells me, however, that the French Military Attaché regards the outbreak of a new Russo-Japanese war within the next year or two as practically certain. Hear that Sir Robert Clive, whom I met in Peking in 1920, is likely to succeed as Ambassador.
Monday 29th January 1934
Stalin has been holding forth once more - on the 27th, at the 17th national communist meeting in Moscow. Though mild compared to some of the recent tirades from there, he nevertheless declared that the non-conclusion of a Russo-Japanese non-aggression treaty showed the lack of amity, that relations are none too friendly, and that the Japanese Govt. was indifferent to the "practically open challenge" voice against Russia by some of the "militarists" of Japan.

Tuesday 30th January 1934
The "Advertiser" has quite a good "leader" on the treatment of foreign writers by the Japanese, pointing out the folly of debarring those who come to Japan with the reputation of being anti-Japanese. The fact that they may have criticised Japan is all the more reason for extending facilities to them, in order to show them that Japan is not as black as she is sometimes painted.

According to a Press report from London, Britain and France may sell their mandate islands in the Pacific to the U.S. in return for part payment of the War Debts. The report is almost undoubtedly groundless, but it is rather typical of the mischief-making rumours that are circulating so freely just at present and adding to the feeling of unrest and worry in Japan and elsewhere. It would certainly be a serious cause of worry to Japan if it proved true, as it would provide just those very "stepping stones" across the Pacific which the U.S. now lacks.

Wednesday 31st January 1934
As press reports on Hirota's remarks in the Diet yesterday about Soviet fortifications and troops on the Manchurian border were somewhat conflicting, I asked Amau about them. His reply was to the effect that Hirota had stressed his belief that demilitarisation of the border area would be far more effective in easing the tension than would a non-aggression pact which left troops and fortifications untouched. Hirota's reference to overtures having been made to Moscow for the withdrawal of troops, he said, was to do wit the suggestion made in November (see diary for 11 November) for the two countries to apply the demilitarisation principles of the Portsmouth treaty. When asked what had been the Soviet reply to this overture, Amau smiled and answered cryptically: "Stalin's speech!"

Thursday 1st February 1934
To Embassy in morning for a talk with Col. James on Russo-Japanese relations etc.. Like myself, he is inclined to discount the belief that war between the two is imminent - as also is the ambassador, who dropped in while I was there and joined in the discussion. While, however, he doubts that war is imminent, he admitted that there are two very definite schools of thought in the Japanese army - one urging the necessity of completing the army readjustment programme, the railways, the new ports and harbours, and the work of consolidation in general before risking a war in which the very existence of Japan might depend, while the other takes the view, "now or never", as delay favours the Soviet side. Incidentally he mentioned having just read a passage in the "life" of Satow, in which Satow, writing in 1901, expressed his conviction that a Russo-Japanese war was inevitable in the
near future and that there were two schools of though at that time too - one urging patience till plans were completed, while the other wanted to strike at once, before Russia had time to complete the Trans-Siberian Railway. The plans were competed by the end of 1903. War was declared in February 1904. Looks rather as though history is repeating itself, for, as Col. James remarked, Japan is always read to act as soon as her preparations are complete. In 1904 it was the fear of Russia gaining possession of Korea, "the arrow pointing at Japan's heart", that urged Japan onward. Next time it may be the fear of Russia being within striking distance of Japan, by air and by submarine, so long as she holds Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces, the fact being that, owing to the development of aviation, Japan's strategic frontiers now extend beyond the Maritime Provinces, several hundred miles inland. The Soviet, on the other hand, have a growing economic interest in these provinces and a growing need for an outlet into the Pacific.

American Congressmen and the like are hardly helping matters by backing up the "Big Navy" advocates in the U.S. with such assertions as: - "Japan would not have invaded Manchuria or occupied Shanghai if our navy had been up to treaty strength." In saying this, they are merely asserting that the so-called "treaty navy" which they advocate would be capable of offensive manoeuvring 5000 miles from its home base. As the "Mainichi" very succinctly remarks:- "We do not object to parity in the middle of the Pacific, but we insist on a margin of superiority on our own side in home waters, for that is the only way to enjoy security".

Monday 5th February 1934

Voroshilov has now joined the swelling chorus of Soviet leaders inveighing against Japan. Speaking before the Communist Congress at Moscow on the 3rd, he started by asserting that the U.S.S.R. has the most highly-mechanised army in the world and a system of fortified zones extending from Lake Ladoga westward to the Black Sea and eastward to "the threatened areas in Eastern Siberia". Having declared that "these fortifications will provide great obstacles for those adventurers who may desire to attack the Soviet Union" and that great advances had been made in aviation, field artillery and tanks, though "the transport division is still the weak link in the defence system", he went on to say that new fleets had been established in the North and the Far East and that, though lacking capital ships, they could inflict serious damage on any attacker. In the air arm, he stressed that bombers had been increased considerably. Then, having warmed up to his subject, he launched forth in sarcastic and provocative vein as to the difficulty of "trusting our dear neighbours the Japanese." "Soviet military preparedness," he said, "is an eyesore for the Japanese, and would have been more pleasant for our neighbours if our Manchurian frontier had been as defenceless and badly protected as those of China in 1931. However, we do not intend to give them this pleasure, despite our usual courtesy".

Amau's comments on this and other recent Soviet diatribes is that, in a way, they are welcome, as it is a Russian characteristic to shout and bluster and be noisy when they don't feel sure of themselves. Japan, he considers, would have far more reason for anxiety if Moscow remained quiet and composed.
Thursday 8th February 1934
Rung up in evening with news that Nakajima, the Commerce Minister, had resigned and had been succeeded by Dr. Matsumoto Joji - the culmination of recent attacks in the Diet on Nakajima for his alleged connection with some scandal and for an article on Ashikaga Takauji.

Monday 12th February 1934
Vassili Bluecher, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, has now joined the ever-swelling chorus of Soviet leaders inveighing against Japan. Speaking at the 17th All-Union Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow on Saturday, he charged that Japan's words differed greatly from her deeds, and asserted that Japan was preparing feverishly for a war of aggression against the Soviet. Owing to the press ban on some of the subjects with which he dealt, some of the most interesting assertions in his speech had to be omitted in the published account of it. Rengo, however, showed me a copy of the original cable as received and in it were the following points that had to be suppressed:

- Over 1000 Kms. of new strategic railways leading to the Soviet borders, he said, have been constructed by the Japanese in the past 2 years and only 30% or 35% of them had any economic value.
- Over 2,200 Kms. of new strategic roads to, and in, the border districts have been constructed during the same period.
- 50 airports and aviation bases established in the triangle formed by Mukden, Harbin, and Tsitsihar and north of it.
- Fully 130,000 Japanese troops, or "over 1/3 of the whole Japanese army" (Sic!) are now in Manchuria, plus from 110,000 to 115,000 Manchukuo troops and 12,000 trained White Russians.

The Sungari military fleet, he asserts, has been increased by 24 units, and Japanese aircraft in Manchuria now number fully 500. The assertion that the Japanese now have as many as 130,000 troops in Manchuria seems a bit of an exaggeration, though the other figures quoted may be more or less correct and are certainly interesting if true.

True or not, Bluecher professed confidence to come out victorious in the event of war, declaring that the Soviet "will be able to concentrate so many aeroplanes that they will certainly be more numerous than Japan's". Amongst the Soviet defence measures, he said, was the belting of the borders with "iron and concrete, sufficiently solid to withstand the strongest teeth", while the army is now reinforced by "the best cadres, brought to such a standard both in regard to quality and quantity that we can continue our work here in perfect calm", and "we are technically strong both in tanks and in aviation".

In view of Col. James's remarks the other day about the Soviet's growing economic interests in the Maritime Provinces, Bluecher's claim that "during the first 5-year plan more funds were invested in the Far Eastern region than during the whole existence of the Czarist Govt." is of more than usual interest, as also is his assertion that "the 2nd 5-year plan includes an
enormous programme for the socialist industrialisation of that borderland." In this connection he singled out the development of the coal areas of the Bureiya district, where, he said, prospected reserves of coal are estimated at 100,000,000,000 tons, while there are also 2,000,000,000 tons of iron ore and copper in the same district. Special privileges, he recalled, have recently been accorded to settlers in those parts, and the settlement of the region and the creation of a powerful stock- breeding and farming base is most important for the district.

Sunday 18th February 1934
Spoke to the British Ambassador about Araki’s invitation, broached last night by Yamada, for him to lunch with him at Atami either Thursday or Friday. Rather to my surprise, he seemed quite pleased at the suggestion and asked me to accept for Thursday. I was afraid he would consider Atami too far afield for a lunch.
According to Langley, one of the American Embassy men told him the other day that the U.S. Embassy is purposely sending adverse reports on Japan to the State Department in Washington in order to affect exchange rates. Personally I can hardly believe this.

Monday 19th February 1934
Internal political situation given a jolt by the sudden and unexpected resignation of Mochizuki, one of the outstanding leaders of the Seiyukai, from the Diet, of which he has been a member for the past 40 years. His resignation is apparently intended to bring the party to its senses lest a serious split occur, as the Kuhara clique have been hurling charges of bribery and corruption against Suzuki’s followers, notably the luckless Hatoyama and, to a lesser extent, Mitsuchi, both of whom the Kuhara crowd are trying to force to resign from the Cabinet.
Following might serve as a check to free conversation, but Araki expressed confidence that, as a former army officer, I could be trusted. The British Ambassador was equally prepared to let me stay, so I was present throughout.

MAIN POINTS IN TALK AT ATAMI, 20TH FEBRUARY 1934
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Saito Cabinet expected to resign as soon as the budget has been passed. If so, Araki is likely to succeed as Premier. If Araki heads the next cabinet, he will probably take over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs himself - at least at the start - and will probably have Fukai as Finance Minister and Mazaki (Inspector-General of Military Education) as Minister of War.
Araki’s personal ambition is to become Chief of the General Staff. The premiership, as such, has no particular appeal for him, according to Yamada, though he would be prepared to take it if he considered it to be in the interest of the country for him to do so.
The political parties and the big monied interests are, on the whole, opposed to him. The masses in general, and the farming communities in particular, support him strongly. Whatever changes take place, they will be carried out by constitutional means.
Reference was made to the Hitler movement in Germany and Fascism in Italy.
To a query as to what he thought of Kuhara Fusanosuke, Araki replied cryptically: - "he is a merchant." Subsequently he expanded this remark by giving full credit to Kuhara as a man of
undoubted ability, both as an organiser and an administrator, but deplored his trickiness and somewhat unscrupulous nature, a man capable of fine, disinterested work, but also of evil; a kind of Jekyll and Hyde complex.

"TENNO NO GO KIBO"

At this point, Araki, who had been talking in semi-humourous vein, changed to more serious mood with the remark - accompanied by a gesture suggestive of desire to turn to more important matters - "but this is all trivial talk." Then, in an aside to Yamada, he made a brief remark in which the only words clearly audible were "Tenno no go kibo" ("The Emperor's wishes"). This may have been a reference to the Emperor's wish, said to have been conveyed to Araki by Prince Fushimi, for closer friendship with England, for the conversation then turned to the subject of Japan's foreign relations.

ANGLO-JAPANESE CO-OPERATION

Points bearing on this question include the following:

- Araki's annoyance with Hirota for failing to say more about relations with Britain in his Diet speech.
- The likelihood of Araki taking on the foreign portfolio at the outset, if he becomes Premier - apparently, in part, with the object of initiating a foreign policy of his own, with closer friendship and co-operation with Britain as its main feature.
- The likelihood of Fukai, a pro-British financier, being made Finance Minister in the event of Araki forming the next cabinet.
- Araki's talk to Osaka merchants.
- Comments regarding the necessity of closer co-operation between Britain and Japan in China, and Japan's desire that Britain should have a better understanding of her position and actions.

SOVIET RUSSIA

Thanks to constant propaganda, including the "gospel" of hate against bourgeois countries, monarchies, and landowners enunciated in the opening pages of the military training manuals, the Soviet army has been imbued with the idea of a "mission" and thereby provided with an almost religious fervour, such as was lacking in the old Czarist army. As a means of strengthening the army's morale, Araki considered this important. On the other hand, Russian characteristics, which tended to weaken the Czarist army as a fighting force, remain unchanged and, although the Soviet army is well supplied with up-to-date technical equipment, Araki asserted that Soviet arms and equipment suffer from lack of standardisation and he seemed doubtful as to the efficiency of Soviet military training.

Examples of Russian characteristics were given. Araki seemed to think quite highly of Rink, but doubted if he subscribed fully to the Moscow creed. He expressed the belief that not more than half the Soviet army belonged to the communist party or were wholehearted supporters of the 3rd International. He contended, too, that there was a lack of real cohesion among the Soviet people, although, on account of the G.P.U. system of metsuke (spies), there was a superficial appearance of unity, as no one dared to make criticisms or exchange views, even with his closest friend. He asserted that
this held true even in the Soviet embassy, where diplomats, naval and military attachés, and commercial officials worked in watertight compartments. Araki spoke strongly on the subject of Soviet propaganda in Japan and abroad.

**GENERAL**

- Other points stressed or touched on included:
  - Japan's unenviable position, surrounded by potential enemies.
  - Japan's actions misunderstood abroad.
  - Manchukuo founded on "will of the people".
  - Friction with America brought on in the first place by the Californian and kindred questions, but no fundamental cause of conflict.

**Wednesday 21st February 1934**

See that some interesting figures on military aviation costs were revealed yesterday in the Diet by General Hayashi. For 1932, expenditure on the Army Air Force was £39,000,000; in 1933 it was £85,000,000; for 1934 the estimate is £83,000,000. In reply to a query as to why the Soviet is so outspoken as to its confidence in its aerial superiority over Japan, General Hayashi said that about £42,000,000 is required for the reorganisation of the Air Corps and personal affairs, and that it is considered sufficient for the time.

**Thursday 22nd February 1934**

To Embassy in morning to see the British Ambassador about the notes I prepared for him on Tuesday's talk at Atami. Spoke to Sansom about the pessimistic cables from London this morning about the Anglo-Japanese trade talks, and was interested to learn that his sympathy is with Japan and that he considers Lancashire is making a fool of itself in trying to tie Japan down to such an (to him) unfair extent. In effect, Lancashire wants to tie Japan's hands and leave herself free and, as Sansom points out, it is all very well for Lancashire to fix up agreements with Japan in all parts of the World, but how can she ensure the carrying out to these agreements in the Dominions and in foreign countries, over whose tariff legislation she has no control. Japan realises this; hence her insistence that only trade in England and the Crown Colonies covered by agreement. Sansom spoke to the Lancashire people very strongly on this point when he was over in England recently, and did his best to urge them not to put forward impractical demands, but they refused to listen to his advice. As Sansom put it, Lancashire regards the Japanese as though they were ordinary Asiatics, with whom "bazaar trading tactics" - starting with impossible demands to be whittled down by bargaining - are necessary. They refuse to recognise that the Japanese are reasonable, levelheaded businessmen, who will respond to treatment as such, but will only by disgusted and irritated if treated like Baghdad Jews.

**Friday 23rd February 1934**

The irritation engendered by the Soviet's action in invalidating the Japanese bids at the fishery auction at Vladivostok a few days ago and in insisting on a 72 sen rouble - contrary to
the Shidehara-Trojanovsky agreement of April 1931 - shows signs of calming down, as Yurenev has adopted a conciliatory attitude in his talk with Hirota.

The long-pending question of the Manchukuo's detention of the six Soviet Chinese Eastern Railway officials also looks like being solved shortly by means of a compromise, by which all six will be replaced - 3 by Soviet and 3 by Manchukuo appointees. The way will then be open for the resumption of negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In this connection, Iwanaga tells me that the Soviet troop concentration is, in part, due to the fear that the Manchukuo, with Japanese assistance, may try to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway by force. As the cost of retaining so many troops on the borders is very considerable, he thinks the Soviet is beginning to feel that the sooner the sale agreement can be reached the better, as they will then be able to reduce their troop strength in those parts and thereby save the present heavy expenditure.

He also tells me that Ohashi had confided to him that his only reason for retaining his post under the Manchukuo is that he feels he can exert a restraining influence on that section of the military that would like to precipitate a clash with the Soviet.

Metzger told me that Von Dirksen, the new German Ambassador, had been down to Atami to see

Meantime the F.O. has instructed Ota, at Moscow, to protest against the flight of Soviet planes over Rashin and Yuki on two recent occasions.

See by the latest Bulletin of International Affairs (1/2) that, according to reports received in Moscow, Lavrentieff, party secretary for the Far East, speaking at Khabarovsky, stated that the Soviet is building a new trunk line to the Pacific - the Baikal-Amur Railway, and doubling the Trans-Siberian track for a further 400 miles from Urusha to Bocheckovo, the junction for Blagoveshchensk. They were also, he said, building a second railway from Irkutsk eastwards. This is apparently the line about which I queried Nagi some months ago.

In view of Metzger's remarks the other day about Araki wanting to put a stop to anti-British propaganda, I suggested at the time that he should stop Bose's little game and that he should ask about Araki's own alleged remarks a year or so ago about driving the British out of India. As I have always suspected, the article in which these remarks appeared was written by a "ghost writer", not by Araki himself. That, at least, is the explanation that Metzger has now brought me. He also tells me that Araki and Matsui fail to see eye to eye on the Great Asia Society, and that Araki is strongly opposed to Matsui's activities in this respect.

Friday 2nd March 1934

Sansom mentioned that someone got up in the House of Commons recently and demanded that the import and sale of Japanese cups and chinaware should be prohibited, as the glazing was poisonous! Someone else trotted out a similar cock-and-bull story about Japanese electrical apparatus. Any old fiction seems to do.

Saturday 3rd March 1934

As expected, Hatoyama has resigned and Saito has taken over the portfolio of Education concurrently with the Premiership. The findings of the committee appointed to examine the
charges brought against him are not very satisfactory and leave one wondering whether he was innocent or not, as the Seiyukai members who held the majority vote on the committee declared him guiltless, while the others were either dubious or else definitely assertive of his guilt.

Tuesday 6th March 1934
The British Ambassador showed me a copy of his despatch to London about our talk with Araki and also showed me the correspondence between himself and our own F.O. about Pu Yi's forthcoming visit to Japan. It is, of course, a cause of very great embarrassment to all the foreign diplomats here, as they obviously cannot, so to speak, "boycott" the new Manchurian Emperor, yet they cannot treat him as an ordinary visiting royalty, as this would be tantamount to recognising the Manchukuo! The British Ambassador is plainly worried and asked my advice - no easy matter to give under the circumstances.
Incidentally I told him of Araki's request, made through Yamada and Metzger, for figures of British exports to Soviet Russia, in order to prove the ridiculousness of the belief, held in certain Army circles, that Britain is supplying large quantities of arms and ammunition to the Soviet for use against Japan. He was much interested, both in this and also in Araki's promise to let me have a frank statement of his views on India; and agreed that it seems to indicate that he is making a very real effort to eradicate anti-British sentiment in Japan.

Friday 9th March 1934
Metzger tells me that the Emperor, is his desire for closer friendship with England, has been largely influenced by the Dowager Empress, who, he says, was also largely instrumental in influencing Okuma to stick to England and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the early days of the War. This information, he said, had been given him by Yamada for transmission, through me, to the British Ambassador.

Wednesday 14th March 1934
According to a War Office report, a Soviet light bomber, with an officer and a pilot on board her, made a forced landing near Mishan, near Lake Hinka, on the 11th. The two occupants have therefore been detained by the Manchukuo, together with the machine.

To lunch with the British Ambassador at the Embassy - an informal lunch for Araki, who was accompanied by Yamada.

Thursday 15th March 1934
Despite indications to the contrary, the trade negotiations in London led to a rupture yesterday over the question of areas, the British remaining insistent on an agreement covering the whole World (though ready to discuss it area by area), whilst the Japanese maintained their stand that the agreement should only concern Britain and the Crown Colonies, as Britain was not in a position to guarantee agreements in the Dominions and other countries on account of the tariff question.
Wrote a snorter to the "N.C.D.N." about their "leader" of the 6th, in which they insinuated that my article on Anglo-Japanese relations in "Contemporary Japan" had been "written to order" for Japanese propagandist purposes.
Monday 19th March 1934

According to Yamada, General Hayashi is at one with Araki in the matter of friendship with England and is prepared to force the Govt.'s hand, if necessary, by threatening to resign and to refuse to nominate a successor, if Hirota sticks to his policy of seeking American and Soviet friendship in preference to co-operation and collaboration with Britain. I warned Yamada, however, that action of this kind might defeat its own purpose, as it would embarrass the British Govt. if Anglo-Japanese friendship was to be brought about by such methods!

Tuesday 20th March 1934

Chichester-Smith tells me that everyone at Singapore seems convinced that Japan is planning to take a swipe at Singapore and Australia in due course. What bilge they do talk!

Wednesday 21st March 1934

Lunched at Club with Zumoto and had a most interesting talk with him on the political situation. Rather surprised to find he considers that Saito will almost certainly resign from office within the next couple of months, though who his successor will be he seemed doubtful. Ugaki he considers quite a possibility - also, which rather surprised me, Hirota. Araki, Howard has been asserting - in connection with the exchange of "good will" letters between Hirota and Cordell Hull - that Japan is prepared to drop her claim for a higher naval ratio if America will (1) scrap the discriminatory clause in the Immigration Law, (2) recognise Manchukuo, and (3) abandon its naval and air bases in the Philippines. Amau did some very straight talking this morning about Roy Howard's "not too intelligent anticipation" and his attempts to formulate international policies by means of the U.P., and he charged the U.P., in this connection, with having worked for the recognition of the Soviet by the U.S.

Friday 23rd March 1934

The most interesting part of the talk was when Araki got on to the subject of the Soviet. Colonel James had remarked that the tension appeared to have eased down a bit during the past month or so. "On the surface, that is so", replied Araki, "but not in reality. With Hirota's open advocacy of peace between the two countries, the Soviet cannot very well continue to ignore his peace offers openly. Under the surface, however, they are continuing their preparations as before." Col. James rather confirmed this, as he mentioned having reliable information to the effect that troop trains, at the rate of three a day, are continuing to arrive in Eastern Siberia, together with fresh aircraft and war material of all kinds.

According to Araki, confirmation of the efforts being expended by the Soviet in preparing fortifications and defence works along the frontier is constantly forthcoming from Chinese coolies, who escape across the frozen river into Manchukuo territory, bringing with them tales of forced labour.

In reply to questions put to him, Araki rather intimated his belief that the Soviet will be more or less compelled to force on a war with Japan within the next year or two, as they cannot afford to continue military preparations at the present rate much longer.
To Colonel James's query as to what the Soviet would have to gain by a war, he asserted that their main object would be to bolshevise China as a step toward world revolution. So long, however, as Manchuria remains independent and under Japanese protection, the bolshevisation of China is almost impossible - hence their desire to drive Japanese influence out of Manchuria. The Soviet, however, are clever enough to see that Japan, not the Soviet, must be made to appear in the role of aggressor. Consequently they will do everything possible to try Japanese patience by assisting Manchurian bandits and malcontents to continue to create disturbances and unrest in Northern Manchuria. In so far as Japan is concerned, he pointed to the fact that her crack division - the 6th Division - has been withdrawn from Manchuria, a fact that, he maintained, shows that Japan has no aggressive intentions.

Asked what he thought of the Soviet army, he expressed the opinion that, in the event of war, they would show up very much better than the old Czarist army at the outset, but that they would not have so much staying power and would crumple up before long.

**Sunday 25th March 1934**

Had a long yarn with Colonel James about the possibility of a scrap between Japan and the Soviet à propos of Araki's remarks on Friday. Tells me in confidence that the Japanese army is working on the re-equipment of divisional artillery and that an order for 204 guns of 112 mm. (?) -i.e. 12 per division - was placed in France some months ago, but that, as the French could not carry out the order in the time stipulated, some of them are being made in the Skoda works. His information is to the effect that about 100 have already been delivered, but that it will take about another year before the whole order is completed. A number of French "75's" have also been made. As he says, it is hardly likely that the Japanese will start a clash with the Soviet till the rearming of the artillery has been completed and the men properly trained in the handling of the new guns.

A propos of which he commented on the recent increase of officers and the calling up of 100,000 reservists for special training in new weapons, though all these measures, he admits, may be nothing more than precautionary. Similarly, all the re-arming and mechanising now going on may be interpreted as merely making up for lost time and bringing the army up to date - not, as some are apt to think, preparation for war.

**Monday 26th March 1934**

Colonel James came in for a further talk in afternoon, to see if I agree with his latest report on Araki's remarks and his own conclusions.

**Wednesday 28th March 1934**

To Embassy in morning to "make my number" with Dodd, Snow's successor.

**Thursday 29th March 1934**

To dentist in afternoon, and while waiting my turn browsed through a Japanese novelette that I found there. With the somewhat sensational title "The Imminent War Between Japan and Russia", it was plentifully illustrated and had forewords by Generals Minami and Hayashi.
Truly extraordinary that men in their position should give their printed benediction to books of this kind just at this time.

Friday 30th March 1934

Looked in to Embassy in evening to see Dodd, who had asked me round for a talk on a couple of memoranda prepared by Yamada, setting forth Araki's views on certain points that I had promised to try and get cleared up for Colonel James - mainly as to why, in Araki's opinion, the Soviet might try to bring about war with Japan. Although very interesting in certain respects, the replies are not as clear or as satisfactory as one might wish, though they show very clearly the anxiety felt about the dangers of Soviet propaganda and activities on and in China.

Dodd also told me of the reply received from London to the query cabled by the British Ambassador on the 3rd about British exports of war material to the U.S.S.R. last year, as Araki had asked me, through Yamada, to obtain the figures in order to quieten the suspicions of Japanese officers, who asserted that the Soviet was obtaining large supplies from the British. The Ambassador's query, however, has elicited the information that the total amount exported to the U.S.S.R. in 1933 consisted of 100 sporting cartridges valued at four pounds!

Saturday 31st March 1934

Ban removed on news of another wholesale murder plot, the intended victims including Saionji, Wakatsuki, Dr. Suzuki, Adachi, Ugaki, Nakano Seigo, Iwasaki, Baron Goh, and He also has some interesting things to say about the Shanghai operations and the operations in Northern China. Regarding the former he says: "the Japanese troops avoided capturing Soochow, as this would have meant the cutting off of the Nanking Govt. from its hinterland resources, which would have caused the fall of that Govt. but this occurrence was not desired by Japan."

Friday 6th April 1934

Okawa Shumei had proposed to him, through Commander Fujii, in August 1931, that an attempt should be made to bring about the murder of a number of Japanese civilians in Manchuria by Chinese, in order to create an opportunity for military action. Nissho, quite rightly, refused to consider such a proposal.

Monday 9th April 1934

Metzger presented me with a couple of photos of some leaders of the Russian Fascist Party who are at present in Yokohama, having come to Japan apparently in the belief that war with the Soviet is imminent!

Wednesday 11th April 1934

Fresh Cabinet crisis, as General Hayashi has tendered his resignation on account of his brother's indictment in connection with the Gas Co. scandal. It will be a great loss if he goes, as from all accounts he is the best man for War Minister at the present time.

Sunday 15th April 1934
"Gogai" [Newspaper Special Edition] issued in afternoon announcing that Prince Kanin, who had hurried back to Tokyo from his tour of inspection, had prevailed upon Hayashi to remain in office.

Wednesday 18th April 1934
To Embassy in morning to see the British Ambassador. He questioned me about the "hands off China policy" announced "unofficially" by the F.O. last night. It seems to have taken everyone by surprise and is likely to cause a bit of a stir abroad, as it goes even further than a Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" and, to al large extent, is a rehash of the famous "Twenty-One Demands"; for, in effect, it demands that China's foreign policy be dictated by Japan and that Japan shall be the final arbiter as to what outside assistance China may or may not receive. Amau asserts that it is merely intended to clarify Hirota's policy of "peace and harmony", but I fear that this is not likely to pass muster with the other Powers, as - apart from anything else - it goes contrary to the policy of the "Open Door".

Colonel James tells me that Hata Shinji, Chief of the Gendarmerie, is believed to be the General who is alleged to have been conspiring to get Hayashi to leave the Cabinet and that Ueda, the Vice Chief of General Staff, is the one who paid the early morning visit to Hayashi in order to urge on him the importance of his remaining.

Yamada tells me that Araki has spoken to General Okamura about my coming visit to Manchuria and that General Yanagawa, the Vice-Minister, has sent instructions to Hsinking to provide me with special facilities for seeing whatever and whomever I wish to see.

Thursday 19th April 1934
Although, according to Sagara, the F.O. continues to assert that the "Hands Off China" statement is unofficial, they have sent out an official translation of it.

Looked in to see Zumoto for a talk on the matter. He admitted quite frankly that it had come as a surprise and that he and others, with whom he had discussed it, considered it very "crude" and liable to cause trouble. It certainly does seem extraordinary, especially coming as it does just at this moment when Hirota is trying so hard to improve relations with the U.S. and others.

AMAU DOCTRINE

"We oppose any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we also oppose any action taken by China, calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Supplying China with warplanes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects."

Friday 20th April 1934
See by a U.P. report that the latest device on the part of the Chinese censors is to insert words in Press telegrams e.g. add "puppet state", and so on, whenever the Manchukuo is mentioned.

The F.O.'s "unofficial" statement continues to be the centre of controversy and, as was to be expected, has called forth some pretty strong criticism abroad. The general impression, however, seems to be that it was clumsily handled and inopportune, though some observers seem to think that it was definitely intended to bring things to a head, instead of just letting them hang on and on simmering indefinitely, so that everyone should know exactly how matters stood.

Metzger tells me that, according to Yamada, Araki and other Army leaders are very annoyed with the way in which it has been bungled by Hirota and the F.O., though they are very pleased with the calm way in which it has, according to Press reports, been treated by the British Ambassador and Simon.

**Wednesday 25th April 1934**

Strange indeed is life, for this is my third visit to Korea and Manchuria, and each time it has been in a different capacity and little anticipated the previous time. In 1920 as an Army officer, via Vladivostok, when I heard of Changchun for the first time and little dreamed of its future importance. My main purpose then was to visit the Russo-Japanese War sites which I had studied at the Royal Military College. The Allied intervention in Siberia had but recently come to an end and only the Japanese remained - never to leave, according to current, yet erroneous belief. Second visit was in 1924 as an oil merchant, when first I heard of the possibilities of Rashin and was so impressed by the road and railway construction in N. Korea. And now for the third time, but this time as a journalist, carrying some 50 or more letters of introduction and provided with special facilities and courtesies of various kinds. And Changchun, the filthy, unimposing, uninteresting-looking Chinese town of 1920, is now an Imperial Capital, while Rashin, the unimportant and little-known Korean fishing village, is rapidly being turned into what will one day be a great port city rivalling Dairen. Incidentally, each of my visits has been on the eve of changing my profession.

Coastline between the two ports of Yuki and Rashin is hilly- barren and treeless hills, but quite picturesque. Rashin itself is a fine, natural harbour, well-protected by hills on three sides and a couple of islands at the entrance to the south. Deep water almost up to the coastline. Five large wharves, each capable of berthing 3 to 6 vessels, are being constructed, together with a fine big breakwater. One of the wharves and the breakwater are expected to be completed this year. A large area of marshy ground is being reclaimed and filled in with material obtained by cutting away and blasting the neighbouring cliffs, thereby increasing the area of level ground on which the future city is to be built. At present, however, the population numbers only a few thousands and the foreshore is barren and desolate, though western-style buildings of brick and stone, for South Manchurian Railway officials and others, are going up rapidly. These details, and many more besides, were given me by Kuwabara Toshihide, head of the South Manchurian Railway construction department at Rashin.
Before starting on the work of construction, Kuwabara had been sent to England to study port facilities at Liverpool, Tyneside, and elsewhere, so that the future port city of Rashin shall incorporate the best features of each. Two consecutive 5-year plans are to be carried out in the course of developing the present barren-looking marshland.

Having bid farewell to the friendly "Kempei" [military policeman] etc. who had come to see me off from Yuki, I set off by the 5.50 p.m. train for Kirin with Igarashi. Arrived Nanyo 10 p.m., changed trains, and set off 5 minutes later by the bridge crossing the Tumen, arriving Tomon a few minutes later. There we had a wait of an hour for passport inspection, Customs etc. and, incidentally, had to put back our watches 1 hour, the difference between Korean and Manchurian time. Fine large station, with armed police and Manchukuo troops on the platform and in the train for protection. There was also a Korean "kempeihō" [assistant military policeman] and some Japanese reservists as "keiro".

Thursday 26th
Woke 5 a.m. at Tashihchou and found it snowing. Wide bleak plains. Guards at each station. Loop-holed barracks and loop-holed mud farms passed from time to time. Arrived Tunghua 6.30 a.m. and shortly after was introduced by Igarashi to a Lt.Col. Kakuda, head of the military hospital at Shinchan, near Lafa. Learned from him that, although the Lafa-Harbin line is running all right, it is necessary to break the journey at Gojo (Wuchang?) and spend a night there in very primitive accommodation, as the train only runs by day. In part this is due to unsettled conditions still prevailing in certain sections, but the main reason seems to be that, as the line was laid very rapidly and partly after freezing had set in, the roadbed is still far from perfect and trains therefore are apt to leave the rails.

For long stretches the train passed through thickly-wooded hills, giving excellent cover to bandits when foliage out, though in most places the forests had been levelled for a distance of from 200 to 500 yards from each side of the railway as a counter-measure. While, however, trees may be cut down, small hills affording cover are immovable and, in places, must be a source of anxiety to those responsible for the safety of the railway.

Most of the stations had sandbag defences and wire entanglements. Troops wearing soft, close-fitting khaki caps, with shrapnel helmets slung on backs. Officers carrying war swords. Plans are on foot to build a number of good roads from Kirin, and one is now under construction between Kirin and Hsinking, some 70 miles long - to be completed this year. By means of these roads and improvements in Kirin itself, it is hoped to turn Kirin into a summer resort for officials and others who wish to escape the dust and heat of Hsinking.

We went off to see the mausoleum of Kwantimiao (Kanteimyo), a fine old building on the top of a hill, Kawamoto a "Kempei" [military policeman] tells me that a year ago it would have been almost impossible for a Japanese to climb the hill to the mausoleum by himself without an armed guard, as he would have been attacked. Attacks, he said, frequently took place in the town itself and no less than three of his personal friends had been killed while he himself had narrowly escaped with his life on 3 different occasions. The whole countryside, too, was bandit-ridden, and amongst other places attacked by them was the waterworks on the
outskirts of the city. No one but those on duty could be out of his house with safety after 8 p.m. Comparing conditions a year ago with those now existing, he remarked "It is now like a dream!" As indicating how quiet it has now become, Kawamoto pointed out that, inside the city he now goes about unarmed when in mufti - impossible a year ago. Went to see a Chinese opium den - a poor sordid sort of place. A few rather jaded-looking men lying stretched on raised wooden platforms, some asleep, others roasting little pellets of opium over a small lamp and then putting it into their pipes and sucking at it. Opium smoking is now under govt. control and only purchasable through the newly-established opium monopoly bureau. In order to do away with opium-smoking eventually, only certified addicts are allowed to smoke. Like most Manchurian towns, the road surfaces are more like cart-tracks than anything else, and dust and dirt are plentiful. Before the outbreak in 1931, there were only about 100 Japanese in Kirin, but now about 4,000, mostly small traders. These are in addition to the troops. Now that peace and order are being restored, permanent quarters for the troops and their families are to be constructed. Gendarme Headquarters have already been established in modern barracks, built on the site of the former Kuomintang Diet building. With the restoration of peace and order, permanent stations for the Japanese troops throughout Manchuria have been more or less fixed and peace training is now being carried on, much the same as in Japan, while the main work of bandit suppression etc. is now being left to the Manchukuo troops, assisted by Japanese military advisers and "kempei". These troops are said to be becoming more or less dependable and capable of dealing with bodies of bandits up to 200 or so - and few, if any, larger bodies now remain. These Manchukuo troops are said to fight well in daylight under Japanese supervision, though not so good at night in the dark.

Saturday 28th April 1934

While visiting Kawasaki Torao of the Foreign Office, was taken up to roof of new Justice Ministry, which is at present shared by F.O., and had the new city of Hsinking construction plans explained by one of Kawasaki’s Manchurian assistants, one William Wu by name. They are certainly showing extraordinary vigour and enterprise, laying out magnificent wide asphalted roads and boulevards, parks, and even a golf course, and fine big buildings going up apace. Two consecutive 5-year plans are to be carried out and a really fine city should be the outcome.

Sunday 29th April 1934

Another very genial officer whom I met was Rear Admiral Kobayashi, Chief of the Naval Mission. A great, fat, jolly- looking beggar, he seemed not to have a care in the World, yet I learned afterwards that, for all his outward appearance, he was one of the moving spirits of the May 15th Affair, and he, it was, who hid and sheltered Tachibana, in his own house, when Tachibana fled to Manchuria for protection. The authorities, it seems, knew perfectly well that he was hiding Tachibana, but owing to his value and influence, they left him alone and no mention of his name was ever made in connection with the Affair.

Tuesday May 1st April 1934
Wu had come to the Yamato Hotel to guide me to the Palace, and Wu it was who acted as my interpreter and presenter when finally the audience with the Manchu Emperor, Pu Yi took place. First, however, it was necessary to pass through various guards to a large waiting room, the Emperor having a personal bodyguard of about 200 Manchu and 100 Mongol troops - a fine-looking body of men on the whole. Then, on being summoned to the actual audience, we had to cross a courtyard and pass through a sort of corridor, all well-guarded, to the reception room, where the Emperor received us.

Much struck by the simplicity of his quarters, which formerly served as the headquarters of the Salt Gabelle. A proper palace is, eventually, to be built for him and the site has already been chosen; but it is said to be his special wish that no money be spent on its construction until completion of the more important govt. buildings, which are required for the proper administration of the country.

Of slight build, he wore thick, smoked glasses. Beautiful hands like a woman, though he gave a good firm hand-grip when he shook hands. Offered me a cigarette and declined to take one himself until I had helped myself - in fact, I was much struck throughout our talk by his easy, unassuming attitude and courteous manners, as well as by his pleasant, friendly smile and good firm hand-grip.

After a few general remarks we turned to the subject of Sir Reginald Johnston's new book, "Twilight In The Forbidden City". From what he had been told about it by friends, he feared it might cause a bad impression abroad, by making people imagine that the terrible atmosphere of sordid intrigue and scandal, together with the eunuch system, which existed in the old Forbidden City, had been transferred by the Emperor to his own court in Manchukuo. I did my best to assure him that such apprehensions were uncalled for, as Johnston had made it quite clear in his book that he himself (the Emperor) had proved himself a staunch reformer even before leaving Peking. After emphasising his complete break from all the evil and corrupt practices of the Forbidden City and his desire to carry out reforms in Manchuria in order to ensure peace, progress, and contentment amongst the people, he bade me farewell, with good wishes for a safe journey and pleasant trip.

As I was leaving the Palace, Wu remarked to me in a confidential tone: "Our Emperor is a good man and has great ideas if only he can carry them out". On my asking if he saw any reason why he should not be able to do so, he replied somewhat cryptically: "It is somewhat doubtful if he can, as the future is ominous." I tried to press him to explain just what he meant, but he only replied: "I cannot say more, but you can guess what I mean" - to which he added later: "One cannot speak, but you, as an intelligent man, can see for yourself." Perhaps he rated my intelligence too highly, as it is by no means clear what he meant, though the implication would appear to be that the Japanese were responsible in some way or other for the "ominous" outlook.

The air trip to Harbin was not very thrilling, as the scenery all the way is very monotonous - flat drab-coloured fields and small twisty streams, with the Chinese Eastern Railway southern
extension running like a ribbon across it almost due north and south. The train journey takes 8 or 9 hours, so there is considerable saving of time by air which takes only 1.

Wednesday 2nd May 1934
Hectic day of visits and interviews with Lt. Gen. Wakayama, Commander of the 3rd Division, Col. Sato, his Chief of Staff, Col. Shimamoto, Chief of Gendarmerie, Maj. Akikusa, Col. Komatsubara's No. 2 in the Tokumu Kikan [Special Services Agency - Japanese Military Intelligence], and Lt. Col. Tanaka, whom I knew both at Shizuoka and at Chiba in Language Officer days. He is now Staff Officer to General Wakayama (for details of talks, see separate notes). Unfortunately Komatsubara is away at present - a pity, as he is another old friend of Language Officer days. Hear he distinguished himself at the time of the Su Ping-wen trouble, as it was he who had to negotiate the release of the 300 or so Japanese women and children in Su's hands. It took him 2 months' hard work, during which he swore off drink and swore to commit "hara-kiri" if he failed in his task.

Col. Sato, I found, was an Language Officer in England for a time and spent a year - 1911-2 - attached to the Sherwood Foresters. Like so many other senior officers out here, he is extraordinarily frank and friendly and had no hesitation in explaining the situation and the general disposition of the troops with the aid of a large-scale map. Tells me he was a regimental commander under Nishi in the 8th Division in the earlier stages of the Manchurian show, so this is his second bout of service her since the outbreak.

Dined in evening with Laycock Reuters' correspondent in Harbin and his wife. The latter is Russian - "White" - and seemed much upset at my disagreeing with her husband about the likelihood of war with Soviet in immediate future. She had, she said, been praying and hoping for it, week after week, month after month, but always in vain. An interesting admission, as it bore out what Col. Shimamoto told me this morning about the Russian emigrés longing for war. Though now wanting to see Japan fight the Soviet, she frankly admitted that in 1929 she would have welcomed the Soviet or anyone else who could put a stop to Chinese arrogance and aggressiveness. The Chinese at that time, she said, used to spit at her and others in the streets and, much as she hates the Soviet, she was heartily glad when, in the summer of 1929, they proceeded to take military action against the Chinese and showed them just "where they got off". Both she and her husband speak highly of the good behaviour and quietness of the Japanese troops and of the way the Japanese military tackled the floods and prevented the subsequent spread of disease in the summer of 1932.

Thursday 3rd May 1934
Left Pinchiang Station (Harbin) for Peianchen. Small armed guard on train. Track, single, uneven, on sandy roadbed. Flat, low-lying, swampy ground at start. Crossed by new 14-span bridge over the Sungari. Red-brick stronghold under construction near centre. Concrete bridge being built over Hulan-ho, with sort of martello towers guarding it, plus sandbag redoubts and wire. Towns in most cases seemed to be some way from the stations. Some of the stations appeared to be unguarded. At most stations were notices giving brief description of fighting that had taken place in neighbourhood in 1932. "Pill boxes" guarding most bridges.
Flat, level country for the most part - drab, treeless, with shimmering mirage. Farms and hamlets of mud, surrounded by high mud walls, loop-holed, with "keeps" at each of the 4 corners. The "pill boxes" and "kyosha" at river crossings are said to have been built by the Tetsuro Sokyoku, which was established by the Railway administration last year - June 1933. Roads practically non-existent and difficult to construct, as country is stoneless, like Chiba. Water, too, is a difficulty and very bad. Troops wear goggles owing to constant dust. Chest and tummy troubles, due to dust and bad water, are chief forms of illness among the troops, according to a Medical Orderly to whom I spoke on the train.

At Hailun - population about 35,000 - which was Ma Chan-shan’s stronghold, saw a small cherry tree being carefully removed from train and handed to the troops - a great treasure apparently in these parts.

Most farms appear to fly Manchukuo flag. Heath fires at numerous points, but no attempt to stop their spread.

Struck by large proportion of recruits among the Japanese troops.

Friday 4th May 1934

[Went] to the barracks of the 9th Regiment at Peianchen, where I was greeted by Colonel Mae, with whom I had a long talk on the situation. Points included in the talk were: that 1 battalion of the regiment is stationed at Hailun; barracks for remainder of regiment recently constructed, together with water works, electric plant, and well-equipped hospital for 4-5,000, as the health of the troops is of primary consideration, consequently decent accommodation, which was impossible to obtain in Peian itself, was essential; a brick factory for house and barrack building was the first industrial plant established at Peian; brigade headquarters in Peian; airfield on outskirts, as air service connects with Kokka (Taheiho); railway to Kokka expected to be completed this year, but apparently no intention as yet of pushing railway through to Kokka from Tsitsihar via Noho; Ma Chan-shan, whose headquarters were at Hailun, fled to hills to eastward, where some of his adherents still remain; formerly no Japanese at Peian, but now about 1,200 and soon expected reach 4,000, including hostelry staff, cafe employees, geisha etc.; dust and bad water; 3,000 Chinese coolies and local townsmen welcome Japanese, as give employment and help trade; total population, exclusive of troops, about 10,000.

Train for Tsitsihar, arriving 9.30.

Population of Tsitsihar about 100,000, including 4-5,000 Japanese - only about 100 formerly. Tsitsihar very dusty and sandy; a few hard-surfaced roads and wooden planks for car wheels and pedestrians on sand roads.

Saturday 5th May 1934

Had hoped to fly to Taheiho to see Amur and Soviet defence works, but no plane till Tuesday, so can't spare time.

Spent busy day with Toyomura, the Rengo man, visiting and interviewing. General Kaba, Commander 16th Division, unfortunately absent, but had very interesting and informative talks with Colonel Oshima, his Chief of Staff, Colonel Matsumuro, the "Kikancho"[Head of the local
Special Services Agency - Japanese Military Intelligence, Capt. Akagi, a cavalry major on the Staff, Colonel Chang, Chief of Staff of the Manchukuo Army of Amur Province, Sun, Governor of the Province, and the local gendarmerie. (For details see separate notes.)

Matsumuro, late 1st Cavalry Regiment, is an expert on Mongolia and took part in the Jehol campaign. Distinguished himself in the Jehol show by "converting" a large body of bandits who had captured him. Induced them to join the Manchukuo. Col. Chang very interesting about development and improvement of Manchukuo Army. Said to be well-disposed to Japanese, like most Amur officers, though civil officials not so trusted, especially older officials, who superficially friendly, but disgruntled because they can no longer indulge in "squeeze" [extortion].

Sunday 6th May 1934

Left Tsitsihar [travelling] as far as Tailai. Flat, level country till Tahsing. Cross Chinese Eastern Railway (single line) by bridge about 1 mile East of Anganchi, which is reached by branch line from Tsitsihar. "Shubitai" [Railway Garrison] now guard Chinese Eastern Railway, including where international train wrecked some 10 ri [1 ri = about 4 kilometres] east of Anganchi, which is always a bad spot. Country like North Berwick links. Wild duck teeming on lakes and ponds. When Japanese advanced on Tsitsihar in 1931, they advanced over open fields, as no road, but followed railway track.

Very interesting seeing scene of Nonni River fighting. Concrete piers of new bridge over river now completed, but not bridge itself. Gunboat anchored in midstream nearby and watch-tower under construction, plus "pillboxes".

Remains of 1932 floods like lakes. Long low ridge. Wooden memorials to slain. Treeless. Gently rolling country with occasional farms surrounded by mud walls with strongholds at corners. Herds of sheep, cattle, and horses on prairie land - but everything drab khaki colour, dead level and treeless, except for occasional leafless tree at station.


Taken to see withered tree, presented by Mongols in return for hides etc. when city founded, now venerated. Really a Mongol town, but Mongols dislike town life, therefore only about 300 Mongols in population of 50,000. About 1,000 Japanese and 2,000 Koreans. Mongol camel caravans of 300 camels frequently seen. Low ground outside city walls sometimes flooded. Irrigation scheme, which will help to prevent floods and also assist road building, is planned. Neighbouring farmers disarmed.

Kumazawa, who took part in the great cavalry drive on Jehol last year, gave me most interesting account of his experiences. Only the Mogi Brigade, he said, took part. Started from Tungliao and went through to Chihfeng in 7 days, averaging 18-20 ri a day - nearly 50 miles daily. In saddle from 4 a.m.- 8 p.m. and practically the only sleep they got was in the saddle,
as they bivouacked at night in the open, with temperature 30-40 degrees below zero. To sleep in open at this temperature would have been fatal, so their "rest" at nights was spent in stamping on the snow to keep themselves awake. For two whole days they were without food, though they saw to it that their horses had something to eat. Seems almost incredible, but bears out what one had heard at the time. To my query as to how they managed it, Kumazawa replied in a matter-of-fact, unaffected way that their enthusiasm and the personal example of the Brigade Commander, who lived the same as his men, sufficed for food and rest. Most of the advance, he said, was carried out over level, sandy country - rather like that around Taonan- against biting wind, accompanied by mountain artillery and "hakugekikoo" [Trench Mortars], part by pack-pony, part horse-drawn. Enemy around Chihfeng strongly entrenched and good gunners. Food, when available, consisted of mugi-meshi [rice boiled with barley] and nigiri-meshi [rice balls].

Watanabe very interesting about advance on Tsitsihar, in which he accompanied the 16th Shibata Infantry Regiment under Imamura (?) - 2nd Division. Marching and fighting from Kaitung (Kaitzu) to Tsitsihar took 16 days, 3 of which were without food, as the rice-balls they carried were frozen solid, as also was the water in their flasks. Only about 60 men fell out from exhaustion, though many frost-bitten. He confirmed the value of "setchu kogun" [marching in the snow] as training for such operations and the endurance tests on Grand Manoeuvres. Strong cutting wind. Bivouacked in open at night. Railway unusable, as bridges burned. At one point they had to wade waist-deep through frozen marsh, which gave way beneath them. One party of 60 men forded half-frozen Nonni River naked, carrying kit. To lighten burden, went without greatcoats. Billets in Tsitsihar were former Chinese barracks, but all windows smashed, therefore bitterly cold.

Monday 7th May 1934

Left Taonan. Passing truckloads of Shantung coolies on way to Mukden - cheery, well-built looking fellows, with nothing against the Japanese, but glad to get work from them. Donkeys everywhere in plenty. Sandstorm raging first part of journey, sand whipping across great level prairie land.

Taipingchuan (Taheisen) largish mud-built town, reminiscent of Omdurman in architecture, but with foreign-style buildings for Japanese and Manchukuo troops. Large flat-roofed, low-roofed mud hovels, surrounded with mud walls, grey-coloured.

Chinshan (Kinjun). More low-roofed mud hovels, black pigs etc. Barbed wire, mud parapets etc. and Manchukuo guards in their black uniform. Look-out posts on station roofs.

Pillboxes at river crossings. 3 Battalions between Tsitsihar and Ssupinghai. Interminable mud-wall towns and sandy roads. Names of stations in Japanese and Mongol characters. Talks with police etc. on train. Struck by constant enquiries about cherry blossom in Japan, which apparently much missed. Mostly ex-servicemen. Japanese consular police, Manchukuo police, Japanese and Manchukuo troops, "shubitai" [Railway Garrison], "kempei", South Manchurian Railway police; must be much overlapping. Also "komon" [Military Advisers],
"tokumu-bu", and "tokumu kikan". "Shubitai" descend at stations which only guarded by Manchukuo troops, who stand at attention, bayonets fixed.

Pamiencheng (8-faced-castle). Japanese barracks, red brick; with perimeter and 4 "keeps" at corners. Pill box building.

Ssupinghai (Shiheigai). Met by two "kempei", who wanted me to stay. Ssupinghai fine modern city, good roads. About 50,000 Manchurians and 5,000 Japanese, 3-4,000 Koreans. Very quiet. Not much change since September 1931.

Arrived Chuan-tou, where notice-board tells in Japanese that Major General Fukushima and Major General Oranofski (?) met at Nishi Sakashi, 13.9.05 at point 15 cho south of station to sign peace. In front of the notice now stands semicircular 8-layer sandbag breastwork, with wire!

Mainline double-tracked, with pill boxes guarding bridges.

Kuiyuan. Barracks for about 1 company, but only police at station and no defence works.

Arrived Mukden. Met by Miura, the Rengo man, who accompanied me to the Consulate, where the Butlers are putting me up.

Butler [said that there were] 400 doctors in Manchuria where 65,000 required. South Manchurian Railway Medical College very good, but 75% of students are Japanese and only 25% Manchurian - and Japanese generally return to Japan after graduation. Great admiration for Dr. Kumo, who spoke up for Scottish Presbyterian Medical College when military wanted it closed down. Lack of doctors due to low standard of education of Manchus. Foreigners in Mukden armed and doubt advisability of going outside city owing to bandits, despite Japanese assurances.

Butler worried about Canadian missionary murdered at Chengchiatun in February under suspicious circumstances. Difficult to deal with such cases, as can't communicate with Manchukuo authorities direct, owing to non-recognition.

90% of Manchurians indifferent about government, so long as safe. Most intelligentsia fled or refused to co-operate at first, but now beginning to accept inevitable, according to Butler, who also says that foreigners in Mukden are, on the whole, favourable to Japanese and, though cynical, give full credit for currency reform, communications etc., though criticise opium policy.

**Tuesday 8th May 1934**

Busy day of visits and interviews, including Major General Doihara, the Tokumu Kikancho, Lt. Gen. Mike, Commander 1st Independent Garrison, Mitani, the Keimuchoo, Izawa of the South Manchurian Railway, Lt. Col. Miura, Chief of the Gendarmerie, and the Japanese Consul. Specially glad of chance to meet the great Doihara, "the Japanese Lawrence". Much taken by him. Thick-set, clipped moustache, heavy build. Frank, and no intriguer by his appearance. Like Lawrence, he is constantly being reported on secret missions, in disguise, in N. China, Mongolia etc. Butler has tried to check up and has generally found these reports quite untrue, as he has found Doihara in Mukden all the time!

**Wednesday 9th May 1934**
On arrival Jehol airfield Col. Giga, Tokumu Kikancho[Head of local Special Services Agency -
Japanese Military Intelligence] at Shanhaikwan took me in his car to the Tokumu Kikan office
and introduced me to Lt. Col. Matsui, the local Kikancho. Went on to Divisional Headquarters
(7th) in the old Palace, where I had very interesting talk with Lt. Gen. Sugihara Miyotaro, the
Divisional Commander, to whom General Yanagawa had given me an introduction. (Details of
this and other talks given in separate notes). Met two old friends there quite unexpectedly,
Major Mabuchi, who was still a "minarai shikwan"[Officer cadet] when I was attached to the
34th 's ability to help herself and that they would therefore welcome Japanese guidance; his
assertion that Anglo-Japanese commercial and industrial co-operation in China would be
mutually beneficial. His idea is that Britain and Japan should agree together that North China
be regarded as Japan's special field for commercial and industrial exploitation, while South
China should be left similarly to Britain. In the Yangtze Valley there should be joint
undertakings, with Jardine Matheson, for example, co-operating with Mitsui's - and so on. The
mutual benefits would be threefold. Cut-throat competition would be eliminated; British and
Japanese interests would be interlocked in such a way that each would support the other in
China; with their interests so closely related in this way, the Japanese could rest assured of
British support against Soviet encroachments in China, while the British could rest assured
that the Japanese would defend their mutual interests. Britain, he suggested, could supply the
capital where needed and be assured of safe investment, while Japan - in the case of
railways etc. - might be left to administer and operate them.
In theory it certainly sounds an excellent solution, but one wonders if, in practice, the
industrialists of the two nations could be induced to work in together in this way. Chancellor
admitted this might be difficult to bring about, though he remarked that Sir Harry McGowan,
since his visit to Japan last year, has been strongly advocating Anglo-Japanese industrial co-
operation, in spite of his former disbelief in its feasibility.

Saturday 26th May 1934

To War Office for talk with Admiral Sakano about the British proposal for preliminary talks on
next year's naval conference. The Foreign Office, it seems, received a despatch from
Matsudaira demilitarise it, and appoint Tang Shao-yi as Chinese High Commissioner.

Wednesday 30th May 1934

Looked up Yamada after lunch, as he had asked me to do so. The main object of his request
was to tell me that Araki & Co. contemplate buying up the "Japan Chronicle" if I will agree to
take on its editorship and make Anglo-Japanese friendship and co-operation the keynote of
its editorial policy. Much, however, as I should like to try and help on Anglo- Japanese
relations in this way, I had to decline. Seems, according to Yamada, that Douglas Young is
wanting to sell the paper, as it has not been paying very well of late. He also maintains that
the War Office has evidence to show that Douglas Young received money from Nanking at
the time of the Shanghai Operations and from Chang Hsueh-liang during the Manchurian
trouble, though it is hard to believe.
According to Lewis, Mitsui and Mitsubishi directors meet together privately in order to regulate market prices etc., despite their outward rivalry - a fact which throws interesting light on the Army's dislike of their monopolistic tendencies.

Saturday 2nd June 1934

Yamada tells me Nakajima, the former Commerce Minister, has now been arrested in connection with the Taikoku Rayon scandal, though the news is under ban on account of the delicate political situation. Also tells me that the outcry against Sakano's statement about the Navy and Ugaki - which brought about poor Sakano's resignation, was largely due to the fact that, as Sakano hails from the same province as Ugaki, it was considered that there was more in it than appeared on the surface. Personally, knowing Sakano as I do, I should imagine he put it out in all good faith, though it was unfortunate coming just at the moment that Ugaki arrived in Tokyo and his resignation certainly tends to confirm Yamada's assertion that there is a strong section in the Navy opposed to Ugaki becoming Premier. Seems they fear his liberality in connection with the Naval Conference next year. According to Yamada, there would certainly be a further outbreak of terrorism if he becomes Premier, and even now, on his present visit, extraordinary precautions are being taken against possible attempts on his life.

Yamada also tells me that Prince Tokugawa's resignation as President of the House of Peers was due to an entanglement with "a lady fair" and that he paid out £100,000 to keep it quiet. It may be so, though personally I am inclined to doubt it.

Friday 8th June 1934

Sounded out by Yamada as to whether I would be prepared to act as "Hochi" Correspondent in London. Seems Noma Seiji, the President, is a pal of Araki's and that it is through Araki that the proposal has been made. Also seems that Araki has induced the "Hochi" to follow out a policy aiming at closer relations with Britain.

Saturday 9th June 1934

Had interesting talk with Iwanaga about the political situation. Like myself, he thinks Saito will almost certainly stay on as Premier, but that, if a new Premier becomes necessary, he will be in the nature of a "dark horse". On the subject of Prince Konoe as a possible candidate, he said that, although Prince Konoe was a personal friend of his, he felt bound to admit that he was too weak-willed. It was because of this, he believed, that Prince Konoe had been induced to go to America, as his friends considered that, on account of this weakness, he would only harm his own future if he was offered and accepted the Premiership. They therefore "hustled" him out of the country, as, in addition, they feared that he might have pledged himself to the Army to carry out their ideas in return for their support in the event of his obtaining the Premiership.

Monday 11th June 1934

Received silver cigarette case from Araki, inscribed with his name - very nice souvenir. Also had a visit from Admiral Funakoshi with a beautiful old kimono as a farewell gift for M. [wife] and a signed photo of himself for me. Jolly good of him.
Gave a cocktail "At Home" at the Club as a farewell to old friends. Went off very well, with 100 or more turning up to it, about half of whom were Japanese. Count Kabayama, who was amongst them, sounded me out as to whether I would - if necessary - be prepared to assist in the organisation of the British branch of the Japan Cultural Association. Tells me Akezaki is going to England in the autumn to "prepare the ground" and make recommendations. He wants me, therefore, to get into tow with Matsudaira as soon as I get back to London.

Tuesday 12th June 1934
Had the unusual, and somewhat embarrassing experience, of being presented by the War Office with an envelope containing 100 (to judge by the thickness) £100 notes as a farewell gift - "sembetsu". Much as I should have liked to accept such a gift, I felt compelled to decline, though it required nearly an hour's talk before I was able to persuade them to take back their gift. The actual presentation was made by Major General Kudo, Tojo's successor, though it was not until I had left his room that I was able to confirm my suspicions as to the contents of the package. Then began the tussle, first with Major Saito and after that with Colonel Nemoto. They both assured me that it was meant entirely as a mark of appreciation for my sympathetic interpretation of Japan and for my assistance in promoting Anglo-Japanese friendship; that there was no intention of trying to influence my opinions or "buy my pen"; that it was customary in Japan to make such presentations; that it was instead of a decoration, which I had already said I could not accept; that no one but the three officers concerned knew anything about the matter - and so on. As they asserted that it was impossible for them to take it back, I finally agreed to accept it on condition that I myself was allowed to present it, through them, to the "jikeibu", the fund for the purchase of "comforts" for the troops engaged in bandit suppression etc. Even to this they were, at first, very reluctant to agree, but after further argument I persuaded them at last to do so. So that's that!

Wednesday 13th June 1934
A hectic day of farewell visits, final arrangements etc. Amongst the visits was one to the War Office, where Nemoto and Saito expressed most profuse thanks for my action in returning their gift for the use of the troops and seemed anxious lest I was angered! Saito, with much bowing, thanked me "in the name of Japan" "from the bottom of his heart", and seemed honestly struck by what I had done, though Heaven knows what other line of action I could have taken, without laying myself open to the charge of accepting bribes, despite their assertion that it was all up and above board.

Incidentally I confided the whole affair to Iwanaga yesterday, in order to ask his opinion about it. I spoke to Homma, too, in strict confidence, as I felt that, in view of our long and close friendship and the fact that he himself was formerly in Nemoto's job, he would be in the best position to say how my action would be interpreted at the War Office. Both Iwanaga and Homma expressed their conviction that there was no intention on the part of the War Office to bribe me, but that it was honestly intended as a mark of appreciation and that "sembetsu" of this kind are frequently given in Japan and accepted without any reflection on any of the persons concerned. On the other hand, Iwanaga said he considered that, in view of the
circumstances, I acted wisely in declining the gift and, he added, "I congratulate you on what
you have done, for you have up-held the best traditions of journalism and, at the same time,
have acted in a way that will increase your country's respect in the eyes of the Japanese
Army!"
Main development of the day was the discovery of Kuramoto, the Japanese Consular official
whose mysterious disappearance in Nanking last week was threatening to precipitate further
trouble between Japan and China, as Japan was threatening to land bluejackets in Nanking if
Kuramoto's whereabouts were not discovered quickly. The tension arising from his
disappearance has now been dispelled.
Had a very interesting talk with Bassompière [Belgian Ambassador]. He asserts that the
various governments in the West are likely to bring about a very dangerous situation if they
continue their present line of policy toward the Far East and refuse to heed the warnings of
their own diplomatic representatives in Japan. His views are, in fact, much the same as Sir
Francis Lindley, and he repeated to me a remark made to him by Sir Francis on the occasion
of their farewell meeting. "I am leaving Japan and resigning," said Sir Francis, "because it is
perfectly useless for me to stay on out here when none of my recommendations are heeded
by my government."
Bassompière's object in sending for me was to beg me to "utilise my influence as a
recognised authority on the Far East" in order to explain the true facts of the situation to
people at home. He then proceeded to read me out his last two despatches to his own
government - and more outspokenness and less mincing of words could hardly be imagined.
Incidentally, he said he had strongly urged the Belgian Government to take the initiative in
recognising the Manchukuo on the occasion of Pu Yi's enthronement, as it afforded a golden
opportunity for Belgium and all the other Powers to rectify the folly of the Non-Recognition
Resolution at Geneva without losing face. His Government, however, turned down this
recommendation just in the same way as they had refused to heed his warnings in February
last year - that Japan would leave the League, and the League would thereby suffer a serious
blow, if they insisted on passing the Non-Recognition Resolution. By continuing to withhold
recognition, the Powers are, as he says, far more guilty than Japan in creating a dangerous
state of tension and instability in the Far East. Their attitude merely serves to provoke Japan
and to play into the hands of the hotheads; it leads China to think - quite wrongly - that she
can depend on the armed support of the Powers if necessary and that therefore she can
safely continue to flout Japan and refuse to enter into direct negotiations with her; and it leads
the Soviet to think they can depend on the moral support of the Powers against Japan and
that therefore they can safely adopt a more aggressive and provocative attitude towards
Japan. Needless to say, the Chinese and Soviet reaction to the Powers' attitude toward
Japan compels Japan to strengthen her own position still further and thereby add to the
tension. Bassompière fairly let fly at "the criminal folly" of the League and the Powers in
general and at the way they are encouraging the Soviet to enter the League and to use it as
an instrument of its own policy against Japan - the one country in Asia which is able and
prepared to fight the Soviet system. He also spoke sympathetically of the famous "Amau Statement", in that he considers that any country in Japan's position would be perfectly justified in protesting against the arming and training of China's military forces. If the League and the Powers in general dislike the "Hands Off China" policy, they have, as he says, only themselves to blame, as it is they who are preventing Japan and China from settling their own differences and it is they who, in consequence, are responsible for the continuance of the present unstable state of affairs in China, an instability which is the cause of the "Hands Off" policy enunciated in the Amau Statement. Instead of continuing their present attitude toward Japan and China, the Powers should, according to Bassompière, reverse their policy and do everything possible to facilitate a settlement of the differences between the two.

Fundamentally, In Bassompière's opinion, the error in the Powers' attitude arises from their policy being based upon a fiction contained in the 9-Power Pact. The Pact revolves in great part around the "maintenance of the peace and administrative and territorial integrity of China". But, as he says, how can any Power solemnly bind itself to maintain two things which have never existed in China? In one of his despatches which he read to me, he described a talk he had had with Siguenza, the Salvador Consul, about Salvador's sudden recognition of Manchukuo. Siguenza, he said, flatly refuted the accusation that Japan had brought any pressure to bear on his country in order to bring about recognition and he showed Bassompière his whole dossier on the subject. Siguenza himself, it seems, knew nothing about his country's action until May 16th, when he found some passing reference to it in a despatch received from Salvador. As he could not understand the reference, he cabled to his Govt. for clarification and, a day or two later, received the reply that Salvador, in acknowledging the Emperor Kangteh's note about his enthronement, considered they had automatically accorded recognition. The curious thing, however, is that apparently neither Hsinking nor Tokyo had placed this interpretation on it at the time. Bassompière himself considers Salvador acted very wisely, and then told me of his own recommendation to the Belgian Government mentioned above. He likewise thinks the Vatican did well to accord recognition.

Bassompière then got onto the subject of British and other commercial competition with Japan and stressed the danger of this becoming intensified and relations embittered if Britain continued to let its present policy in the Far East be so influenced by Geneva.

Thursday 14th June 1934

Had a last talk with Colonel James, to whom I confided the facts about the War Office gift, as it seemed advisable to let him know. Glad I did so, as he has promised to utilise this information in order to clear my name in British official circles if - as he thinks quite probable - the usual "back-stair" whispers begin to circulate. In which connection he tells me that "whispers" of this kind have already reached him about Cox, though he does not put much faith in them - nor do I!

He then ran over his views on Anglo-Japanese relations and Japanese-Soviet relations from the military standpoint, in order to see that they coincide with mine, as he wants me to look up
Grimsdale as soon as I get back to England and give him my views on the situation out in these parts. Regarding the possibilities of a Japanese-Soviet clash, I told him what Bassompière had said yesterday - viz. that despite widespread belief to the contrary, he personally did not consider war imminent. This, of course, is my view too, and Colonel James shares it, as we both consider that, in so far as Japan is concerned, there is a desire to avoid war - at least till her own preparations are complete. These preparations include the army replenishment plan and electric power plans. The former should be nearly complete by the spring of 1936, as $500,000,000 of the $800,000,000 sanctioned has been appropriated for the current fiscal year, and most of the balance for next fiscal year, though actual completion is not expected till 1943. As for the electric power plans, he tells me that Lewis puts 1938 as the year for their completion and says that his firm alone has about $30,000,000 of tentative orders for electric equipment on their books, although hydroelectric resources in Japan have now been developed almost to their fullest.

Amongst the Japanese who came down to the "Chichibu Maru" to see us off was General Tsunoda, whom I had not seen for many a long day - a very faithful friend. Yamada was also there, and he brought with him the good wishes of Generals Araki and Yanagawa. Seems that it was on Yanagawa's instructions that the gift of $10,000 was presented, as Yamada came down specially to express General Yanagawa's regret that I had apparently misunderstood the implication of the gift which, he emphasised, was made in all good faith, as a mark of appreciation for my work as a go-between between Araki and Sir Francis Lindley owing to my having expressed my inability to accept a Japanese decoration.

LETTER TO COLONEL JAMES, BRITISH EMBASSY, TOKYO, WRITTEN ABOARD THE N.Y.K. SHIP THE "CHICHIBU MARU", 20TH JUNE 1934.

"A private talk I had with Yamada on board ship subsequent to bidding you farewell. Possibly it might be of interest to Dodd, as I introduced Yamada to him a day or two before I left, by way of ensuring what Dodd described as the "Apostolic Succession" in the matter of the "go-between" business.

Freelance Journalist and Writer, 1934 - 1935
[back in Britain]
Friday 17th August 1934

Had an interesting talk with Oka about the naval talks. He seems to think that the October talks are doomed to failure and that the projected conference next year will never materialise, as the U.S. Government has made it clear that the U.S. will never agree to ratio abolition, whilst Japan cannot afford to give way on this point on account of the strong national sentiment about it in Japan. Japanese intransigence on the ratio question is, in fact, primarily due to the domestic nationalistic temperament aroused by the Manchurian trouble. Oka was somewhat sarcastic about the American attitude. If, as he put it, the U.S. consider that their
present superiority of 10 to 7 over Japan is no threat to Japan, it is hard to understand how they can imagine that equality with Japan would bring a Japanese threat to America!

Although my sympathy is with Japan in this matter, I cannot help feeling that Japan is liable to land herself in for a serious armaments race with the U.S. if she continues to insist on the ratio system being scrapped, as the U.S. can afford to build as much as she likes and may end by making the ratio even more unfavourable for Japan than it is now. Oka, however, appears confident that this danger is more apparent than real. The U.S., he admits, can out-build Japan if she wishes, but, he asserts, she cannot get the men to man the ships if she does build them.

Friday 5th October 1934

See by a "leader" dated 30 August in the "Trans-Pacific" of 13 September that the Foreign Office Spokesman is quoted as revealing that Japan is to submit, at the forthcoming preliminary negotiations in London, a naval plan as a substitute for the Washington Naval Treaty. If this plan be accepted by the other Powers, the Washington Treaty will become void by mutual consent; but if it is rejected, no doubt is left that Japan will then abrogate the Treaty unilaterally.

Angus somewhat surprised when I told him of Kerbey's remark about reinforcements from India reaching Singapore in 9 days, as he says it takes 81 days to mobilise the 4 divisions available in India for service overseas, and that, in any case, munitions, medical equipment, supplies, transport etc. are hopeless and scandalously inadequate owing to lack of funds. As examples he mentioned that when his own battalion was moved from Shillong to Chaman, enough transport was only available by using every vehicle in the whole division. On another occasion, several Lewis guns in the battalion were out of commission about 2 months, because there was not a single spare spring left in the whole of India and Lewis gun springs are continually breaking - in fact, every gun is supposed to have 9 "spares". On yet another occasion, several N.C.O.s were left without prismatic binoculars, as Simla said they had over 2 years of work ahead for repair of glasses already in their hands.

Tuesday 16th October 1934

"Trans-Pacific" of 20 September carries sensational cable from Hongkong (14 September) of most mischievous nature. According to "reports emanating from European diplomatic circles", it says, an agreement between Britain and the U.S. for "an Anglo-American naval defence line connecting Alaska with Australia" is likely to be concluded if the coming naval conference reaches a deadlock.

Wednesday 17th October 1934

Lunched at the Empire Society, where met the House Secretary, Colonel Savage, late S. Staffords. Tells me that the Westminster boys have been set to study the question of Japan and the Soviet - which goes to show the interest now being taken in it in England.

Monday 29th October 1934

To the Japanese Embassy to see Kato before my interview with Admiral Yamamoto. Questioned Kato once more about the Manchurian Oil Monopoly question. According to him,
it will make little difference to the foreign oil firms in so far as their sales of oil are concerned, as the bulk of the oil will still have to be imported. Retailers, however, will be hit to some extent, as everything will have to be done through the Monopoly Bureau, which will regulate prices.

Talk with Admiral Yamamoto, whom I had not met before, lasted about an hour, Admiral Yamamoto speaking in Japanese, while I spoke mostly in English - as per previous arrangement with his secretary Mizota, whom I used to know in Tokyo. Admiral Yamamoto seemed very friendly and replied to my questions at considerable length, though he told me little that I did not know already. He stressed that Japan wished to retain the agreement about non-fortification in the Pacific, but was prepared to forego this rather than agree to retention of the ratio system. The report about his having indicated readiness to abolish submarines in return for abolition of aircraft-carriers, he said, was due to a misunderstanding, as he was speaking at the time in English without an interpreter and his English was apparently misunderstood. Japan, he recalled, had pledged herself not to abuse the use of submarines against merchantmen in wartime, but could not agree to abolition, as the submarine was the cheapest and most effective weapon for defence according to the Japanese view. For this, he agreed, that vessels with small radius of action would suffice, but they required to be up to 1700 tons in size in order to be effective against cruisers. The Soviet, he believed, had about 20 submarines at Vladivostok, but he doubted if they were more than 1000-tonners, as these would be ample for attacks on troopships crossing the Japan Sea.

Thursday 1st November 1934
Had talk with Colonel Dawnay at the B.B.C. in afternoon. Find him very sympathetic with Japan and a great friend of Homma's, but no use for Ando. Told me of an incident, when he was M.I.2 Colonel at the War Office, over the Japanese desire to make a wholesale award of decorations to British officers as a mark of appreciation for the friendly attitude of the British General Staff during the Manchurian trouble. Dawnay had great difficulty in making them realise that such action on their part would be very embarrassing for the British General Staff and would hinder rather than help the Japanese cause.

Tuesday 20th November 1934
Japan appears to have turned down the British counter-proposals on parity in principle and points out that, although she has no objection to Britain having greater naval armaments than herself - in view of her widespread commitments - she must have at least global equality with the U.S., as the U.S. is able to transfer her whole fleet to the Pacific by the Panama Canal. Britain attaches great importance to restriction of type of ships, as this would limit the cost and prevent a rival designing new types which would render existing vessels obsolete, as Germany has done with her "pocket battleships".

The U.S. apparently wants to break off the talks, now that Japan has so definitely rejected the ratio principle, but we are anxious to continue. We are also at variance with the U.S. on the subject of a separate Anglo-American agreement, which the U.S. seem to think would make Japan more "amenable to reason", but which we - quite rightly - consider would have the
reverse effect. The long and the short of it all is, that the U.S. are determined, for prestige sake, to have equality with England and to be able to carry out operations if necessary in the West Pacific (i.e. definitely aggressive from the Japanese point of view), whereas Japan merely wishes to ensure that the U.S. shall not be in a position to take a swipe at her in the West Pacific. Fundamentally therefore, it is the U.S., not Japan, that makes agreement impossible.

Wednesday 21st November 1934

Today's "Times" contains an interesting cable from Washington giving the gist of an article in the "Christian Science Monitor" by Admiral Viscount Saito, in which he gives an exceptionally frank exposition of the naval question and asserts that, if next year's Conference fails and a "devastating naval building race becomes inevitable", it will be due primarily to the fact that "the possible Japanese view for the conference has been so manufactured, inflated, and magnified by Japanese, American, and British writers that I hardly recognise the Navy with which I have been closely associated since 1873". "A constant reviewing and amplifying of the questions of ratio, parity, capital ships, and categories have beclouded facts with fiction, and rhetoric is taking the place of reason", while "propaganda in all nations is complicating the problem even more" and "the great welter of half-information and misinformation and the backlog of propaganda may foredoom the Conference to failure".

Urging that naval forces should be limited by mutual agreement to "fleets just large enough to provide protection to our commerce and our coastlines", he denounces the terrible waste of money on inflated armaments at the expense of the poverty-stricken people and speaks with feeling of the dreadful burden of the depression in Japan, which must become immeasurably heavier "if an unbridled naval race is the result of an unsuccessful conference in London 1935". With great courage he speaks of the "great pressure (that) has been brought to bear on the Prime Minister to force cancellation of Japan's allegiance to the terms of the 10-10-6 ratio" and strongly denounces the Seiyukai for "taking advantage of an international crisis to further its own ends" and "seeking to ride the wave of propaganda so that it can gain control of the politics of Japan". Even more courageous are his direct allusions to the Emperor, who, he declares, "will not allow the Navy to proceed uncontrolled" and "will not tolerate an unbridled programme for the future". In speaking out so frankly, he is certainly taking his life into his hands and is sure to raise a howl, not only from the Seiyukai but also from the super-patriot fraternity on account of his references to the Emperor.

Thursday 22nd November 1934

Much interested in Piggott's remarks about the way in which we pay so much attention to the U.S. It used to disgust him, he said, to see when he was M.I.1 Colonel, the way in which our Ambassadors and Ministers in European Capitals so invariably used to start their despatches on important questions with:- "I have consulted my American colleague and find that his views are so and so". As Piggott remarked, "Surely it is more important to know the views of our own diplomatic representatives than those of their American colleagues!" From what he says, I gather that the Imperial Defence College and our own military authorities in general are
beginning to kick at the way in which we show so much deference to America's wishes and so little to our own.

See that the "Daily Mail" carries a very American propagandist despatch from Washington about the necessity of Britain and America working out a joint plan for the protection of their interests in the Pacific for use in the event of the naval talks ending in failure. Similar suggestions have been all too common of late and are bound to put Japan on the defensive more than ever, though fortunately Simon & Co. appear to realise this and are refusing to consider such propagandistic overtures.

Sunday 25th November 1934

See by papers that the Cabinet in Tokyo has approved the estimates for next fiscal year, £2,210,000,000 in all, including £490 millions for the Army and £520 millions for the Navy, making the Defence estimates no less than 46% of the total Budget.

Monday 26th November 1934

Looked up Colonel Maruyama and had long talk with him about the prospects of the naval talks. While he made it quite clear that there could be no question of Japan giving way on the subject of equality, he was equally insistent on Japan's wish to avoid an armaments race and, if possible, to reach an agreement for definite reduction both of tonnage and of expenditure.

Thursday 29th November 1934

Received letter from Foreign Office definitely offering me the job about which I was approached last week, though the appointment is not to be made before April.

Friday 30th November 1934

See that Hirota, in his speech at the opening of the special Diet session today, emphasised Japan's efforts to "establish firmly the principle of non-menace and non-aggression" and, by the proposed abolition of the ratio system, the establishment of a "common upper limit" at the lowest possible level, and the "drastic reduction and limitation of offensive arms", to bring about "thorough and drastic naval reduction and to lighten thereby the tax burden of the nations in the future" - and "to render it difficult for any Power to attack another, but easy to defend itself". He also asserted there had been "some improvement in relations with the U.S.S.R. and that "a better understanding now prevails among the Powers regarding Japan's position in East Asia".

Monday 3rd December 1934

Received letter from Bassompière Belgian Ambassador to Japan, very complimentary about my article in the "19th Century", which, he says, he made the subject of report to his Government on November 6th, using my arguments and my authority (!) to back up his own views, "which they parallel exactly".

Thursday 6th December 1934

I went on to Stratton House to see Lord Rothermere, with whom I found Ward Price. Rothermere, heavy-jowelled and heavily built, struck me as unpleasantly aggressive and self-assertive - quite in keeping with one's idea of the "Daily Mail" Press Baron - but he was easy to speak to and seemed ready enough to listen to what I had to say in reply to the questions
with which he plied me. I came away, however, more convinced than ever of the dangerous power wielded by men of his type. "What is Japan going to grab next?", "When are the Japs going to strike at us?" and other equally provocative questions - emphasised in the most pugnacious tone - were among the questions put to me; and he was most emphatic in declaring that he knew for a fact that the reports of a German-Japanese alliance were as well-founded as those regarding the Franco- Soviet Alliance, which he said he knew to be true, despite the official denials. He seemed, however, much interested in my comments and replies, and was, I think, induced to see that his beliefs about Japan's aggressive intentions were not wholly justified; and before we parted he admitted, that what I had said about the necessity of facing the fact that we had to choose between Japanese friendship and Japanese hostility - and that the former was preferable in every way - was all too true and that it was necessary to retain that friendship.

One point onto which he hopped, by way of proving that Japan was launching forth on new imperialistic adventures, was the recent announcement of the contract for the three new railways "into Mongolia". As I pointed out, however, only one of the three is "into Mongolia" and, in any case, all three are railways that have been projected for many years past and are shown as such on the railway map prepared by the Japanese for the Lytton Commission.

He was very positive, too, about German rearmament being far more extensive than admitted by Baldwin or even by France, and asserted that "Germany would strike out next year". In fact, he was self-assertion and sensationalism personified, a personification truly dangerous for one in a position, as he is, to appeal to mob psychology.

As I was leaving, after a full half-hour's talk, he thanked me for coming to see him and asked me to keep in touch with him through Ward Price.

Wrote to the "Daily Telegraph" in evening replying to a letter by Commander Carlyon Bellairs, in which - in reply to one by myself in yesterday's issue - he talks a lot of rot about Japan being a country "militarist to the core, and so tyrannically aggressive".

**Tuesday 11th December 1934**

Long letter from Sir Reginald Johnston, telling of a reply he had had from Hsinking about the young Emperor's comments to me about his book. "The Emperor maintains that I must have misunderstood him on account of the interpreter's "imperfect English", and adds that "Wu, the interpreter, has now been removed! It is quite possible that Wu may have deliberately distorted the Emperor's words but his English was, in point of fact, word perfect and there was no question of misunderstanding what he said the Emperor said."

**Thursday 13th December 1934**

Lunch at the Nihonjin-kai with Captain Tanikawa, a young air force officer who is over in England on a short visit from Riga, where he is studying Russian and "observing". Afterwards went on to see Commander Denniston about my Foreign Office job [Government Code & Cipher School].

**Wednesday 19th December 1934**
To town for lunch at Claridges by the Japan Society Council in honour of the F.B.I. Mission that has just returned from its visit to Japan and Manchukuo. Lord Barnby, who headed the mission, seemed to be greatly impressed by the readiness of all the leading Japanese industrialists and businessmen to put themselves to immense inconvenience in order to meet the mission and exchange views - a readiness which he said was all too rare in England when foreign missions come here.

Looked in to War Office to see Hunt and, in course of talk with him and Field, learned one of the causes of Sir Reginald Johnston's dislike for Miles Lampson. Seems that, when Lampson was at Peking, he was instructed to offer Johnston the choice between the governorships of Hong Kong and Wei-Hai-Wei. Instead of offering the choice, however, he merely offered him Wei-Hai-Wei, and it was not until his return to England some years later - when he was asked by a pal of his at the F.O. why he had declined Hong Kong - that Johnston learned for the first time of the shabby trick played on him by Lampson.

Saturday 22nd December 1934


Tuesday 22nd January 1935

"The Times" publishes Hirotu's speech to Diet this morning in full, and a very good speech it is. Main points are:

1. Reiteration of Japanese desire to effect drastic reduction of offensive armaments and to impose the principle of non-aggression and non-menace. Also emphasised that Japanese denunciation of Washington Treaty "must not be taken to mean that we intend to launch out on any expansion of our armaments", but is a prelude to concluding new pact more consonant with spirit of disarmament.

2. Regarding Japanese-U.S. relations, he stressed "vital relationship of a mutual interdependence unparalleled elsewhere".

3. Vis-à-vis Anglo-Japanese relations, he emphasised that "good understanding and co-operation between Japan and Great Britain constitutes a really important contribution to the peace of the world". Also stressed that, despite trade rivalry, there was nowhere where interests were not adjustable.

4. Regarding Japanese-Soviet relations, he stressed desire for peaceful development and expressed hope for closer friendship between Japan, the Soviet and Manchukuo as result of transfer of Chinese Eastern Railway which expected shortly. Invited "hearty co-operation" of Soviet for solution of pending problems and expressed hope that Soviet would give "special consideration" to the question of military works in the Far East, especially along the Soviet-Manchukuo frontiers, with a view to promoting mutual trust and assurance.

5. Vis-à-vis Sino-Japanese relations, he expressed gratification at signs of improvement and invited China and other states in East Asia to participate in "bearing the serious responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order in this part of the world". While pleased, however, at the apparent expulsion of the main Red armies from Kiangsi and...
Fukien, he expressed apprehension that the remnants "are said to be establishing contact with their allies in Kweichow and Szechwan and thereabouts and moving westward into remoter regions". In view of this fact, coupled with reports of the sovietisation of Sinkiang, the Japanese Government will be obliged to continue to watch with concern the activities of the Communist Party and armies in China".

(6) Regarding trade in general, emphasised that "For a country like Japan, with a vast population on the one hand and meagre natural resources on the other, foreign trade constitutes an important peaceful means of livelihood". Also pointed out that not only does Japan benefit others by buying large quantities of raw materials from them, but that, despite all the talk of Japanese goods flooding the markets, the actual volume of Japanese trade is only 3% of the world total and Japan occupies only 7th or 8th place among the principal trading nations of the world.

A very sound levelheaded speech, but the reference to the "Sovietisation of Sinkiang" is not without significance.

See that the "Trans-Pacific", recording Hanihara's death, reveals that his famous note about "grave consequences" was drafted on the advice of Hughes himself, as Hughes, who was himself strongly opposed to the discriminatory clauses of the Immigration Bill, considered that Hanihara's original protest was too mild. Yet Hanihara had to accept all the responsibility for the outcry raised by these words, although it was the American Secretary of State himself who had urged him to put them in. A most interesting revelation and reflects most creditably on Hanihara, who was too much a gentleman to reveal the facts in his lifetime.

Wednesday 23rd January 1935

Announced that negotiations for sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway at last concluded, the price being fixed at £170,000,000, including £30 millions as retiring allowances for Russian employees. One-third of total to be paid in cash, of which half be due when agreement signed next month, and remainder in goods. Payment spread over 3 years.

Thursday 24th January 1935

Force of about 2,000 Japanese launched attack on Chinese irregulars in Chahar and occupied disputed area between Tushikkou, one of the passes in the Great Wall area, and Kuyuan. Some of the papers appear to be playing it up as though it were the beginning of another big offensive, but in actual fact it seems to be nothing more than an attempt to occupy a few square miles of territory which the Manchukuo maintain is their own, their western frontier never having been very clearly defined.

Saturday 26th January 1935

Another clash reported, this time between Manchukuo troops and Outer Mongolian forces near Buir Nur in the Barga region. Like the Chahar clash, however, it appears to be nothing more than a local "incident", though it clearly indicates the danger of future developments in connection with the whole question of Mongolia and the Mongols - and Japanese-Soviet rivalry therewith.
Meanwhile Hirota is quoted as declaring that Japan will be involved in no war so long as he is Foreign Minister - which is perhaps reassuring.

**Tuesday 29th January 1935**

Osumi is quoted as declaring in the Diet that Japan sincerely desires a peaceful settlement of the naval question and has no wish to be drawn into a naval armaments race, but will be compelled to build if America insists on forcing the pace - in which case Japan must stand prepared to live on "okuyu" if necessary, in order to find the necessary funds. He also urged the necessity of an increase in air strength - in which he was strongly supported by General Hayashi.

**Wednesday 30th January 1935**

Had Marsden to lunch at the Empire Society and afterwards had one Korostovetz along there for tea and a talk. A former Russian diplomat, he worked under Sasanoff in St. Petersburg during the war and, incidentally, came to know Araki very well while Araki was there during the War. He himself, however, is a Ukrainian and, with other Ukrainians, is engaged in propaganda work of sorts, aiming to obtain sympathy for, and understanding of, the Ukrainian Question. Sir Reginald Hall, Lord Denbigh, and others, it seems, are helping him in this work in England - the idea being apparently to obtain moral support for Ukrainian independence, but definitely not active intervention. He gave me a lot of interesting information on the ins and outs of the whole question and on the subject of Soviet intrigue - asserting incidentally that Trotsky and other "rebels" are really hand-in-glove with Moscow and acting as agents - but like so many of these ardent "nationalists", he seemed very visionary and impractical. One quite interesting point he asserted was that there are large numbers of Ukrainians amongst the peasantry in the Maritime Provinces and that they would welcome the opportunity to rise up against the Soviet in the event of a Japanese-Soviet war.

**Thursday 31st January 1935**

Tukhachevski, Soviet Vice-Commissar for Defence, speaking in Moscow yesterday revealed that the peace strength of the Soviet Army is now 940,000, not 562,000, the figure officially registered in Geneva. And this does not include the frontier guards, the former OGPU battalions, territorials on short-term training, or military preparation battalions. And behind the Regular Army is the Ossoaviakhim - the League for Air and Chemical Defence, which trains millions to enter the army with full military knowledge. Other points brought out by him were:

(1) That the war budget in 1934 was 1,665,000,000 roubles, but the real military expenditure was 5,000,000,000, and this year it will be 6,500,000,000.

(2) Air Force increased 330% in past 4 years, flying speed of pursuit planes and bombers nearly doubled, and fighting range increased 3 to 4-fold.

(3) Light tanks increased 760% and medium tanks 792%, with 3 to 6-fold increase in speed.

(4) Air machine guns increased 800% and heavy artillery 210%, the quality of the latter, both in guns and ammunition, being extremely high.

(5) Submarines increased 435% and light torpedo craft 370% since 1931.
Friday 15th February 1935

Hear from Grimsdale that James has cabled saying that a mixed brigade is being sent to Jehol to relieve the 7th Division and that a 5th Dokuritsu Shubitai is being formed; but, as the War Office has no information of a 4th ever having been organised, Grimsdale has sent a query. Tells me the Soviet Military Attaché told James some time ago that if the Japanese increased their strength any further in Manchuria, the Soviet would regard it as a "casus belli". As, however, the "shubitai" are purely for internal defence, there seems no reason for any special anxiety in this particular case, though it is interesting to note the Japanese faith in mixed brigades, which are capable of rapid expansion.

Wednesday 20th February 1935

To town to lecture at the I.D.C. [Imperial Defence College] on recent events in Manchuria. Had long yarn beforehand with Major-General Haining, the Commandant. The I.D.C. course lasts one year and is attended by some 20 or 30 specially selected men in the various government services, including 3 or 4 senior officers from each of the fighting services. Heard from O'Connor that the Far East is being studied very seriously at the I.D.C., and that, amongst recent lecturers on the subject have been Lindley, Vansittart, Grimsdale from the War Office, O'Neale from the Air Ministry, and Allen from the Foreign Office. Much interested to hear that Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, emphasised in his lecture the necessity of striving both for Japanese and American friendship and avoiding any attempt to court the favour of one at the expense of the other - from which it would seem that the Government has realised the mistake we made in scrapping the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in order to please America and thereby leaving Japan with a feeling of grievance and insecurity. Haining showed very clearly, by what he said to me, that he, too, shared this view very strongly, and both he and O'Connor were very sympathetic towards Japan's position and fully recognised the necessity of increasing friendship and co-operation with Japan.

There seems to be divergence of opinion, however, as to Japan's strength in the purely hypothetical event of her ever becoming our enemy, and the various "syndicates" into which those attending the I.D.C. course are divided are making careful study of the probable outcome of an Anglo-Japanese war, especially in connection with Singapore. O'Connor himself is inclined to think that Japan might very possibly seize possession of it by means of a rapid thrust and tomorrow he is to act as spokesman for his "syndicate" in showing how this could be done, Japanese troop transports moving rapidly out from the Luchus, round by North Formosa and steering clear of the ordinary trade routes in order to escape detection until almost within striking distance. A cheerful prospect, but all going to prove the rank folly of adopting a policy liable to bring us into conflict with Japan.
Prior to lecture, looked in to War Office to see Grimsdale about latest details of railway construction in Manchuria and air strength etc. Regarding air strength, he tells me the War Office and Air Ministry disagree as to details, though War Office information indicates 9 air squadrons in Manchuria. He also tells me that James has cabled confirming that two new "dokuritsu shubitai" [Independent garrisons] are apparently being organised, making 5 in all. Received letter this morning from a Brigadier-General H.F.E. Lewin saying he had just read my article in the R.U.S.I. [Royal United Services' Institute] Journal and urging me to write a reply to Lord Lothian's letter in the "Times" of the 18th, as he considers the views expressed by him and Smuts and others are doing "more than anything else to create the dangerous situation in the Pacific which they all profess to deplore". I decided - on the strength of Lewin's letter - to draft a reply this afternoon, and, having done so, went round to the "Times" with it and had a talk with Deakin, the Foreign Editor, on the whole subject. He seemed much interested in what I told him; and although he contended that the British public as a whole is less sympathetically inclined towards Japan now than it was in the early stages of the Manchurian trouble - a contention which personally I rather doubt - he asserted that British naval and military officers - and naval in particular- appeared to be increasingly keen on a return to the old friendship and increasingly regretful of the Alliance having been scrapped. That, perhaps, is but natural, as it will be the poor old Army and Navy who will have to bear the brunt in the event of trouble arising from our damn silly policy in recent years.

LETTER FROM PIGGOTT TO KENNEDY DATED 28 FEBRUARY 1935
PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL.

My dear Malcolm,

I saw your letter in the Times about that ass Lord Lothian and congratulate you upon it. Would you look through the attached document and let me know in confidence what you think of it? As you will see it is an account of the recent Red Cross Conference in Tokyo, but I do not wish to divulge its authorship, so please keep it to yourself - and return with your comments,
Yours ever,
Roy Piggott

Captain M.D. Kennedy, Marley Cottage, Haslemere, Surrey.

Thursday 28th February 1935

Another good reply to Lothian in the "Times", this time from the Duke of Atholl; but, like all the other replies, it is tucked away with the general correspondence where it will be overlooked by most readers, whereas Lothian's own letter was played up on the centre page and even had the backing of an editorial.

To a R.C.A.S. dinner at the Naval & Military, followed by a debate on British policy in the Far East in which I had been asked to take part. Sir Francis was, as always, very sound in what he said and, after referring to the fact that Japan had even more cause than pre-War
Germany to fear "encirclement", pointed out that, however much Japan's actions might be open to criticism, it would be well to recognise that, in actual fact, the outbreak in Manchuria did us two very good turns, for it put a stop to China's declared intention to abolish extraterritoriality and enabled us to obtain redress for the Thorburn case by peaceful means. Both he and Scott were of the opinion that an economic agreement with Japan offered the best prospects of easing the present situation, while Barnby urged the advisability of recognising Manchukuo.

Friday 1st March 1935
To Ashridge [Bonar Law College - Conservative Party] in evening to lecture on the Far East situation at a weekend course on international affairs.

Saturday 2nd March 1935
Most interesting talk, remarkably fair and free from prejudice, on conditions in Soviet Russia by Alan Monkhouse of Moscow trial fame.

At 5.30 p.m. came Admiral Richmond's lecture on the naval talks and I was delighted to hear him bear out exactly what I had said last night about the U.S., not Japan, being the principal stumbling block to an agreement in the Pacific, as I had been taken to task on this assertion by several of those present. Richmond, of course, stressed his usual theme about smaller ships and smaller guns and showed how it was the U.S., and no other country, who was so strongly opposed to this - and opposed on quite untenable grounds. He also asserted that the ratio ought to be 5-3-3 not 5-5-3, which is just what I had said last night, so I feel that my honour is vindicated!

Sunday 3rd March 1935
Amongst letters awaiting me was one from General Lewin, commenting on the way in which the "Times" played up Lord Lothian's letter and tucked away all the replies in a back position, where only a few readers will see them. "Geoffery Dawson is incorrigible!" is his comment. I'm afraid he is right.

Monday 4th March 1935
To the War Office to see Piggott. Piggott threw quite an interesting sidelight on Smuts's recent remarks about having been always opposed to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. "Of course he was always opposed", said Piggott, "as it was signed at a time when he, Smuts, was fighting against us and when Japan was about the only friend we had in the whole world". That may, of course, have something to do with Smuts's apparent dislike for the Japanese.

Piggott, by the way, is furious with Dodd for a very cynical and flippant report to the Foreign Office on the recent Red Cross Conference in Tokyo, a report in which, incidentally, he shows extraordinary ignorance of previous international conferences in Japan, as he asserts that none had ever been held there before.

He had previously sent me a copy of the report, in confidence, for my comments, without indicating its authorship. It read more like an article by Peter Fleming than an official
despatch, and had it not been for a brief reference to a previous despatch, it would have been impossible to recognise it as an official document.

To Highgate in evening to lecture on the Far East situation at the Presbyterian Hall. A very attentive audience, though one or two of those present seemed a bit upset by some of my remarks! On the other hand, a New Zealand lady came up to me afterwards and thanked me for speaking up for Japan, as she said there was so much anti-Japanese sentiment among public speakers at the present time.

Sunday 10th March 1935
Train for Ashridge to lecture again on the Far East situation to Peers and M.P.s and prospective M.P.s, who were there for a weekend course. One of my questioners, a Commander Olliver, mentioned the interesting fact that, while serving with the Mediterranean Fleet, he took part in a number of exercises designed to see how quickly naval reinforcements could be sent to Singapore if ever it was attacked. The invariable conclusion was that it would be almost impossible to rush reinforcements there in time to prevent its fall. One serious cause of delay, he pointed out, was that speed would have to be reduced to a minimum when nearing the Straits, as slow-moving trawlers and mine-sweepers would have to be sent ahead to clear the narrow waters of mines, which would certainly be sown in large numbers by the enemy.

Another member of the audience, one Leslie Boyce of Gloucester, sounded me out afterwards on providing him with material from time to time to put forward in debates in the House when Far East questions crop up.

Much struck by the obvious desire for friendly co-operation with Japan shown by most of those present at my talk and by their interest in the subject, as evidenced by the frequent applause and by the request that I should continue speaking beyond my allotted time.

Monday 11th March 1935
Kellett asked me also why it was that South Africa was so afraid of Japan and asserted that South Africans are seriously worried as to Japan's intentions towards their country. It was news to me that any such fear existed. Curiously enough, another man present confirmed what he said.

On reaching town, went round to see Kinlock-Cooke, who had asked me to look in for a talk. Find he wants me to write another article for next month's "Empire Review", dealing with the folly of bull-baiting Japan. He is very down on Lothian and mentioned that the reason his letters are given such prominence in the "Times" is that he is a great pal of Geoffrey Dawson, the Editor.

About an hour's talk with Sir Reginald Johnston. Johnston is very disgusted with "The Times" and with Fleming's articles on the Manchukuo, as he considers them - quite rightly - badly biased and misleading, and calculated to do much harm. I suggested that he himself should write to "The Times" about them, but he thinks it no use doing so, as he is persona non grata with Geoffrey Dawson. Seems that Dawson asked him early last year to write a sketch of the young Manchukuo Emperor for "The Times" in connection with the enthronement at Hsinking.
A few days before it was to be published, however, "The Times" came out with a "leader" making fun of the young Emperor and referring to Pu Yi as a puppet and a Pooh-Bah. Johnston therefore wrote to the Editor, pointing out that, as "The Times" apparently held very different views to his own on Pu Yi, he did not see much point in contributing the proposed article. He received no reply or comment, but heard later that it was Dawson himself who had written the insulting "leader" and that he had been greatly offended by Johnston's remarks about it - so offended, in fact, that "The Times", alone of all the leading papers, failed even to publish a review of his "Twilight In The Forbidden City", a curious example of petty spite on the part of Dawson.

Tuesday 12th March 1935
Papers very full of yesterday's debate on the White Paper on National Defence. The Labour crowd, with their usual inconsistency, are strongly attacking the Government for their alleged "militarism" in increasing the Air Force and giving up unilateral disarmament, although they simultaneously take the Government to task for not having imposed an economic boycott on Japan in connection with the Sino-Japanese dispute, an action which would most certainly have led to war and put us in a very serious predicament on account of our inadequate forces.

Friday 15th March 1935
See the Japanese Navy is reported objecting to the plans for constructing aerodromes on Midway Island and Wake Island for the use of the proposed American trans-Pacific air services, as the Navy considers them a threat to the Japanese mandate islands in the event of war.

Cable from Moscow quotes Litvinov as indicating in a press talk that the Soviet will "be ready to discuss the reciprocal withdrawal of part of her armed forces, including military aeroplanes, to a definite distance behind the Soviet-Manchurian frontier", following the anticipated easing of tension as a result of the Chinese Eastern Railway sale. Although he preferred not to use the word "demilitarisation", this is, in effect, the "demilitarisation" which Hirota has been urging and which Moscow, hitherto, has refused even to consider. Possibly Moscow's growing anxiety about Berlin and Warsaw may have brought about this change.

See Guy Locock, speaking on the results of the F.B.I. Mission to Manchukuo, has very wisely been warning exporters in Newcastle that the introduction of measures to deal with Japanese competition likely to lead to a trade war are to be avoided.

Thursday 21st March 1935
Long letter from Kumasaki, in course of which he remarks: - "Mr. Hirota is now mighty popular. He is now embarking on the apparently impossible task of making China a friend of Japan. So far he looks successful. If he should accomplish this task, a temple will be dedicated to him. He will be a national hero, a Baron Hirota to begin with, and there will be no knowing what he will ultimately become before becoming ashes." An interesting commentary, despite the curious wording and sentiments!

Friday 22nd March 1935
To town to lunch with Sir Reginald Johnston at the Athenaeum. With Johnston at lunch was Oudendijk, the former Dutch Minister and Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in Peking. It was Oudendijk to whom Johnston referred in "Twilight in the Forbidden City" as the unnamed foreign Minister who promised to help the "Boy-Emperor" to escape to Tientsin in 1923, an attempt that was thwarted at the last moment. It was he, too, who probably saved the young Emperor's life by personal representations to Feng Yu-hsiang when Feng, a year later, forced him to sign certain documents and expelled him from the Forbidden City. A letter from Oudendijk in the October 1934 number of the R.C.A.S. Journal throws some interesting light on the whole affair and helps to supplement Johnston's description. Had a very interesting talk with Johnston and Oudendijk. Both spoke very highly of Yoshizawa, Oudendijk asserting that it was to Yoshizawa that he always turned for advice when difficult questions were under discussion at Peking. At the Conferences of Ministers over which he, Oudendijk, had to preside as Doyen, Yoshizawa, he said, would generally sit silent most of the time while the other ministers held forth at great length and to little effect. Then, when everyone else had finished speaking, Yoshizawa would say a few words, very slowly and very calmly, and provide the very solution for which they were looking. When, therefore, it became the fashion in the closing months of 1931 for armchair critics to belittle Yoshizawa for his handling of Japan's case at Geneva, Oudendijk always pointed out to these critics that Yoshizawa's slowness of speech was no criticism of his inability as a diplomat but that, on the contrary, he was one of the ablest and most levelheaded statesmen at Geneva and that his critics were merely displaying their own ignorance when they allowed themselves to be carried away by the empty oratory of Wellington Koo & Co.

Of Koo himself he has a very poor opinion, and so has Johnston. Johnston was the British High Commissioner at Weihaiwei when Koo fled there as a political refugee in 1927 and his description of how Koo, who had previously been so loud in his demands for the return of Weihaiwei to China, came to him secretly for protection and subsequently sought his help to smuggle him safely to Canton, was most enlightening. He also threw much interesting light on the reason for Japan's strong objection to Koo as Nanking's representative with the Lytton Commission. Koo, it seems, had been finally restored to favour in China by the personal intervention of Chang Tso-lin, who forced Nanking to remove the price that had been set on his head when he fled to Weihaiwei. For having his life saved and for being reinstated by Chang, Koo was, accordingly, bound to Chang and his son as a blood-brother. Consequently he should have been disqualified from being taken on by the Lytton Commission, as he was naturally predisposed to work in Chang's interests.

Oudendijk threw some interesting light on the Chinese raid on the Soviet Legation in Peking in 1926. The Chinese, it seems, had long suspected the Soviet of using their legation as a centre for Communist intrigue against the Chinese, but owing to diplomatic privileges etc., the Chinese were unable to enter the Legation Quarter in order to verify their suspicions. Eventually, however, they approached Oudendijk and, after showing him satisfactory proofs of their suspicions, asked him, as Doyen, to permit Chinese police to enter the Quarter and
search the Soviet Legation. After consultation with his principal colleagues, Oudendijk gave the necessary permission and the raid was carried out. Although the Soviet Military Attaché and others managed to burn a number of important documents, sufficient incriminating evidence of Soviet intrigue etc. was obtained to justify the raid, and a number of Chinese Communists, who had been making use of diplomatic immunity to carry on their activities from the shelter of the Soviet Legation, were arrested. Among the documents seized were carbon copies of all important despatches sent out for some years past from the British Legation! Oudendijk was strongly taken to task by his own Government for having sanctioned the raid, as complaints against his action were sent to the Hague by Soviet sympathisers! Had an interesting discussion on Sino-Japanese and Franco-Soviet rapprochement. Both Johnston and Oudendijk think that the present attempt to bring about Sino-Japanese rapprochement will prove successful and that the consequences for ourselves and others will be most unfortunate although, as both say, we shall only have ourselves to blame. They both agree, too, that the present Franco-Soviet rapprochement is fraught with danger and they seemed much interested in what I told them about Viscount Ishii’s article on the subject in the current issue of "Contemporary Japan". If it leads to a Japanese-German rapprochement, as is quite possible, there again we and the other Powers will only have ourselves to blame. Interested, though rather surprised, to hear that Sir Frederic Whyte left China under a cloud, after being debarred from the Shanghai and other clubs. Seems he ran off with another man’s wife and that the lady subsequently committed suicide when Whyte left her and returned to his own wife.

Oudendijk tells me he wrote strongly to the "Times" at the time of the Manchurian trouble about the folly of forcing Japan out of the League, but apparently his warning that Japan really would leave the League if they passed their resolution against her went unheeded and, in spite of his own former high position as an authority on Far Eastern affairs, his letter was merely tucked away with the "extracts from letters to the Times".

Saturday 23rd March 1935
Sale of Chinese Eastern Railway completed.

Sunday 24th March 1935
See that the Soviet is contemplating construction of 1,250 mile line from Chita to Urga via Kolulun.

Monday 25th March 1935
See Hitler has been emphasising to Simon and Eden that Germany's main fear is Soviet Russia, hence her preparations; and nothing will induce her to join the proposed Eastern Pact.

Tuesday 26th March 1935
See Baldwin, speaking at the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, expressed the belief that it is practicable to do something with Japan by agreement, but that, in the event of failure, we shall be up against a very difficult problem. Very true.

Wednesday 10th April 1935
To town to speak on the Far East situation at the "English Review" Luncheon Club, Sir Francis Lindley acting as Chairman.

Amused by Petrie’s comment to me afterwards à propos of my remark that the Press always seemed so afraid of hurting American susceptibilities, but had no hesitation in hurting Japan’s. His explanation was twofold - first, that many of our leading Pressmen always hoped to make money by articles for the U.S. Press or by lectures in the U.S., and secondly, that a number of them had American mistresses! What degree of truth there is in the latter contention I know not!

Looked in to War Office in afternoon for talks with Grimsdale and Piggott, the latter taking me in to see the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingbred, whom I had not met before. Surprised to learn from him that Lindley, on his return from Japan, had paid him a visit in order to ask that my services in Japan should be recognised by special promotion to the rank of major. Unfortunately, as there was no precedent for such action, the request could not be granted, but the General thanked me personally and promised to help me in any way he could if, at any time, I wanted any help.

Tuesday 16th April 1935

See by the "Japan Chronicle" that Hirota has been mooting the question of buying Northern Sakhalin, a question that was brought up last in 1922.

Thursday 30th May 1935

See by the papers that the War Office in Tokyo has announced the establishment of three new air defence headquarters in Tokyo, Osaka and Kokura, each under a general or lieutenant general, the one in Tokyo opening on 1 July and the others in 1937. Said to be part of a 4-year plan for the enlargement and development of the Air Force. According to the Press, an increase of 100% in the number of military planes, which is now under 1000, is considered desirable owing to Russia’s 3000.

Also reported that the Japanese Army is threatening to take action and to insist on the demilitarised zone in North China being extended to include Peking and Tientsin unless the Chinese authorities put a stop to anti-Japanese activities in that area.

Sunday 2nd June 1935

Old Mr. Ker dropped in for talk after tea. Very caustic about the unseemly rush on the part of the other Powers to raise their legations in China to embassies after Japan announced her decision to do so a week or two ago. Blames Italy for having set the lead and stolen a march on the others some time ago, despite agreement to act in concert on this matter. Italy’s action, according to him, was due to Mussolini’s desire to have his son-in-law raised to ambassador.

According to Fukuoka, Matsudaira is likewise very critical of the step taken.

Monday 3rd June 1935

Received letter of congratulations from Piggott in morning, so looked up the Birthday Honours and, much to my surprise, found myself figuring with an O.B.E..

Wednesday 5th June 1935
To town in afternoon to meet Lionel Gall for a talk and from him learned something of the inner history of the Anglo-Japanese Friendly Relations Committee. Seems it arose from a request from the Japanese Embassy to some publicity bureau to do what it could to correct and counteract the misleading statements and campaign of vilification of Japan appearing in a section of the Press. The bureau thereupon helped to organise a committee, but it was of very poor quality and its methods were equally poor. Gall and one or two others are therefore trying to enlist the support and sympathy of prominent parliamentarians and others interested in promoting better relations between the two countries and I have been asked for advice on sundry matters. It is a pity, though, that the help of a publicity bureau was ever invited, as it immediately conjures up the unpleasant implications of paid propaganda. I gather, however, that the services of the bureau have now been dispensed with. This is all to the good.

Tuesday 11th June 1935
To Staff College for guest night. Amongst those I met was Wilson-Brand (Argyles). He was on the Staff at Shanghai during the 1932 operations and apparently got on very well with the Japanese. Told an amusing yarn of how Samejima came to him one day and gravely demanded the despatch of a British lance-corporal and two men to prevent the entry of two Chinese divisions, who were reported to be planning an attempt to force their entry into the City. On being asked what use a lance-corporal and 2 men could be against two divisions, Samejima explained that they would be accompanied by a Japanese lance-corporal and two men and the mere visual indication of Anglo-Japanese solidarity would suffice to hold the Chinese in check. Sounds Gilbertian, but is probably true, as Anglo-Japanese solidarity is the one thing needed more than anything else to make the Chinese behave themselves.

Thursday 13th June 1935
Sent off article on Doihara to the "Evening Standard".

Saturday 15th June 1935
As Sir Frederick Whyte stressed on the wireless a day or two ago, the Japanese Army has carried out its promise to leave Hirota a free hand for 6 months to try the effect of co-operative diplomacy and then to act according as it saw fit if it had failed to achieve its purpose. The 6 months are now up, the desired results have failed to materialise, so the Army is resorting to other means.

Sunday 23rd June 1935
Had Gall to lunch and tea, and discussed with him the possibilities of building up an influential body of public opinion in this country in favour of closer relations with Japan.

Tuesday 25th June 1935
To town to speak at a League of Nations Union lunch on the present situation in the Far East. I appeared to tread on a good many corns and had a somewhat heated argument with Geoffrey Mander, the verbose M.P., who seems obsessed with the idea that we should force Japan to come to heel, even though he admits that war might - I say would - result. Surprised to find that most of the questions put to me after my talk had nothing whatever to do with what I had said, but were mainly concerned with Japan's attitude on the Abyssinian question -
would she fight Italy on Abyssinia's behalf and was it true that she had obtained huge concessions in Abyssinia for opium growing - and so on! Amazing!

Wednesday 3rd July 1935
See the Soviet have been protesting again to Japan about frontier incidents, but it seems a case of six of one and half-a-dozen of the other.

Saturday 6th July 1935
More hopeful sign. Moscow reported agreed to Hirota's proposal for joint Japan-Soviet-Manchukuo commission to deal with frontier dispute.

Wednesday 17th July 1935
See Mazaki, the Inspector-General of Military Education, has been relieved of his post and Watanabe Jotaro appointed to succeed him. Seems change is outcome of disagreement between him and Hayashi over the coming military reshuffle in August. Hayashi, it seems, wanted the removal of certain disturbing elements in the Army, officers in key-positions who wished the Army to play a political role and tended to take independent action. Mazaki opposed him. Hayashi therefore has now dismissed Mazaki after twice asking him to resign, and his action is interpreted as a victory for the moderate elements.

Saturday 20th July 1935
See that Toyama Mitsuru has been cabling on behalf of the newly-formed Ethiopian Problems' Society, to the Abyssinian Foreign Minister, exhorting him to maintain the independence of his country.

Friday 26th July 1935
Looked in to War Office to see Boxer, who tells me the Japanese have just increased their troops in Manchuria by one division (9th) while a mixed brigade - about equal in strength to a division - recently relieved the division in Jehol. The organisation of the two new independent garrisons - making five in all - is also said to be complete and the Formosan garrison strengthened by the addition of two new air squadrons and some heavy artillery units.

Monday 12th August 1935
To town in morning to lunch at the Grosvenor with Edwardes, Gall and Fukuoka. Edwardes very down on Teichman and Pratt, whom he regards as the two greatest menaces to the British Empire! Both are, of course, "defeatists", and according to Edwardes, Barton, when C-G Commanding General at Shanghai, was so furious with Teichman over the Hankow business in 1927 that he refused to see him. O'Malley, it seems, was compelled by Teichman to sign the agreement with Chen for its retrocession, but was so upset about it that he threw himself into a chair in Barton's office and burst into tears. Incidentally, Teichman has apparently now got Cadogan under his thumb in the matter of our China policy, although it was thought at the outset that he would take a different line to Lampson's. Pratt's colour, Edwardes tells me, is due to Andaman blood. Strange that our China policy should be so influenced by one of Andaman, the other of German, blood!

Another interesting sidelight was that Duncan, who was sent out to command Shaforce at the outset, was apparently a politician rather than a soldier and was under orders to do everything
possible to avoid fighting. So literally did he interpret these instructions that he fell foul of both Tyrwhitt and Gort, who both recognised the need of firmness. Tyrwhitt was actually about to bombard the Chinese at Hankow, when orders were received from home - on the advice of Duncan and Teichman - to let the Chinese remain in possession of the British concession. Duncan was subsequently "stellenboshed" for incompetence in command at Aldershot. Other points mentioned by Edwardes included the assertion that Quo Tai-chi is very "Red" and that the Chinese Navy is, in effect, nothing more than a commercial concern!

News received that poor Nagata, the "Gummukyokuchoo" [Head of Military Affairs Bureau] has been assassinated by a disgruntled colonel, who drew his sword and cut him down in his office - apparently by way of registering disapproval of the recent removal of the Mazaki group, which was carried out on Nagata's advice.

Monday 19th August 1935
"The Times" carries a cable from Byas, the concluding words of which should be taken to heart by our people as they are so patently true. "It is safe to say," he remarks, "that the size of the British Fleet concerns Japan relatively little. Her objective is either the reduction of the American Fleet, or freedom to build against the American Fleet according to her own judgement. The former course would be preferred, but she is prepared for the latter". This is what I have said time and again, but it is difficult to get people to appreciate the fact.

Monday 2nd September 1935
See that the Harbin-Hsinking line has now been changed over to the South Manchurian Railway gauge.

Tuesday 3rd September 1935
According to Tokyo despatch in "The Times", Leith-Ross, on his arrival in Japan, is likely to be told quite plainly that "the price of Japanese co-operation in China is greater freedom for Japanese goods in the British Empire", as the Japanese consider it unfair for Britain to raise tariff and immigration barriers against Japan and then try to check her only remaining outlets - Manchuria and China - by restraining her advance there by raising the question of the Open Door and proposing co-operation in China.

Wednesday 4th September 1935
To town to lunch with Maruyama, who had young Araki along to meet me. Maruyama seemed rather hurt when, after he had asserted that England ought to use force if necessary to check Italian aggression against Abyssinia, I remarked that, if we did so, we ought to have taken similar strong measures against Japan! Surprised to learn from Maruyama that gum boots are known in Japan as "Jimmu Tenno kutsu" ["Emperor Jimmu boots"], as they are shaped like those in the pictures of Jimmu! For a Japanese to make fun of the great Emperor in this way seems almost lèse majesté, considering the sanctity in which he is held!

Looked in to the War Office to see Boxer and learned that news of Hayashi's replacement by Kawashima as War Minister had just come in, Hayashi's resignation being due, apparently, to his sense of responsibility over the changes he felt compelled to make for the purpose of
tightening up discipline in the Army. The War Office knows very little about Kawashima's affiliations, so I have promised to look up my notes on him.

**Wednesday 18**th September 1935

To town to see Nisbet's about my book ["The Problem of Japan"]). Nisbet's appear worried about my book, as they don't like my views on the Far East and Japan and are afraid my views will prejudice its sale among what they consider the liberal elements.

Seems that a paper called "The Week" professes to have inside information to the effect that Gareth Jones and his companion stumbled across some vitally important information regarding Japanese plans and military preparations in Mongolia. The Japanese therefore arranged with a party of bandits to have them kidnapped and murdered. The bandits, however, released Gareth Jones's companion, who thereupon revealed the facts. My scepticism was still further increased when, on mentioning it to Piggott he remarked: "The Week is a Communist publication and was proscribed for a time in this country on account of the lying and insidious propaganda contained in it. It is one of the organs used by the Soviet as a "whispering gallery" for spreading distrust among classes and nations and is thoroughly malicious". It would seem, then, that the Soviet is deliberately exploiting these rumours as a part of their policy to do everything possible to discredit Japan so that, if ever the two countries come to blows, the world may be led to believe that Japan is the aggressor.

**Saturday 28**th September 1935

See by the latest "Chronicle" that according to the Mainichi the naval authorities have come to the conclusion that, for the future industrial development of Japan, it is imperative for a "southward advance" policy to be pursued. All that Japan wants, it declares - e.g. foodstuffs, war materials and industrial materials - can be obtained from the South Seas, and not only can that territory supply Japan's demand for oil, rubber, raw cotton, iron ore, wool and pulp, but there is also a good prospect of increased production there. The Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, and Borneo, it contends, have inexhaustible natural resources awaiting exploitation and the way must be opened for the settlement of Japanese there in large numbers.

**Monday 30**th September 1935

See Roosevelt has been declaring that the U.S. holds to her policy of bringing her navy up to full treaty strength by 1942.

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**Government Code and Cipher School, 1935 - 1944**

**Tuesday 1**st October 1935

Started work in my new job at the Foreign Office [Japanese Section, Government Code & Cipher School], where working with a number of old friends - Marsden, Hobart-Hamden, Nave, Roscoe etc.

**Thursday 3**nd October 1935
Went round to the Far East Department of the Foreign Office for talk with Harcourt-Smith and also saw Randall. Harcourt-Smith tells me that one of Samuel Hoare's first actions on becoming Secretary of Foreign Affairs was to ask the Far East Department to submit their views as to the best means of drawing up a concrete policy for dealing with the Far East situation, as he is very anxious to find a peaceful solution. Hoare is apparently very well disposed towards Japan, as also is Neville Chamberlain, who is very keen on bringing about a naval agreement with Japan in order to avoid unnecessary expenditure on naval armaments.

Harcourt-Smith also showed me a despatch from Clive reporting that Debuchi is seething with indignation at having been debarred from some golf-course in Australia (?) on the grounds of his being an Asiatic. Most unfortunate, and the Foreign Office is naturally worried to know what to do, as they fully appreciate the unfortunate effect of such incidents on Anglo-Japanese relations, but are powerless to do anything about it. Apparently the Japanese Consul-General at Mombasa has had the same experience.

Evening papers full of the Italian offensive on Abyssinia launched this morning.

Tuesday 15th October 1935
See Hirota, in reply to Yurenev's protest against a fresh frontier incident in which mutual recrimination has arisen as to which side really violated the other's frontier, has suggested the appointment of a mixed commission to delimit the frontier in order to avoid similar incidents in the future.

Thursday 24th October 1935
See Matsudaira, speaking at a dinner of the Japan-British Society in Tokyo, has given a fresh warning against any attempt to bring about a united Anglo-American front against Japan.

Friday 1st November 1935
Went round to see Christian once more to discuss further points in connection with the book. Am getting very annoyed with him, as he tries to dictate to me what I ought to do and what I ought not to do, and he wants large chunks of the book cut out as he dislikes my views and says they will cause offence to the Lothian-Cecil crowd. Be blowed to them, I say. They are my own views and are fully shared by men like Lindley, Crowe, Parlett and others, who are best placed to express judgement and, as I told Christian, the tragedy is that the views of doctrinaire pacifists like Lothian and Cecil, who have no firsthand knowledge of the situation, are accepted like Holy Writ.

Tuesday 19th November 1935
According to the evening's wireless news, Japan has delivered the anticipated ultimatum to China to make the five provinces of Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Chahar and Suiyuan either independent or autonomous. Looks as though Doihara's remarks to me in Mukden last year were in the nature of intelligent anticipation! North China, he declared on that occasion, was not likely to join Manchukuo, but "might become independent". Chahar and Suiyuan likewise were unlikely to become a part of Manchukuo, but were expected to work in friendly cooperation against the extension of Soviet influence. Japan's object is seemingly twofold -
economic interdependence and mutual aid against sovietisation. It seems likewise to be part
and parcel of Japan's policy to deal with autonomous provinces and groups of provinces
rather than with a central government incapable of ensuring its orders in outlying provinces.

Thursday 21st November 1935

According to wireless report in evening, the anticipated independence of North China has met
with an unexpected setback, as Hirota is said to have stepped in to check the Military, whom
he considers are going too far. Looks rather as though Dohara & Co. had been trying to push
matters too far and too fast.

Wednesday 27th November 1935

Had Fukuoka to lunch. Fukuoka very pessimistic about the outcome of the Naval Conference,
which he considers doomed to failure. Very frank, too, about Leith-Ross, whose visit to Japan
and China he regards as having been most untimely and a serious blunder, as our Foreign
Office apparently sent him in the mistaken belief that his visit would be welcomed and failed
to ensure beforehand that the suggestion of a loan to China would have the support of Japan,
France and U.S. and their co-operation. His visit, combined with China's action in suddenly
announcing currency reform, merely served to arouse Japan's suspicions and play into the
hands of the Army, thereby precipitating the present crisis in North China. It all adds point, in
fact, to the fears expressed by Yamada, in a recent letter I had from him, lest a loan be made
to China and be used by her for political purposes against Japan. It is perhaps significant that
even "The Times" has been critical of the Leith-Ross mission. It looks very much as though
the Chinese were using him as a political pawn in the game, while the Japanese Ronin bunch
similarly make capital out of his visit by representing it in an unfavourable light and
demanding action to counteract the effects. The Foreign Office in Tokyo and the moderates in
Nanking are therefore placed in embarrassing positions.

Monday 9th December 1935

Naval Conference opened in London. Prospects not very good, for although each country
concerned is obviously anxious to cut down expenditure on naval armaments, it is difficult to
see how they will be able to compose their respective differences of opinion as to the best
way of doing so.

Saturday 14th December 1935

Called on Nagai at the Grosvenor in afternoon and had a most interesting talk with him.
Briefly stated, the main points made by him were: (1) that Japan fully recognises that Britain
requires a larger navy than Japan, but so long as the U.S. insist on parity with England, Japan
must insist on parity with both England and the U.S., as she cannot agree to American
superiority over herself; (2) that the U.S. contention about having two coasts to guard and
therefore requiring equality with England and superiority over Japan is all nonsense, as she is
practically self-contained and is in any case so far removed from potential enemies as to be
virtually immune from attack, apart from which the bulk of her fleet is in the Pacific and can
pass through the Panama Canal from one coast to the other in 48 hours; (3) that although
Japan is anxious to avoid an armament race, she is not seriously afraid of America
outbuilding her in the event of such a race, as she would find difficulty in manning many more
ships than she has at present; (4) that the only Power to profit from an armed clash between
Japan and Britain or America would be the Soviet, who would be able to exploit the resultant
chaos and unrest in East Asia; (5) that even for a Japanese it is difficult to known the true
sentiments of the North Chinese towards the autonomy movement, as they tell the Japanese
one thing and the foreigners something entirely different.

His main object in asking me to come and see him, however, was to question me on unofficial
reaction in England towards the Naval Conference and Japan's proposals. On my voicing the
opinion that, thanks to the lack of sensational headlines, the average Englishman was but
little interested in the conference, he said this served to confirm the impression that he himself
had received and that he felt this to be a welcome sign, as the less excitement aroused by the
conference, the greater the chance that an agreement might be reached.

Monday 16th December 1935
To see Gascoigne in evening about Nagai's talk, and met Charles Orde, the head of the Far
Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

Saturday 28th December 1935
Wrote to "Punch" about the gross and virtually libellous misrepresentation of my book in the
review published in their issue of the 25th and have offered to send a "fiver" to the editor for
any charity he likes to name if the reviewer can quote anything from the book to support his
accusations. Alternatively, if he fails to do so - and he obviously will, I have suggested that the
reviewer should pay a similar sum to charity! Criticism is one thing, but malicious
misrepresentation and slander do not constitute legitimate criticism and one hardly expects
such "hits below the belt" from a paper like "Punch", despite its strong anti-Japanese bias.

PUNCH, DECEMBER 25, 1935
BRAVE NEW BANZAI

The Japanese nation, it seems, is grossly misjudged. It really consists of innocent children,
forced to stand on the defensive against the threatened tyranny of those sinister bullies,
China, Russia, America and Great Britain. We must therefore be sympathetic and helpful
while the Yamato race proceeds with its benevolent expansion. Such, at any rate, is the view
maintained by Captain M.D. Kennedy in "The Problem of Japan" (NISBET, 15/-). It is an
astonishing piece of propaganda, for in order to make his contentions even plausible the
author is compelled to impute the basest motives to all the nations and their League and to
explain away some extremely stubborn facts. In this he is not uniformly successful. And the
events of the last few weeks in China have already falsified some of his most confident
predictions.

Sunday 5th January 1936
Despite it being my birthday and a Sunday, had to go up to town and spend the day working
at the Foreign Office in connection with tomorrow's reopening of the Naval Conference.
Wednesday 8th January 1936
Much interested to see that the Foreign Office Spokesman in Tokyo has come out with a statement to the effect that Japan is "ready to negotiate on all outstanding questions affecting her relations with the British Empire, but is unwilling to discuss the question of China alone". Byas, in his cable to "The Times" about it, very rightly says: "His prompt response to a suggestion of general negotiations at this moment, when China's future and security in the Pacific are open questions, has an importance which my easily extend beyond tariffs and trade privileges".

Thursday 9th January 1936
Lunched at the Carlton with Gascoigne, Orde, and Henderson. The two former were very complimentary about my book, which rather pleases me, as it shows that those in official quarters are taking note of it. Boxer tells me the same about the War Office, where it is apparently being studied.

Orde tells me that certain busybodies are spreading reports, "on highest authority", that Wiggins did not commit suicide, but was murdered by the Japanese. These reports, as he says, are absolutely without foundation, as there is not the slightest suspicion of anything but suicide, vide both the medical evidence and the letter left by him - another typical case of "giving a dog a bad name". Concerning Garett-Jones's death he says that all available evidence goes to show that the Japanese had nothing whatever to do with it, despite reports to the contrary, and that only by the widest stretch of the imagination could any suspicion rest on Japanese complicity.

Friday 10th January 1936
"A profound a unpleasant impression" has been caused in Tokyo by the publication of documents in New York alleging that Lord Lee of Fareham first proposed to the U.S. naval equality with Great Britain and suggested that the British Fleet might guard the Atlantic, leaving the U.S. free to concentrate in the Pacific against Japan. These allegations are not unnaturally "casting a shadow on British good faith towards Japan, then her ally". Lord Lee, in a statement to "The Times", strenuously denies these allegations. Looks very much as though the Yankees were up to their old game of trying to make mischief between Britain and Japan - a particularly dirty trick just at this moment, when the Naval Conference is already threatened with disruption.

Saturday 11th January 1936
 Interested to see that, according to Press despatches from Tokyo, Japanese officials are stating, "with greater candour than before that Japan's chief interest is a reduction of the American Fleet". This is, of course, what Nagai and others have told me quite frankly before and is obviously true. The pity is that they have not formally made this clear from the very start.

Tuesday 14th January 1936
With Maggie [wife] in evening to a cocktail party at the Carlton given by Fujita in honour of the Japanese naval delegation. Met a number of old friends there, including Dooman, who has come over here with the American delegation.

Introduced to Admiral Nagano, whom I had not met before and was surprised to learn from him that the Japanese delegation is to announce its withdrawal from the Conference at tomorrow's meeting. Their decision to withdraw is not wholly unexpected, but what surprised me was the frank way in which he told me that the decision to do so has already been reached.

Thursday 16th January 1936

Had Leslie and Denniston [Head of Government Code & Cipher School] to lunch at the R.E.S.

Monday 20th January 1936

To dinner in evening at the Naval & Military given by the Council of the Japan Society in honour of the Japanese naval delegation. A very friendly, informal affair, but broke up early on receipt of grave news about the King. The bulletin, received shortly after 9.30, read: "The King's life is moving peacefully towards its close".

[At dinner] Fujita tells me that he and Fujii have been instructed to act as Japan's "observers" at the Conference, Nagai, Nagano etc. returning to Japan next week. Lindley, who was in the Chair, made a good speech as usual, humorous, but with "meat" in it.

Tuesday 21st January 1936

Had Edwardes to lunch at the R.E.S. He had just come away from seeing Nagai, who, he said, had spoken very highly of the friendly attitude of Monsell and Chatworth in the naval talks, but apparently he was disappointed with Eden who seemed to have little interest in, or understanding of, the Far East in relation to Japan.

Friday 24th January 1936

Lunched with Gascoigne, who tells me the Foreign Office has received from the War Office a paper setting forth the desirability of entering into an agreement with Japan for a settlement of the Far Eastern situation by means of mutual recognition of rights and interests in China, or, as Gascoigne put it, "a division of the spoils". This is presumably the proposal which Boxer mentioned to me the other day, when he said the War Office was drawing up a scheme of sorts for an Anglo- Japanese agreement somewhat on the lines of the suggestion put forward in my book, although it is hardly correct to call this "a division of the spoils", as I emphasised the need of considering the interests of China herself and of the other interested Powers as well as of our own and Japan's. According to Gascoigne, however, the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office is opposed to the proposal on the grounds that it would be unfair to China and that Japan could not be trusted to keep such an agreement, but it remains to be seen what the heads of the Foreign Office will think of it, as it now goes to them for consideration.

While it depends, of course, on the actual nature of the proposed agreement, I personally think Japan could be trusted to keep it, provided it is reached by free and friendly negotiation without any taint of "pressure". Japan's record is pretty clear in the matter of honouring...
bilateral engagements of this kind. Where she has failed is in multilateral agreements into which she has entered under threat of what might be called "moral blackmail".

Told Gascoigne of Edwardes's remarks about Nagai and Eden. Gascoigne rather admitted that there might be something in what he said and mentioned that Lindley recently remarked to him in a letter that, in view of Eden's appointment to the Foreign portfolio, he (Gascoigne) would be well advised to give up diplomacy as a vocation and invest all his money in armaments firms, as Eden was more likely to run the country into war than to ensure peace by diplomatic methods!

Tells me there is good reason to believe that there is good foundation to the recent "Morning Post" report about a Japanese-German agreement, though he thinks it is more in the nature of an understanding between the naval and military staffs of the two nations than a binding agreement between the two governments.

Saturday 25th January 1936

To Grosvenor House after lunch to meet Nagai and bring him out to Horsley by road for tea. Questioned him on a number of points on the way out, including his impressions of Eden. His reply confirmed what Edwardes had told me. Two men in particular he had wanted to meet, he said, were Eden and Ribbentrop, as he had heard such conflicting opinions of both that he wished to form his own. Both of them he found, had little knowledge of Far Eastern affairs, but whereas Ribbentrop seemed anxious to listen to what he had to say on the subject, Eden appeared to be completely indifferent, almost to the point of rudeness, as he was obviously taking in nothing that Nagai was saying to him and seemed only too anxious to turn the conversation to other matters. He, Nagai, incidentally mentioned that when he was here in England as Chargé d'Affaires shortly after the War he was disappointed also in Curzon, who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as Curzon always appeared either unable or unwilling to realise how greatly things had changed in the Far East since his own visit there in the early 'nineties!

Working round from the question of Italy and oil sanctions, I sounded Nagai out as to how Japan would have reacted if the Powers had tried to apply sanctions to Japan. His reply was more or less as I expected, for he said it would have made her desperate and led her to adopt desperate measures in order to counter them. Just what measures she would have taken he did not specify, but it was clear from his reply that they would have included steps to ensure control of neighbouring sources of supply, for he said that it was generally considered sufficient supplies of raw material to hold out for at least two years if necessary.

I took occasion to intimate tactfully the danger of Japan's present actions in Northern China driving the Chinese to appeal in desperation to the League for sanctions, and pointed out that, even among those in England who had sympathised with Japan at the time of the Manchurian trouble, there were many who were now growing increasingly critical of her actions in Northern China. He asserted, however, that there was no cause for apprehension and said that General Minami had assured him, just before he left for London, that the Kwantung Army had no intention of pressing matters too far.
To my query as to whether Japan was likely to enter into another naval conference in order to avoid a race in armaments, he replied in the negative, adding that he could see no point in holding another conference so long as the present abnormal conditions prevailed, as they made calm deliberation impossible. On my pressing the point, however, he admitted that an agreement embodying naval, political, and economic considerations might tempt Japan to confer and he indicated that the general atmosphere would be greatly improved if Manchukuo were accorded recognition. He even went so far as to express the opinion that, if recognition were accorded, Japan would be prepared to re-enter the League and bring in Manchukuo with her. This rather surprised me, as also did his assertion that he expected Shidehara to come back once more as Foreign Minister, though he made it clear that this could hardly be expected so long as the army retains its present strong position. The inference was, that the army will retain this position so long as the attitude of the other Powers leaves Japan apprehensive, but that, once assured that its apprehensions are no longer warranted, the country as a whole will swing over to the side of the moderates and strong reaction against the Military will set in.

Nagai also expects Yoshizawa to return as Foreign Minister in the even of the Seiyukai regaining their former influence, and he asserted that the Okada Cabinet is now discredited and would be overthrown straight away if another Premier could be found.

**Thursday 13th February 1936**

Frontier scraps between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolian troops becoming increasingly frequent, the latest - according to press reports - having been on a pretty big scale, with artillery and a couple of planes taking part.

**Saturday 22nd February 1936**

See poor Minobe has been shot at and wounded by a member of the super-patriotic fraternity - fortunately not seriously.

**Monday 24th February 1936**

Details of the Japanese General Election results are given in "The Times". The Seiyukai, some of whose leaders angled for reactionary support, has dropped from 304 seats in the last election to only 174, while the Minseito, which demanded constitutional government and extermination of Fascism, secured 205 as compared with only 146 last time. The most surprising features of the election is that the Social Democrats and Proletarians obtained 18 and 6 respectively as against only 3 and 2 in 1932, their unexpected success being ascribed by the Press to public disgust with the orthodox parties’ failure to combat Fascism. The whole election, in fact, seems to indicate a growing disgust with recent Fascist tendencies.

Lunched at the Senior with Norman McLeod and Irma. Norman appears to be a strong advocate of close co-operation between ourselves, Japan, Germany and Italy.

**Tuesday 25th February 1936**

The latest issue of the "Japan Chronicle" to hand gives an interesting account of the amazing scenes at the trial of Colonel Aizawa for the murder of poor Nagata last summer and seems
to indicate an extraordinary amount of misplaced sympathy among Army officers for the murderer, or any way for his motives.

Wednesday 26th February 1936

Bad news from Japan, part of the 3rd Regiment, taking advantage of the fact that they were under orders for transfer to Manchuria and had been supplied with ball ammunition, carrying out a sudden coup during a snow storm in the early hours of the morning and murdering Okada, Takahashi, Saito, Admiral Suzuki, and General Watanabe Jotaro, the Inspector-General of Military Education. Makino and others were also picked out for slaughter, but apparently escaped, although, owing to strict censorship, full details are not yet available. A thoroughly rotten show and a terrible loss to Japan.

Rung up by O.M. Green, the "Morning Post", and "Evening Standard" for my comments, the two latter asking me for interpretative articles on the whole affair. As the articles were wanted straight away, I had to decline, though the "Morning Post" sent a man to see me at the R.E.S. during the luncheon interval for an interview, which they are to publish tomorrow.

Saturday 29th February 1936

The Tokyo revolt has at last been brought to an end by orders, in the name of the Emperor, that the insurgents should lay down their arms. It seems to have been pretty well touch and go, though, as Kashii, commander of the martial law area, had apparently exhausted his patience in trying to persuade the insurgents to quit the new Diet buildings and other points held by them and had decided to use force to turn them out. One of the most amazing developments, however, is that Okada is alive after all! Apparently his brother-in-law, Colonel Matsui, was killed in mistake for him, while Okada himself remained hidden. Apparently Admiral Suzuki, too, is still alive, though seriously wounded.

Received letter from Yamada denying the recent reports of a Japanese-German secret alliance. Seems worried that Litvinov was received in audience by the King while over here last month for the royal funeral, though personally I do not imagine that there was any political significance in it.

Sunday 1st March 1936

Wrote articles for "Morning Post" and "Evening Standard" on the trouble in Japan, emphasising agrarian unrest as the fundamental cause.

Tuesday 3rd March 1936

Lunched at the Union Club with Edwardes and Gwynne of the "Morning Post", both of whom seem well pleased with my article published in todays' "Morning Post". Both Edwardes and Gwynne are very critical of our Foreign Office's handling of the Far Eastern and Italian situations and of our ambassadors in Tokyo and Rome - Clive and Drummond respectively.

Edwardes bears out what Piggott has said about Clive being quite unfitted for his post and tells me that the Japanese Embassy here in London is very upset at Clive's extraordinary action in declining the Japanese army's offer to provide a guard of honour of 1,000 men of the Guards Division at the King's memorial service in Tokyo. It really is simply amazing, as such
an offer is without precedent and the refusal to accept it is naturally considered a gross insult. Edwardes tells me of a similar blunder at the time of the Barnby mission’s visit to Japan. The Emperor expressed his wish to receive the mission in audience, but Clive, without consulting Barnby, declined the invitation, although it came from the Emperor himself - an amazing breach of etiquette. Barnby was naturally furious when he heard what had been done and gave Clive a piece of his mind and declared his intention to report the matter to the King in person on his return to England. As a result, Clive asked the Kumaisho [Imperial Household Department] to arrange for an audience after all, but the Kumaisho was so furious with Clive’s refusal that it was only with the greatest difficulty that the audience was eventually arranged. Another instance of Clive’s extraordinary behaviour during the visit of the Barnby mission told me by Edwardes was that when Shigemitsu was introduced to Lady Clive, she remarked to him in a very condescending tone, “I think I have heard your name mentioned by my husband!” This was five or six months after the Clives’ arrival in Japan, so one can appreciate Barnby’s assumption that she was already personally acquainted with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yet it bears out Prince Tokugawa’s remarks to Piggott and Nagai’s remarks to me about Clive’s failure to make the personal acquaintance of the leading men in Japan. According to Gwynne, Sir Eric Drummond [former Secretary of the League of Nations] is equally unfitted for the Ambassadorship at Rome and was only given it in order that he might qualify for an ambassador’s pension.

In criticising the Foreign Office, for its handling of the country’s foreign policy, Gwynne was equally critical of “The Times” and “Observer”, as he maintains - and I think rightly - that their policy is directed entirely by the Astors and that, consequently, they are bound by the principle of saying nothing that might offend American susceptibilities. This, of course, explains Garvin’s remarks to me in 1925.

An interesting point brought out by Edwardes in the course of conversation was that our retrocession of Hankow etc. to China under threat in 1927 was due to the Government’s fear lest failure to retrocede should result in war with China just at a time when a General Election was due. Even a justifiable war, they felt, would have an adverse effect on their chances in the coming elections. In other words, party interests were placed above national honour. Pretty disgusting.

Wednesday 4th March 1936

Prince Konoe has been ordered to form the new Cabinet in Japan, but has declined on the grounds of ill health. An interesting commentary on what Iwanaga told me about Konoe shortly before I left Japan.

Evening papers playing up interview given to Roy Howard by Stalin, in which Stalin declared that the Soviet would come to the help of Outer Mongolia if Japan attacked the latter.

Thursday 5th March 1936

According to Press telegrams, Hirota has accepted the command to form the new Cabinet and has selected Yoshida Shigeru for the Foreign Office, Terauchi for the War Office, Nagano
as Navy Minister and Baba Eichi as Finance Minister. Yuasa is to be Lord Privy Seal and Matsudaira Minister of the Imperial Household.

Surprised at Yoshida's selection as he has little strength of character or personality and he is Makino's son-in-law and therefore persona non grata with the Army.

Friday 6th March 1936
Fresh crisis in Japan! The Army is strongly opposed to Yoshida as Foreign Minister and to one or two of the politicians who have been given Cabinet posts. Terauchi has therefore declined the post of War Minister, and the Army refuses to nominate anyone else for it unless Yoshida & Co. are withdrawn.

Saturday 14th March 1936
Boxer tells me that the news of 1,000 Imperial Guards being offered as a Guard of Honour at the King's funeral service in Tokyo was handed to the Press Section at the War Office, but the Press Section failed to give it out - a great pity. They failed, too, to give out that, except for Minami who was in Manchuria and Watanabe who was laid up ill, every General in the Japanese Army attended the memorial service.

Thursday 19th March 1936
Lunched at the "Rag" with Wards. Tells me that, although there is not much love for the Japanese among the foreigners in Northern China, it is freely recognised by most of them that, if it had not been for Japan's action in 1931, the foreigner in China would now be even worse off than he is, as the Chinese were preparing to force the Powers to restore the Tientsin and other Concessions and to abolish extraterritoriality. Though no great love is lost on the Japanese by other foreigners in China, a sneaking admiration is felt for them in the way they refuse to let themselves be trampled on by the Chinese. The dislike felt for the Japanese, according to Wards, is largely due to jealousy on the part of the other foreigners, who would like to see their own governments act in the same way!

Sunday 22nd March 1936
Went over to Ewhurst with Maggie [wife] to lunch with the Piggotts, where met Colonel and Mrs. Gressitt. Colonel Gressitt was formerly Director of Military Intelligence at Simla and is expected to become Chief of the Imperial General Staff eventually. Tells me the War Office and General Staff were "horrified" to learn of the proposal for Anglo-French Staff talks for possible action on the Rhine, as apparently it was put forward without consulting them!

Thursday 26th March 1936
Lunched with Henderson at the R.A.C. and had a long discussion with him on the situation in the Far East. Glad to find that, although we do not see wholly eye to eye on the question, he appears to recognise that the time has come for the Foreign Office to work out a definite policy on the basis of actual facts instead of drifting on as at present. Although he doubts the efficacy of multilateral agreements, he thinks Japan could be trusted to maintain bilateral agreements and considers, therefore, that the best solution of the problem is to work for something of this kind. I am inclined to agree.

Tuesday 28th April 1936
Had Steptoe to lunch at R.E.S. and was interested to find that he fully shares my opinion about the need of entering into friendly agreement with Japan before it is too late. If we don't, we shall, as he put it, find ourselves in the undignified position of having to go to her, "cap in hand", to beg favours - which would be a serious blow to our prestige in India etc. - or else fight - which we are not in a position to do.

Saturday 6th June 1936
See that General Matsumuro, Japanese political agent in Northern China, has been accusing the British authorities in Peking of "insincerity" in connection with the alleged murder of Sasaki by two British soldiers a week or so ago. Damn sauce on his part, as our people have done everything possible to clear up the matter.

Tuesday 9th June 1936
Protests against Japanese smuggling in Northern China, and of their failure to stop it being due to their attempt to use it for bargaining with Nanking to reduce the tariff, continues apace. The Japanese are certainly doing themselves no good by their behaviour in the matter of smuggling and in that of the Sasaki case, as they are merely putting everyone's back up.

Meantime Leith-Ross has returned to Japan and is having talks with Isogai etc.

Wednesday 24th June 1936
Japan has decided not to adhere to the London Naval Treaty, as it conflicts with the principles announced by Japan at the London Conference.

Tuesday 7th July 1936
See that 13 officers and 4 civilians have been sentenced to death by Court Martial in Tokyo for the 26th February rebellion, and heavy terms of imprisonment passed on a number of others. Following, as it does the execution of Colonel Aizawa last week for his murder of poor Nagata last August, it looks as though the authorities are determined to have no further ultra-patriotic nonsense. A healthy and reassuring sign.

Wednesday 8th July 1936
See by the papers that Mazaki, Kawashima, and others were asked by the rebels, after the outbreak in February, to assume the leadership, but very rightly refused to do so. The rebels, in fact, appear to have made a serious miscalculation, as they seem to have expected that the whole Army would be with them after they had struck the first blow.

Wednesday 5th August 1936
See by the "Times" that Minami has succeeded Ugaki as Governor General of Korea. Interesting to see if Ugaki's resignation foreshadows his accession to the Premiership.

Friday 14th August 1936
Having received an invitation to call on him, dropped in at Japanese Embassy to see Yoshida [Ambassador], who at once apologised for having troubled me needlessly! He then went on to explain that he had asked me to call, as he had wanted to offer me a post as a "fellow-worker" in interpreting Japan to Great Britain - and so forth - but he had just learned that I was already employed in the British Foreign Office and realised, therefore, that I could not take on the work he had in mind.
Tells me that the coming conference of Japanese Ambassadors in Paris is the outcome of a recommendation put forward by himself on his return to Japan two years ago after his visit to Europe as "Ambassador-at-large". Seems he found that, at each of the Japanese embassies he visited, the Ambassador was a strong advocate of closer relations or actual alliance with the country to which he was accredited. He felt, therefore, that it would be for the good of all if all these diplomats could be brought together for a yearly discussion in order to give them a broader outlook as to what would be best for Japan.

In reply to my query as to whether he found much change in this country since he was here in 1921, he said, "Yes! I find the friends of Japan more friendly, and the hostile critics more hostile!"

He seems well pleased with Kobayashi's appointment as Governor General of Formosa, as Kobayashi is very moderate in his views and his appointment should have a moderating effect on the present advocacy of Southern Seas' expansion for Japan. Tells me, incidentally, that Suetsugu is not the firebrand that he is generally depicted as being, but is cool and levelheaded when in a responsible position.

Monday 24th August 1936

Boxer rang me up to draw my attention to an article in the "Morning Post" on the growing exasperation with England in Japan and the bearing of this on the general situation and on the tendency to look to Germany for friendship. I'm afraid it is all too true.

Wednesday 9th September 1936

See Dill has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces to be sent to Palestine, with Simson as his Chief of Staff.

Grimsdale tells me that, just before Dill gave up his appointment as Director of Military Intelligence, the German Military Attaché intimated to him informally that Germany had decided to denounce the Naval Pact with England, as she felt it tied her hands too much now that the Soviet is expanding its naval forces.

Grimsdale agrees that the choice of Dill for Palestine could hardly be bettered and thinks that, although Simson is a believer in the "heavy hand", he will fall in with Dill's more moderate views, as Dill is the one man on earth for whom he has any real regard!

Tuesday 6th October 1936

With Maggie [wife] to farewell dinner at Japanese Embassy to Mrs. Piggott. Met a number of old friends unexpectedly, including Yoshizawa, Soyeshima, and Tsurumi Yusuke, all of whom are in England on short visits.

Yoshizawa, though reticent and tactful, seems a little hurt that he has been unable to see Vansittart, Sir John Simon or any other high official, as they are all "too busy" to see him.

Considering how seldom a former Japanese Foreign Minister has been in England, one would have thought that our people at the Foreign Office would have made a point of fixing up interviews with him, no matter how busy they were.

Friday 9th October 1936
To lunch at the Hotel Splendide with Keene, Reuters Diplomatic Correspondent, to meet the Soviet Naval Attaché, Eng. Flagman Antsipo-Chikunsky. O.M. Greene was also there. The Soviet Naval Attaché seemed quite a decent sort of fellow and was very interesting about Sato, the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, who he met at the Montreux Conference on the Dardenelles question. Apparently Sato made a great impression on the Soviet delegation by his firmness, dignity and tact, and by his quiet, unassuming bearing. This rather bears out what one has learned from other sources and is particularly interesting in that it was a spontaneous expression of opinion by a Soviet official.

Keene told me of a talk he had had recently with Fukuoka, according to whom Japan's decision on the question of capital ships and gun calibres will depend entirely on whether Article 19 of the Washington Conference concerning fortifications in the Pacific is retained or not. Fukuoka also contended that the Japanese Navy has been losing ground to the Army of late and that, as it is now becoming realised that the necessary funds cannot be raised to carry out both the Army and Navy programmes, it is the Navy who will have to give way to a cut in the estimates. This is because it is felt that, with the other naval Powers preoccupied in Europe at the moment, the need for strong naval forces is not so urgent as for the Army, and the Navy is said to have suffered a loss of influence by the fact that most of the ablest naval leaders were removed from the Active List as a result of the London Naval Treaty.

Monday 12th October 1936
To dine in evening at the Hyde Park Hotel, a dinner given by Soyeshima. Yoshida, who was there, tackled me about Wednesday's "leader" in "The Times" and asked what I thought about it. I told him and also said I thought he did well not to reply to it, though both Somerville and Admiral Mark Kerr urged him to do so. Tsurumi, who was also there, tells me that Ugaki is almost certain to be the next Premier and I reminded him of our talk at Ugaki's dinner in 1929.

Wednesday 4th November 1936
See that some of our "higher-ups" in the Foreign Office are beginning to fear that the more moderate stand adopted by Japan during the past few weeks may be taken by China as a sign of weakness. Knatchbull-Hugessen has therefore been warned to put it tactfully to the Chinese authorities that they should avoid doing anything to aggravate matters again.

Tuesday 17th November 1936
The existence of a German-Japanese agreement for a common front against the spread of Communism is now made public.

Wednesday 18th November 1936
Lunched with Tomii at the Carlton Grill and had a very frank talk with him on the German-Japanese agreement. He is, very rightly, critical of today's "leader" on it in "The Times". To the substance of the article he takes no objection. It is to the sarcastic, provocative tone and to the cheap sneering witticisms that he objects; and no wonder. It simply disgusted me when I read it this morning and it absolutely beats me how a responsible paper like "The Times" can descend to the "gutter Press" level in a leading article of this kind. It will certainly do no good and is liable to do a great deal of harm - in fact, one might almost imagine that the writer of
this and of the one they published a month or so ago, was out to block any attempt to bring about more friendly relations and a better understanding between the two countries.

Friday 20th November 1936
To luncheon at the Savoy given by Tatsumi, the new Japanese Military Attaché, whom I had not met before. He brought me a letter from Homma, to whom he was previously Assistant Military Attaché. Tells me that Homma will probably be coming over here as A.D.C. to Prince Chichibu next year for the Coronation. An excellent choice.
At the lunch sat next to Matsutani, Tatsumi's Assistant Military Attaché, who seemed rather worried about Germany and Italy having recognised the Franco Government in Spain, as he considers they have acted too precipitately in according recognition while the issue of the struggle is still in doubt. Although he did not say so in so many words, I gained the impression that his anxiety arose from the fact that Japan has no desire to get herself entangled in European politics, but - thanks to her agreement with Germany - she may find herself dragged in willy nilly. It is known, of course, in official circles, that there was, for this very reason, strong opposition in certain Japanese quarters to linking up with Germany.
Matsutani's comments would therefore seem to indicate that the wisdom of doing so is doubted even by a section of the Army, despite the fact that the Army was apparently the principal advocate of the agreement.
Much interested to learn that Eden had instructed Clive to let the Japanese Government know that Wednesday's "leader" in the "Times" in no way reflected the views of [the British Government].

Sunday 29th November 1936
See that Litvinov & Co. have been holding forth once more at the Congress of Soviets in the usual bellicose and defiant spirit against Japan, Germany and Italy. According to Admiral Orloff, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Soviet submarine strength has increased 7-fold since 1933 and seaplanes 5-fold, while other naval increases are also given. Also stated that a new railway to the Pacific has now been completed, the new terminus being at a point north of Vladivostok where a large port is being constructed.

Thursday 3rd December 1936
The King's affair with Mrs. Simpson, about which the U.S. Press has been talking so freely for some time past, has now been brought to light in our own Press, which hitherto has shown a laudable readiness to keep silent on the subject. A most ghastly business and likely to do untold harm to British prestige in general and to the prestige of the Throne in particular. I heard of it first from Roscoe some 3 or 4 weeks ago and, of course, knowledge of it was spreading gradually in this country; but to the general public it has come like a bolt from the blue and most people are naturally horrified.
Had Chapman to lunch at the R.E.S. Tells me the matter has been freely discussed in the R.E. Mess at Chatham for some time past, as copies of American papers were being received there. One of these papers, "The Baltimore Sun", came out recently with large headlines, "Canto Cuts King's Cutie" - the reference being to an incident at Balmoral, where the
Archbishop of Canterbury refused to be introduced to her. The U.S. Press, of course, has been simply gloating over the whole thing and publishing columns and columns of the most sordid and sensational details. The general feeling among the officers in the R.E. Mess, Chapman tells me, is one of complete disgust, especially with the King's desire to marry the woman. So long as he dallied with ladies quietly and privately, they were prepared to emulate the shut-eyed sentry; but to do it all so openly and blatantly and then to propose making one of them, who has already been divorced twice, Queen of England, is more than they can stomach. This, in fact, seems to be the general feeling everywhere and Colonel Savage, when I met him this morning, even went so far as to say, "I'm damned if I would tolerate an American harlot on the Throne of England. It is time that the King himself was thrown off it, now that he has brought this discredit on it." It is all very sad and very humiliating and one wonders how it will end.

Friday 4th December 1936

Yesterday the Press seemed pretty well unanimous in criticising the idea of the King marrying Mrs Simpson; but the gutter Press is now beginning to turn round and Beaverbrook & Co. are trying to make political capital out of it in order to pursue their miserable vendetta against poor Baldwin, whom they accuse of trying to force the King's hand.

Monday 7th December 1936

Greig has lent me his copy of Saturday's "Evening Standard" with G.B. Shaw's article on the present constitutional crisis. A most scurrilous bit of writing in the very worst taste, and grossly insulting to the King, the Premier, the Archbishop and the people of this country alike. It is difficult to say where to lay the chief blame - on the paper for publishing it or on Shaw himself for writing it. On the whole I think the paper is the main offender, as it is all part and parcel of its dirty, under-hand policy of hitting poor Baldwin beneath the belt, whereas Shaw is merely a buffoon, consumed with self-conceit, who is incapable of distinguishing between legitimate humour and damned bad taste.

Thursday 10th December 1936

This morning's papers indicated that the King was likely to abdicate. Knowing that the final decision was to be broadcast at 4 p.m., I went along with Marsden to a room which had imported a wireless set for the occasion. Found most of the office congregated there - a curious, almost uncanny gathering, with everyone doing his or her best to appear calm and collected, though all present were clearly in a state of nervous tension. A low, subdued chatter; then complete silence as the announcer began to speak, the tense silence continuing until the announcement was finished, when everyone dispersed quietly and returned to work. A most tragic ending to a reign which had seemed to hold out such great prospects; but in view of all that has come out, the King's decision to abdicate may perhaps prove all for the best. And even though his successor may not, at first sight, appear so well-fitted as his brother and may be lacking his magnetic personality, he seems likely to prove a far more conscientious, steady-going monarch, and his wife has all the qualities of a most popular Queen.
Friday 11th December 1936
Had the rather unpleasant experience of being "put on the mat" for allegedly giving away confidential information in the article I wrote last month for the "Morning Post", and was told that, in consequence, I must either leave the Foreign Office or give up writing. Being much mystified, I went across to see Orde, whose signature was attached to the "minute" which had led to the rebuke. On my asking him about it, he said that the Foreign Office was much embarrassed by what had been said in the article, as Yoshida had come round to complain of this "leakage" and Millard of the U.S. Embassy had called in to enquire about its truth. This left me more mystified than ever until further questioning revealed the fact that the "leakage" in question was contained in an entirely different article, which I had never even seen! Orde was very apologetic; but even so, it is a bit thick to have it stated as a fact, in official correspondence, that I had been guilty of giving away confidential information to the Press. As the article in question was an unsigned editorial, they might at least have queried me about it. But no; they just took it for granted that I had written it and then proceeded to brand me as the guilty party and report the matter to Cadogan and Vansittart. Makes one almost inclined to take out a libel action!

Sunday 13th December 1936
The Far East looks like coming into prominence once more, as Chiang Kai-shek, who was on a visit to Sian, has been seized by Chang Hsueh-liang, whom he was visiting! Chang professes to have carried out this coup in order to force Chiang to take stronger action against Japan and to join with the Communist armies (which Chang is supposed to be suppressing!) to fight the Japanese.

Tuesday 19th January 1937
Went round to Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office to see Orde about a fatuous blunder he made yesterday in reply to Tomii, who asked what department I was working in. Instead of saying that I was employed in general intelligence work on the Far East - which is what I myself always say quite frankly - he asserted I had nothing to do with the Foreign Office. Tomii naturally expressed surprise and now, presumably, I am regarded by him and by his Embassy in general as being either a prize liar or a spy. Although I am neither the one nor the other, it is difficult to see what other construction they can put on Orde's reply. This is the second time that Orde, through crass stupidity, has got me into trouble. He is a pleasant enough fellow in his way and no doubt he is a great scholar, but if our Foreign Office officials are all as muddle-headed as he is, it is hardly surprising that we make such hopeless blunders at times in the handling of our foreign relations.

Friday 22nd January 1937
See by the papers that the Army and the Diet in Japan have come to verbal blows, with the result that a fresh crisis has been precipitated.

Saturday 23rd January 1937
 Seems that the Navy in Japan, fearing that the budget with the estimates for the new naval programme would have to go by the board if the Diet was dissolved, has done its utmost to
effect a compromise between the Army and the politicians; but although dissolution has been avoided for the time being, the Government has resigned, so heaven knows what the final outcome will be.

Meantime Moscow is once more staging a monster show trial, with Karl Radek, Sokolnikov, and a number of other leading figures in the role of traitors and villains in league with Trotsky, Germany and Japan! The usual "confessions" are being staged and the usual mass executions will no doubt follow. And yet our "pacifists" and labourites continue to hold up the Soviet as the land of liberty and the stronghold of world peace! Ye gods!

Wednesday 27th January 1937
Glad to see that Clive [British Ambassador to Tokyo] is strongly opposed to the proposal to tell Arita that no Japanese warship will be invited to visit England for the Coronation unless Japan admits the guilt of the Japanese police in the Keelung case and makes full amends. It is simply monstrous that such a suggestion should ever have been put forward, and shows how utterly ignorant our Foreign Office is regarding Japanese psychology. I can't help feeling, too, that the Foreign Office is treading on dangerous ground in getting Clive to recall the Darragh case for the purpose of obtaining an apology. It is apt to prove a two-edged weapon; for, although it is true that we made full apologies on discovering the truth of the matter, it proved that the Japanese police version was true all the time and that Darragh and his pal had lied from beginning to end. The Japanese might well retort, therefore, that, as the police told the truth in the Darragh case, their version of the Keelung incident must be regarded as more dependable than ours, unless absolute confirmation to the contrary is forthcoming.

Friday 29th January 1937
Rung up by Greene in the morning with the news that Ugaki has been compelled to give up his attempt to form a cabinet, as the Army refuses to nominate anyone to serve under him as War Minister.

Wednesday 10th February 1937
See Nakamura is down with typhoid and has been replaced by Sugiyama as War Minister. Piggott will be pleased, as Sugiyama is an old friend of his and very friendly disposed to Britain, having formerly been Japanese military representative at Simla.

Wednesday 3rd March 1937
To Chatham House in evening to take part in an informal "round-table conference" got up by General Sir Kenneth Wigram to consider ways and means of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Far Eastern problem. About a dozen present, including Pratt, Henderson, Hubbard, Harrold, Ainger and George Sale.

Tuesday 9th March 1937
According to a report in "The Times", Sato, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, has clearly indicated his intention to pursue a more moderate policy towards China and to aim for a better understanding with England. From what one knows of Sato, one may reasonably infer that this is not merely diplomatic verbiage and pious platitude, but honest intention, and it all helps to bear out my forecast in this month's "Empire Review".
Thursday 11th March 1937
To Bordon [Hampshire] in evening to dine with the Regiment [Scottish Rifles] for Neuve Chapelle night. Ferrers and Smart completed the roll of guests. Very pleasant to see them again and to dine in the Mess once more amid the old familiar sights, sounds, and customs.

Tuesday 23rd March 1937
Took part in another meeting at Chatham House under Wigram to consider how best to deal with the Far East problem. After much debate, it was finally decided that co-operation with Japan held out the best prospect for maintaining peace in the Far East and for the preservation of British interests. To me, of course, this has always seemed obvious, but it required a great deal of arguing before unanimity of agreement on that point was obtained.

Wednesday 31st March 1937
Rung up by B.B.C. shortly after 7 p.m. with a request to speak in the 10 o'clock news on the dissolution of the Diet, which was carried out suddenly and unexpectedly this morning. As I did not feel inclined to return to town and, in any case, would hardly have had time to prepare a statement and get up to town to deliver it, I wrote up an appreciation of the situation and telephoned it to the B.B.C., who gave it out in their news summary. The dissolution was apparently precipitated by the Diet's action in delaying the passage of a number of important Government bills - the old, old game, seemingly, of placing party interests before those of the State.

Sunday 4th April 1937
Finished reading Vaughn's new book, "Covering the Far East" (Published by Covici Friede, N. York). Although his story loses nothing in the telling and although he is not always strictly accurate, there is a lot of good material in the book and it is very readable on the whole. As he covers the same period as I covered for Reuters - 1925-34 - it has a personal interest for me, and some of his comments and observations have a special interest of their own. Two of his comments on news reporting help to bear out what I wrote in my recent article on the Press. One of these refers to the bombardment of Wanhsien [by the British], at which he was present. He mentions with surprise that, whereas his radioed despatch on it laid the principal emphasis on the Chinese casualties, a British correspondent, who was also present, only mentioned these casualties as an incidental, the main emphasis being laid on the reasons for the bombardment. Personally, I consider the British correspondent was right, as he provided the necessary background for a proper understanding of the whole thing, but Vaughn's contention is that the real "news value" - the "headline stuff" - lay in the large number of casualties inflicted and that, in making this part of his story only secondary, the British correspondent was really guilty of trying to "whitewash" his own people! A curious way of looking at things, but, unfortunately, typical of your "100% newspaperman".
He has a gentle dig at Will Rogers in a similar connection and quotes him as remarking: "Trouble with you boys is that you all want to write headlines instead of news. You got brains", Rogers added, "Tell 'em what you think about it. After all, you're here on the ground and you got a good chance to see what's what". Rogers "refused to believe that correspondents
should always write with the stringent objectivity demanded by the press associations". Personally I absolutely agree with Rogers and it is just what I was always telling Reuters, but my only reward was to be told that the papers wanted "headlines", not "Times suet"! For all that Vaughn is inclined to smile at Rogers, he appears to have agreed with him up to a point, for he remarks that he tried "interpreting the situation", but found no one interested. His despatches merely found their way into the editorial waste-paper basket or, if published, brought him letters of abuse, accusing him of being in Japanese pay. In fact, his experience seems to have been much the same as mine, as similar accusations were levelled against me.

Tuesday 13th April 1937
Keelung incident settled at last. Thank heavens that it is now out of the way, as it was doing much harm to Anglo-Japanese relations.

Thursday 15th April 1937
To lunch by Japan Society at Savoy Hotel in honour of the Japanese flyers [limura and Tsukagoshi who had flown from Tokyo to Croydon in 94 hours 18 minutes].

Thursday 29th April 1937
Took part at another R.T.C. [Round Table Conference] pow-wow at Chatham House 5.30-7 p.m. on the Far East.
Stayed in town for the night, so as to attend reception at the Japanese Embassy in honour of the Chichibus and the Duke and Duchess of Kent. Was pleasantly surprised to be recognised by Prince Chichibu. Met many old friends, including Homma, who has come over here with the Prince.

Friday 30th April 1937
Marthe [Austrian maid] gave notice in evening on grounds that she has got another job in London. A great blow to poor old Maggie [wife] and just the kind of thing that Geikie Colb [Doctor] said must be avoided at all costs in her present state of health.

Saturday 1st May 1937
Main feature of Japanese election results is the increase in Labour representation, a good indication that, despite the apparent growing unpopularity of the Army, the people are tired of the old political parties and their ways. The papers talk of "the Government's defeat", but as the Government is non-party, this does not seem to signify anything very much! See "The Times" has come out with a report of Yoshida's negotiations "with a high official of the British Foreign Office" for a settlement of Anglo-Japanese differences and misunderstandings. Looks rather as though there had been a "leakage" of information somewhere, as the talks hitherto have been very "hush-hush".

Wednesday 5th May 1937
To cocktail party given by Tatsumi at the Dorchester in honour of Homma. Met Colonel James [former Military Attaché in Tokyo] and other old friends there.

Friday 7th May 1937
"Times" publishes main points of an address given by Sato [Minister of Foreign Affairs] at a reception to foreign correspondents in Tokyo yesterday. The improvement of Anglo-Japanese relations received the principal attention, but he also dealt in conciliatory terms with the attempt to improve relations with China and the Soviet, and emphasised, amongst other things, that Japan is "not interested in the redistribution of colonies, but in access to raw materials and markets".

Thursday 13th May 1937

Had Homma and Tatsumi to lunch at the R.E.S. Gathered from Homma that the Army does not think much of Sato, who, he tells me, is known as the "Rip Van Winkle" Foreign Minister, because he has been abroad so long that he has lost touch with the great changes that have been taking place in Japanese outlook. Sorry to hear this, as it sounds a bit ominous, especially coming as it does from a man like Homma, who is no reactionary.

He seemed rather upset, too, at the British attitude towards the Keelung affair, and was very critical of the way we made so much of a broken jaw while treating lightly the question of Sasaki's murder. I tried to argue the point, but he seemed so convinced of the accuracy of the Japanese versions of these two incidents and so sceptical of the British versions that I felt it best to change the conversation before the argument became too heated. It was interesting, though, to hear the Japanese point of view so frankly stated.

Tuesday 1st June 1937

The papers publish the news of the resignation of Hayashi and his Cabinet "because an unfortunate controversy with a section of the House [of Representatives] was impairing national unity". It certainly looks as though Hayashi blundered in forcing an election in which the electors had no means of supporting the Government [since it was non-Party] and in failing to make any attempt to effect a reconciliation with the political parties after the election; but I am sorry he has resigned, as there was much to be said in his favour and the political parties have done little to instil any great confidence in themselves.

Wednesday 2nd June 1937

Prince Konoe has accepted the Premiership, though he declined it in February. This may be a good sign, though it calls to mind what Iwanaga told me about his [i.e. Konoe's] friends' advice.

Thursday 3rd June 1937

Hirota has been brought back as Foreign Minister. A pity Sato has gone.

Sunday 13th June 1937

The Soviet seem bent on carrying out "bigger and better purges", Marshal Tukhachevsky and a number of other high Army officers being the latest batch executed. A wonderful country!

Wednesday 30th June 1937

According to the "Evening Standard", a Soviet gunboat has been sunk with heavy loss of life in the Amur by Japanese gunfire. Though I can't believe that either side wants a war just at the moment, this sounds a bit serious if true, following - as it does - the seizure of two islands.
70 or 80 miles south east of Blagoveshchensk, though the latter incident appears to have been settled amicably.

Saturday 3rd July 1937
After an exchange of mutual recriminations between Japan and the Soviet, the Amur "incident" is reported to have been settled. Although the Japanese appear to have had the best of the argument, the fact that the Soviet have backed down seems indicative of Moscow's realisation that the "purge" of some of the best brains in the Soviet Army has weakened their military position and made it inadvisable, therefore, to adopt too strong an attitude.

Thursday 8th July 1937
Serious clash between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peking reported in evening papers. Seems that a company of Japanese troops carrying out manoeuvres was fired on by Chinese troops, who are said to have mistaken the manoeuvres for an attack on themselves!

Friday 9th July 1937
Further details of Sino-Japanese clash indicate a pretty dangerous situation, as each side is blaming the other for the outbreak and also for violation of true agreements subsequently concluded. Personally I cannot believe that either side wants a full-fledged war just now and it looks more as though the clash was akin to the recent trouble on the Amur and that, like it, the main cause of the trouble is over-zealousness on the part of subordinates on the spot, acting somewhat irresponsibly without either the sanction or the approval of their "higher ups". That, however, is just where the danger lies; as Tokyo, Moscow, and Nanking - however anxious they may be to avoid war - are liable to have their hands forced by incidents of these kinds precipitated by young hot-heads on the spot.

Monday 12th July 1937
Although the Sino-Japanese clash undoubtedly has dangerous possibilities, Byas's cable in today's "Times" still leaves room for hope that war may be averted despite its pessimistic opening words.

Tuesday 13th July 1937
[Attended] an informal discussion with the Japanese Economic Mission at Chatham House in afternoon. Very nice seeing Kadono once more, and Takahashi, who has come with him.

Sunday 25th July 1937
Just as the North China situation was beginning to look more hopeful, fresh "incidents" are reported and the usual charges and counter-charges of bad faith are being bandied about once more.

Tuesday 27th July 1937
Attended farewell dinner given at Grosvenor House by Kadono and the Japanese Economic Mission. A very "posh" show with 300 or more present.

Had talks with Yoshida, Tatsumi, Fukuoka and others about the North China situation. The general impression seemed to be that the situation was likely to get worse before it was
better, but that the worst would probably be over within a week or two. Fukuoka, however, appeared a bit pessimistic.

Thursday 29th July 1937
As expected, see that the great "victory" which the Chinese have been celebrating has proved entirely mythical! Verily are the Chinese a bunch of asses, as they never seem to learn their lesson.

Friday 30th July 1937
The Japanese seem bent on teaching the Chinese a lesson this time and are giving them a terrific drubbing, with an air bombardment of Tientsin included. That's what comes of celebrating mythical "victories" and getting too cock-a-hoop as the Chinese did recently.

Friday 13th August 1937
Following the shooting of a Japanese naval officer and a bluejacket on the evening of the 9th, events have moved rapidly in Shanghai and according to Press reports street fighting started this morning between Japanese and Chinese. A large number of Japanese warships are now concentrated off Shanghai and, following the Chinese refusal to fall in with Japanese demands for the withdrawal of all military effectives not less than 30 miles from the city and the dismantlement of all defences within the area, the Chinese have moved the 88th Division from Nanking into the Shanghai area to reinforce the local defenders. A repetition of 1932 therefore appears imminent.

Saturday 14th August 1937
Morning papers give fuller details of yesterday's fighting in Shanghai, which seems to have been pretty serious, with artillery in action on both sides and with some of the Japanese warships taking part too. This evening came the news that about 800 people were killed and 1,000 or so wounded, including British and other foreigners, by bombs dropped on the International Settlement by two Chinese planes, which were trying to bomb the Japanese flagship, "Izumo". A thoroughly bad show.

Monday 16th August 1937
Main developments in this mornings "Times" include the bombing of Chinese aerodromes at Nanking and other points by Japanese naval planes yesterday; a combined sea and air offensive launched at Shanghai by the Japanese this morning; the Japanese Cabinet's decision to carry out "drastic measures" to chastise the "lawless Chinese troops"; our own Government's decision to evacuate 2,700 British women and children from Shanghai without delay; a battalion of the Royal Ulster Rifles to be sent from Hong Kong to reinforce the R.W.F. [Royal Welch Fusiliers] at Shanghai.

Friday 20th August 1937
The Japanese Government are reported as being unable to accept the British proposal for the Japanese and Chinese forces to withdraw from the vicinity of Shanghai and for the Powers to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order and the protection of the Japanese and other residents. The reasons given for this refusal are that Japan does not consider that
foreign forces would be sufficient for the task and that the Japanese Government are responsible for the safety of their own people.

Byas in his telegram in today's "Times" emphasises what is probably true, namely, that there is good reason to believe that the Japanese Government from the outset "disliked the prospect of having to open a second front on the Yangtze". The defence of the Japanese in Shanghai, he remarks, is still in the hands of the Navy; and although reinforcements have been sent there, there has still been no large movement from Japan. Despite the levelheaded views of their Tokyo Correspondent, however, "The Times" have come out today with a terrific blast against Japan in their "leader", though I fear me that denunciations of this kind are calculated to do far more harm than good.

Tuesday 24th August 1937

Some 50,000 Japanese troops are reported to have been landed yesterday at various points near Shanghai.

Wednesday 25th August 1937

Japanese reported to have occupied the Nankou Pass and the capture of Kalgan is regarded as imminent.

Thursday 26th August 1937

Greeted at lunch time by huge placards reading: - "Japanese Shoot British Ambassador"!

Rather crudely put, but not without foundation, as Knatchbull-Hugessen is reported seriously wounded as a result of bombing and machine-gunning of his car by a Japanese plane while on his way from Nanking to Shanghai. A bad show and likely to raise an awful shout, even though the attack was obviously not intended for him.

Friday 27th August 1937

As expected, Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen's wounding has called forth a terrific scream and "The Times" has come out with an absolute snorter on what it calls "an outrage for which there is no parallel". That it is a thoroughly bad show is not to be gainsaid, but it certainly will not help matters to have a responsible paper like "The Times" losing its sense of proportion and going into hysterics about it. Normally I have little use for "The Evening Standard" but in this instance it sets an example of restraint, such as might be followed to advantage by others if an amicable settlement is to be sought; it says bluntly that unless we are prepared to embark on military action in order to obtain redress, it is essential to avoid wild talk.

It is all very unfortunate and, without wishing to pose as a prophet, serves to confirm the aptness of what I have been saying for some years past about the necessity of coming to an understanding with Japan before it is too late i.e. before matters drift on to the point at which the only way to check Japan will be to resort to force (vide p289 "The Problem of Japan"). Incidentally, quite apart from the rights and wrongs of the case, it seems at least "imprudent" on the part of the ambassadorial party that the Japanese were not informed beforehand that [the Ambassador] proposed going to Shanghai by road as, in view of existing conditions, it must have been clear that an element of danger was to be expected if due warning was not given.
Saturday 28th August 1937
Received complimentary copy of September issue of "The 19th Century" with my article on "The Far Eastern Crisis" in it at last. The August issue had my article on "This Freedom of the Press" an article which appears to have attracted not a little favourable attention and brought me a number of letters from people who have read it. I only hope it may do some good, though I am not very sanguine.

Monday 30th August 1937
"The Times" gives the full text of the British Note to Japan, demanding the "fullest measure of redress" for the wounding of Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen. The demands include a formal apology, punishment of those responsible, and an assurance that steps will be taken to prevent the recurrence of any such incident. So far so good, though I'm inclined to think that publication of the full details may serve to hinder rather than help a settlement. Be that as it may, a more fundamental fault seems to be that, not content with demanding redress, the Note proceeds to deliver a lecture on ethics - a sort of school-masterly admonition such as might be delivered to a naughty little schoolboy or to a small, unimportant State which could be overawed by such means. But to deliver admonitions of this kind to a country like Japan - no matter how justified the reprimand may be - seems to me to be the height of folly, as it will merely serve to put Japan on her mettle and make it harder than ever for her to comply with the demands. And if she declines - as she probably will, at least in part, what then? Either we shall have to back down and suffer a serious blow to our prestige accordingly, or we shall have to take sterner measures, neither of which alternative is going to help matters. In short, we seem to have overlooked the very first principles of diplomacy by failing to leave a loophole for either country.
Meanwhile official confirmation is now given of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between China and the U.S.S.R.

Tuesday 31st August 1937
Evening papers report a Japanese air raid on Canton. I'm afraid that the Japanese are rather playing with fire and making it difficult for their best friends to stand up for them properly.

Wednesday 1st September 1937
The list of bombings and torpedoings, successful and otherwise, of neutral ships in the Mediterranean of late has increased rapidly and it is time something was done to put a stop to it. It would seem that both sides in the Spanish trouble - or their sympathisers - are concerned in these attacks. A rotten business, and what worries me is that, with tension increasing all round and tempers becoming frayed, a general flare up may be precipitated in due course and, willy nilly, we may find ourselves jockeyed into a war on the side of France and the Soviet against Italy and Germany. If so, Heaven help us, as the U.S.S.R. would be a veritable wolf in sheep's clothing and we should be almost worse off if we won than if we lost, with the Soviet as an ally. Incidentally there is good reason to believe that Japan and Italy are a present trying to "get together" and a combination of Germany, Italy and Japan could make
things pretty unhealthy for us, with Italy controlling the Mediterranean and Japan the Western Pacific.

Saturday 4th September 1937
Heard from Chapman that Tatsumi is much worried at the long delay in receiving Tokyo's reply to the British Note about the wounding of Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen, as he thinks this means that the redress demanded will not be forthcoming. Poor Yoshida, from whom I received a letter a few days ago, is also much perturbed at the developments now taking place.

Incidentally Chapman tells me that when Tatsumi called on the Director of Military Intelligence to express regrets about the wounding of Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen, he came down afterwards to Chapman's room mopping his brow and remarked that his talk with the D.M.I. had been the most embarrassing half hour he had ever experienced!

Tuesday 7th September 1937
Pending completion of its investigations, the Japanese Government has sent an interim reply to the British Note on the shooting of Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen. Seems that the Japanese Government is honestly in doubt as to whether a Japanese plane was responsible for the attack and is in the unpleasant predicament of being precluded by public opinion in Japan - and especially by the extreme nationalist elements - from making an apology so long as this doubt exists.

Meantime Amoy, Swatow and other coastal towns have been shelled and/or bombed by the Japanese during the past day or two, and the Japanese have seized a couple of Chinese Customs' launches near Hong Kong and occupied the Pratas Shoals, apparently with the object of using them as a seaplane base. This is bringing things unpleasantly close to Hong Kong and tending to bring about a situation such as I envisaged in my lectures at Ashridge and elsewhere two-and-a-half or three years ago when I expressed apprehension of our possibly being faced with the necessity of using force at some time in the future if we delayed any longer in checking Japan's advance by friendly agreement.

Thursday 9th September 1937
In a message issued to the Japanese people, Prince Konoe [Prime Minister] last night made it clear that the struggle with China has developed into a bigger war than appeared likely at the outset and that Japan, having put her hand to the plough, will not look back until a decisive victory opens the way to the settlement she desires.

The trouble - and danger - as I see it is, that the longer this victory is deferred and the bigger the war, the greater will be the demands of the fighting services when finally it is attained. Our own and other foreign interests may then be so seriously affected that international complications of the gravest nature may follow.

Tuesday 14th September 1937
While the Japanese have come up against a far tougher proposition than was apparently expected, the Chinese have at last withdrawn to a new line in the Shanghai area, though this appears to have been done primarily for strategic purposes.
Meantime, in the North the Japanese have overrun the Province of Chahar and are now well within the borders of Shansi.

**Thursday 23rd September 1937**

Japan's reply to the British Note on the wounding of Hugessen and the British acceptance thereof are published in this morning's paper. The "incident" is now considered closed, for which, glory be! That an amicable settlement has been reached is undoubtedly due largely to **Craigie** [British Ambassador to Tokyo], to whom Eden & Co. should feel truly grateful for rescuing them from the consequences of their own unfortunate mishandling of the whole affair.

The satisfactory termination of this matter seems likely, however, to be offset by the somewhat ruthless manner in which the Japanese have been carrying out air-raids on Nanking and Canton. The wholesale slaughter of non-combatants is calling forth official and unofficial protests from various quarters and alienating the sympathy of the world in general.

Had a talk with **Field** on the subject and he confirms that the raids are being carried out entirely by naval machines and that the Army is very annoyed with the Navy for having dragged them in to the Shanghai show and thereby compelled them to divert troops which would be much more useful in the North China operations.

**Friday 24th September 1937**

Lunched with **Yanada** at the Nihonjinkai [Japanese Society]. Found him surprisingly outspoken against his Government's present policy in China. "More Japonico", however, he remarked that, much as he and many other Japanese disapproved of what was being done, he and they felt compelled to back up their Government now that the country was committed to this line of action. He expressed the belief, however, that there would be a strong anti-military reaction in Japan after the present trouble was over, as the people were getting tired of all these military adventures and the immense expenditure involved. I am inclined to think he is right, provided we and others do not have to butt in - an action which would simply tend to unite the whole country against us.

**Saturday 25th September 1937**

Paotingfu has now been captured, a most important gain for the Japanese in their North China campaign.

**Tuesday 28th September 1937**

The Far East Advisory Committee of the League, representing 23 nations, has passed a strong resolution (yesterday) condemning Japan for the aerial bombardment of open towns in China. The British, Australian and certain other delegates tried to have the resolution toned down a bit, so as to make it a condemnation of such bombardment per se rather than an outright denunciation of Japan, but Ecuador and **Litvinov** urged otherwise and won their point.

Were it not so tragic, it would be truly comic that British statesmanship should be thwarted in such a matter by Ecuador of all countries and that Litvinov should have the nerve to denounce Japan or any country for terrorism! Litvinov, whose own country is even now
displaying the most ruthless terrorism imaginable - a reign of terror as ghastly as the world has ever seen.

**Wednesday 29th September 1937**

After office [went] to Chatham House for discussion on the Far Eastern situation under chairmanship of Sir K. Wigram. In view of the dangerous growth of demands for stern measures against Japan - economic boycotts and the like - I was agreeably surprised to find that those attending the discussion were pretty well unanimous in opposing forceful measures and in emphasising the need of cool judgement in order to avoid aggravating the situation.

**Thursday 30th September 1937**

Demands for an economic boycott against Japan are increasing, the latest being included in a declaration issued yesterday by the National Council of Labour denouncing Japan, welcoming the condemnation of Japan by 52 States at the League Assembly, and urging a world-wide boycott of Japanese goods.

**Friday 1st October 1937**

Disgusted to see that the Archbishop of Canterbury is to take the Chair at a National Protest meeting against Japan at the Albert Hall next Tuesday. The meeting is being organised by the "News-Chronicle" and is therefore presumably in the nature of a Press stunt. What good it expects to achieve, Heaven knows. All it will do will be to aggravate an already dangerous situation still further, and the fact that the Archbishop is taking the Chair will give it an authoritative appearance which is bound to be misunderstood in Japan and do untold harm.

**Saturday 2nd October 1937**

After a series of letters vilifying Japan and all her works, letters dictated by the heart rather than the head, "The Times" has at last published one in which the writer, one Robert Schlee, emphasises the very real danger of plunging the country into war 8,000 miles away under conditions most disadvantageous to ourselves - a warning almost identical with my own in "the Problem of Japan".

**Monday 4th October 1937**

Much interested in telegram from Bishop Heaslett, warning the Archbishop of the unfortunate effect, on Japanese Christians, of his acceptance of the Chairmanship of the Albert Hall meeting and urging him to withdraw from it. It really is amazing that the Archbishop should butt into politics in this way, especially after his recent reprimand to his own Dean for doing so. Though naturally not published, Craigie [Ambassador to Tokyo] has cabled very strongly on the same subject to the Foreign Office, urging them to dissuade the Archbishop and warning them of the serious effect such actions are bound to have on public opinion in Japan e.g. driving Japan still further into the arms of Germany and Italy and weakening our own restraining influence on Japan.

See that the Soviet Far Eastern Army Headquarters are being moved from Khabarovsky to Irkutsk, apparently for the purpose of strengthening Moscow's hold on Outer Mongolia. The Japanese Press considers it also indicates the Soviet intention to make Outer Mongolia their base for operations against Japan and Manchukuo in the future. This speculation is held to
coincide with the Chinese explanation of why Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador to China, has hurriedly flown to Moscow, the idea being that he has gone to urge that part of the large stocks of war material in Outer Mongolia should be spared for China, as it could be sent from there more quickly and easily than from Russia proper.

Wednesday 6th October 1937
Roosevelt, speaking a Chicago yesterday, came out with a strong denunciation of Japan, Italy and Germany - by implication. Last night, too, Japan received further reproof and condemnation at the Albert Hall meeting and, although the Archbishop was rather more moderate than might have been expected, he indicated his belief that "economic pressure" should be applied if protest fails. A most dangerous suggestion.

"The Times" publishes a joint letter from Tokugawa, Ishii, Hayashi, Matsui and Fukai in defence of Japan, but I'm afraid it will do more harm than good, as some of its points are open to question and are somewhat crudely stated. Extraordinary that statesmen of their calibre should lay themselves open to attack in this way.

Thursday 7th October 1937
Though nothing has been allowed to appear in the Press about it, we have acted as an informal channel of communication for letting it be known to Chiang Kai-shek that the Japanese are prepared to negotiate very moderate peace terms, though the offer can only hold good if accepted within the next week or so. Chiang, however, has declined and says he intends to fight on.

Saturday 9th October 1937
Lunched at the Nihonjinkai [Japanese Society] with Fukuoka, who had rung me up to say he wanted to have a quiet talk with me "on a important matter". This turned out to be the question of Japanese propaganda in England. Yoshida, he said, had received instructions to carry out a vigorous campaign to make Japan's position better understood in this country and to counter anti-Japanese propaganda put out by the Chinese. The difficulty was to know how best to do it, as, now that the "Morning Post" has been amalgamated by the "Daily Telegraph", Japan is left without a friend among the London papers. Yoshida had therefore asked Fukuoka to have a frank talk with me and to seek my advice.

I feel awfully sorry for poor Yoshida, as there is no doubt that the British Press as a whole is giving Japan a pretty raw deal just at present. Beyond advising Fukuoka of the need to stick to unassailable facts and to avoid any attempt to "buy" friendship by offers of subsidies and the like, however, it was difficult to offer anything much in the way of advice, though I suggested that Yoshida should talk the matter over frankly with someone like Lindley [former Ambassador to Japan] or Crowe, as they might be able to help. Fukuoka seemed will pleased with Chamberlain's speech [the previous evening at the Conservative Party Conference], though he complained that "The Times", in summarising it, omitted some of his most important points and made it appear more critical of Japan than it really was. He was pleased, too, with Inskip's talk last night and its emphasis on the need for moderation. Tells me that the Japanese Government think very highly of Craigie [British Ambassador] and put great faith in
him, as not only have they great faith in his judgement and understanding of the situation, but they feel that, as he has but recently held a high post in the Foreign Office, he is more likely to receive attention and to exert a good influence in Foreign Office circles. Though Fukuoka himself clearly regrets what is happening in China, he emphasised that, however much the Government might wish to bring the war to an end, it is now impossible for them to "call off" until victory has been achieved, as otherwise the Chinese would regard it as a victory for themselves and would make things impossible. This, of course, should be obvious to everyone, but it is sadly overlooked by those who shout so vehemently for economic sanctions against Japan as a means of forcing her to call a halt. Hear that the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo has called on the Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and informed him of Italy's "moral support".

Monday 11th October 1937

Chiang Kai-shek, in a broadcast statement, has called on his countrymen for still greater sacrifices and warned them that "there is absolutely no hope of hostilities being ended in the course of a few months". Met Chapman, who tells me he attended the Albert Hall Protest meeting and was much struck by the fact that the protests were levelled far more against war and aerial bombing than against Japan - in fact, he said the newspaper reports gave a wholly false impression.

To Chatham House after work to an informal talk by Dr. Chang of the Nankai University to members of the Far East Division. He was, of course, strongly partisan. One interesting point he made was that the Japanese Army had, as it were, been preparing a "seven-course dinner" for the Soviet for some time past and had then decided to "give the hors d'oeuvres" to China. They had now discovered, to their dismay, that China required more than the "hors d'oeuvres" and had already used up 2 or 3 courses as well! He disposed very airily of the help given by the German and Italian missions, though the fact is that the Germans under General Falkenhausen are, apparently, in almost complete control in directing the present operations for China and in working the air defences. They also are providing much of the war material, as they argue that, if they don't, the Chinese will turn to the Soviet for assistance and Soviet influence will increase accordingly. While, however, this reasoning sounds logical enough, it is somewhat ironical that the Germans, in order to keep out the Soviet, should be helping to fight the Japanese with whom Germany, is bound by the Anti-Communist [Anti-Commitern] pact!

Tuesday 12th October 1937

The Japanese seem to be making good headway in North China and the strong defences of Shihchiawan have collapsed only 16 days after the capture of Paotingfu.

Wednesday 13th October 1937

According to Press reports, Mussolini has ordered all Italian air experts in China to discontinue their service with the Chinese Government. This step is said to have been taken in accordance with an understanding reached during his visit to Germany. Hitler, it is also reported, has recalled or will shortly recall all German officers who have been instructing the
Chinese Army, and Germany is helping, through the medium of German patents and machinery, to increase Japan's output of steel.

Friday 15th October 1937

While the Japanese continue to drive the Chinese before them in North China, they seem to be making good headway in Inner Mongolia as well and have now pretty well over-run both Chahar and Suiyuan.

Sunday 24th October 1937

To Horsley in afternoon to tea with the Rimingtons. Rimington tells me that Terasaki, who is leaving for Rome shortly, is very disgusted with the British attitude towards the present trouble in China and is very bitter about the treatment to which he and other Japanese in England have been submitted of late. The Japanese Embassy, it seems, is being inundated with abusive and threatening letters and telephone calls and individual Japanese are being insulted in the streets. On several occasions anonymous callers have rung up the Embassy and demanded to speak to "the murderers" department, and there have been a number of demonstrations outside the Embassy. Knowing how intensely keen Yoshida has always been to bring about closer relations with England, his staff have done their best to hide up as much of this as possible from him, but they can't keep it all quiet and the poor little man is just about heart-broken. Terasaki remarked bitterly that he himself had always been a friend and admirer of England's, but he has nothing but contempt for her now and regards her a Japan's principal enemy and thinks Japan was well rid of her as an ally.

Wednesday 27th October 1937

To Far East Division pow-wow at Chatham House in evening. Amongst a number of interesting points brought out in the course of the discussion was Ellenger's considered opinion that the Japanese have sufficient surplus stock and reserves of material of all kinds to enable them to weather an economic boycott for 6 or 8 months or even more and that even a financial boycott would probably prove ineffective. Another point brought out was that, from what the Government spokesmen said in the recent debate in the House [of Commons], [the British Government's] policy is now definitely aimed at bringing about peace between Japan and China rather than at backing up China against Japanese aggression. This certainly may be inferred from the speeches and one can only hope that this policy will be continued despite the criticisms and imprecations of Atlee, Sinclair, Lloyd George & Co..

Thursday 28th October 1937

See that Tokugawa and his co-signatories have replied in "The Times" to some of the criticisms directed against their last letter.

Sunday 31st October 1937

See that the following resolution has been passed in Tokyo [by the 'Council on the Current Situation', consisting of members of the Diet and leading industrialists. It demanded severance of diplomatic relations with Britain]. It is all most distressing and, though the body passing it may not be very influential in itself, there is all too good reason to believe that it reflects the growing antagonism of Japanese public opinion to this country and is all in line
with Terasaki's remark to Rimington that he had been forced to the conclusion that England must now be regarded as "Japan's enemy number 1". The one redeeming feature is that we now have a first-class ambassador in Tokyo in the person of Craigie and that the Japanese themselves - as mentioned quite voluntarily by both Terasaki and Fukuoka - have great faith in him. Poor Craigie, however, is having a very trying time and is desperately worried as shown very clearly by what he says in his cables to the Foreign Office. It is a rotten business, all this mutual recrimination, and extremely dangerous, as each provokes the other to further anger and abuse.

Monday 1st November 1937
The coming inclusion of Italy in the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact, which up to now has been kept very "hush-hush", has at last leaked out as shown by the following Tokyo despatch in today's "Times". It would be interesting to know how and where the leakage has occurred. We, at the Foreign Office, have known of it for some weeks past, but it was not supposed to be known outside Foreign Office circles.

Another curious "leakage" is shown by the following extract from "Scrutator"'s article in yesterday's "Sunday Times". This and the negotiations for the Italian Pact have been matters of such secrecy up to now that I have hitherto refrained from mentioning them even in my diary. [Details of agreement between Germany and Italy].

Thursday 4th November 1937
The Tokyo despatch in "The Times" gives food for thought in its reference to Hong Kong and a probable extension of the present [Japanese] blockade [of the Chinese coast]. The point about Hong Kong is particularly ominous, as we know from official reports how strong is the feeling about Hong Kong's refusal to close down on the despatch of munitions to China, especially now that France has agreed to do so in the case of Indo-China, and Portugal too in the case of Macao.

Saturday 6th November 1937
The Protocol by which Italy joins Japan and Germany in the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed this morning at Rome. On the surface it does not really amount to very much in so far as we ourselves are concerned, but in that it forms a link between Japan and Italy it has undoubtedly very serious potentialities for tying our hands in the Far East and the Mediterranean respectively.

To University College to lecture in afternoon to the International Students' Service on Japan's position in the present conflict in China. Hubbard had spoken in the morning on the background to the conflict and Sir Kenneth Wigram took the chair on both occasions. As the audience included a number of Chinese students and as most of the audience was both pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet, I got well heckled, but I quite enjoyed myself and think I gave as good as I got, though I was not able to put my case as strongly as I could have done if the audience had been wholly British. It was a weekend course on Far Eastern affairs run by a Miss Woodall, a most competent and attractive young woman.

Monday 8th November 1937
Hear that the Admiralty has spent an anxious weekend trying to check up a report that Japan has decided to take a smack at Hong Kong on the 15th. Personally I very much doubt it and think the report is a garbled version of a recent Press despatch to the effect that Japan is expected to make an actual declaration of war on China shortly and increase the blockade. The "Daily Telegraph" has an interesting account of the Japanese landing at Chapoo, in Hangchow Bay, which was carried out with little opposition, thanks to the Japanese having made a clever feint at Liuho and at the mouth of the Whangpoo. Funnily enough, I myself had commented on recent official despatches on the preparations being made so openly at the mouth of the Whangpoo and had suggested that possibly this was being done purposely to delude the Chinese, as I remembered how they had misled the Russians at the Yalu in 1904 by similar means.

**Tuesday 9th November 1937**
The Japanese have now captured Taiyuan, the Capital of Shansi.

**Wednesday 10th November 1937**
Hear that Madame Chiang Kai-shek has caused considerable embarrassment to our people by a statement to the "Chicago Tribune", in which she expresses gratitude to the British troops at Shanghai for the help (entirely fictitious) given to the "Doomed Battalion". A clever, but most unscrupulous piece of propaganda, aimed at embroiling us with the Japanese, who are naturally indignant at this latest "proof" of British un-neutral action.

Heard an amusing comparison between the Turkish, Arabic and Persian languages. It was made by Fletcher, who speaks all three. In Turkish, he said, a word can mean itself or its exact opposite. In Arabic it can mean itself, its opposite, or something about a camel. In Persian it can mean itself, its opposite, something about a camel, or an unnatural vice! Except for the camel, Japanese would appear to be akin to Persian in this respect.

**Thursday 11th November 1937**
The Japanese have at last obtained possession of Nantao, so that the fighting in and around Shanghai is now presumably pretty well at an end.

General Matsui is reported to have warned foreign Press correspondents that he is now to be regarded as "master of Shanghai" and that, if necessary, he will take control of the International Settlement and the Post Office etc.

**Friday 12th November 1937**
The "Yomiuri" is quoted as declaring that "the Japanese now feel that their ultimate enemy in the present struggle is not China but Great Britain, and that nothing decisive can be achieved until that enemy is disposed of". Though the "Yomiuri" does not carry any great weight, the blunt assertion seems to reflect a growing belief in Japan. A rotten state of affairs, for which our own muddled policy since 1921 is largely responsible.

**Saturday 13th November 1937**
See that poor Yurenev [former Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo] is apparently amongst the latest batch of high officials to be indicted as traitors by the present Soviet "purge". An amazing country.
Sunday 14th November 1937
Following Japan's refusal to accept the invitation to discuss [the Far Eastern situation] at [the] Brussels [conference], a declaration has been drafted by the conferees sharply censuring Japan, saying she is out of step with the rest of the world and hinting at stronger measures. Those responsible for this declaration seem to be completely mad, as (a) such admonitions will only aggravate matters, and (b) to talk of "stronger measures" is pure bluff and the Japanese know it. That responsible statesmen should indulge in such mischievous antics is little short of incredible.

Japan has been doing her best of late to get onto closer terms with Poland on account of the U.S.S.R., and Japan and Poland have just raised their legations in each other's country to the status of Embassy. Sakoh, an expert on Russian affairs, has been appointed as Japan's first Ambassador to Poland.

Monday 15th November 1937
The Brussels Conference yesterday accepted, for transmission to the Governments represented there, the draft declaration censuring Japan. Only the Italian delegate refused to accept it and I don't blame him. It is a most mischievous piece of work and I am rather surprised to learn that the moving spirit in its drafting was apparently Norman Davis, the U.S. delegate. Wellington Koo, of course, is delighted and tried to stampede the others into "concerted action, material, moral, and economic." Fortunately he failed to do so.

Meantime the Japanese advance in North China continues to meet with success and on the afternoon of the 13th, by means of a surprise attack, they obtained possession of Tsiyang, on the Yellow River.

Sunday 21st November 1937
See that the Japanese are now in possession of Soochow, which they took by means of a ruse.

In his article in today's "Sunday Times" "Scrutator" discusses the question of why an air raid, which may cause only a relatively few casualties and is over quickly, should be regarded as so much more horrible and brutal than a blockade, whose object is to starve whole nations into submission.

Monday 22nd November 1937
A number of "requests" have been made by the Japanese Consul-General, Okamoto, to the authorities in the International Settlement and French Concession at Shanghai, the gist of them being that all Chinese Government influence and anti-Japanese activities be suppressed.

Meantime the newly established Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo has, in its first public statement, warned the nation that the final victory in China is still distant. Japanese business circles are said to be perturbed by the fear that a central authority able to make peace for all China may disappear, and that Japan may find that her victory has reduced China to chaos. As this possibility looms up, it is thought that the Italian pact may be
explainable as an additional insurance against interference from Russia while Japan's energies are engrossed in China.

Tuesday 23rd November 1937

Ashida, who is in England on a short visit as a "good will envoy" of the Seiyukai, lunched with me today at the R.E.S. and we had an interesting talk on the present situation in the Far East. In reply to my query as to when Japan would be prepared to accept some form of third-party mediation to bridge the gap between her insistence on direct negotiations and China's determination to refuse, he said he and Yoshida both felt that mediation should be accepted before making any attempt to occupy Nanking, as the occupation of the Chinese Capital would make the Chinese lose face too much. But the Army, as a whole, would probably refuse any mediation until they had taken Nanking, after which they would probably welcome it. On the question of intermediaries he expressed the belief that the most acceptable to both parties would be Britain and/or the U.S. On my referring to Germany as another possibility, he remarked ruefully:- "To be quite frank, we are disappointed with Germany, as we have been forced to the conclusion that, in spite of our pact with her, our only friends in Germany are Hitler and Goring. The Army, the industrialists, and the educationalists are frankly pro-Chinese, and so is the nation as a whole. Although this was not entirely news to me, I was surprised to hear Ashida stating the facts so frankly and categorically.

His next remark was even more surprising, for he went on to say that it was believed in some quarters that France was getting a bit tired of her link with the Soviet and that, sooner or later, she might decide to break with the U.S.S.R. In that case, he said, Moscow might very well turn to Berlin for a friend. Personally I cannot see much likelihood of Germany and Russia combining as things are at present, though it is known that the German General Staff and the Soviet Army have been carrying on a mild flirtation for some time past, and there is good reason to believe that Tukhachevsky's downfall was brought about by information given to Moscow by certain members of the Nazi Party, who strongly disapproved of the friendly relations growing up between the two armies. This may sound somewhat fantastic, but is borne out by certain inside information.

In discussing the question of the present widespread anti-British sentiment in Japan, Ashida asserted that it was largely superficial and would soon evaporate, once the present mess in China has been cleared up. Amongst responsible businessmen and bankers, he said, there was a genuine feeling of regret and of apprehension over the present mutual antipathy, as they regarded close and friendly relations between the two countries as of the greatest importance to the economic and financial welfare of Japan.

Another interesting point brought out by him was that both Konoe and Hirota were in favour of Japan accepting the invitation to [the] Brussels [Conference], but they had been over-ruled by the military.

Thursday 25th November 1937

"The Times" gives an interesting account of an interview given by General Ugaki to foreign correspondents in Tokyo. In expressing his belief that Japan and China may end by becoming
close friends, he is saying much the same as I said in my recent talk at University College, when I remarked that it should for no great surprise if, in a few years time, Japan and China are on the best of terms and we or some other country are the main object of Chinese abuse.

Friday 26th November 1937
An interesting article in "The Times" on the Sino-Japanese conflict as seen from Hong Kong. One point emphasised is the Chinese tendency to depend upon appeals to foreign sympathy and their concentration on propaganda as a substitute for the organisation of national resistance. Another point brought out is the circulation of "deplorable exaggerations" by Chinese news agencies. In short, the old, old game!

Saturday 27th November 1937
To lunch at Grosvenor House with Ashida, the rest of the party consisting of Yoshida, Kano, Tomii, Yanada, C.V. Sale and Davies. The last-named has been brought home and seconded for two years for service in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, which has very belatedly come to the conclusion that someone with a proper firsthand knowledge of Japan and the Japanese is badly required there. Better late than never, but they ought to have recognised that very elementary fact and acted on it long before this.

One of the U.S. correspondents in Tokyo has been trying unsuccessfully to obtain from the Foreign Office Spokesman and explanation of the anti-British sentiments which have recently inspired so many embittered articles. Though the Spokesman would not say, he suggested they might easily be guessed. Byas says in his cable to "The Times":
"But though the reasons for the campaign against Great Britain cannot be officially stated, they are easily inferred. Hong Kong, the great point of trans-shipment for China, is a British port, and if the agitation here should cause the British Government to deny use of that port to such cargoes China's powers of continuous resistance would be greatly reduced, if not extinguished. France has already closed the Indo-Chinese frontier, and the route from Russia through Sinkiang, almost 3,000 miles from railhead to railhead, is not really practicable for supplies other than aircraft. The Japanese perfectly realise that the action they desire would be a violation of British neutrality, but when that point is made they reply that any country at war would feel as they do".

Monday 29th November 1937
Had Davies to lunch at the R.E.S. Was much interested to hear his views on the Keelung incident, in connection with which he was sent to Formosa with Rawlings to negotiate a settlement. He thinks there is little doubt that the British bluejackets were responsible for starting the trouble and that they did, in fact, refuse to pay the taxi man; but the Japanese police, instead of handling the case as a minor affair of "drunken brawl", acted in their usual high-handed way and [the British Government] made matters worse by giving unnecessary publicity to it and by tactless handling. Davies himself was placed in the embarrassing position of having to up-hold belief in the bluejackets' innocence, though he was in reality convinced of their guilt. He spoke very highly of Kobayashi, who, in private, was very frank in his criticism of the Japanese police methods in Formosa and admitted that, in a way, he was
glad the incident occurred, as it gave him a chance to set about police reforms, which he considered were badly needed.

Much interested in a despatch from Craigie talking of his very cordial reception by, and talk with, the Emperor and Dowager Empress. Both were patently genuine in their friendly sentiments towards Great Britain and the British Royal Family and immensely grateful for the treatment accorded to the Emperor himself during his visit in 1921 as Crown Prince and to the Chichibus during their recent visit. Craigie seems to have been particularly impressed by the intelligent grip of foreign affairs displayed by the Dowager Empress and by her courage in sticking to her friendship for England at a time when anti-British sentiment is so bitter in Japan. His comments bear out Araki's remarks, made to me in strict confidence 3 or 4 years ago, about the Empress Dowager's intense desire to restore closer relations with Great Britain and between the two ruling houses.

Tuesday 30th November 1937

Italy yesterday accorded formal recognition to Manchukuo - the first of the great Powers, other than Japan, to do so.

I learn confidentially that 2 of our 3 battalions in Shanghai are to be withdrawn shortly - ostensibly because they are no longer needed there, but actually for fear of their being "bottled up" in the event of "further deterioration" in our relations with Japan. My predictions and warnings of 3 years ago are proving all too well-founded.

Wednesday 1st December 1937

Japan has now recognised Franco.

Thursday 2nd December 1937

The situation around Hong Kong is becoming unpleasantly delicate and dangerous, and in the event of trouble - which God forbid - our position will have been made even more precarious than before by the Japanese occupation of Chikkai and other islands in the vicinity. If Hong Kong should be attacked, our chances of holding it would seem pretty slender.

Friday 3rd December 1937

Franco and Manchukuo yesterday accorded each other recognition.

Friday 10th December 1937

Far East news continues somewhat disturbing, including another Japanese attack on a British gunboat at Wuhu and other "regrettable incidents" during the past few days. Meantime pressure on Nanking is increasing and an ultimatum to surrender or take the consequences was dropped on the city for the commander of the garrison, Tang Sheng-chi, yesterday from an aeroplane. The policy to be followed after the fall of Nanking is said to be causing a clash of views in the Japanese Cabinet. Sugiyama is said to contend that the fall of the city is not the ultimate goal, and that the destruction of the Chinese Army, which is regarded as the fountain-head of anti-Japanism, and the submission of the Chinese Government are Japan's objectives. Others, however, hold that the fall of the Capital and the flight of the Government would be sufficient and that Japan could then await the appearance of a Chinese Government prepared to sign a peace treaty.
Saturday 11th December 1937
The Army's view that the war must go on even after the fall of Nanking has been accepted by the Japanese Cabinet.

Tuesday 14th December 1937
Nanking reported occupied last night. Tense situation brought about by the sinking of the U.S. gunboat "Panay" and three U.S. merchantmen in the Yangtze about 28 miles above Nanking. This was preceded the same day (Sunday) by attacks on the British gunboats "Bee", "Ladybird", "Scarab" and "Cricket", the first two by Japanese artillery fire at Wuhu and the other two by Japanese aircraft at Nanking. A thoroughly bad show.

Thursday 16th December 1937
Feeling in the U.S. is becoming increasingly aroused over the sinking of the "Panay", as the attack appears to have been deliberate and, if reports are true, had certain very unpleasant features about it. Roosevelt has created something of a stir by demanding, in effect, that his feelings on the subject be made clear to the Emperor himself and that guarantees for the future must come from the Emperor.

Friday 17th December 1937
Rear Admiral Mitsumani, head of the Japanese naval air forces in China, has been recalled to Tokyo in connection with the bombing of the "Panay", for which he is held responsible.

Saturday 18th December 1937
"The Times" publishes graphic reports of eyewitnesses of the "Panay" affair and of the capture of Nanking. If true, the Japanese will have a lot to live down, but personally I am inclined to think that some, at least, of the accounts are grossly exaggerated.

Monday 20th December 1937
Saito, in Washington, has resorted to the unusual course of a nation-wide wireless "hookup" to broadcast to the U.S. an apology for the "shocking blunder" of the "Panay" affair. Another bunch of former high Soviet officials has been executed in the course of the "Purge" among the latest victims being Karakhan, who apparently has been executed without even a trial. And this is the country which has just been holding "free" elections and which our Labour crowd hold up as a model of liberty and democracy!

Wednesday 22nd December 1937
Some of the points made in yesterday's debate in the House [of Commons] on foreign affairs were quite interesting. Chamberlain got in a good retort to the Labour crowd who, as usual, showed the value of ignorance and were all for strong measures against Japan and others. "Britain", he replied, "could not be the policeman of the whole world"; and on Atlee asserting "Yes, with others!", Chamberlain promptly challenged him with, "Tell us how to get the others!" This, of course, floored the Labour crowd completely.

Sunday 26th December 1937
The U.S. have accepted Japan's apologies for the sinking of the "Panay", but have issued a stern warning against the repetition of any such incident.

Tuesday 28th December 1937
Following the wholesale destruction of Japanese cotton mills etc. in Tsingtao, the Japanese are now advancing into Shantung and have captured Tsinan. They have also taken Hungchow, the Capital of Chekiang.

Wednesday 29th December 1937

The Japanese reply to the British Note about the attacks on "Ladybird" etc. was handed to [British Ambassador] last night. In addition to repeating their apologies and promises of indemnification, disciplinary action against those responsible, etc., the Japanese Government explains the incidents as due primarily to the confusion prevailing on the 11th and 12th and to the fact that the Japanese were aiming to cut off the Chinese who were fleeing upriver. As foreign representatives had been requested on the 9th to withdraw their nationals from the fighting zone, the Japanese, it is explained, thought that no foreign vessels remained in the danger zone and that therefore any vessels seen must be Chinese.

From Washington comes the news that Roosevelt has announced that a recommendation may be made to Congress for an increase in naval strength. The tone and manner of the President and his reference to the international situation gives to what otherwise was an informal announcement an air of much significance, though no particular nation or situation is mentioned.

Thursday 30th December 1937

Dodds has protested in Tokyo against a statement issued on Tuesday evening by the Service departments without warning, the statement giving a version of the attacks on the "Ladybird" etc. which is contrary to the facts verified by [the British Government] in that references are made to poor visibility, fog, and a "smoke-screen".

Monday 3rd January 1938

Although Chiang Kai-shek has rejected Japanese peace terms, it is apparently not a flat rejection, as the German Ambassador [acting as intermediary] is continuing his talks with the Chinese.

Wednesday 5th January 1938

Much interested in a despatch from [British Ambassador] on the attitude of the Throne towards developments in China. From this it is clear that the Emperor himself is much upset by the "Ladybird" and "Panay" incidents and by the high-handed actions of the fighting forces towards foreign rights and interests in China. Seems he has administered some personal reproofs, to the great embarrassment of the naval and military chiefs.

From all accounts, it is not only between the fighting services and the civilian officials that there is friction, but also (in the Army) between the higher commanders and some of their subordinates. This, of course, is presumably due mainly to the "Younger Officer" movement and the spread of Pan-Asianism, but it is significant, if true, that even Matsui himself, who has always been noted for his reactionary views, is said to have admitted that he is unable to control men like Colonel Hashimoto and is trying to get him ousted by indirect means.

I learn that Donald, Chiang's adviser, has expressed his belief that the Soviet want the Sino-Japanese conflict prolonged as long as possible, as the longer it continues, the more will each
be weakened, thereby increasing Moscow's chances of exploiting the resultant dissatisfaction in both countries. There is little doubt he is right; but, coming as it does from a man in his position, it is particularly interesting.

The Soviets are, of course, playing a thoroughly dirty game. Incidentally, it looks very much as though the Japanese peace terms had been exposed by the Soviet with "malice afore thought", knowing that premature exposure would make negotiations for a peaceful settlement all the harder.

With a view to embroiling Britain and Japan, the Chinese are apparently giving false information to the Japanese about the transit of munitions through Hong Kong. What with China, Italy, and the Soviet all striving to widen the gap between England and Japan, it is little wonder that the feeling in Japan against England is becoming so inflamed.

Saturday 8th January 1938

[Went] to farewell "tsuki-yaki" party at Nihonjinkai [Japanese Society] given by Fukuoka, who leaves for Japan on Tuesday. Very sorry to lose him, as he is one of the best.

Hasegawa, who has come to England to relieve him, was at the party. Fukuoka tells me that Golkovitch, Rink [both former officials of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo] and Nagi [TASS correspondent in Tokyo] have all come under the Soviet "purge". I knew the two latter had been recalled to Moscow and had half-wondered if they were "for it". Apparently they were, poor beggars. What a country!

Tuesday 11th January 1938

Tsingtao occupied by the Japanese yesterday without opposition. Craigie has again asked the Foreign Office to try and get "The Times" to moderate their remarks, this time in connection with a "leader" on 16th December, in which it is declared, "Save for a small civilised class no Japanese can be trusted to carry firearms even in the Emperor's service, because he is too ignorant and irresponsible not to run amok without provocation". This remark has caused intense resentment in Japan and, as Craigie says, abuse of this kind causes the maximum resentment without achieving any good whatever.

Wednesday 12th January 1938

According to reports reaching the Foreign Office, the Soviet are delighted at the Yangtze incidents, and Soviet diplomats and others have been instructed to exploit Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-U.S. differences and to do all in their power to widen the gaps.

For the fourth time in the history of modern Japan, an Imperial Conference was held in Tokyo. Although the Cabinet had decided on "strong policies" on Monday and the Imperial Conference was by way of giving its approval and ratifying measures for the continuance of the war in China, nothing has been disclosed as to its decisions. This is interpreted in some quarters as indicating that the Chinese are still considering the Japanese peace terms, despite their apparent rejection, and that the Japanese Government is therefore withholding the tentative decisions reached at the Imperial Conference for the time being. It seems generally believed that the Imperial Conference considered the alternative courses of
declaring war and imposing a stringent blockade, and of withdrawing recognition from the
Chinese Government and supporting a rival regime. Indications are that it decided, at least
tentatively, on the latter course, as war would entail heavy loss from the U.S. bringing the
Neutrality Act into operation and a stringent blockade would increase the friction with England
on account of the Hong Kong problem.
Thursday 13th January 1938
See that Dr. Sun Fo, before leaving Singapore on his way to England, declared that China
must depend “to a large extent” on Britain's willingness to help her by allowing munitions to
pass through Hong Kong. A thoroughly mischievous remark and obviously aimed at widening
the breach between England and Japan.
Friday 14th January 1938
See that three U.S. cruisers are to attend the formal completion ceremonies of the Singapore
Base next month. If this is to be a true earnest of Anglo-U.S. co-operation in the event of a
clash à la Agadir, well and good; but otherwise I am inclined to doubt the wisdom of it, as it
will only serve to convince the Japanese more than ever that their suspicions concerning the
Base ever since 1922 have been well founded and tension will thereby be increased rather
than diminished.
Monday 17th January 1938
In a statement issued yesterday, the Japanese Government undertake responsibility for the
building up of a rejuvenated China in co-operation with a new Chinese Administration;
withdraw recognition from the Chinese Central Government. The deliberation with which the
decisions now announced were reached shows that the Japanese Government face with
reluctance the task of building up a subservient Chinese administration and eliminating
resistance and establishing order while the new regime gradually acquires vitality. The
Japanese have certainly set themselves a big task and one can well appreciate the gloomy
forebodings voiced in Germany, where the fear is expressed that, far from suppressing
Communism, the present operations in China are liable to goad that country into a
Communist revolution and Japan herself may have to face internal outbreaks in addition to
being weakened militarily vis-à-vis the Soviet.
Tuesday 18th January 1938
To dinner at the Japanese Embassy with the Yoshidas, where I met a number of old friends,
including the Kurusus (now Ambassador in Brussels), K.K. Kawakami, Kase, Hachiya, the
Hills, young Astor, Ronald and Peter Fleming, accompanied by his wife, whom I had not met
before. Kawakami is over here on a short visit and Kase has just been sent to London as 3rd
Secretary. Hachiya leaves for Japan this week.
Had a long talk with Mme. Yoshida, who seems terribly distressed at the present trend of
Anglo-Japanese relations. It had been her husband's great ambition in life, she said, to bring
about a return to the old friendly relations between the two countries and he had had great
hopes of the negotiations which he had initiated; but the outbreak of the China trouble in July
had dashed his hopes to the ground and for some time he had been unable either to eat or
sleep properly, as he was so upset by what was happening. "It is like some terrible nightmare to us both", she said.

Thursday 20th January 1938
Lunched with Kawakami at the Piccadilly Grill. Seems a bit worried as to how the present trouble in China will end; for, as he says, if the Chinese continue to resist and to refuse to negotiate, Japan will be forced to carry on there, as withdrawal would be regarded by the Chinese as a victory for China and the position would then become worse than ever. "The Times" has a very good 2-column article by Byas on Japan's aims and the means by which she hopes to attain her goal - the establishment of a great East Asiatic Empire in which China, Manchukuo, and Mongolia will be partners with herself, but subservient to her. Had a visit from Admiral Troup, the Director of Naval Intelligence - a fine-looking type of man with a good Scot's accent. He is much concerned as to whether the four naval Language Officers at present in Japan should be withdrawn now in case of a clash with Japan, in which event they would be interned and their services as interpreters would be lost. Personally I consider the risk of losing them should be taken, as withdrawal now would raise suspicions and, except for one of them whose time is nearly up in any case, their ability as interpreters is too limited. He agreed, and only the one is to be withdrawn.

Wednesday 26th January 1938
Craigie reports an interesting talk with Hirota, who remarked to him that, with Chiang eliminated by Japan's withdrawal of recognition, it will now be possible to offer easier terms to China.

Saturday 29th January 1938
As anticipated, Roosevelt has asked Congress for a 20% increase in naval armaments to meet the international situation.

Tuesday 1st February 1938
The U.S. have accepted Japan's apology for the Allison incident - the slapping of an American diplomat's face by a Japanese sentry at Nanking - but relations remain a bit strained, as the U.S. are getting a bit tired of these incidents, followed by apologies and promises that steps will be taken to prevent their recurrence. Poor Hirota must be in a very difficult and embarrassing position, as he himself seems genuinely anxious to maintain friendly relations with both Britain and America and is fully alive to the harm done by these constant "incidents"; but he is powerless to prevent them.

Wednesday 2nd February 1938
Had hoped to have Kawakami and Hasegawa to lunch at the R.E.S. to meet Davies, but Kawakami has gone down with a cold and Hasegawa had to call off at the last moment owing to sudden urgent business in connection with the refusal of the London dockers to load the "Haruna Maru". Seems that the dockers, in refusing to do so, acted against the orders of their own union officials, as they had been "got at" by Communist agitators, who induced them to go on strike as a protest against Japan.
Davies tells me that the Japanese are much upset about the attendance of U.S. warships at the Singapore Base ceremony and want to know why Japanese warships have not been invited as well.

**Friday 4th February 1938**

Glad to see Hirota, in addition to reaffirming Japan's desire to retain Britain's friendship, has been defending the British Government against criticism. Replying to a questioner in the Diet who asked him whether Japan, in framing her policy, should not regard Britain as her enemy, he declared that, in spite of the criticism levelled against the British attitude, he himself did not agree that, "so far as the British Government are concerned", they have "wilfully acted against Japanese interests".

**Saturday 5th February 1938**

Papers very full of the great shuffle announced in Germany. In that Ribbentrop is to be Minister of Foreign Affairs and Hitler and the Nazi party in general are to have even greater power than before, it seems likely that the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis will be strengthened. Britain and the U.S. have addressed notes to Japan urging her to say definitely whether or no she is building capital ships of over 35,000 tons. Unless she is able to give a satisfactory reply by the 20th, it is to be assumed that she is doing so and Britain, U.S. and France will be compelled to do likewise.

**Tuesday 8th February 1938**

See that Matsui has issued a stern warning to the troops under his command, with a view to putting an end to the excesses that have been committed in Nanking and elsewhere. It is to be hoped that his orders will prove effective, as some of the Japanese soldiery seem to have got badly out of hand.

**Wednesday 9th February 1938**

Much interested in a telegraphic despatch to the Foreign Office from MacKillop, at Hankow. MacKillop does not mince matters, but goes baldheaded for the Chinese Central Government, which he roundly condemns for its incapacity, irresponsibility, disunion and ill-founded optimism, this optimism being based on the belief that, if Britain and others fail to come to China's help voluntarily, China will get them embroiled in the conflict and thereby save herself from defeat.

Lovat-Fraser, our Military Attaché, is equally blunt and outspoken and distributes blame impartially on the Chinese themselves for their refusal to face facts, on the Soviet for pushing the Chinese into the present conflict by promises of help which have not been implemented, on Falkenhausen and his German mission for misleading the Chinese into believing they could more than hold their own against the Japanese, on the French for their Indo-China policy vis-à-vis the Chinese, and on Donald and Malley for playing up to the over-weening conceit and unfounded optimism of Madame Chiang and the intriguing politicians and others in her camp.

It will be interesting to see what effect these blunt revelations of Chinese incapacity and intrigue will have on our own Foreign Office.
Saturday 12th February 1938
Japan has replied to the British, U.S. and French notes on naval construction and declines to reveal whether or not she is building capital ships of over 35,000, though the reply is worded in such a way as to convey the impression that she is not doing so. It is a pity that Japan has taken this line, as it plays into the hands of the anti-Japan crowd in this country and, incidentally, will presumably compel us to build, at immense expense, ships which we do not want. At the same time, as Craigie points out in one of his telegrams, the notes to Japan were unnecessarily sharp and brusque in tone and therefore calculated to ruffle her feelings. This is, of course, what both Roscoe and I remarked at the time. The notes were, in fact, unnecessarily peremptory and hectoring, and showed an extraordinary lack of appreciation of Japanese psychology, for they were bound to flick Japan on the raw and conjure up bitter recollections of the Triple Intervention. Moreover, by setting a time limit, without explaining that this was necessary for budgetary purposes, gave the notes the appearance of an ultimatum. Why, oh why, do we so often do things in this foolish way?

Monday 14th February 1938
Opening ceremony of the Singapore Base took place today.

Tuesday 15th February 1938
Had the Hunts in to dine in the evening. Hunt tells me that Chapman was recently placed in a very embarrassing position when he went to the "movies" with Matsutani. Amongst the news films were pictures of Japanese troops in China. When these were shown, part of the audience started hissing and booing, and a picture of the Emperor on the charger was greeted in the same way. Rotten bad form; but, with feelings roused as they are at present, it would be best not to show pictures of this kind.

Also hear from Hunt that the British officer who got beaten up in Hong Kong recently, when showing a couple of Japanese officers round the place, was Charles Boxer!

Wednesday 16th February 1938
Interested to see in "The Times" today a telegram from Tokyo in which Byas expresses his belief that Japan might have revealed her naval plans if the request made by Britain etc. had been less formal and less public. Made, however, in the way it was, the Navy would have "lost face" if they had acceded to it. What a bunch of fatheads we are, not to appreciate this elementary fact. Even if a more tactful and conciliatory approach had failed to elicit the information required, it would have saved us from making it appear - as it does to the Japanese - that we were merely trying to shift responsibility for the armaments' race onto Japan's shoulders.

I am being constantly asked why it is that Italy appears so indifferent to Germany's coup in Austria, following Hitler's talk with Schussnigg on Sunday. We, in our department of the Foreign Office, have good reason to know, but it seems curious that no one seems to have noticed "Scrutator's" recent remarks about the understanding concerning Austria and the Mediterranean reached between Hitler and Mussolini in their talks last year.

Thursday 17th February 1938
Amazed to find Eden instructing our new Ambassador in China to bring pressure to bear on the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank representative to induce him to withdraw his opposition to the loan for which the Chinese are asking. Eden's contention is that it is to Britain's advantage to help the Chinese to continue their resistance to Japan, i.e. to prolong hostilities, as our commercial interests in China are likely to suffer more at the hands of a victorious Japan than a victorious China. Quite apart from ethical considerations, this stand of his would seem to indicate that he has deliberately turned a deaf ear to the advice and warnings tendered by MacKillop and Lovat-Fraser. He is simply incorrigible!

Friday 18th February 1938
Matsui is being succeeded by Hata as Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the Shanghai area, the idea apparently being to remove one whose utterances and actions have given such offence to the foreign Powers. This would seem to indicate, therefore, that more moderate councils are beginning to prevail as a result of Homma's recent visit.

Monday 21st February 1938
Eden has resigned. Personally I am not sorry; my only regret is that he did not do so long ago, as the Far Eastern question might then have been handled with greater tact and statesmanship. At the same time, it is a pity this split has occurred just at this moment when the situation in Europe is so critical and when national unity in this country is therefore all the more necessary.

Seems that the split is due to Eden's insistence that Italy must mend her ways before we can consider opening negotiations with her for a peaceful settlement, whereas Chamberlain holds the view that, as Italy has expressed her readiness to negotiate, we should do our best to seek a settlement. While I have no great faith in Italy, one cannot but feel that Chamberlain is right.

Hitler's speech [on the previous day], though not calculated to improve the general situation, does not seem likely to make it any worse. Japan is well pleased with it, as not only did he announce Germany's decision to recognise Manchukuo; he also declared, à propos of her demand for the return of her former colonies, that she had no desire to return to the Far East and the Pacific, so there will be no question of Japan being asked to give up her mandate islands.

Wednesday 23rd February 1938
Following Matsui's supercession by Hata (Shunroku), both Prince Asaka and General Yanagawa have been recalled to Japan, presumably as a result of the criticisms levelled against the behaviour of some of the troops under their command at Nanking and elsewhere.

According to the evening papers, the Chinese have carried out an air raid on Taihoku, the first instance of the Chinese carrying the war into their enemy's country. Much as I want the Japanese to win, I should like to see a few more raids like this, as it is not good for the Japanese to have everything their own way and it is just as well to let them have an occasional taste of their own medicine.

Thursday 24th February 1938
A good cable in "The Times" today on the recall of Matsui etc. The excesses committed by the troops under their command are put down to the fact that a large number of those troops are reservists, who were called up hurriedly on the outbreak of the Shanghai trouble and were sent off at once to the front without any preliminary training and without even knowing their own officers. Many of the officers, too, were reservists and some of them, like Colonel Hashimoto, President of the Nazi-like League of Youth, had, in civil life, become imbued with extreme nationalist ideologies.

Wednesday 2nd March 1938
Very good "leader" in "The Times" on the latest Soviet mass trial, which includes such outstanding figures as Bukharin, Yagoda, Rykov, and Rakovsky.

Friday 11th March 1938
Sensation follows sensation and the state of Europe gets steadily worse. On the very day that the Soviet trial ends, Hitler has carried out a fresh coup which appears to end once and for all the independence of Austria and to render nugatory our attempts to bring about an improvement of our relations with Germany. By way of preventing the Austrian plebiscite which was to have been held on Sunday, Germany, with the threat of force, has compelled Schussnigg to resign and has started pouring troops into Austria on the pretext of helping to prevent serious disorders there. Poor Schussnigg, realising that resistance is useless, has ordered that no military resistance be attempted. This, in a way, is a blessing, as presumably it absolves us from having to take active steps to support our guarantee of Austrian independence; but the situation is serious enough even so.

Monday 14th March 1938
Attended first lecture in A.R.P. course on gas protection etc. - a precautionary measure which, as the lecturer pointed out, is made all the more necessary by the events over the week-end.

Tuesday 15th March 1938
To lecture at the Livingstone Hall by Sekiya in afternoon, with Bishop Cecil in the Chair. A truly pathetic exhibition of Japanese propaganda at its worst, as Sekiya's command of English is far too limited and his ignorance of politics is abysmal.

Friday 18th March 1938
Last night's headlines concerned the slaughter of 500 civilians in an air raid on Barcelona. This evening's are devoted to Poland's ultimatum to Lithuania and the massing of 50,000 Polish troops on the Lithuanian frontier. Ye gods, what a mess the World is in and what a wonderful time for the so-called popular Press with its craving for glaring headlines. Japan and China; civil war in Spain; Germany's seizure of Austria; the Soviet "purge"; and now Poland and Lithuania. Thank God, we have a man like Chamberlain at the head in this country a man who refuses to be rattled despite the hysterical screams and denunciations of Messrs. Atlee & Co.

Monday 21st March 1938
To second of series of lectures on A.R.P. [Air Raid Precautions].
Tuesday 22nd March 1938
To lunch with Hasegawa at the Inner Temple, in the hall where those who are practising for the Bar take their dinners. A fine old building with stained-glass windows and panelled walls. After lunch, Hasegawa, who is a Christian, took me into the Chapel, one of the few existing round churches in England - interesting rather than beautiful.
Poor Hasegawa, like many other of his countrymen, seems rather worried about the course of events in China and admitted that he was at a loss to understand exactly what the Japanese Army was aiming at and how far they were prepared to go. Had operations been confined to Northern China, he said, he could have understood it, but he was clearly worried as to the extension of the operations in the Yangtze Valley, though he remarked somewhat wistfully that no doubt he would understand better shortly, as he is being transferred to Shanghai next month.

Friday 1st April 1938
The U.S. yesterday invoked the Escalator Clause and apparently plans to build 45,000-tonners, though we ourselves are by no means anxious to have such large ships.

Friday 8th April 1938
Reports of fighting at and around Taierchwang appear to indicate that the Japanese have been receiving some pretty rough handling of late from the Chinese and that they are in a pretty serious plight. Looks as though they had committed the error of under- rating their enemy. For the time being, their attempt to take Suchow appears to have failed lamentably. While no doubt a defeat of this kind is salutary to some extent, I cannot agree with those who hail the Chinese victory as good news and I am much interested in a telegraphic despatch from Craigie to the Foreign Office, as it bears out my own views on the subject and is just what I myself have been saying. Briefly his contention is that the longer the Sino-Japanese hostilities last, the more severe are the final terms of the peace settlement likely to be and the greater will be the damage to British interests as a result of Japan's attempt to recoup herself for her losses. The one bright spot is, as Craigie points out, that the young officer elements are beginning to realise that financial assistance from Britain and others will be required for the development of the occupied areas and they cannot expect such assistance unless they are prepared to respect British rights and interests.
Meantime Britain is receiving the main blame for the introduction of the Escalator clause and for thereby forcing on the race in naval armaments, though the Japanese conveniently overlook the fact that they themselves, by their reticence, are primarily responsible for the latest developments in this respect.

Saturday 9th April 1938
Took Mungo and Jean[son and elder daughter] in afternoon to see "Captains Courageous" - a very good film and pleasantly devoid of "sex appeal".

Monday 11th April 1938
Had Hasegawa of the Japanese Embassy to lunch at the R.E.S. Tells me that the Embassy have received no official news about the alleged Chinese victories - a fact that seems to indicate that the reports are more or less correct.

Wednesday 13th April 1938

According to official reports reaching the Foreign Office, the Soviet have recently supplied about 160 planes to the Chinese and about 80% of the personnel is Soviet.

Meantime, friction between Japan and the U.S.S.R. appears to be on the increase once more and a number of statements have been made against the Soviet by Japan, one of these being to the effect that concrete evidence of active Soviet assistance to China has now been obtained.

Thursday 14th April 1938

Completed my anti-gas course by being put through the gas chamber both with and without a gas mask.

Thursday 21st April 1938

The Japanese are trying to make good their recent reverses by carrying out a vigorous attack on Linyi and are making a fresh attempt on Suchow.

Tuesday 26th April 1938

Another step towards peace taken, the Anglo-Irish Agreement being signed yesterday - at least, one hopes it will prove a step in the right direction and that the handing over of the three naval ports to Eire will never need to be regretted. It is, of course, a risk, but it is a risk which, under present circumstances, seems worth taking, as it will remove one of the causes of resentment among the Irish. What with the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian and Anglo-Irish agreements and the Anglo- French and Italo-French talks, the general situation in this part of the World shows a great improvement on a month ago and tension caused by the series of crises last month has been eased very considerably.

The one real danger point at the moment seems to be Czechoslovakia and the question of the Sudeten Germans, and the fact that the Soviet have now embarked on a new "purge" in the form of anti-religious activities provides a further indication of unrest in that country.

Meantime the Japanese appear to be intent on avenging their recent reverses in South Shantung and are continuing to make progress in their fresh advance on the Lunghai railway. We, for our part, are to have our Income Tax raised to 5 shillings and six pence in the pound in order to help out with the huge rearmament programme necessitated by world conditions. An unpleasant prospect, but unavoidable under the circumstances.

Wednesday 27th April 1938

"The Times" publishes a 2-column article by Byas on Japan's Naval Ambitions, in which, inter alia, it is emphasised very rightly that the spirit of aggression is kept alive in Japan by the belief that she is debarring from sending her emigrants abroad, from acquiring colonies, and even from selling cheap products freely to coloured people who cannot afford to buy anything else.

Tuesday 3rd May 1938
Two-column article in "Times" showing Soviet technique in the matter of aiming at world revolution. A "leader" accompanying it emphasises the fact that eventual world revolution is still the Soviet aim. This should, of course, have been clear all along, but it is surprising how many seemingly intelligent people seem to imagine that the U.S.S.R. have undergone a change of heart and given up the old objective.

Friday 6th May 1938
Read a very interesting article in the April number of the "Army Quarterly" by a man named Leurquin - apparently French - who describes his experiences with the Japanese Army in the operations in Northern China. His comments on Japanese military psychology are particularly interesting and bear out one's own observations on the subject. One very striking point is his contention that, on active service, the Japanese soldier ceases to be a soldier in the ordinary sense of the word and becomes a warrior instead, with all the strength and weakness of the warrior as compared to the trained soldier.

Sunday 8th May 1938
Set off about 11 a.m. with Maggie and Aline [wife and younger daughter] in the car for Stanford-in-the-Vale, some 32 miles the other side of Reading, for lunch and tea with the Jameses.
James tells me the War Office tried to get him to go out to Shanghai to take on the job of liaison with the Japanese, but he had just sent in his papers and declined to take them back. This, of course, is the job to which Hunt is now being sent.
He told me one or two interesting yarns about the Shanghai show in 1927 when he was there as C.R.E. One concerned Tyrwhitt and Duncan. The former was, of course, a bit of a fire-eater and was all for taking strong measures against the Chinese. Duncan, on the other hand, was rather too much the reverse and was somewhat lacking in initiative. In a sense he was right, as the Government's orders were for moderation and for dealing as gently as possible with the Chinese. Tyrwhitt, however, urged Duncan to have a smack at Hankow and take forceful measures there after the seizure of the British Concession by the Chinese and the unfortunate Duncan had a very rough time with him when he (Duncan) refused to fall in with his suggestion of forcing the Government's hand by attacking the city - an action which would have been in direct contravention of [the British Government's] orders.

Tuesday 10th May 1938
According to a Foreign Office telegram, the German military mission in China has recently been reinforced and now consists of between 80 and 100 members. The good defence put up by the Chinese is largely due to this mission, as the operations are being directed almost entirely by German officers.

Thursday 12th May 1938
To cocktail party in evening at the Carlton given by Tatsumi as a farewell and in order to introduce Suganami, his successor.

Friday 13th May 1938
As a result of yesterday's Council meeting at Geneva, League members are now free to recognise [Italian-controlled] Abyssinia. Taking the broad view, the decision was undoubtedly right, but the meeting must have been a bit embarrassing for all, as the Emperor of Abyssinia himself was present and, not unnaturally, spoke with some bitterness. A pity the League did not act in the same way long ago about the recognition of Manchukuo - in fact, the Japanese must be more convinced than ever of western hypocrisy, as, compared with Italy's seizure of Abyssinia, the establishment of Manchukuo was a very mild affair. The former was 100% premeditated aggression; the latter was only partly so. Yet the annexation of Abyssinia has been recognised within two years, while Manchukuo, which is not even a case of actual annexation, still remains unrecognised after the passage of more than six years. Apparently in order to divert Japanese public attention from recent reverses in Northern China, Amoy has been attacked and seized by the Japanese who succeeded in occupying it on the evening of the 11th by means of a feint. Craigie, very rightly, is strongly opposed to the proposed issue of a loan to China and emphasises the danger of a fresh anti-British outburst and a permanent grudge against Great Britain if a loan is granted; but [the British Government] seem more inclined to agree with Clark Kerr that the loan should be granted. Foreign Office mentality defeats me entirely and I fear me that, as Craigie says, we shall rue it in the end if we fall in with China's wishes in this matter.

Sunday 15th May 1938
Looks as though the Japanese are really going to get through to Soochow at last, as they are reported to have cut the Lunghai Railway both east and west of that city.

Tuesday 17th May 1938
According to the evening papers, Soochow has at last fallen, the Japanese entering it this morning.

Wednesday 18th May 1938
To farewell luncheon at the Savoy given by Tatsumi, who leaves for Japan tomorrow. See that Halifax has telegraphed to Craigie, that although he shares his distaste for the present policy of constant protest to Japan, he considers it unavoidable for the time being.

Thursday 19th May 1938
According to a report received at the Foreign Office, the Soviet "purge" has, up to date, resulted in the "liquidation" of 60% of the full generals, 70% of the lieutenant generals, and 25% of other officers in the Soviet Army. Pretty grim if true! Tuesday's report of the capture of Soochow appears to have been a bit premature, as it is now reported to have been occupied at noon today.

Friday 20th May 1938
A report in "The Times" today, referring to the Italian outburst against France for allowing arms and munitions to pour into Spain, remarks caustically that some of the people of the totalitarian states might be surprised if they learned the origin of some of these supplies. On my asking Harris about this, he laughed and said the reference was to Germany, as Germany
is carrying on a lucrative trade in munitions with Republican Spain on the quiet. Seems extraordinary, but Harris explained it by saying that, unlike the Italians, the Germans are quite content to see the prolongation of the struggle in Spain, as not only are they making good money by the sale of munitions to both sides, but they are able to get their aviators trained under war conditions at a minimum risk and to try out new arms etc. experimentally. German aviators are sent out generally for about 3 months at a time and are then replaced by a fresh batch. In this way hundreds of airmen obtain firsthand experience of flying under war conditions. Apart from these airmen and a certain number of technicians, the Germans, unlike the Italians, have very few troops in Spain. Germany's position vis-à-vis her two allies is really extraordinary. In Spain she is nominally assisting Italy, but surreptitiously is helping the other side as well, while in China she has a military mission which is directing Chinese operations against Japan, her other ally! Both Japan and Italy, however, are so anxious to retain German friendship that neither of them dares to protest openly.

**Sunday 22nd May 1938**

Last night's wireless reported serious tension in Europe over German-Czech relations and this morning's papers clearly reflect the dangerous possibilities. France has made it quite clear that if Germany tries the same game on Czechoslovakia that she tried on Austria, France will fight. If that happens, we would almost inevitably be brought in too and that would mean we should be ranged on the same side as the Soviet - a most unpleasant thought. Fortunately, however, Germany has no desire for war at the moment, so France's firm stand seems likely to deter her from taking active steps against Czechoslovakia.

**Monday 23rd May 1938**

Find there was an awful "flap" at the office yesterday in connection with the German-Czech situation, as it was very much touch-and-go for a time. Fortunately it did not affect my particular section, otherwise we would have been summoned to the office too. The main crisis, however, is now regarded as having passed over for the time being anyway, though there is still considerable tension. The chief credit for having prevented war is given to the French and ourselves - the French for showing they intended business, and ourselves for mediating with both Berlin and Prague.

Unexpectedly ran across Boyce at lunch at the R.E.S. and find he has just fetched up in England from Japan, ostensibly on leave, though actually he is coming to the Foreign Office for a time.

**Tuesday 24th May 1938**

Ran into Major on way to office, so asked him what he thinks about the orders for the German Military Mission to withdraw. He seems doubtful of Berlin's orders being obeyed, especially in the case of Falkenhausen himself who, it seems, is somewhat out of odour with the present regime in Germany. If, however, the mission is withdrawn, Major thinks it will almost certainly be replaced by a Soviet mission - which will be even less to Japan's liking!

**Wednesday 25th May 1938**
See by Foreign Office telegram that Piggott is to be sent over to Shanghai from Tokyo next week to try and smooth the way for better relations between our own and the Japanese military authorities there, as there is much friction between the two and frequent "incidents". May he succeed, though it will not be too easy, I'm afraid.

Thursday 26th May 1938
O.M. Greene rang me up in morning to say that news had just come in of a rather surprising reorganisation of the Japanese Cabinet. Ugaki has succeeded Hirota as Foreign Minister, Ikeda has been made Minister both of Finance and Commerce, and Araki has been brought in as Minister of Education. Just what it portends is not quite clear. At first sight it looks like an increase of military control, as there are now no less than three generals and two admirals in the Cabinet; but Ugaki, of course, is by way of being a moderate and therefore up against the extremist "young officer" element in the Army. While therefore the fighting services appear to have increased their hold on the Government, it may be that Ugaki has been made Foreign Minister for the purpose of putting a stop to meddling in foreign affairs by the "younger officer". If he succeeds, so much the better for everyone. It may be, too, that this is but a preparatory step to making him Premier after "testing the ground" to see how the Army's attitude towards him has changed since January 1937. The fact that Araki, formerly one of his most bitter opponents, has been brought into the Cabinet with him would seem to indicate that the two of them have agreed to bury the hatchet and let bygones be bygones. Possibly Piggott's cocktail party, to which both were invited, served to pave the way to reconciliation!

Tuesday 31st May 1938
Craigie in his comments to the Foreign Office on the Cabinet reorganisation in Japan is very reassuring and speaks highly of Ugaki, who has apparently made a very good impression on him. He emphasises the fact that both Ugaki and Araki are well disposed toward this country and that the old feud between the two seems to have been ended. He appears hopeful, that although the strengthening of the Cabinet will probably result in the China campaign being carried on with greater vigour, Ugaki will exercise greater control of the young officer element and the more extreme elements in general.

Foreign Office despatches indicate that Falkenhausen and some others of his mission intend to stay on with the Chinese and that Stennes is doing his best to persuade others to stay on as well.

Wednesday 1st June 1938
Ugaki is quoted as emphasising his desire for co-operation with Britain.
I learn confidentially that we have all but decided on 42,000- ton capital ships and the U.S. on 45,000-tonners. Both of us are to have 16" guns.

Thursday 2nd June 1938
Sun Fo, who has been on a visit to Moscow, is reported to have concluded a "nine-point agreement" with the Soviet. [On Soviet military assistance to China- covering deliveries of arms and ammunition and the training of Chinese troops].

Sunday 5th June 1938
See that Craigie has made strong representations to the Japanese Government against the continued air raids on Canton and their heavy loss of life to civilians.

Tuesday 7th June 1938
The Japanese Press, as expected, is very peeved with the British protest, and maintains that the real reason for it is that Britain is afraid of the railway being cut, as this would make it difficult for her to continue supplying China with munitions. Britain is also accused of hypocrisy, as she, it is asserted, is bombing and slaughtering civilians on the North-West Frontier and in Palestine.

While such criticisms are not wholly justified, they have a basis of truth and it is most unfortunate that we should have laid ourselves open to these charges by making useless protests.

Wednesday 8th June 1938
Interesting telegram from Piggott, who has been sent over to Shanghai on a short visit to try and smooth relations between our own and the Japanese military there. Very critical of the Japanese troops along the perimeter and describes them as slovenly, lacking in esprit de corps, discourteous, and ill-disciplined. Coming from Piggott, who is so very well-disposed towards the Japanese, such criticism is particularly telling. He adds that he proposes to speak very frankly, as a friend of Japan’s, to Homma and others on his return to Tokyo and urge them to do something to remedy matters on the grounds that it makes such a bad impression. While very critical of the troops on the perimeter, he speaks very highly of Hata and other higher commanders on the spot and seems hopeful of establishing more friendly relations between them and our people.

Friday 10th June 1938
Telegram from Craigie giving his views on the question of a loan for China. If, he says, we were prepared to float one of £100,000,000 or more, it might do some good; but, as he rightly observes, a mere £5,000,000 or so would be totally inadequate to be of any real assistance to China and would only rouse Japan’s ire against us and leave a permanent and deep-rooted feeling of resentment. Moreover, it would be a piece of the rankest folly just at this moment when Ugaki is seemingly anxious to do his best to restore more friendly relations between our two countries, as it would embarrass him and probably put an end to his attempting such a policy.

Tuesday 14th June 1938
To Chatham House to attend the Far Eastern Division discussion. Amongst a number of interesting points brought out by different authorities on the subject were: (a) that the City was in no mood to back the flotation of a loan for China, as the risks were too great; (b) that the U.S., in spite of sympathy for China, were most unlikely to agree to active participation in any form of intervention in the Sino-Japanese dispute, as there was too strong a feeling in the U.S. against anything savouring of helping Britain to pull her chestnuts out of the fire; (c) that whatever the final outcome of the present Sino-Japanese dispute may be, even more serious
trouble is likely to take place when it is over, as the Chinese Communists, with Soviet backing, are almost certain to make trouble.

Knowing what has been going on in the background, I was much interested to hear Brennan (Sir John) trying to sound opinion as to the pros and cons of floating a loan for China if such a proposition should ever come up for consideration! In spite of the general sentiment of those present being more favourable to China than Japan, the general verdict was, from practical considerations, against any such loan.

Thursday 16th June 1938

The Yellow River floods are becoming increasingly serious and each side is accusing the other of breaking down the dykes and causing the inundation of the country.

Friday 17th June 1938

An interesting despatch from our Minister at Bangkok examines Siam's position vis-à-vis ourselves and the Japanese. While noting that Siam has no more real love for Japan than she has for us - perhaps not even as much - he considers that, if ever it came to a show-down between ourselves and the Japanese in the Far East, Siam would almost certainly side with Japan against us, as she has more to fear from a hostile Japan than a hostile England. With a hostile Siam holding the Kra Isthmus, Singapore's land communications with Burma would not be too healthy.

Saturday 18th June 1938

Lunched with the Davieses at the Overseas Club and then brought them over to Camberley for tea. Though pleased with his accelerated promotion to Consul-General, neither Davies nor his wife relish the idea of being sent to Harbin. It is most unfortunate that his time at the Foreign Office is to be cut short, as the whole object in bringing him home was to place at the Foreign Office's disposal a man well-versed at first hand in "things Japanese". True, he is to be replaced by Denning; but Denning has spent practically all his service in Manchuria and Korea and has little or no firsthand knowledge of those at the head of affairs in Japan. Far from being in a position to provide a sympathetic interpretation of the Japanese outlook - which is what is needed so badly at the Foreign Office and which is Davies' strong point - he is hypercritical of Japan and hopelessly out of touch and sympathy with current trends in Japan.

Tuesday 21st June 1938

Met Chapman, who tells me that Halifax has sent a memo. to Inskip, urging the necessity of pushing ahead with the rearmament programme as quickly as possible, as our diplomacy is badly hampered and seriously weakened by inability to take a strong stand - a most interesting, significant, and enlightening commentary on the unfortunate position in which we now find ourselves as a result of our post-War policy of "leading the way in disarmament".

Thursday 23rd June 1938

Ugaki and Ikeda, according to a highly placed Japanese informant quoted by Craigie in a despatch to the Foreign Office, only agreed to take office on the strict understanding that
more effective control would be exercised over the Japanese authorities in China and that improvement of Anglo-Japanese relations should be an object of Japanese policy. According to another despatch - from China - there are about 80 Soviet planes at Sian and there is considerable friction between the Soviet and the Chinese 8th Route Army stationed there.

Friday 24th June 1938
Severe restrictions are being placed by the Japanese Government on imports into Japan and strict economy is being enforced.

Friday 1st July 1938
An interesting despatch from Craigie tells of a talk between Ugaki and Piggott. The former seems genuinely anxious to promote better relations with ourselves, though the reactionaries and extremist elements in the Army necessitate his going about it slowly and cautiously, and his task is not facilitated by the captious criticism of some of our people. When Piggott drew his attention to the bad impression made by the ill-discipline of some of the Japanese troops in China, he frankly admitted that he was painfully aware of the fact, but assured Piggott that he was doing his best to improve matters. Unfortunately, though, the anti-British tirades in the Japanese Press had done immense harm by making the troops convinced that Britain was scheming against Japan all the time and it required time and patience to eradicate this belief.

Monday 4th July 1938
General Lyushkov, Soviet Commissar of Internal Affairs [N.K.V.D. -later K.G.B.] in Eastern Siberia, is reported to have escaped into Manchuria and handed himself over to the Japanese in order to escape the "purge". As two of his immediate subordinates have recently been "liquidated" and he himself had been under suspicion, one can hardly blame him for clearing out before it was too late. In addition to inveighing against Stalin, he is reported to have told the Japanese that the Soviet Army of the Far East is now 400,000 strong, with 2,000 aircraft and 90 submarines.

Wednesday 6th July 1938
To O.G. [Old Glenalmond] dinner at Cafe Royal in evening [Old School reunion], whereat met many old friends.

Thursday 7th July 1938
The situation in Palestine is increasingly serious once more, both Arab and Jewish terrorists resorting to bombing and shooting outrages in Haifa and elsewhere. As a result, two battalions are being sent there from our garrison in Egypt.
Colin, who arrived home on leave from India a week or two ago, tells me that, according to a staff officer who lectured to the officers at Jhansi early this year on the general world situation, the clash between Chamberlain and Eden started last year, when Chamberlain sent his personal message to Mussolini without first consulting Eden, or at least contrary to his advice, as Eden was insufficiently a realist to appreciate the argument put forward by the General Staff regarding the necessity of trying to detach Italy from Germany so as to avoid the possibility of having to fight both - a possibility for which we were totally unprepared.
Friday 8th July 1938
Roscoe tells me that Horikoshi, who is over here on an official visit, told Struthers quite frankly that the Army heads, as well as the leading businessmen in Japan, are heartily sick of the war in China and would gladly bring it to a close if they could.

Wednesday 20th July 1938
Mrs. Hill came over to tea. She tells me that Pat received a postcard a few days ago from young Chiba, who is now in Shanghai, and on it he said, that although little damage has been done at some of the places figuring in the news, he felt ashamed of the behaviour of the Japanese troops at Nanking. It certainly looks as though they had got badly out of hand there for a time, though it is rather surprising to find a young Japanese diplomat making such remarks on an open postcard.

Mrs. Hill also quoted Mrs. Yoshida as remarking regretfully that Prince Chichibu was really the leader of the young officer element and was all for a forward policy and strong measures in China, whereas his brother, the Emperor, was definitely a "moderate". Though the latter part is undoubtedly true, I can hardly believe that Mrs. Yoshida meant to imply that Chichibu was an extremist in the sense that he condoned "patriotic murders" and other excesses of the more extreme elements in the "young officer" movement. What she probably meant was that, being a keen soldier himself, his sympathies were more with the Army than with the politicians and he had the pure military rather than the politico-military outlook. At the same time, her comments rather tend to bear out some of the other reports about Chichibu vis-à-vis the Army and the Emperor.

Tuesday 26th July 1938
Commemoration Day [at Glenalmond College]. Spent day at College and met many old friends.

Wednesday 27th July 1938
See that Craigie and Ugaki are reported to be holding weekly pow-wows by way of trying to build up more friendly relations between the two countries.

Latest news of operations in China is that the Japanese have now worked up the Yangtze as far as Kinkiang.

Sunday 31st July 1938
Japanese-Soviet frontier disputes are of frequent occurrence, but the one now raging over the ownership of the Changkufeng hill near the junction of the Manchurian, Korean, and Soviet frontiers appears to be on a larger scale than usual and further skirmishes are reported. The origin of the trouble seems to have been the occupation and fortifying of the ridge by a detachment of 40 Soviet soldiers on the 11th, against which Japan made a formal protest on the 15th on the grounds that the hill in question was in Manchurian territory. This the Soviet denied and produced a map to show that, under the Sino-Russian Treaty of Hunchun of 1869, it was in Russian territory. The Japanese countered by producing a Russian map of 1911 to prove their claim; and so things went on till the 26th when a 5-hour engagement took place in the region of the hill under dispute, as a result, apparently, of the Japanese trying to dislodge
the Russians. More serious fighting has followed and Tokyo and Moscow are indulging in mutual protests and recriminations.

**Monday 1st August 1938**

The Changkufeng situation sounds serious, though I can hardly believe that either Tokyo or Moscow want war and, in so far as Moscow is concern, I recall what Japanese officers told me during my visit to Manchuria four-and-a-half years ago about Stalin's reasons for wishing to avoid hostilities - reasons which have been borne out by the subsequent "purge". The bombing of Kojo [in north-eastern Korea] recalls my visit to the Tumen salient and Hunchun in 1924, places in the immediate vicinity of the present trouble. Rashin and Yuki are also figuring in the news and recall my visits of 1924 and 1934.

**Tuesday 2nd August 1938**

Both Tokyo and Moscow appear anxious to localise the present trouble, though sporadic fighting continues. The Japanese estimate the Soviet losses in these engagements at 270 and claim to have captured 13 tanks and other material. They also claim to have shot down 5 Soviet planes which were bombing Changkufeng and certain Japanese positions on Korean territory. The Soviet claim they lost only 13 killed and 55 wounded and put Japanese losses at 400. The chief object of the Soviet is said to be to prevent the Japanese from transferring troops from Manchuria to the Hankow front.

**Friday 5th August 1938**

The Russians are said to have withdrawn from the Shatsaoping area after a battle lasting from dawn to 3 p.m. on Wednesday with a loss of 15 tanks, 25 guns and 200 men. Shigemitsu is reported to have expressed his Government's desire to settle the dispute without further fighting and asked Litvinov to instruct the Russians to cease their attacks on the Japanese positions. Litvinov replied, however, with the demand that the Japanese withdraw from the positions occupied at Changkufeng to behind the line shown on the map attached to the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1869. Shigemitsu declined to consider this proposal, as Japan knew nothing about this map and could not be bound by it. The Japanese have been complaining of Soviet air raids on Korean territory on the grounds that it is outside the area under dispute. While emphasising that, in order to prevent any aggravation of the situation, they have hitherto refrained from replying in kind, they warn the Soviet that they will retaliate if raids continue and on Tuesday they carried out a demonstration by flying along the eastern border of Manchuria, though they did not cross over it at all.

Poland appears satisfied that war will not develop, as it is thought that Russia is merely testing Japan's strength and trying to assist China by dividing Japan's attention. Stalin's distrust of Bluecher is quoted as one of the main reasons which may prevent an outbreak, as Stalin does not wish to see Bluecher as Commander-in-Chief of an army in the field, lest this lead him to dictatorship. This, too, confirms what Japanese officers told me in 1934, and it is not without significance that a fresh "purge" is said to be in full swing.

Finished writing article for "Asiatic Review" on the future of Anglo-Japanese relations.
Saturday 6th August 1938
Wrote article for the "Evening Standard" on the country round the area under dispute between Japan and the Soviet.
Japan has proposed to the Russians the complete withdrawal of all forces from the disputed area at Changkufeng as a preliminary to negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

Monday 8th August 1938
Returned to work at the Foreign Office [after a fortnight's holiday].
See that Japan has proposed that both sides should return to the positions held prior to 11th July, i.e. before the Soviet occupied Changkufeng. Litvinov, however, refuses to agree, and insists on return to the situation on 29th July, i.e. before the Japanese turned the Soviet out of their hold on the hill.

Tuesday 9th August 1938
Germany and Italy are reported to have urged Japan to exercise moderation and avoid war, as they have enough troubles on their hands already and do not consider the present juncture propitious for a possible war with the Soviet.

Wednesday 10th August 1938
An interesting despatch from our people at Shanghai points out that, according to all available maps, Changkufeng is on the Manchurian side of the border. It also comments on the restraint shown by the Japanese in not retaliating with aircraft and in not firing on Soviet troops on Soviet territory, although these troops are being sent up as reinforcements and are covered by Japanese guns. It is also indicated that the Japanese are not very impressed by the efficiency of the Soviet troops - in fact they seem pleasantly surprised to find that the Soviet soldier is not as good or efficient as expected.
"The Times" today publishes the letter I sent them last week on the opinion expressed to me by Japanese officers in 1934 during my visit to Manchuria about a Japanese-Soviet war.

LETTER FROM CAPTAIN KENNEDY TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

RUSSIA AND JAPAN

Sir,

Your leading article, "Russia and Japan" in "The Times" of August 5th recalls a number of conversations I had with Japanese officers in Manchuria in the course of a visit there in the spring of 1934. I had travelled up from Rashin, passing close by the scene of the present dispute on my way to Hsinking via Kirin. The belief that war between Japan and the Soviet was imminent was widespread at the time in Japan as well as in other countries. I was surprised, therefore, to find that this view was not shared by the military in Manchuria. Far from being perturbed by the Soviet concentrations in the frontier districts, they declared themselves satisfied that the Russians had no intention of taking the offensive. Japan, they declared, was equally disinclined to attack.

In view of recent developments, the reasons for believing that the Soviet had not desire to precipitate hostilities are worth recalling. Stalin and his friends in Moscow, it was contended,
were anxious to avoid war with Japan, as they feared that, if war broke out, the Soviet Army of the Far East and the Soviet military authorities in general would usurp the functions of government throughout Russia. Stalin himself and the bureaucrats in Moscow would be displaced and an end would be put to their iron rule. Stalin, it was asserted, was already becoming seriously alarmed at the growing power of the Soviet military and was more concerned with trying to curb their activities than with affording them an opportunity to take matters into their own hands. Bearing in mind the rigorous "purge" carried out in Russia during the past year or so, this appreciation of the situation made in the spring of 1934 is shown to have been remarkably accurate. It seems safe to assume that Stalin, for the same reason as then, will do his best to prevent the present trouble at Changkufeng from developing into a major conflict. It remains to be seen whether he will be able to do so, for, as my Japanese friends observed four-and-a-half years ago, the only danger of war lay in the fact that, among the Soviet military, there were many who were "itching for a fight."

I am, Sir, yours truly,
M.D. KENNEDY
Captain (Retd.).
Fosse Bank, London Road, Camberley.

Thursday 11th August 1938
Japan and the Soviet having agreed to end hostilities, fighting ceased today at noon, though it continued up to the very last moment, as one of the terms of the agreement was that the actual positions held be each side when "cease fire" was sounded were to be taken into consideration in the final terms of settlement. It has also been agreed to discuss the actual frontier at once by means of a commission composed of 2 Soviet, 1 Japanese, and 1 Manchurian representative.

Friday 12th August 1938
"The Times" has a somewhat ill-advised "leader" on the Japanese-Soviet armistice. Instead of complimenting both sides - especially the Japanese - for the restraint and common sense that have made the armistice possible, there is barely concealed pleasure at the alleged fact that the Japanese have been made to climb down. Such an attitude will certainly not encourage the Japanese to show similar restraint and spirit of compromise in the future, though this is just what should be encouraged. The fact is that the Japanese did show extraordinary restraint in not retaliating to the Soviet air raids on Korea.

Much interested to see in a Foreign Office telegram, commenting on the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs' suggestions for British and U.S. mediation in the near future, that Halifax appears to favour the suggestion, though he emphasises very rightly that we should avoid the word "mediation" and offer, rather, "good offices" i.e. to act as a postman between the two parties and to offer no suggestions or comments on the communications between them, unless specifically invited to do so. One reason for favouring this suggestion, he says, is that, unless we are prepared to act in this way, the Japanese and Chinese may decide to combine,
in the final settlement, against Britain and the foreign Powers in general - a possibility that I have frequently warned against in the past.

Monday 15th August 1938
According to Soviet official reports, the Soviet lost 236 killed and 611 wounded in the fighting around Changkufeng. Japanese official reports a day or two ago put Japanese losses at 300 killed and 600 wounded.

Thursday 18th August 1938
Had Davies and Roscoe to lunch at the R.E.S. Davies confirms that the Foreign Office archives throw no light on either the Hunchun Treaty or its map, on which the Soviet base their claim to ownership of Changkufeng. Apparently, therefore, it was a secret treaty and quite possibly only became known to the Soviet themselves but recently - in the course of studying the old Czarist archives.

Monday 22nd August 1938
Lectured this morning [at Bonar Law College, Ashridge] - an historical survey of Japan.

Saturday 27th August 1938
The Chinese now admit the loss of Juichang, an important gain for the Japanese, and report that the Japanese are "making progress" along both banks of the Yangtze in their advance on Hankow. Another Japanese force is advancing westward from Hofei on Sinyang, a town on the Peking-Hankow Railway commanding the pass through the hills to the north of Hankow. It is rapidly nearing Liuan, the gateway through the Anhwei hills into Honan.
"The Times" carries a long despatch from Tokyo on the pro-British and anti-British elements in Japan, the former being mostly 45 years of age [and over] and the later under 45. The problem of Anglo-Japanese relations is, as it puts it, "a struggle between youthful dynamism in all departments of the national life and what is called generally "the elder clique", that capable, temperate, and none too numerous oligarchy that has ruled Japan since her emergence as a modern State." The strength of the former and its effect on the latter is well set out and, in so far as the future of Anglo-Japanese relations is concerned, makes rather gloomy reading as it emphasises the difficulty of Ugaki & Co. to make any concession to Britain.

Wednesday 31st August 1938
Soviet have admitted that the chief Soviet admirals and naval experts were shot a few months ago.

Monday 5th September 1938
European situation becoming unpleasantly tense and, with the opening of the Nazi rally at Nuremberg today, it seems likely that the issue of peace or war will be decided in the course of the next week or ten days. Pray Heaven for a speedy and amicable settlement of the Sudeten German question, lest Hitler decides on forceful measures against the Czechs, as war would then be inevitable and we should be dragged into fight on the same side as the Soviet - and that would mean the end of the British Empire whichever side won militarily.
Evening papers report that, owing to increasing German military activities, France has called up her reservists for the Maginot Line - a purely precautionary measure, but ominous.

**Wednesday 7th September 1938**

To lunch with Byas, who is home on leave. Byas has just heard from the "Asahi" correspondent that Shigemitsu is to succeed Yoshida as Ambassador in London, while Togo is to be transferred from Berlin to Moscow, and General Oshima, the present Military Attaché in Berlin is to be the new Ambassador to Germany. Of Shigemitsu's and Togo's coming moves, I had already received an inkling, but Oshima's promotion is news and seems a bit ominous, as it was he who was largely responsible for bringing about the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact. Other coming changes include Shiratori as Ambassador to Rome, and Horinouchi Ambassador to Washington. Rome should prove a spiritual home for Shiratori! From the Japanese point of view, the changes seem very sound moves, but although the choice of Shigemitsu and Horinouchi is to be welcomed by ourselves and the U.S., the choice of Oshima and Shiratori will hardly be so welcome to us.

**Saturday 10th September 1938**

After a week of alarums and excursions in regard to the European situation, a highly critical weekend has opened with the news that 200,000 German troops, ready to move at an hour's notice, have been concentrated on the Czech frontier. Against this is to be set the reassuring report that Italy has made it clear that, in spite of her sympathy with the German demands, she insists that Czech sovereignty must be respected and maintained. Presumably, therefore, she would not agree to the rather surprising suggestion put forward a day or two ago in a "Times" leader, that the Sudeten German territory be seceded to Germany.

See by the "Telegraph" that Sato and Arita are to be appointed as special advisers to the Tokyo Foreign Office. If this report proves true, it would seem to indicate a victory for the more moderate elements, as both of them are liberal in outlook.

**Sunday 11th September 1938**

Yesterday's report of German concentrations on the Czech frontier is now denied, but the situation appears pretty grim all the same and both Goering and Goebbels have been indulging in violent diatribes and wild boasting, calculated to aggravate an already highly dangerous state of affairs. Goring's speech was the speech of a cad and a bully, and was grossly and deliberately insulting - a great contrast to the statesmanly utterance of Benes.

**Monday 12th September 1938**

Campion, with whom I travelled up to town this morning, expressed his belief that, even if Germany does walk into Czechoslovakia, we shall not necessarily be dragged into war. I'm afraid he is wrong, though his reasoning is interesting. France, he maintains, is only bluffing and realises that she cannot go to Czechoslovakia's aid without attacking Germany. As, however, England is only committed to helping France if France is attacked, France cannot count on our assistance if it is she who does the attacking - ergo, there will not be war.
Amongst a number of disquieting reports reaching the Foreign Office is one to the effect that the German Army warned the Nazis in May that, although Czechoslovakia could be occupied within a week if no other Powers intervened, it would be dangerous to make the attempt, as the western frontiers would be left undefended and open to attack while this was being done. The feverish activity in strengthening and fortifying the western borders since then is the result of this warning. The Army, however, is still opposed to military action against the Czechs, as it recognises that this will almost inevitably lead to a general conflagration, but Goebbels, Goering and Ribbentrop are urging Hitler to disregard the warning and the Army leaders fear that the Nazi Party is now out of control and fully prepared to risk war.

A sure indication of the serious view of the situation taken by our own Government authorities was shown by the issue of secret instructions this afternoon to my branch of the Foreign Office that we are to be prepared to move at any moment. Everyone of us is therefore to have a suitcase ready packed until further orders, though no one outside the office is to know this except, where necessary, one’s wife. Where we are to be sent is not stated, but presumably the idea is to evacuate us from London to some place less likely to be bombed.

Tuesday 13th September 1938

Hitler’s long and anxiously awaited speech at Nuremberg last night has done little or nothing to ease the tension, though it still leaves the door open for negotiations to continue and avoided bringing the crisis to a head. It was violent, vehemence, and threatening, and in its insistence on the principle of self-determination (with German backing!) for the Sudetens, it seems pretty ominous. At the same time, it gives one to think furiously for, much as one may detest Nazi methods, it would be ironical if Britain were dragged in to war in order to prevent three-and-a-half million Sudeten Germans being given the right of self-determination, which was one of the rights which we demanded for small nations in the last war!

Some idea of the dangerous elements at work is given in a report reaching the Foreign Office this week to the effect that there are both German and Soviet agents at work in Prague and elsewhere, endeavouring to stir up trouble among Czechs, Sudetens, Poles etc. - the Germans for the purpose of providing pretexts for Germany to take action, and the Soviet with the object of precipitating a general conflagration with as many nations as possible dragged in, as Moscow considers - probably with all too good reason - that such a war would result in ultimate chaos and revolution in all the countries concerned. One had rather hoped that, with the closing of the rally, things would ease down a bit; but there have been wild scenes in the Sudetenland according to this evening’s papers and wireless news, and about a dozen Czechs and Sudetens have been killed. The Czechs were compelled to declare martial law in the districts affected and this has been followed by an ultimatum to the Czech Government from the Sudeten leaders to withdraw the emergency decrees or take the consequences - a pretty ominous demand.

Called in after lunch at the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office for a talk with Howe, who has succeeded Orde as head of the Department. He comes of very humble origin, being the son of a working man; but I was much taken by him. Nothing of the suave diplomat about
him in his appearance or mannerism, but a straightforward, unassuming, matter-of-fact sort of fellow.

Wednesday 14th September 1938
In spite of Saturday's report that Italy was not prepared to see Czechoslovakia's sovereignty violated, Press reports from Rome now declare that Italy is wholeheartedly in support of Germany and is demanding a plebiscite for the Sudetenland to decide whether it should secede from Czechoslovakia or not.

The increasing seriousness of the situation is shown by the decisions reached in Paris and London, according to the evening papers, for the full co-operation between the defence forces of both countries. Another indication of the gravity was yesterday's meeting of the heads of the three Services with Chamberlain.

On the other hand, I have been much struck by talks with fellows in the War Office and at the R.E.S. and elsewhere to find a growing feeling that, much as Hitler’s methods are disliked, it is ridiculous for England to get embroiled in war for the sake of 8 million Czechs who are merely concerned in hanging on to three-and-a-half million Germans - a war which would result in millions of deaths and probably world revolution. It certainly is a pretty ghastly thought and there would certainly be precious little enthusiasm for such a war, but it is difficult to see how it could be avoided if France became involved.

There is, of course, still hope that war will be avoided, for although the Sudetens have broken off negotiations with the Czechs, Runciman has been instructed to seek a new basis of settlement.

Later - Just heard announcement on the wireless that Chamberlain has arranged to fly over to Munich tomorrow to see Hitler. A most unexpected development, but a very sound and reassuring move. The suggestion for the meeting came from Chamberlain himself and Hitler readily agreed to it.

Thursday 15th September 1938
The Foreign Office Spokesman in Tokyo is quoted as declaring that Japan is in full sympathy with the stand taken by Germany on the Czechoslovakian question and is prepared to "join forces with Germany and Italy for the fight against Red operations in accordance with the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Agreement". While, however, the P>Benes has made it clear that he will never agree to a plebiscite. Special prayers in all churches today for a peaceful settlement.

Monday 19th September 1938
Met Ashton-Gwatkin on way to office in morning. He has been figuring very prominently in the news of late in connection with his own and Runciman's talks with the Czech and Sudeten leaders. On my remarking that he must have had a pretty strenuous and anxious time of late, he replied that, although that was so, he foresaw an even more strenuous and anxious time ahead for him- "Yes", he said, "but nothing to what is coming!"

I don't envy him his task, as the Czechs are likely to show both bitterness and stubbornness as a result of the Anglo-French agreement to get them to hand over part of their territory to
Germany. That, at least, is the decision reported in this evening's papers, which also tell of the bitter distress of the Czech Minister in Paris when informed of the decision. Official confirmation of the settlement agreed upon has not yet been announced, but if, as seems likely, these reports are true, one cannot but feel a certain sense of shame for giving way to German threats in this way, even though it is difficult to see how a world war - followed probably by world revolution - could have been avoided by any other means. A terrible choice of alternatives and, much as one dislikes the one taken, one feels that, under the circumstances, Chamberlain did the right thing. Quite apart from the question of a world war, with the example of Abyssinia and the rejection of the Hoare-Laval proposal before us, one cannot but feel that the Czechs themselves will stand to lose less by conceding territory now than by risking the seizure of the whole country by German armed force. All the same, Chamberlain and Daladier, I'm afraid, are likely to raise a bit of a storm against themselves for paying this price for peace. As they must fully appreciate this, all honour to them for taking the risk.

Amazed to hear in this evening's wireless news that the League has agreed to the Chinese demand for the application of Article XVII of the Covenant. That Japan will refuse to conform to it, is a foregone conclusion. Refusal, however, will entail the automatic application of Article XVI and it is an equally foregone conclusion that no one is going to carry it out and impose sanctions against Japan. It is not, therefore, going to help anyone - the Chinese least of all - and the only result will be to aggravate the situation still further and strengthen further the hands of the Japanese extremists. What utter folly! Truly is the League an absolute menace in its present imbecility.

Tuesday 20th September 1938

According to this evening's papers, the Czechs have appealed to the Soviet to help them, but Moscow has declined on the grounds that her obligations no longer hold good now that France has backed down. This report, however, was denied by the Soviet according to this evening's wireless news. Meantime the Poles and Hungarians, taking their cue from Germany, are now demanding the cession of the districts in Czechoslovakia which are predominantly Polish and Hungarian respectively. And if Germany is to be given the Sudetenland, it is difficult to see how, in fairness, the Poles and Hungarians are to be denied similar "rights"; yet they can only be granted them at the price of further dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, an action to which we cannot very well accede. A most infernally dangerous state of affairs however one looks at it.

Wednesday 21st September 1938

The Czech reply to the Anglo-French proposal for ceding the Sudeten-German territories was received yesterday and is reported to have included a request to revise the proposal for transferring the frontier districts. At 2.15 a.m. today, however, the British and French ministers in Prague called on Benes and urged immediate and unreserved acceptance of the peace plan, as events were moving too fast for further delay. As a result, the Czech Government finally announced this afternoon their acceptance of it "under irresistible pressure from Britain
and France", but made it conditional on those two countries promising to come to their help in the event of an attack.

Another development today was the formal demand of Poland and Hungary for the cession of their minorities in Czechoslovakia, while the German Press is now indicating that the cession of the Sudetenland will no longer suffice. One can only hope that Hitler, when he sees Chamberlain tomorrow, will not support these new demands of the German Press, as Chamberlain is already being strongly denounced by large sections of the British public - as well as by the Americans and others - for having gone so far as he has gone to placate Germany, and it would be impossible for him to give way still further, even though refusal to do so would probably make war inevitable. Poor Chamberlain! I feel terribly sorry for him, as he is faced with a ghastly dilemma and seems likely to be made a scapegoat whatever he does.

Thursday 22nd September 1938

Chamberlain set off this morning by air for his talk with Hitler and, before leaving, made a short statement emphasising the importance of improving Anglo-German relations as a preliminary step to a general European settlement and that he hoped to achieve this in his coming talks. Heaven grant that he may succeed, but there are ominous signs that it will be far from easy, as Hitler is said to favour the demands made during the past day or two by Poland and Hungary for the cession of the Polish and Hungarian districts of Czechoslovakia, and the German Press is demanding the removal of Benes and declaring that Czechoslovakia must be broken up completely, as otherwise it will always provide a base for Soviet propaganda and Soviet aircraft.

Latest development today was the fall of the Czech Cabinet and the formation of a new government under General Sirovy. It was also reported this evening that three members of the French Cabinet had handed in their resignations to Daladier, though they had not been accepted.

In France, as in England, there has been a wild outcry by certain elements against the government for their alleged "betrayal of Czechoslovakia", and the Czechs themselves are, quite understandably, very bitter against both England and France, especially the latter. Meantime Japan, as expected, has replied to the League, declining the invitation under Article XVII of the Covenant. Glad to see by a Foreign Office despatch to Craigie, however, that the British delegates at Geneva did their utmost to dissuade the Chinese from invoking Article XVII against Japan, but the Chinese insisted, so the Council had no option but to do as requested.

Friday 23rd September 1938

Davies tells me he has put forward my name for consideration, both at the Foreign Office and to Cunningham at the Embassy in Tokyo, in the event of the Treasury sanctioning the appointment of a Press Attaché in Japan. It is a job I should like; but, even if it is definitely offered to me, it would have to depend on the pay and allowances as to whether I could
accept it or not, as the children would have to be left in England to finish their schooling and that, in itself, would be costly business.

"The Times", this morning, has a very sound "leader" defending Chamberlain against the attacks and abuse being levelled against him by the Labour crowd and political opponents in general. As it points out, the Labour Party and the Liberals have, ever since 1919, been arguing with not a little reason that there can be no peace without frontier revision; yet now Chamberlain has proposed to work on this principle, he is denounced with the most bitter invective by these former proponents of revision.

The irresponsible and grossly unfair criticism to which Chamberlain is being subjected is simply deplorable at a time of such grave crisis, and the gravity of the situation is all too clear from the latest developments given in this evening's papers. Chief of these is that Chamberlain, having reason apparently to believe that the German troops were preparing to march into Czechoslovakia almost at once, postponed the talk that he was to have had with Hitler this morning and sent him a letter asking him to promise that there would be no movement of troops so long as negotiations were continuing.

Later: Announced in the wireless news that Hitler's reply was handed to Chamberlain this afternoon. No mention of its contents was given, but the fact that its receipt was followed by an official announcement that Chamberlain was returning to England tomorrow and that the movement of huge bodies of German troops in the direction of the Czech border from Munich and Dresden and other points was also reported seems unpleasantly ominous. The one ray of hope lies in the announcement that Chamberlain is to see Hitler once more before his departure. One can only pray that Chamberlain's decision to quit may help to bring Hitler to his senses and that he may make an 11th hour decision to prevent war.

Saturday 24th September 1938
A day of grim suspense, and on getting to the office in the morning we were warned that we would very probably move to our war station before the day was over. We were advised to pack up certain of the office equipment accordingly. In spite of the "flap" in the morning, however, the tension eased a bit in the afternoon; and although we had to remain on duty, we were allowed to leave about 5 urprisingly and very conspicuously, in this morning's "Times" by various Communist and Left Wing organisations - an advertisement which illustrated very strikingly the assertion made by Lord Ponsonby (also in this morning's "Times") that the "righteous indignation" being expressed over Czechoslovakia was mainly camouflage for hatred of Hitler.

Reports of German troop movements into the Sudetenland, which caused Chamberlain to postpone his talks yesterday, are now said to have prove unfounded. The number of seemingly authentic reports which turn out to be pure canards is but one of many disquieting features of the present crisis, as one never knows what to believe.

Sunday 25th September 1938
A day of pleasant peace and quiet after all the tension of yesterday. With Maggie and Aline [wife and younger daughter] to Matins, and after lunch went for a walk over the moors, where
the atmosphere of peacefulness and autumnal beauty made it hard to realise that we are perilously close to a new world war - a war far more serious and ghastly than 1914-8. True, the morning papers announced that the Home Fleet had sailed suddenly yesterday from the Cromarty Firth for an unknown destination and that, in London and the Home Counties, urgent measures are being taken to fit out everyone with gas masks; but there is little sign of anything unusual here in Camberley, in spite of the fact that it is shown on the A.R.P. confidential map as a "starred" area and likely to be bombed in event of war.

Later: Evening wireless news brought one back to realisation that, in spite of the air of peace and quiet here today, the situation is increasingly serious. The Czech rejection of the German memorandum, with its 6-day ultimatum, is now virtually certain; Mussolini talks of Italy being compelled to make ready for all contingencies in the face of mobilisation by the Czechs, France etc.; and Daladier and Bonnet have just arrived in London by air and are now discussing with Chamberlain & Co. what measures are to be taken. Most ominous of all is the news that Hitler is to address the whole German nation and the world at large tomorrow at 8 p.m. As he always gets carried away by his own verbosity on such occasions, the situation is likely to be aggravated rather than eased.

Monday 26th September 1938

So rapidly is the situation developing that it is difficult to keep pace with the movement of events in their proper sequence. The outstanding developments in this evening's news were the definite rejection of the German memorandum by the Czechs and the hardening of French opinion in the same connection. The memorandum, in its demands, goes very much further than the Anglo-French proposals to which the Czechs had agreed, and neither gives anything in return nor takes into account the time required to effect the transfer fairly. Considerable annoyance has, moreover, been caused in British official quarters by garbled versions of events given out by the Germans and by their assertion that [the British Government] recommended the Czechs to mobilise. This, it seems, is entirely unfounded - in fact, it is now stated that Chamberlain was very taken aback by the Czechs' action when he heard of it while still at Goddesberg.

Main developments reported in the evening papers are an appeal by Roosevelt to both Hitler and Benes to avoid plunging Europe into war; French decision to fight if Germany resorts to force; Anglo-French accord as result of Daladier's and Bonnet's visit and visit by General Gamelin, the French Commander-in- Chief, who flew to London this morning; the despatch of Sir Horace Wilson to Germany by air this afternoon with a further letter from Chamberlain to Hitler; and the decision to summon Parliament on Wednesday.

Two rather brighter bits of news are that the Czechs and Poles are reported to be discussing the settlement of the Teschen question by peaceful means and that Yugoslavia and Romania have given the Czechs a guarantee to hold Hungary in check if she resorts to force.

Was to have gone to a farewell cocktail party [for] the Byases, who leave tomorrow, but called it off in view of the tenseness of the situation, as this may be my last chance to have the evening at home.
Later: Evening’s wireless news gave extracts from, and gist of speech delivered at 8.20 p.m. in Berlin by Hitler. Ominous and hysterical and full of somewhat vulgar abuse of Benes and of the democratic countries. Started in relatively harmless vein; but, as usual when he gets on his feet, he soon seemed to get carried away by his own verbosity and ranted and raged like a madman. He seems determined to carry out his threats and to get the blood as well as his pound of flesh, though he must realise now that this will mean war. Other ominous news was the announcement that the distribution of gas masks to the civilian population in London and other towns and cities is to start tomorrow, but that the A.A. personnel of the Territorials - gunners, searchlights, etc. - have been called up for immediate service, and all R.A.F. establishments ordered to stand by. These are, of course, but precautionary measures - as, too, is the start made on the construction of trenches in the London parks. But it all serves to bring home the dangerous imminence of war.

Tuesday 27th September 1938

Gas masks were served out today to the household in Camberley and to all of us in the office up in town.

Listened to Chamberlain’s broadcast from 10 Downing Street at 8 o’clock this evening - pathetic in its genuine and very deep distress at the seeming failure to bring Hitler to reason. His voice sounded tired and terribly anxious; and little wonder, as the mental and physical strain of the past 2 or 3 weeks must have been terrific.

Wednesday 28th September 1938

No tube trains running between Waterloo and Charing Cross, as the tubes here and in certain other parts, too, have been closed for the time being for structural work in connection, apparently, with A.R.P.

On arrival at office, was greeted with the news that we would probably be moved off to our "war station" in the course of the morning; but in spite of the ominous news in the papers (e.g. mobilisation of the Navy ordered; Hungary reported mobilising; and, most ominous of all, announcement on wireless from Berlin that general mobilisation was to take place in Germany tomorrow if the Czechs had not accepted the terms of the memorandum by 2 p.m. today), the day passed off without any such orders being issued. At lunch time the morning’s tension became eased by reports that Hitler was showing signs of preparing to climb down to some extent. From Germany came a denial that 2 p.m. was to be the time limit for acceptance, and from Hungary came a denial of Hungarian mobilisation. Then came rumours that Mussolini was trying to mediate with Hitler, and shortly after 4 p.m. the news was circulated that Hitler had invited Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini to meet him in conference at Munich. The outlook has therefore become very much more reassuring and it looks as though Hitler may yet listen to reason.

One of the most ominous features in the morning had been the fact that the news of Roosevelt’s appeal and Hitler’s reply to it had remained unpublished in Germany. So, too, had Chamberlain’s guarantee to see that the Czechs carried out their agreement. It looked, therefore, as though Hitler were deliberately concealing these important matters from the
German public for fear that, if they were known, the public, who seem genuinely anxious to have war averted, would refuse to support his demands for the use of force.

Incidentally, Fletcher tells me he has had a letter from a German officer friend, who declared in it that the more senior officers in the Army were strongly opposed to war, but that they were being over-ruled by the younger officers, most of whom are ardent Nazis. This, of course, merely confirms what one had heard already, but it is interesting nonetheless.

Orders came round this afternoon that no one in our branch of the Foreign Office is to be allowed to join up in any of the defence or auxiliary Services. In view of the importance of the work in which we are engaged, this is perhaps but natural, though I, for one, have already approached the War Office on the subject of being taken back into the Army for work in M.I.2c [Far Eastern Intelligence, War Office] or elsewhere in order to let someone, who is fit G.S., go off on more active service.

Later: This evening’s wireless described the dramatic scene in the House this afternoon when Chamberlain announced the receipt of Hitler’s invitation for a 4-Power conference at Munich tomorrow. Chamberlain was just finishing his speech explaining his talks with Hitler and his efforts to bring him to reason when a paper, which had just been brought in by a messenger, was handed to him. He had just been telling how, as a last resort, he had, after his broadcast speech last night, sent a message to Hitler offering to meet him at a 4- Power conference and how, at the same time, he had informed Mussolini of this offer and had asked him to mediate; and he had then gone on to say that Mussolini had agreed and had induced Hitler to postpone mobilisation 24 hours. And it was at this point that the piece of paper was handed to him. He looked at it for a full minute and then, turning to his audience once more, announced that he had just received an invitation from Hitler for a conference at Munich tomorrow with him and Mussolini and Daladier.

The announcement brought the whole House to its feet with wild cheering and, with the sole exception of Gallacher, the Communist member, it was agreed unanimously to adjourn till Monday so as to give Chamberlain a chance to prepare for his departure and for the coming meeting at Munich.

Listened to the wireless news in candle light, as Camberley had a practice "black out" this evening. In view of the Munich meeting it is to be hoped that a "black out" in earnest will not now become a necessity and that the air raid trench which we had dug in the garden today by Merryweather will never have to be used. Undue optimism, however, is still to be avoided.

Thursday 29th September 1938

Great relief brought by yesterday’s announcement of the conference at Munich, though precautionary measures continue. Trenches being dug in all the London parks and open spaces elsewhere and the War Office has all its ground floor windows barricaded with sandbags.

According to a report reaching the Foreign Office, the higher ranks in the German Army were so opposed to Hitler’s intentions of resorting to force that a military coup was projected in the event of his starting to do so. What truth there is in this report it is difficult to say, though it is
known that most, if not all, the higher commanders are highly critical of his plans in this respect.

Evening papers report sudden resignation of Ugaki owing to differences of opinion with the Army over the question of control etc. of the projected central bureau, which is to handle Japan's affairs in China. Ugaki insists that it be under the Foreign Office, as otherwise it will encroach seriously on the diplomatic field.

Friday 30th September 1938

Great relief and rejoicing everywhere at announcement in wee hours of the morning that an agreement had been reached and signed by the "Big Four" at Munich. On getting up to town, special editions of the evening papers were already on sale (evening papers at 9.30 a.m.) giving the full text of the agreement and other relevant matter. The immediate threat of war has thus been averted and, for that, one must feel truly thankful; but unless this is but the preliminary to a general peace settlement in Europe - which is what Chamberlain is aiming to bring about - it is a heavy price to pay for the agreement and bodes none too well for the future.

The unfortunate Czechs were only given until noon today to accept the terms of the agreement and, although these terms were described as causing them amazement and dismay, this afternoon's papers announced their acceptance, as they had no other alternative. Also announced that Chamberlain and Hitler have signed a separate agreement - in the nature of a non-aggression declaration to the effect that Britain and Germany desire never again to fight one another, but to settle all their disputes by consultation - a most important agreement in principle.

While at Munich, Chamberlain also took the opportunity to discuss with Mussolini certain questions affecting the Mediterranean. Taken all in all, therefore, it may be hoped that he has really succeeded in laying a firm foundation for a general settlement in the near future, and it is not without significance that the only country failing to applaud Chamberlain's magnificent efforts for peace is Soviet Russia which, on the contrary, is scathing in its denunciations.

Saturday 1st October 1938

Chamberlain had a wonderful and well merited reception on his return to London yesterday evening, immense crowds turning out to welcome him back amidst prolonged and vociferous cheering. As was only to be expected, however, there are already signs that, grateful as is the nation as a whole for all he has done, there are many who feel he has paid too high a price for averting war. Not only is criticism already being levelled at him by some of his political opponents, but this evening's papers report the resignation of Duff Cooper as First Lord of the Admiralty on the grounds of profound disagreement with his foreign policy.

Personally, although I had hoped he might have obtained rather more quid pro quo from Hitler, I feel that, in view of all the known circumstances, Chamberlain took the most statesmanly course, though admittedly there is an element of gambling in the line taken. If, as Chamberlain hopes, the agreements reached at Munich have paved the way to a general
settlement in Europe, the future benefits will far outweigh the temporary disadvantages. If, on the other hand, these hopes fail to materialise, the outlook is pretty grim.

Evening papers report the Czech acceptance of the Polish demands for the cession of the Teschen district, so that removes yet another immediate threat to peace. And German occupation of the Sudetenland has already begun, without any opposition - another satisfactory sign.

**Monday 3rd October 1938**

Bluecher reported to have been "liquidated".

**Tuesday 4th October 1938**

The Japanese are reported as taking the view that, as the League have invoked Article XVI, they, ipso facto, recognise that a "state of war" exists between Japan and China; consequently Japan is now free to exercise full belligerent rights. Looks as though the League had blundered badly once more.

**Wednesday 5th October 1938**

Evening papers report resignation of Benes - a wise and self-sacrificing move on his part.

**Saturday 8th October 1938**

"Emergency period" ended in so far as our particular branch of the Foreign Office is concerned and normal hours or work returned.

**Tuesday 11th October 1938**

News from Palestine gets progressively worse, with law and order practically non-existent in most districts. A sad commentary on British administration in those parts and on our handling of the whole sorry business.

**Wednesday 12th October 1938**

The long-expected Japanese attack on Southern China opened at dawn today with the landing of 35,000 Japanese troops at three points in Bias Bay. Unpleasantly close to Hong Kong. One of the objects is, of course, to cut the Kowloon railway so as to put a stop to the traffic in munitions etc. sent from Hong Kong to Canton.

**Thursday 13th October 1938**

Had Henderson to lunch at R.E.S. He leaves for Tokyo next week. Expressed opinion, with which I fully agree, that the U.S. have, throughout the present trouble, followed a far sounder and more dignified policy than we have vis-à-vis both Japan and China. By promising aid to China and failing to give any, we have annoyed the Chinese, and the fact that we have promised help to China has angered the Japanese, who accuse us of being anti-Japanese accordingly. The U.S., on the other hand, have refrained from any promises to the Chinese, and also from nagging at the Japanese.

Had an interesting talk on Communism in China with Sir Sydney Barton, whom I had not met before. I really looked him up to see, if by any chance, he could throw any light on the reliability of Amleto Vespa, whose book, "Secret Agent of Japan", I am reviewing for Chatham House. Barton could not recall his name, but I had a talk on the 'phone in the evening with Denning who knew him well by repute in Harbin and told me he was thoroughly unreliable and
was strongly suspected of murder, arson and blackmail! While, however, much of what he writes must therefore be discounted, Denning considers there is little doubt that he was employed by the Japanese as a secret agent, though he doubts Vespa's contention that he was forced into this employment against his will.

Friday 14th October 1938
With Maggie [wife] to informal farewell luncheon at Japanese Embassy given by Yoshida, who leaves for Japan on 19th.

Tuesday 18th October 1938
To lunch with Norman McLeod. Richardson [also at lunch], who is in the R.A.M.C. [Royal Army Medical Corps], mentioned that, at the time of the recent crisis, when war seemed almost inevitable, the medical authorities in the London area were warned to be ready to deal with 50,000 casualties in the first 24 hours in the event of an air raid on London.

Wednesday 19th October 1938
Japanese appear to be meeting relatively little opposition in advance on Canton and have already advanced about 70 miles in 7 days.

Thursday 20th October 1938
Notes published yesterday by Poland and Manchukuo agreeing to establishment of consulates and other matters. Though Poland does not specifically state that it has accorded recognition to Manchukuo, the notes are a clear indication that, in point of fact, she has done so.

The accounts of recent happenings in Palestine remind one very forcibly of the Japanese accounts of the "mopping up" operations in Manchukuo a few years ago. The description of the rebels as "bandits"; the rather curious wording of the pamphlets dropped by our airmen by way of reassuring the native inhabitants; and the assertion that the Arab women, whose dead bodies were found, must have been killed by the terrorists - all these things have a strangely familiar ring about them. I, for one, fully accept the explanations given by our people; but this being so, one can hardly blame the Japanese for putting similar faith in the accounts given by their people with regard to Manchuria or for being indignant at others who ridicule these accounts.

Friday 21st October 1938
Canton occupied by the Japanese at 6.30 this morning - an extraordinarily rapid advance and totally unexpected, in so far as speed is concerned, by most observers. Covered about 90 miles in 9 days.

Saturday 22nd October 1938
The Czechs yesterday denounced their pact with the Soviet. I hope the French will now do likewise, though there seems to be some fear lest, if they do so, the Soviet will eventually enter into a similar pact with Germany.

Wednesday 26th October 1938
Hankow has at last fallen to the Japanese, who entered yesterday.

Friday 28th October 1938
"Times" published my letter on the subject of mischievous propaganda, but only in very attenuated form.

Friday 4th November 1938
Konoe gave out a statement yesterday in the course of which he hinted at Japan's readiness to negotiate with the Kuomintang government.

Tuesday 8th November 1938
To Far East discussion at Chatham House after office.

Thursday 10th November 1938
Evening papers give pretty grim accounts of Jewish pogrom carried out today by Nazis in principal cities of Germany and Austria. Large numbers of synagogues destroyed, many thousands of Jews arrested, and wholesale destruction and plunder of Jewish shops and violence against Jews. A most disgraceful and barbarous business for a nation which boast so blatantly of its "kultur".

Monday 14th November 1938
Very interesting telegraphic despatch to Foreign Office from Clark-Kerr telling of his talk with Chiang. Chiang, he says, continues confident of ultimate success for China and, while admitting that the fall of Canton was wholly unexpected, appeared satisfied that it would be retaken before long. He was bitterly disappointed, however, at Britain's failure to help China financially and compared the readiness with which ten million pounds was voted for the help of Czechoslovakia with the failure to loan any money to China in spite of the pious resolutions passed at Geneva, Brussels, and elsewhere. He warned Kerr of the harm done to British prestige by this failure to implement these resolutions and by the calm way in which Britain had taken Japan's invasion of Southern China, which had always been regarded as Britain's sphere of interest. He also warned Kerr that, unless help was forthcoming from England in the immediate future, China would be compelled to turn elsewhere for help and, after emphasising that this was the last time he would give such a warning, he went on to hint very clearly that, unless this warning was taken to heart, Britain could hope for little or no consideration from China in years to come when the trouble was over, as China would always remember that help was withheld in the hour of her direst need.

One cannot but sympathise with Chiang and, whether he wins out or not, there is no getting away from the fact that his warning has a most ominous ring about it. Our prestige has suffered badly and the danger, which I myself have frequently expressed from the outset, that China may eventually make a settlement with Japan at our expense, cannot be overlooked. The damnable thing is that the forebodings and warnings which I and others (I myself in my last book 3 years ago and verbally at intervals since the Shanghai operations in February 1932) expressed, were pooh-poohed at the time and have proved all too clearly justified.

Another Foreign Office telegram is from Craigie and makes gloomy reading in that he expresses the fear that the assurances given him in the past by Ugaki, Hirota, and others are no longer to be depended upon, as those who gave them in all good faith have now been superseded by men of more extreme views, who talk freely of compelling the Western nations
to recognise that the old conceptions of "Open Door" etc. in the Far East no longer hold good and that Japan is now the paramount Power in East Asia.

Incidentally, a memorandum prepared by the Board of Trade (?), considering ways and means of bringing economic and financial pressure to bear on Japan, makes it clear that retaliatory measures are likely to do more harm than good and may even lead to war. I myself have expressed this view for a long time past, so there is a gloomy satisfaction in finding it confirmed by the trade experts.

Wednesday 16th November 1938

The Anglo-Italian Agreement has been signed at last and, inter alia, involves British recognition of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia. A distasteful but, under the circumstances, a wise policy, though it serves to emphasise all the more the folly of our continued refusal to recognise Manchukuo, which was brought into being by methods far less reprehensible than Italy's seizure of Abyssinia. Little wonder that the Japanese complain that different standards prevail for East and West.

Meantime Japan has rejected both the British and the American - and French - notes on the subject of broken pledges concerning the Open Door and Equal Opportunity with special reference to the Yangtze.

Thursday 24th November 1938

Craigie, commenting in a despatch on the implications of the Japanese Government's statement of 2nd November, Konoe's broadcast of 3rd November, and Japan's reply to the 3-Power representations on Japan's restrictions and discriminations on the Yangtze, expresses the opinion that the assurances given from time to time since the outbreak of the "incident" last year are, by these announcements, virtually rescinded; and he thinks that the real explanation of Ugaki's resignation is that Ugaki refused to break his pledged word. He pays him the compliment of adding: "He is that sort of man".

Monday 28th November 1938

After leaving the office I went to the Japanese Embassy to see Shigemitsu, whom I had not seen since his arrival here a month or so ago as Ambassador. He had asked me to tea, so I expected a regular tea-party; but rather to my surprise I found it was a tête-a-tête, no one else being there.

After 5 or 10 minutes of general talk, he got onto the subject of Anglo-Japanese relations and explained that he was much worried as to what ought to be done to stop the present unfortunate drift. Would I, as an old friend of Japan's, give him my views on the subject. We had a very frank talk and I thought it best not to mince matters, but to tell him just how the average Englishman regarded Japan's treatment of the Chinese and her failure to live up to her assurances about the Open Door, 3rd party interests, and so on. He, on his part, was equally outspoken with regard to Japan's attitude towards Great Britain.

While professing to appreciate the British point of view, he harped on the fact that the whole situation in the Far East had undergone such drastic change in the past year or two that the old conceptions no longer held good and that the best way to protect her interests was for
Britain to recognise the new situation that had been brought about and to co-operate with Japan. Moreover, while appreciating that the British stand at the outset had been dictated by her League obligations, he maintained that, as the League was now virtually dead in so far as its original form was concerned, the time had come for Britain to recognise and acknowledge that fact and to start afresh, unburdened by the League findings and resolutions which had been such a drag on her freedom of action in the past.

On the subject of a peace settlement, I asked him if there was any likelihood of Japan revising her decision not to deal with Chiang. On his replying that Japan could not discuss with him at present, I asked him if this ruled out the possibility of dealing with him in years to come if he returned to power after a temporary eclipse. He professed inability to foretell how Japan's attitude towards Chiang might change after peace had been restored, but recalled that, after her previous wars, Japan had always shown generosity to a defeated foe. His point seemed to be that the foe - in this case Chiang - must first be defeated and made to settle on Japan's terms. This done, Japan could then afford to show him generosity.

Wednesday 30th November 1938

Thanks to Daladier's firm handling, the 24-hour strike planned to take place throughout France today, has fizzled out. Broadcast appeals to the workers' patriotism, combined with military preparations to adopt drastic measures in case of need, served to avert a most dangerous and threatening situation, which was being engineered largely by Communist and other subversive elements.

This evening's wireless news reports a speech by Ciano at the opening of the Fascist Chamber, explaining Italian action at the time of the crisis. Referring, at the close, to Italy's inflexible resolution to safeguard the interests and aspirations of her people, Ciano was wildly cheered by the Deputies and spectators in the balconies, who shouted "Tunisia", "Corsica", and "Nice" - a demonstration deliberately planned to express a demand. Unpleasantly ominous.

Thursday 1st December 1938

The French are naturally furious at yesterday's demands in the Italian Chamber. Meantime apprehension with regard to future developments in the Far East has been aroused by Arita's failure to give the customary reassurances about the Open Door to the heads of the foreign diplomatic missions on the occasion of his first meeting with them after his assumption of the foreign portfolio.

Monday 5th December 1938

A cabled despatch from Craigie tells of a talk with Chichibu, whom he quotes as hinting that, if Chiang could be persuaded to break with the Communists, it would help greatly to pave the way to a peaceful settlement. He also indicated that a statement of Japan's war aims and peace terms was now under discussion and would probably be made public shortly.

Tuesday 6th December 1938

Konoe is quoted, in a recent Press message published in Shanghai by Trans-Ocean, as having informed the Privy Council that the "Incident" would be brought to an end sooner than
expected if Chiang, after the resignation of his present government, would consent to head the government of the new China. Very interesting and significant if true, as it appears to indicate that responsible Japanese are coming to realise that co-operation with Chiang would be the best way to ensure the stability and rehabilitation of China and to avoid China being thrown into the hands of the Communists, if and when the present trouble is concluded. It seems to bear out, too, the comment made by Craigie in a recent despatch, that Arita appeared to be aiming at bigger game than any of the Chinese leaders in the present "reformed" governments. I thought at the time that he meant Wu Pei-fu, who has been mentioned as the possible future head; but it may be that he had Chiang himself in mind. Incidentally, according to Press reports Wu Pei-fu has "disappeared" and cannot be found, and it is also reported that there is divided opinion between Doihara, representing the more moderate political elements in the Army, and the more extreme elements as to Japan's aims. Doihara is said to advocate being content with getting control over the 5 northern province only, whereas the others aim for all China. It is further reported that, on conclusion of the "Incident", Japan plans to leave garrisons in Canton, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, and Peking, but to withdraw all other troops; and one report has it that no further advance into the interior will be made after she has obtained possession of the Canton-Hankow railway.

Thursday 8th December 1938
Craigie has cabled to the Foreign Office a warning from Piggott about the serious repercussions to be expected if we grant an exchange stabilisation loan to China. Piggott tends to overstate the danger, though there is no doubt that such a loan, if made solely by ourselves, would have a very harmful effect on Anglo-Japanese relations. Piggott's contention is that it might be regarded as a "casus belli".

Tuesday 13th December 1938
A report from our G.S. at Shanghai on the Southern China Font Size=2>, Locock of the F.B.I., Kieb (German representative on the Non-Intervention Committee), Barnes (Hong Kong Shanghai Bank), Yanagida (banker), Okamoto (Counsellor), and the respective wives - and the Snows, whom I had not seen since they left Japan.

Had a long and interesting talk with Dirksen, which was only brought to an end when his wife, a somewhat commanding and austere matron, got up and called to him peremptorily, "Herbert! We must go!" Dirksen was, of course, Ambassador to Japan before coming here. Much struck by one remark of his. Expressing great admiration for the work done by the Japanese in Korea, he added rather surprisingly that the Japanese, like the Germans, were fine colonial administrators but, again like the Germans, seemed unable to win the love of their subject races. I could not help wondering if he would have been so outspoken if he had been in Germany!

Saturday 17th December 1938
The announcement made on the 15th regarding the credit of five million pounds granted to China by the U.S. appears to have come as an unpleasant jolt to Japanese complacency, as the belief had been studiously cultivated for a long time past that America was "truly neutral"
and that England was the real sinner. However, we seem determined to earn further reproaches by granting a credit of £500,000 to the Chinese, a sum totally inadequate to be of any real help to China, but more than sufficient to inflame Japanese sentiment against us still further. What fools we are.

Thursday 22nd December 1938

Much interested in a cabled despatch to the Foreign Office from Blount, our Consul-General in Canton, urging friendly co-operation with the Japanese authorities there. For the safety and welfare of Hong Kong, it is, as he points out, essential to be in control at Canton. In recognition of this fact, it has always been our policy in the past to establish friendly relations with whatever party happened to be in power there at the time. Now, however, that the Japanese are in control, it is but logical that we should work in with them there, quite irrespective of whether we approve of them or not. Quite apart from anything else, we are not, as he points out, in a position to refuse to have anything to do with them, unless we are prepared to risk a head-on collision; and, moreover, it is a far wiser and more effective policy to make minor concessions voluntarily now than to be forced into making them later. In short, the policy he recommends now with regard to Hong Kong and Canton is the policy that I myself urged in "The Problem of Japan" with regard to China long before the present trouble started in July last year, a policy which, if acted upon, might well have prevented this trouble, and saved China from her present plight, and safeguarded our own rights and interests in China.

Friday 23rd December 1938

The statement on Japan’s peace terms forecast to Craigie by Chichibu early this month was issued by Konoe last night and makes interesting reading. The statement embodies decisions recently approved by the Imperial Conference - decisions the announcement of which has been delayed for reasons not clear - and contains the following conditions:
1) Chinese recognition of Manchukuo;
2) Chinese adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact;
3) Consent to the stationing of Japanese troops at specified points as an anti-Communist measure, and the designation of Inner Mongolia as a special anti-Communist area;
4) Freedom of residence and trade in the interior for Japanese with facilities for the Japanese development of China’s natural resources, especially in North China and Inner Mongolia.

Sunday 25th December 1938

Christmas Day! A real white Christmas with thick snow and hard frost. Had Angus and his family to lunch, tea and supper - the first Christmas I have spent with Angus since 1908.

Saturday 31st December 1938

Wang Ching-wei reported to have urged Chiang to accept the majority of the Japanese peace terms as a basis for discussion, a report born out by official despatches to the Foreign Office, according to which the Japanese had got into touch with Wang some 3 weeks ago, prior to the publication of their terms, through the medium of Father Jacquinot. From official despatches it seems that, in spite of Chinese denials, there has been considerable friction of
late between Wang and Kung; and although Chiang himself professes to be absolutely opposed to negotiations with Japan on the basis of the terms set forth, Wang may in reality be flying an official kite.

Sunday 1st January 1939

The New Year starts with a mixture of optimism and apprehension regarding the coming months.

Strongly worded Note from U.S. protesting against Japan's policy in China delivered yesterday in Tokyo. The Note was by way of reply to the Japanese Note of November 18th and flatly refused to recognise Japan's efforts to end the Open Door policy in China and insisted that discrimination against U.S. interests must end. It declares, inter alia, the inability of the U.S. Government to "admit any need or warrant for one Power to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny" in areas not under its sovereignty, but announces U.S. readiness to negotiate for the changing of the treaties affecting China.

Tuesday 3rd January 1939

Konoe, not wholly unexpectedly, is reported to have resigned and Hiranuma and Minami are mentioned as the most likely candidates for the Premiership. Seems that Konoe's resignation is due, at least in part, to his statement on Japan's peace terms on the 22nd. The more moderate elements in Japan considered them too drastic, while the military and extreme nationalists regarded them as too lenient. If, as was probably hoped, they had been accepted by the Chinese or had caused a real split in their ranks, Konoe might have stayed on; but although Wang Ching-wei urged their acceptance, with reservations, as a basis of negotiations, he has been strongly denounced by all the other leading personalities in China and deprived of all his offices, and the expected split has failed to materialise.

Wednesday 4th January 1939

According to the evening papers Hiranuma has been appointed to succeed Konoe as Premier - a most unfortunate development, as he is an out-and-out reactionary; but Konoe was always regarded as the last of "the old order" of Premiership calibre, so Hiranuma's appointment comes as no great surprise.

Konoe's resignation is ascribed to his refusal to agree to Meantime Craigie reports from Tokyo that the French Ambassador there tells him that he has good evidence to show that the Japanese are planning to carry out a swift and sudden attack on the Soviet early in April with the object, apparently, of seizing the Maritime Province. Craigie himself appears a bit sceptical, but passes on the report to the Foreign Office for what it is worth. There are also indications that the Japanese are planning to occupy the Spratley Islands, in which case they will run foul of the French and possibly us too, so I hope to heaven they will try nothing of the kind. In themselves the islands are of no great value, but their strategic position is considerable.

Sunday 15th January 1939

See by the papers that Craigie presented a firmly-worded Note to the Japanese Government yesterday on much the same lines as the recent U.S. Note. In it [the British Government]
protested strongly against the unilateral revision of treaties (in connection with the question of the Open Door etc.) and aligned its policy with that of the U.S. although, like the U.S., it indicated its readiness to negotiate. In actual fact, the Note was already drafted when the U.S. presented theirs.

Monday 16th January 1939
Chamberlain returned from Rome last night. Although, as expected, the visit produced no concrete results or outstanding achievements, Chamberlain's reception by Mussolini and by the Italians in general appears to have been genuinely friendly. One can therefore but hope for the best, though it is unfortunate and disturbing that the Italian Press continues its campaign of virulent invective and abuse against the French.

Wednesday 18th January 1939
To Japan Society dinner in evening at Claridges in honour of Shigemitsu. Quite a good turn out - about 350 attending. Lindley took the Chair and Leslie Burgin, Minister of Transport, sprang the chief surprise of the evening by delivering about 5 minutes of his speech in Japanese, both the grammar and pronunciation of which were excellent on the whole. Apparently the study of Oriental languages is his particular hobby.

Monday 23rd January 1939
To Chatham House after work in evening for meeting of the Far East division. Davidson-Houston, who has just returned from China, where he has been doing M.I. work, gave some very interesting sidelights on the military situation out there at the present time.

Thursday 26th January 1939
Barcelona has fallen at last and Franco's troops took possession at noon today. Whether its fall will help the cause of peace or have the reverse effect remains to be seen. The general situation in Europe at the present time is pretty grim in any case, and has not been improved by yesterday's announcement that Italy has called up 60,000 reservists. Added to this is the rumour that Germany is planning another UP> January 1939

The Japanese are reported to be making strenuous efforts to persuade Wu Pei-fu to throw in his lot with them and to place himself at the head of the Japanese-controlled Government of China, but Wu continues evasive. This may be due in part to fear of assassination if he does so, for, as Davidson-Houston pointed out in his replies to questioning at Chatham House last Monday, a number of able men amongst the Chinese have evinced readiness to work in with the Japanese, but have been deterred by the fate of those who have done so and by threats of assassination if they do.

Tuesday 31st January 1939
Hitler's anxiously awaited speech last night proved very much less menacing than generally anticipated; in fact, although he intimated that, if Italy became involved in war, Germany would stand by her, he also professed belief that a long period of peace lay ahead. In consequence, markets have reacted favourably and have brought about what the evening papers call "a Hitler boom".

Thursday 2nd February 1939
Germany very wrathy with Roosevelt for his alleged remarks about France and the Rhine being now the U.S. frontier and for his criticisms of totalitarian states.

Friday 3rd February 1939
More bombings by the I.R.A. - this time Tottenham Court Road and Leicester Square tube stations. Wish some of the blighters could be caught red-handed and be handed over to the crowd for summary punishment. If they were lynched, so much the better. They would get what they deserved and it might serve as a healthy warning and deterrent to others of their own kidney [character]; but they haven't got the guts to come out into the open, but place their bombs in suitcases and the like.

Roosevelt has come out with a flat denial of the remarks he is reported to have made about the U.S. frontier on the Rhine etc. and he accuses his political opponents and others of having concocted and spread these reports deliberately.

Sunday 5th February 1939
The Spanish war, at least so far as Catalonia is concerned, looks like coming to an end at last. the Republican leaders are reported this evening to have crossed the frontier and fled into France, while soldiers and civilian refugees appear to be doing likewise in tens of thousands.

Monday 6th February 1939
Speaking in the House this afternoon, Chamberlain made an unequivocal statement to the effect that France can count on British support if attacked. This should have been clear from what had been said before, but up to now the Italians have professed to believe that Britain would stand aside in the event of a Franco-Italian clash over Tunis etc.. After Chamberlain's very definite assertion today, they can hardly profess this belief any longer.

The "Evening Standard" carries a full account of todays' hearing in regard to a number of men arrested in connection with the I.R.A. bombings. In addition to large quantities of explosives etc. having been seized in various parts of the country, a number of incriminating documents have been discovered, amongst those being orders and instructions for widespread incendiarism, bombing, and terrorist activities of various kinds.

Friday 10th February 1939
See by "The Times" that the Social Mass Party in Japan has amalgamated with the Tohokai under Nakano Seigo. Japanese "Labour" has been tending more and more in the direction of the "Right" for some time past, and this latest move on their part would seem to indicate that they have now gone over completely, lock, stock, and barrel. Nakano himself is a great admirer of Hitler's and will no doubt do his best to model his followers on the lines of the Nazi Party, but he is no Hitler and without a Hitler the process is not likely to succeed to any very great extent.

A.J. Cummings in the "News-Chronicle" has again come out with a piece of inside information about the strengthening of the Tokyo-Berlin-Rome "axis", which appears to have come from the Soviet cryptographers.

Evening papers report the occupation of Hainan by the Japanese.
Tuesday 14th February 1939

Arita has assured the French Ambassador in Tokyo that Japan has no territorial designs on Hainan and that its occupation by Japanese troops would not "in nature of duration exceed military necessity". Arita no doubt means what he says and to this extent his statement is reassuring. One cannot but feel apprehensive, however, lest the fighting services force the hand of their Government into making the occupation semi-permanent, if not actually permanent. If so, our own and the French and U.S. strategic position in the Far East will be very seriously affected.

Monday 27th February 1939

Situation in China far from reassuring. Following a series of murders of Chinese friendly with the Japanese in Shanghai - including assassination of the Nanking Foreign Minister, Chen Loh, on the 19th and of Marquis Li a few days later - the Japanese are accusing the International Settlement authorities of inability to control anti-Japanese elements in the Settlement and are threatening to seize the Settlement accordingly. Tension is increasing, too, in Tientsin on account of the Japanese action in encircling the British Concession with live wire etc.

Monday 6th March 1938

To pow-wow at Chatham House on Japan's economic position. Figures produced to prove (in theory!) her inability to continue the struggle in China for more than another 18 months at most, as her gold reserves will have been exhausted completely by then.

Tuesday 7th March 1939

According to a despatch from Craigie, Japanese naval, financial, business and Court circles are much perturbed by the way that Oshima, Ambassador in Berlin, has been forcing the pace in the matter of bringing about an alliance with Germany and Italy. Such an alliance is opposed by all these circles and it is to explain this that Ito, Abe and Tatsumi have been sent off on a secret mission to Germany; but the fear is that Oshima may have virtually committed Japan to an alliance already and that the Government's hand may be forced.

Wednesday 8th March 1939

Another very enlightening despatch from Craigie, according to which Oshima is on very close terms with Ribbentrop and Goebbels and, with them, is doing his best to prevent an Anglo-German rapprochement. Craigie also says he has learned that the Japanese occupation of Hainan was inspired by the Italian Government by way of distracting French attention from the Mediterranean. In this connection the despatch throws some interesting light on German-Italian relations. The Italian Embassy in Tokyo, it seems, was aware of Japanese plans to occupy Hainan a week or more before they were put into effect. The German Embassy was informed only one day before the occupation. Relations between the two embassies are said to be anything but cordial, and the relations between the local German and Italian communities are even less so. Incidentally the German Ambassador himself, General Ott, is strongly opposed to an alliance with Japan.
Amongst other interesting points mentioned in today's batch of copies of despatches from Clarke-Kerr and others are: (1) that Chiang is anxious to make a formal declaration of war, but is being urged by our people not to do so, as the Japanese would benefit more than he would by such action; (2) that according to diaries and letters found on the bodies of Japanese soldiers killed in action, a feeling of war weariness and disillusionment is making itself evident; (3) that according to Chinese official sources, the Chinese now have about two million trained men in the field, though our own people think this is an exaggeration and that the number is not more than one-and-a-half million; (4) that the Japanese have now given up any hope of obtaining Wu Pei-fu's co-operation; (5) that Schacht has been invited by the Chinese Government to become their chief economic adviser, but that the German Government won't allow him to accept; (6) that a suggestion has been put forward to utilise the present opportunity to purchase Kowloon and the leased territory outright, thus ensuring our own position at Hong Kong for all time and, at the same time, providing China with the funds she wants.

Personally I rather doubt the wisdom of this last point, as it would smack rather too much of Russia's action after the Triple Intervention of 1895 and would provide Japan with ammunition for denouncing Britain as hypocritical and unneutral.

Friday 10th March 1939
24 years since [battle of] Neuve Chapelle.

"The Times" carries an interesting despatch today from Tokyo on Arita's comments and explanations in the Diet about the Anti-Comintern Pact: "The point of this statement is the implicit declaration that Japan cannot sacrifice her relations with Great Britain, the United States, and France to the interests of her ideological allies."

Wednesday 15th March 1939

Following developments in Czechoslovakia during the past few days, Slovakia yesterday declared her independence and today German troops crossed the Czech frontier and marched unopposed into Prague. Europe is therefore once more faced with a first-class crisis; for, although the Slovaks are entitled to break away from the Czechs if they choose to do so, Hitler's action in suddenly seizing Bohemia and Moravia appears to be undiluted aggression and a complete violation of his Munich pledges.

In his recent talk with Henderson, Goering assured him half jokingly that, as he was going off for 3 weeks holiday to San Remo, no special developments were likely to take place for the time being, as otherwise he would not be going away. Either, therefore, Goering was deliberately trying to mislead Henderson, or else the more extreme element in Germany, who apparently do not see eye to eye with Goering took advantage of his absence to carry out this latest coup. There are indications that this second explanation is the more likely, and there are indications, too, that not only he, but the Italians as well, were kept in the dark as to what was intended, as Lord Perth reported to the Foreign Office on the 10th or thereabouts that Ciano had told the U.S. Ambassador, apparently in all good faith, that he could pretty well guarantee that there would be no major crisis in Europe this year.
Incidentally Lord Perth reported also that, according to the Chinese Ambassador in Rome, the Germans and Italians were urging Japan to patch up her difficulties with the Soviet and to settle the fishery question with Moscow as soon as possible so as to devote her attention to creating trouble for Britain and France. If this is really so, it may, of course, be that Rome and Berlin - or rather Ciano and Goering - were not as honest as they appeared to be in giving these assurances to the U.S. Ambassador and Henderson respectively and that their request to Japan was made with the deliberate object of holding Britain and France in check in the Far East so as to give Germany and Italy a freer hand in carrying out such acts as the seizure of Bohemia and Moravia.

Thursday 16th March 1939
Hitler has now proclaimed the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" as part of Greater Germany and has "accepted" Slovakia's invitation to be made a protectorate of the Reich. Thus ends Czechoslovakia, for Ruthenia, the only section left untouched by Germany, has been seized by Hungary, who has taken advantage of the present trouble to invade Carpatho-Ukraine and carry out her desire for a common frontier with Poland.
Apart from the gross immorality of the whole business - which included Hitler's dragooning of the unfortunate Czech Premier into ordering the Czechs to put up no resistance by threatening to bomb Prague out of existence if any resistance were encountered - one serious aspect of the latest developments is that Germany, by her action, obtains an addition of 1,500 aircraft to her already huge Air Force. She also gains possession of the famous Skoda munition works and a large number of other munition factories as well, plus all the war material of a very well equipped and up-to-date army - also ? 25 million in gold.
"The Times" has come out with a very strong "leader", which does not mince its words but says exactly what it thinks of Hitler and his broken pledges.

Friday 17th March 1939
Listened in this evening to the broadcast of Chamberlain's speech in Birmingham, a speech which will go down to history. After defending his policy at Munich, he launched forth into bitter denunciation of Hitler for his gross breach of faith in breaking his pledged word - a pledge repeated three times in public and in private - and declared that, by his action, Hitler had made it impossible for anyone ever to accept his assurances again. Indignation, disillusionment, and bitter irony alternated as he spoke, and the cheering of his audience was terrific especially when, after stressing his own devotion to the cause of peace and his detestation of war, he went on to declare that he would sacrifice almost anything for the sake of peace, but would never sacrifice liberty for peace. Hitler, he said, had now shown that he was bent on European and even World domination and the time had come for the democracies to fight, if necessary, to prevent it.
Coming from a man known for his moderation in word and thought, his words and his outspokenness were all the more striking; and if they don't give Hitler cause to ponder seriously on the fatal folly of his present policy - and one doubts if they will - it is to be feared that nothing ever will do so.
In line with Chamberlain's speech is an equally strong protest issued by the U.S. One result of Hitler's action is the cancellation of the visit that was to have been made by Hudson and Stanley to Berlin for their much-heralded trade talks, of which so much had been hoped. Another outcome of it is the recall of Sir N. Henderson to report on developments. On top of all this comes the announcement of the breakdown of the talks on Palestine, the British proposals having been rejected by both Jews and Arabs.

Saturday 18th March 1939
Hear that the Government has received a despatch from Henderson, who has always been regarded as almost too pro-German in his outlook, expressing the most bitter disillusionment and indignation at Germany's latest action and at the way he has been deliberately deluded by the Nazi leaders all the time.
Hear also that the German coup, though anticipated eventually by our General Staff, caught them unawares, as it was not expected for another 3 months or so. As an indication of the revulsion of feeling caused by Hitler's action, "The Times" carries a letter this morning from Lord Esher, repudiating everything he wrote in an article in the "Fortnightly Review" last December advocating a colonial rearrangement with Germany. "You cannot", he declares, "make an arrangement with a ruler whose word no man relies on".
It is now reported that Germany, through the head of her economic mission in Romania, has delivered a virtual ultimatum to the Romanians. (Subsequently proved untrue). If, according to this report, Romania will agree to close down all her factories and limit herself to agriculture, and if she will give Germany a complete monopoly in the matter of Romanian exports of grain, oil, lumber, cattle, and foodstuffs, Germany is prepared to guarantee her territorial integrity and independence.

Sunday 19th March 1939
France yesterday sent a strong Note to Germany denouncing her actions, and the U.S. are expected to send one tomorrow.

Monday 20th March 1939
Found my three usual travelling companions in the morning train somewhat pessimistic about the situation, which all of them seem to think makes war more likely than it was at any time in the September crisis. At that time Campion never faltered in declaring his belief that there would be no war; but today, when recalling this, he frankly admitted that he felt no such comfortable conviction with regard to the present crisis and he considers that if war comes it will come almost immediately. One can but hope that his gloomy forebodings prove unjustified.
Incidentally he tells me that Romania and Yugoslavia have been put in a rather uncomfortable position as a result of Germany's seizure of Czechoslovakia, as they are almost entirely dependent on the Skoda Works for their equipment and munitions. This, combined with the loss of the Czech Army, he considers a serious blow for us, although, on the credit side is to be place the fact that Germany's action has served to stir up the U.S. in our favour.

Tuesday 21st March 1939
Campion & Co. still very pessimistic. Recalling Hitler's speech earlier this year to the effect that Germany must "export or bust", Campion expressed the opinion that, with the economic screw being threatened more and more by Britain, America etc., Hitler may feel that the only way to avoid the "bust" will be to hit out before it is too late. If so, he is likely to attempt a rapid knockout blow by sending a great horde of bombers to attack London and, as Campion put it, Hitler would start with the advantage of "15-Love" in his favour, as the attack would be carried out with little or no warning.

Wednesday 22nd March 1939

Hitler's latest move is to take possession of Memel; but as this development was not unexpected and as Memel was largely German in any case, its occupation has not created the sensation that was caused by his seizure of the Czech country. At the same time, his method of obtaining possession seems to have been on a line with his other "triumphs", namely a campaign of propaganda alleging ill-treatment of local Germans and so on, followed by a threat of brute force if Lithuania failed to hand the place over to him.

Saturday 25th March 1939

Germany is very full of her three major successes at the expense of the democracies in the past few days - the absorption of Slovakia, the annexation of Memel, and her trade pact with Romania. Unless we take more definite steps to show the smaller countries of Europe that we are prepared to back up our words, if necessary, with force, it looks as though Germany will simply continue her present triumphal progress. Poland and others are showing quite clearly that they require something more tangible than words to prove our readiness to give concrete assistance against further acts of aggression - the adoption of conscription, for example, and definite commitments. There is a growing feeling in England that we should bring in conscription without delay; but the devil of it is that Chamberlain is pledged not to adopt it in peace time and Atlee & Co. remain adamant in their opposition to such a step.

Hear that 160 Japanese M.P.s are petitioning Hiranuma [Prime Minister] to form a military alliance with Germany and Italy against Britain and France.

Sunday 26th March 1939

According to this morning's "Sunday Times", Germany has unofficially warned both Poland and Roumania against collaborating with the Soviet. The Polish War Office journal, on its part, has issued a statement, clearly intended for Germany, declaring Poland's readiness for war "even against the strongest of our antagonists". On the other hand, Poland appears somewhat scornful of Chamberlain's proposal for a joint declaration of resistance to aggression and thinks that something more concrete and definite is required.

Monday 27th March 1939

Guy Dawnay has a short but telling letter in to-day's "Times" emphasising our failure to make either our friends or our enemies believe we are in earnest, and although Atlee & Co. continue to stand out strongly against conscription, there is a growing feeling that conscription
or some other equally definite move on our part is required if German aggression is to be checked.

Tuesday 28th March 1939

Madrid has surrendered at last; so now, thank goodness, the Spanish War may be regarded as virtually at an end.

Slovakia and Hungary continue to bomb each other and no one quite knows what is coming next.

Hear that Finland is much perturbed at Britain seemingly linking up with the Soviet - and no wonder; but, under the circumstances, I suppose it is unavoidable, though personally I would almost as soon trust Berlin as Moscow. Learn, too, that Ciano may be replaced by Grandi and that, if so, Hitler, is likely to go "beserk".

According to information reaching the Foreign Office, Hitler has explained to Mussolini that he seized Czechoslovakia and moved towards Roumania so as to ensure Germany of certain essential sources of supply, as he is convinced that, in the event of war, the U.S. will join England and cut off all supplies.

A most interesting despatch from Craigie giving his views on Japan's probable actions in the event of a European conflagration. He strongly urges the immediate despatch of 3 or 4 capital ships to Trincomalee, as he considers that, if war comes, their presence there would have a salutary effect on Japan and serve to deter her from joining in against us. If this suggestion is carried out, he suggests that Japan should be informed tactfully beforehand that they are being sent there, as otherwise it might lead to misunderstandings and possibly aggravate the situation.

Wednesday 29th March 1939

The German Press has started a violent campaign of abuse and accusation against Poland as it did in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia immediately prior to annexation - a most ominous action.

Valencia and other towns and cities in Spain have now surrendered to Franco.

Chamberlain, replying to a question in the House yesterday, stated that what the Government had in mind in its discussions with other nations at the moment went "a great deal further than consultation". This is certainly more encouraging.

Thursday 30th March 1939

Dear old Mother was buried this afternoon in St. Alban's Cemetery at Hindhead in Father's grave, next to Marjory and Leslie. A beautiful, peaceful spot overlooking the open moors.

See that Hiranuma has declared that, as Japan is neither democratic nor totalitarian, she confronts neither bloc. It looks, therefore, as though the more moderate elements are still in control and have managed to restrain those who are urging a military alliance with Germany and Italy against Britain and France.

Daladier made a firm and statesmanly broadcast yesterday on France's stand against Germany and Italy and made it clear to Italy that she was not prepared to yield an inch of territory.
Germany is reported to have made demands on Poland concerning the Polish Corridor, though the report is denied in Berlin.

Hore-Belisha announced yesterday plans for bringing the Territorials up to war strength and doubling that strength so as to bring the total establishment up to 340,000.

Friday 31st March 1939
Chamberlain announced in the House this afternoon that we have pledged ourselves to help Poland to the fullest extent in the event of Germany attacking her. This is certainly a move in the right direction and should have a good psychological effect.
The pledge was welcomed on all sides in the House, a fact which goes to show the great change brought about during the past few weeks by Hitler's actions, which have served to unify British public opinion.

Saturday 1st April 1939
Japan yesterday announced the annexation of the Spratley Islands. Though this is by no means unexpected, it remains to be seen what France will do about it.
For the third or fourth day in succession, further I.R.A. bomb outrages are reported in various parts of London.

Monday 3rd April 1939
The main development to-day has been the arrival of the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, in London on his official visit, of which much is hoped.

Wednesday 5th April 1939
King Ghazi of Iraq has been killed in a motor smash and the wretched British Consul at Mosul, Monck Mason, has been murdered by a mob, which had been incited to attack him and burn down the Consulate by agitators, who asserted that the King had been assassinated by the British.

Moscow, with whom our Labour crowd are so anxious for us to link ourselves, is excelling itself by its vituperative abuse of Britain as the enemy of mankind. Dymott told me only a day or two ago of a Moscow broadcast in English on these lines, which he himself had heard, and this vituperation is fully confirmed by recent Press reports. Those who urge a virtual alliance with the Soviet might well ponder upon the words of a speaker at the 18th Communist Congress, which closed just a fortnight ago. A "capitalist war" (i.e. a general conflagration in Europe) should be welcomed, he asserted, as it would provide good soil for a crop of Bolshevism. As pointed out very aptly by "The Times" Correspondent in Warsaw, this view was merely a reflection of what is expounded in "The Foundations of the International Policy of the Soviet Government", published in 1933, which is still the basis of Soviet foreign policy, just as much as "Mein Kampf" is the basis of Hitler's. It is really amazing how the Labour Party and other the situation in the Balkans is, for us, complicated by the fact that Bulgaria labours under grievances against the Versailles Treaty similar to Germany & Co. and is more likely to side with them.

Thursday 13th April 1939
Chamberlain announced in the House this afternoon that Britain and France had pledged their full support to Greece and Roumania in the event of their independence being threatened, the same as to Poland, and made it clear that, although Britain had no intention of occupying Corfu, she would "take a very grave view if anybody else occupied it". On Easter Day, he said, [the British Government] had been informed by the Greek Government that, according to information received, Italy was intending to attack Corfu in the near future. Italy had subsequently given concrete assurances both to Britain and Greece that she had no such intentions.

Although pressed by Atlee and others to denounce the Anglo-Italian Agreement, Chamberlain declined to do so and declared that, in spite of Italy having violated certain of its terms, the crucial test would come after the victory march into Madrid, as Italy had pledged herself to withdraw all her troops from Spain as soon as this had taken place and [the British Government] was not prepared to denounce the Agreement unless this pledge was broken. According to one report, Italy's seizure of Albania was in part due to her fear of Germany's advance towards the Mediterranean - an interesting commentary, if valid, on the real state of relations between Germany and Italy. The War Office, I am told, is inclined to believe this and to believe, too, that Italy acted without informing Germany of her intentions, although at first it was believed that the whole thing had been pre-arranged at the recent Italo-German Staff talks.

This rather adds point to the concluding comment in an article by Winston Churchill in to-day's "Daily Telegraph" on the situation in the Mediterranean. After pointing out Italy's vulnerability and the present dispersal of her armies in Spain, Libya, Abyssinia etc., he expresses the belief that, in the event of war, Italy would be a liability rather than an asset, as Germany would probably have to go to her aid. In conclusion he remarks that it remains to be seen whether Italy's pledges to Germany are anymore dependable than those to Britain, which she has already broken; in other words he appears to hold the view that I have so often expressed- i.e. that it should occasion no very great surprise if Italy eventually "ratted" on Germany if Mussolini considered it would be to her advantage to do so.

Saturday 15th April 1939
Hear that our M.O. branch at the War Office are worried about the coming visit of a large portion of the German Fleet to the Mediterranean and Atlantic, as they consider it may be planned to threaten, or actually attack, Portugal from the sea while the Italian and Spanish exert pressure on the land frontiers with the object of forcing Portugal to join with them or even to be annexed by Spain. In support of this fear, it is pointed out that Italy has been pouring troops into Spain of late and now has about 60,000 there.

Alternatively it is suggested that the German Fleet movement is for the purpose of enabling it various units to scatter in the event of war and act as commerce raiders.

It seems to be thought probable that, in the event of war, Germany will strike in a number of places at once - e.g. Portugal, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland etc., so as to leave us uncertain where and how to act. How to counter such moves is a serious problem, as the only
part of Germany at all vulnerable at the start would be East Prussia and that would have to be left to Poland to tackle.

Hear that in recent Anglo-French Staff talks we apparently cut rather a poor figure, as we wanted the French to provide troops for some of our garrisons, including Gibraltar, and not unnaturally the French declined and made it clear that we must pull our weight by adopting conscription without delay.

Had Dr. Kolbe to lunch at the R.E.S., he having rung me up yesterday at the Foreign Office from the German Embassy to say that he was in London for a few days. He is now in the Foreign Office at Berlin in charge of cultural relations, having returned from Japan last autumn. Had a long and very frank talk on the present state of Anglo-German relations. I had always regarded him as a very liberal, broad-minded sort of fellow; but, though just as friendly as ever, I could not but be struck by the whole-hearted way in which he seems to have been converted to the National Socialist creed. Some of the assertions he made by way of proving what he said were clearly the outcome of unscrupulous propaganda and I did my best to disillusion him. To some extent I think I succeeded, as he admitted that many of the reports he quoted were merely hear-say, and he seemed rather struck by what I said by way of rebutting certain of his statements about Czechoslovakia, as he remarked that he had rather suspected the German official explanation at the time.

To my argument about the folly of Germany and Italy plunging Europe into war and thereby playing into the hands of the Soviet, he assured me that Hitler would certainly not risk by war the edifice he had built up if he thought there was any likelihood of the Soviet gaining advantage. His whole policy was anti-Soviet and it was because he had saved Europe from Communism that he was now so indignant with Britain for seeking Soviet aid for the encirclement of Germany. If a man like Kolbe is prepared to put forward such arguments in, apparently, all good faith, one almost despair of expecting Germany to listen to reason. She seems incapable of understanding that, if she goes on as she is doing at present, war is inevitable whether Hitler really wants it or not.

Sunday 16th April 1939

Announced that the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which has been holding joint manoeuvres with the Atlantic Fleet off the East Coast, has been ordered to return to the Pacific without delay. The reason for this is not given, but presumably it is intended to act as a deterrent to those in Japan who might be tempted to force the Government's hand into having a smack at Hong Kong and Singapore - not to mention the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, etc. - in the event of a general conflict in Europe. It should, in fact, have much the same effect as the despatch of British capital ships to Trincomalee as suggested recently by Craige.

Tuesday 18th April 1939

Hear that, according to Kano, the Army and Navy in Japan are showing definite signs of war weariness and are becoming worried at the dissatisfaction being expressed in the country districts.

Wednesday 26th April 1939
Reports from Japan indicate that Germany is doing her best to persuade Japan to enter into a
definite alliance with her against the “democratic” bloc. A small but powerful section of the
Japanese are strongly in favour of this, but most of the Cabinet, including Hiranuma, are said
to be firmly opposed to committing the country in this way and in this they have the support of
most of the civilian elements, the political parties, and the Navy.
It would, of course, be a great thing for Hitler if he could announce an alliance with Japan in
his coming speech to the Reichstag. Heaven forbid he will be able to do so. The one thing to
fear is that our attempt to link up with the Soviet may serve to tilt the scales in favour of those
urging alliance with Germany. Craigie is doing his best to allay the Japanese Government’s
fears about the Anglo-Soviet talks, pointing out that they are concerned only with co-operation
in Europe and not in any way with the Far East.
Announced in the House this afternoon that the Government has decided to bring in
conscription for all men between the ages of 20 and 21.

Thursday 27th April 1939
Japan is reported this evening to have rejected Germany’s pressing overtures for her to ally
herself with the Axis Powers.

Monday 1st May 1939
Lunched with Sir John Pratt in his rooms in the Inner Temple. He has some beautiful Chinese
works of art there, including a couple of imitation Wedgewood vases made by command of
the Emperor Chen Liu at the time of Lord Macartney’s mission to China at the close of the
18th Century. They were presented to Pratt some years ago by the Nanking Government.
Pratt’s reason for asking me to lunch was to ask my opinion as to the best means of carrying
out British propaganda in Japan, as he is to be put in charge of the Far East branch of the
Ministry of Information which, he confided, is under contemplation.

Tuesday 2nd May 1939
Voroshilov, in a May Day speech, has been holding forth on the wonders of the Soviet Army,
which, he indicated, is spoiling for a fight, but is only interested in a big war and not in any
little one!

Wednesday 3rd May 1939
To cocktail party in evening at the Carlton given by Yano by way of farewell to himself and of
introduction to the new Japanese Naval Attaché, Captain Kondo. Was much struck by the
way in which a number of the Japanese to whom I spoke referred to Anglo-Soviet relations
and harped on the fact that, in their opinion, our main object in trying to link up with the Soviet
was due to our fear that, unless we did so, the Soviet might turn to Germany as an ally. It is,
of course, known that there has been a mild flirtation between the General Staffs of the
German and Soviet armies for some time past, but it struck me as rather significant that this
point was stressed so strongly to me by one Japanese after another and I could not help
wondering if this fear of a German-Soviet alliance had something to do with the heated
discussions now going on in Japan regarding a German-Japanese alliance.
As matters stand at present, the Soviet are wanting France and ourselves to join them in a
definite alliance, in return for which they are prepared to guarantee the independence of
various small countries; but we are unable to fall in with their demands, which were brought
back by Maisky [Soviet Ambassador to Britain] on his return from Moscow a day or two ago.
What the outcome will be, Heaven alone knows. What we want is a pledge from Russia to
come to the aid of her Baltic and Balkan neighbours in the event of attack.

Thursday 4th May 1939

Another unexpected development, the exact significance of which is not yet clear. Opened the
paper this morning to hear that Litvinov has resigned and been succeeded by Molotov. In
view of the remarks made yesterday by my Japanese friends, it would almost seem as though
they may have had an inkling of this and interpreted it as an indication that Stalin and Litvinov
did not see eye to eye on the question of Anglo-Soviet and German-Soviet relations.
In this connection Dymott tells me that, in listening to recent broadcasts from Moscow, he has
been struck by the fact that little or nothing has been said about Anglo-Soviet rapprochement
and that England is abused quite as freely as Germany, if not more so.

Friday 5th May 1939

"The Times" report about Litvinov's resignation is most enlightening and significant and
serves to bear out the views that I myself have so often expressed - that the Soviet policy is
aimed at producing and profiting from chaos in Europe.
The Japanese Government is reported to have decided definitely against a military alliance
with Germany and Italy against the so-called democratic Powers [Kennedy uses "so-called"
because the Soviet Union is included], though she is said to be prepared to enter into a
limited alliance for mutual assistance in the event of a Russian attack on any of the three Axis
Powers. "The Times", however, appears doubtful as to whether a formal decision has been
reached yet.

Saturday 6th May 1939

Beck's statement yesterday about Poland's policy is highly extolled in England and France for
its combination of firmness and studious moderation. He defended the agreement with Britain
and the rejection of Hitler's proposals on Dantzig [Gdansk] and the Corridor, but expressed
Poland's readiness to join in conversations with Germany if the Reich was prepared to
proceed by peaceable methods.
Berlin takes the view that the situation remains unaltered, but the fact that the text of the
speech has been withheld from publication in the German Press would seem to indicate that
Hitler & Co. are anxious to avoid letting the German people see how moderate and
unprovocative it was.
The following comment from Rome about German-Polish and German-Soviet relations is of
considerable interest:
"It is asserted with some authority that if [Hitler] fails to get what he wants from Poland now by
negotiation he will make an approach to Russia, the first steps towards which have already
been taken, with a view to squeezing Poland with Russian help."
As reflecting the Japanese attitude towards Germany and the fear of a German-Soviet rapprochement, the following despatch from Tokyo to "The Times" is most enlightening:

"Claiming that it is repeating military views, the "Kokumin" suggests that the Soviet Government is now seeking a rapprochement with Berlin in the effort to estrange Germany from Japan. As Britain and France (according to the newspaper) are trying to limit the Soviet's participation in the peace front to guarantees to Poland and Rumania, the Soviet Government fear that they will be abandoned in the long run and prefer to approach Germany. Herr Hitler's omission to attack Russia in the Reichstag speech is construed as an invitation to refuse to enter the anti-German camp, and M. Litvinov's resignation is interpreted as an indication that Soviet policy is changing. The "Kokumin's" conclusion is that Germany will not easily accept the Soviet's overtures, but that Japan must pay the closest attention to these developments."

Brought Hasegawa out to Camberley for tea and supper and had a long and interesting discussion with him on Anglo-Japanese relations and foreign affairs in general. One point that he expressed a number of times recalled similar views expressed to me by Homma, when over here for the Coronation, and by Dr. Kolb, when he lunched with me at the R.E.S. a couple of weeks ago, and was of interest in that it appears to reflect nationalist mentality in general. In each case it was stressed that Britain must realise that the days had gone by when she could adopt the attitude of a superior dealing with an inferior. Japan (in Kolb's case, Germany) was no longer an inferior, but an equal, and demanded treatment as such. To this Hasegawa added the enlightening comment that the younger generation in Japan felt that the older generation was far too ready to show deference to England and others - like a pupil to a former master or a son to his father - because the older generation had been brought up in the days when Japan was still more or less in that relation to the great Powers. Those days, however, were now a thing of the past and it was necessary, according to Hasegawa, for the older generation of Japanese and for Britain etc. alike to recognise the fact that all were now equal.

Sunday 7th May 1939
According to this evening's wireless news, it is announced in Milan, following the meeting there between Ciano and Ribbentrop, that a military and political pact has, as expected, been concluded between Italy and Germany. Though they do not say so, they are probably a bit sore that Japan has declined to join them in it. From what Hasegawa told me yesterday, her refusal to do so was in no small part due to the Emperor's objection to joining the pact.

Wednesday 10th May 1939
According to a despatch to the Foreign Office from Clark-Kerr, who is at present in Chungking, Chiang urged strongly that Britain should join up with the Soviet and make the pact applicable to the Far East as well as to Europe. If, as a result, Britain came into armed conflict with Japan, he offered to provide up to 200,000 Chinese troops for the defence of Hong Kong. That Chiang should try to drag us in on his side is perhaps not unnatural, but it is to be hoped that we shall not allow ourselves to be inveigled in this way. It is perhaps
fortunate that Eden is no longer in power, as he might have fallen in with the idea. Halifax is not likely to do so.

Shigemitsu [Japanese Ambassador], in a talk with Halifax yesterday, expressed the opinion that the suggestion that the Soviet may link up with Germany if Britain fails to enter into alliance with Moscow should not be taken too seriously, as he considers it is merely a device on the part of the Soviet to frighten Britain into falling in with her wishes. He recalled that Moscow used a similar device some years ago to bring about her pact with France.

Saturday 13th May 1939
Announced yesterday that an Anglo-Turkish defensive agreement is to be concluded shortly and, pending its conclusion, Britain and Turkey have declared that, in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area, they would lend each other all the assistance in their power. This is all to the good.

Tuesday 16th May 1939
"Ready to fight aggression but not for the retention of the "status quo"" sums up the attitude expressed by a correspondent in to-day's "Times". A very sound slogan.

Opinion in this country appears, unfortunately, to be tending more and more to advocate falling in with the Soviet demand for an actual alliance. Both Eden and Churchill are amongst those advocating such a step, though Eden's contention in the "Sunday Times" last Sunday that the Soviet showed a high standard of international morality and good faith (or words to that effect) strikes me as being utterly incompatible with the known facts.

Wednesday 17th May 1939
Had a talk with Colonel Burkhardt, who has just returned from Hong Kong where he has been G.I. Intelligence for some time past. Grimsdale, he tells me, has succeeded him.

He had not heard of Chiang's offer of 200,000 troops for the defence of Hong Kong, but he agreed they would be more of a liability than an asset, though he thought that if we could recruit and train a brigade of Shantung men such as used to compose the Weiheiwei Regiment, it would be invaluable at Hong Kong. He seems to have a poor opinion of Japanese aircraft and tells me the engines wear out far more rapidly than ours.

Thursday 18th May 1939
Ran into Steptoe, who tells me he has just returned from China via the new Burmah road.

Says it is good in parts - like the parson's egg.

Thursday 18th May 1939
Here that Goering, on going to Valencia recently on the recommendation of the German Ambassador, who had forecast a great welcome for him in Spain, found not a soul to meet him except his own Ambassador. He was so disgusted that he returned to Germany without more ado.

Colonel Thompson tells me he heard from a member of the British horse-jumping team in Rome that the British team was put to considerable embarrassment at times by the friendly cheering given to them and by the booing and even hissing given to the Germans - another interesting sidelight on the Rome-Berlin Axis!
Friday 19th May 1939
In a most interesting despatch to the Foreign Office on the 13th, Craigie warned [the British Government] of the bad effect it will have on Japan if we link up with the Soviet. If we conclude such a pact, we shall, as he points out, merely risk making a certain enemy of Japan in order to gain the very uncertain friendship of the Soviet, and he adds the well-merited warning that Japan should not be underestimated. His advice is that it would be better to reserve an Anglo-Soviet agreement as an answer to a Japanese move rather than take the initiative which would drive Japan into the opposite camp.

Araki, he says, is one of the strongest opponents of an alliance with Germany and although

Tuesday 6th June 1939
Situation in Tientsin becoming somewhat tense owing to the Japanese threat to blockade the British Concession unless we hand over 4 Chinese terrorists who are alleged to have taken part in the murder of a pro-Japanese Chinese official in April. Jamieson, our Consul-General there, is strongly urging our Government to comply with the demand and says that his recommendation has the full support of our Brigadier and of the leading British legal authority, as the 4 Chinese in question, though retracting the confession of guilt which they made to the Japanese, are known to be members of a terrorist gang and to have been responsible for various acts of terrorism. The Chinese contend that their confession was extracted under torture, but Jamieson quotes medical evidence to the effect that their bodies showed no signs of torture. Be that as it may, our Foreign Office for reasons best known to themselves refuse to have the men handed over, as they say there is no "prima facie" evidence against them. Another typical instance of doing the exact opposite to what the man on the spot recommends. A most dangerous policy in a case like this, as we shall be placed in an impossible position if, as seems likely, the Japanese carry out their threat and a most serious situation will then be brought about, a situation which is likely to be exploited to the full by the extreme elements amongst the Japanese. Jamieson clearly recognises this and indicates that we are only weakening the hands of Homma, "the one pro-British General in the Japanese Army", who is having a hard enough task as it is to restrain the more hot-headed elements and to give us time to fall in with these demands.

Wednesday 7th June 1939
In evening went with Angus and K. to the Aldershot Tatoo, where Gamelin took the salute. Spectacularly the Tattoo was as good as ever, but in view of the international situation one could not but wonder what Gamelin thought of it all. C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre!

Friday 9th June 1939
Lunched at the Caledonian with Ferrers who was "throwing a party" for about 15 or 16 members of the Regiment [Cameronian Regiment], past and present, and for their wives. The Regimental "Tea" was held at the Tower this afternoon, the Battalion being stationed there at present, but unfortunately I could not spare the time to attend.
Becoming increasingly clear that Britain is being used as a scape-goat in the Far East by way of explaining away the failure to finish off the war with China more rapidly; and in this the Japanese are seemingly acting to some extent under German and Italian pressure. A most sorry state of affairs.

Sunday 11th June 1939

To Matins with K. and then on to lunch and tea at Farnborough with the Almses.

Alms tells me that Spears, who has been detained at Kalgan for the past week or more by the Japanese, got into somewhat similar trouble once in India when he was found wandering around in mufti without a permit in one of the Indian States. Spears is probably innocent of the espionage charge laid against him by the Japanese, but, as Halifax remarked in strangely ponderous language in a telegram to Craigie a day or two ago, "It has been present in my mind that the propriety of Colonel Spear's action might not be without objection".

Wednesday 14th June 1939

The Japanese have carried out their threat to blockade the British Concession at Tientsin and an unpleasantly serious situation has, as predicted, been created. Unless we are prepared to use force and risk an armed clash, the only outcome seems likely to be a miserable climb down on our part and a disastrous loss of "face". No doubt the Chinese and the Germans (though from different motives) are equally delighted to see how we have allowed ourselves to be jockeyed into this sorry plight, but how we expect to gain anything by it, God knows.

Poor Jamieson made a most abject appeal to the Foreign Office some 2 or 3 days ago urging once more that he should be authorised to hand over the 4 terrorists and pointed out, that not only did the Brigadier support him in this final appeal, but also the whole British community, as they saw no reason why they and the many thousands of innocent Chinese in the Concession be sacrificed for the sake of 4 self-confessed criminals. The French too are as sick as muck about it, as their Concession also is to be blockaded unless these 4 men are handed over. It really is simply amazing that our people in the Foreign Office should take up the stand they have done and place us in this impossible position.

The Tientsin branch of the China Association, in an appeal forwarded by Jamieson on the 10th, emphasised very aptly that [the British Government] must recognise that they are "no longer in a position to force their ideals on the Far Eastern peoples".

The pity is that these telegrams, and the advice and facts contained in them, cannot be made public. Our people would then be in a position to judge for themselves the rights and wrongs of the case and be brought to realise that Halifax has little or no justification for declaring that there is no "prima facie" evidence to prove these men guilty.

It is now being suggested that a mixed commission of three - an Englishman, a Japanese, and a neutral - should examine the facts and decide whether or not the men should be handed over, but the proposal has come too late and the Japanese say ominously that "the arrow has already left the bow" and that they "will not sheathe the sword until the British Concession has turned a new leaf". No longer is it merely a question of handing over the 4 terrorists; the Japanese now declare they will not relax the blockade until Britain agrees to co-
operate in the establishment of the "new order" in East Asia and to cease their support of the Chinese currency.

Apart from the dangerous situation brought about in Tientsin itself, I'm afraid the present tension will serve finally to drive Japan into the alliance with Germany and Italy which the extremists have been demanding, as it is bound to weaken the hands of the Government and moderates in Tokyo and may lead to their overthrow.

Thursday 15th June 1939

The Tientsin situation gets steadily worse and British subjects are being submitted to indignities which are likely to do immense harm to our prestige in India and other Asiatic countries if we fail to take drastic action; but the difficulty is to see what action we can take which will hit Japan harder than ourselves. It is all very well for people to say, as they are saying, that we should give Japan a good "kick in the pants"; but unless we can do it in such a way as to make it more painful for Japan's backside than for our foot, there is little satisfaction to be obtained in doing so. One suggestion is that we should close Hong Kong, Singapore, and Penang to Japanese shipping; but once you start retaliation of this kind, you are treading on very dangerous ground, as retaliation by one leads to retaliation by another and may end in war. It is simply amazing that Halifax should not have foreseen the grave possibilities of refusing the advice of Jamieson, the Brigadier, Kent, Craigie et al., who all warned him of the dire consequences. Instead, he preferred to listen to Clarke-Kerr, who has been strongly opposed to handing over the 4 terrorists. Kerr, who was in Chungking during the big air raid a short time back, may be forgiven for feeling pretty bitter towards the Japanese, but that does not excuse him for letting his heart over-rule his head in this matter and for getting us into this horrible mess.

In a telegram of the 11th, which I saw to-day, Jamieson is very outspoken in his criticism both of Halifax and Clarke-Kerr for ignoring the advice of those on the spot; and in another telegram he asserts that the Japanese are both legally and morally justified in their demands. The terrorists admitted to British police officials and others that they were carrying arms at the scene of the assassination and that they helped to cover the retreat of the assassin. If that is not prima facie evidence, what is? The Japanese, he declares, believe justifiably that we are already guilty of a breach of faith and would be still further confirmed in that belief if - as suggested - we merely expelled the 4 men from the Concession and gave them a chance to escape. As for the suggestion that we should take retaliatory action if the Japanese - as they have since done - institute a blockade, he emphasises the dangers of such counter-measures, especially in view of the fact that we would "not be on a sound wicket". Finally, he warns [the British Government] of the hardship, loss and danger of life which a blockade is bound to inflict on the British community and predicts that it will ruin all the good work that has been done in the past 80 years and sound the death-knell of British trade in North China. Force is added to his appeal by the stress he lays on the fact that the advice tendered by himself and the Brigadier is not influenced by fear, but primarily by the rights and wrongs of the case.
Monday 24th July 1939
The formula reached at Tokyo is published this morning, but, though it should provide at least a breathing space, it seems to me to be far from satisfactory, as the Japanese are likely to interpret it one way and we another, with the result that, unless we are careful, the situation may become worse than ever. At the same time, it enables a start to be made on the main negotiations which is all to the good.

Tuesday 25th July 1939
To Chatham House for a lecture by Pickering. On the whole the lecture was deplorable and Pickering made a very bad impression, both by his manner and by his attempt to put forward Japanese propaganda of the crudest type. Not the kind of talk to win sympathy for Japan. A case of “Save me from my friends”.

Thursday 27th July 1939
Evening papers announce that Roosevelt, unexpectedly and entirely off his own bat, has informed Japan of his intention to abrogate the Commercial Treaty of 1911 six months hence. Though the official announcement carefully avoids any mention of the motive behind it, the implication is obvious and will come as a shock to most Japanese, who have been kept in ignorance of the growing volume of resentment in the U.S. against Japan.

Friday 28th July 1939
The I.R.A. Bill for action to stop terrorism was rushed through its final stages and received the Royal Assent this afternoon. It is being put into operation without delay and the police are carrying out wide-spread round-ups in the hope of seizing those responsible for the bombing outrages at King’s Cross and Victoria on Wednesday.

Monday 31st July 1939
Though the talks with Russia still hang fire on the question of the guarantee for the Baltic States, it was announced in the House this afternoon that British and French missions are to be sent to Moscow shortly for Staff talks.

Tuesday 1st August 1939
The Tokyo talks on Tientsin seem to have struck a snag on the questions of the currency and the silver in the banks in the British Concession. The Japanese are demanding that we should cease supporting the “fapi” [Chinese currency as opposed to that introduced by Japanese into areas occupied by them] and that we should hand over the silver belonging to the Chinese Government in the banks, but we can do neither without the consent of other interested Powers even if we wished to do so. On the other hand, reasonably good progress appears to have been made on the question of policing etc.

Poor Craigie is faced with the unenviable task of not only trying to defend British interests, but also to safeguard the Japanese Government against the onslaughts of the Japanese Army and extremist elements. From what Craigie says, it is clear that the Japanese Government would readily compromise with us if they could, but if they do so they would bring down the wrath of the Army on them and would be overthrown and replaced by extremists. That would
make things worse than ever. Kato has been very frank in admitting privately to Craigie the very delicate position in which Arita and Co. find themselves.

Wednesday 2nd August 1939

Craigie very upset at learning that arrangements have all but been made for granting three million pounds credit to the Chungking Government under the Export Guarantee scheme, and he is strongly urging that the idea should be abandoned or at least postponed. If the loan goes through it will, as he says, make further negotiations in Tokyo impossible and will lay us open to a charge of bad faith. He even goes so far as to hint that the position of himself and the senior members of his staff would be so seriously impaired by such a step at the moment while negotiations are in progress that they would have no alternative but to resign office. Meantime anti-British processions continue in Tokyo, though these are said to be organised largely by politicians, who see an easy way of winning a little cheap and momentary popularity for themselves.

Friday 4th August 1939

Chamberlain spoke out very frankly in the House to-day on the Far Eastern situation - in fact, perhaps rather too frankly, as he emphasised our own weakness in the Far East and the difficulty of taking any action there while our hands are tied as they are at present in Europe, and then went on to deliver what he stressed was only a warning (though it sounded uncommonly like a threat) that we would, if necessary, take action against Japan. One can only hope that the Japanese extremists will not interpret this "warning" as pure bluff and attempt to call it accordingly.

Having remarked that the Japanese were doing things that "made his blood boil", he explained that our Fleet in the Far East was much inferior to the Japanese and that, if war broke out there, our scattered communities in China would be in a most unenviable position - a fact that I stressed in my last book 4 years ago.

He then spoke of our own heavy commitments in Europe and, by way of emphasising the difficulty of taking action in the Far East, stressed that there would be "greater and nearer dangers in the next few months". That facts such as these should be brought home to our people is all to the good, but the pity is that those of us who have been emphasising for some years past the dangers and difficulties into which our policy was leading us went unheeded or else were derided as "pro-Japanese". To emphasise these dangers and difficulties at this late stage must merely serve to encourage the Japanese to believe that they can go ahead with impunity.

Monday 7th August 1939

Bank Holiday. Took the children in afternoon to see "The 39 Steps".

Friday 11th August 1939

Ciano and Ribbentrop met at Salzburg. Generally believed that one of the principal matters discussed was the Dantzig question, as Italy is believed to be worried lest Germany take action liable to precipitate a general conflagration.

Saturday 12th August 1939
British and French Staff talks with the Soviet opened in Moscow. Following on yesterday's meeting at Salzburg, Ciano and Ribbentrop saw Hitler to-day.

Sunday 13th August 1939

Germany is now attempting to bring pressure on Hungary via Slovakia, where she is reported to be concentrating large masses of troops. Should she succeed by these means in forcing Hungary to join the Axis, Poland will be open to attack from Hungary as well.

Saturday 19th August 1939

The "War of Nerves" (as the German campaign of propaganda and intimidation is now called) is boiling up and the situation in Europe is becoming more tense and ominous than ever.

Sunday 20th August 1939

European situation increasingly tense and it is difficult to see how Hitler can climb down without serious loss of prestige such as he cannot afford. No longer is Germany demanding merely the return of Dantzig. The German Press is demanding also the return of the Polish Corridor, Polish Silesia, and western Poland up to the 1914 frontiers.

Monday 21st August 1939

Papers announce the conclusion yesterday of a German-Soviet Trade Agreement. Is this the beginning of the threatened German-Soviet rapprochement!

Tuesday 22nd August 1939

An unexpected bombshell has added fresh complications to the general situation. Germany and the Soviet, the morning papers announced, have concluded a non-aggression pact. The possibility of such a pact was rumoured some weeks ago, but no confirmation was forthcoming and everyone though the idea had fizzled out. Now, just as we and the French are in the midst of Staff talks with the Soviet, and the Polish crisis is coming to a head, along comes this bombshell- which all goes to show (what so many of us have said all along) how utterly untrustworthy and unscrupulous the Soviet are.

Germany, of course, is delighted, as she no longer has anything to fear from the Soviet if she goes for Poland and she boasts that she has thereby scored a great diplomatic victory over Britain and France who will now see that the game is up and go back on their pledges to Poland accordingly.

Japan has been given a nasty jolt by the announcement of the German-Soviet Pact, as not only had she been kept completely in the dark about Germany's intentions, but she fears that, with the German threat removed from her western flank, the Soviet will now be free to turn her attention to the Far East. Meantime the crisis is drawing to a head and the issue of peace or war seems likely to be decided within the next few days. British visitors have therefore been advised to leave Poland without delay.

Thursday 24th August 1939

The German-Soviet Pact was signed in Moscow late last night and its terms are even more amazing than expected. One cannot but feel that, behind it all, is some sort of agreement or understanding for the partition of Poland as rumoured in the Press. Meantime Americans are being advised to leave England and British to leave Germany; British shipping is being
diverted, lighting restrictions stressed, and numerous other precautions taken in view of the
imminence of war.

My particular branch of the Foreign Office received orders this morning to pack up all our
secret documents etc. and to proceed to "War Stations" tomorrow.

Friday 25th August 1939
Left by road for war station [Bletchley Park], arriving there a bit before noon after a 60-mile
run. Found that no arrangements had been made for providing us with lunch, and the school
which is to serve as our office building is still occupied, so we won't be able to get in our stuff
and settle down to work till tomorrow at the earliest. Found, too, that we are to be billeted in
Northampton, 23 miles from our work, so thither I took Roscoe in my car in evening and now I
am sharing a single room with him at the Angel Hotel, a 16th century coaching inn, as
accommodation is limited. Ostensibly we are now engaged in "Civil Air Defence", but this
camouflage seems a bit thin and why we can't admit that we are a branch of the Foreign
Office heaven alone knows!

Sunday 27th August 1939
After breakfast took Roscoe by car, first to my new billet at Wavenden House, Wavenden, to
dump my baggage there, and then on to his new billet at Woburn to dump his before going on
to our war station at Bletchley to spend the Sabbath at work. In evening took Roscoe and
Turner to their new billet at Woburn and Marsden to Wavenden, as he and I are both billeted
there. Our host is one Le Roy Lewis, a former 12th Lancer, who was invalided out of the
Service after the War with shell shock. He and his wife prove most charming hosts and have
a beautiful house in a large estate. Marsden and I have very comfortable rooms in it and a
sitting room and bathroom to ourselves. A really comfortable way to conduct a war!

Monday 28th August 1939
Evening wireless reports that Hungary, having refused on the 26th the offer made by
Roumania on the 25th to conclude a non-aggression pact, has now proposed to Roumania a
pact for mutual better treatment of minorities [Large Hungarian minority in Transylvania].
Other outstanding developments reported this evening are the British closure of the
Mediterranean and Baltic, the return of Henderson to Berlin with the British reply to Hitler's
proposals, and the resignation of the Japanese Government as a result of the German- Soviet
Pact. General Abe (Nobuaki) has succeeded Hiranuma as Premier- a healthy sign, as he is
Ugaki's right-hand man and has always been regarded as a moderate and is in close touch
with the leading industrialists and financiers.

Tuesday 29th August 1939
Craigie is strongly urging [the British Government] to take steps for improving relations with
Japan without delay while she is still brooding over the scurvy trick played on her by
Germany, as otherwise the opportunity may be missed and she may even be led into making
her peace with the Soviet at our expense. Such a step, he says, is being urged by certain
small but powerful sections in Japan and he considers that the Soviet would be quite
prepared to throw over China, in the same way as she has thrown over Poland, if she thought it would be to her advantage to do so.

Wednesday 30th August 1939
Hear that 10,000 cardboard coffins have been prepared for the disposal of those killed in the initial air raids on London. Sounds a bit grim! Cardboard has been used for the dual purpose of conserving wood and facilitating the burning of the corpses.
On way back from office in evening, put in an hour's walk in Woburn Park, the Duke of Bedford's place, with Marsden. A grand spot with ostriches, deer, and other birds and beasts wandering about freely.

Thursday 31st August 1939
Announced in evening that, as a precautionary measure, the evacuation of 3 million children and invalids from London etc is to start tomorrow.

Friday 1st September 1939
On arrival at war station this morning learned that news had been received that Germany had started land and air operations against Poland. Though not yet technically at war, this means presumably that we shall be at war within a matter of 24 hours or possibly less- and all because of the gross ambitions of a criminal lunatic. Parliament met today at 6 p.m. and in the course of his speech, just broadcast in the evening news, Chamberlain stated that [the British Government] and the French had informed Hitler this morning, that unless the German troops were withdraw from Poland without more ado, we should carry out our pledges. General mobilisation for all services was announced today and conscription between 18 and 41 is to be enforced.

Saturday 2nd September 1939
A day of suspense, with no word of British or French military action against the Germans despite our pledge to Poland. Rumours in the morning that internal unrest had broken out in Germany were followed in afternoon by rumour that our failure to implement our pledge was due to France having "ratted" at the last moment. It seems incredible and I hope to God it is not true. This evening's wireless made no reference to any such rumours, but Chamberlain in his speech in the House to-day rather hinted at some sort of hitch with regard to Anglo-French action, though he tried to soft-pedal this by emphasising that some delay in concerting plans with France was inevitable under the circumstances. If France really is going to climb down - though it seems almost inconceivable that she will- this would account for the remarks which Mrs. Le Roy-Lewis told us some days ago had been made to her while in France recently. England was berated, she said, for trying to drag France into war.

Sunday 3rd September 1939
We are now at war with Germany once more. The announcement was made this morning in a broadcast by Chamberlain at 11.15 a.m., following an official warning on the wireless at 10 a.m. in which it was revealed that [the British Government] had given Germany until 11 a.m. B.S.T. to return a favourable reply to our demand for her withdrawal from Poland and that so far there had been no sign of reply.
Though a Sunday, we worked all day at the office the same as last Sunday, and on leaving off I went over to the 6 p.m. Service at the Church, which is just next to our office, and heard the King's speech broadcast at the opening of the Service. I had previously been round to ask the Vicar, one Partridge by name - a very pleasant old chap - if he could have the speech broadcast at the outset and he very sportingly agreed to do so.

Other outstanding developments mentioned in the 9 p.m. wireless were: (1) Reorganisation of the Cabinet, with Churchill brought in as 1st Lord [of the Admiralty] and a number of other changes. (2) France also is now at war. (3) Japan has indicated her intention to remain neutral. In view of recent telegrams exchanged between Craigie and the Foreign Office, Japan's action was not wholly unexpected. Edwardes, in fact, has been sounding out Halifax on behalf of Shigemitsu as to the possibilities and prospects of resuming the Anglo-Japanese negotiations initiated by Yoshida in June 1937 just prior to the outbreak of the China "Incident" and Halifax has indicated his readiness to fall in with the idea of taking concrete steps towards a rapprochement.

Children evacuees from London have been pouring in to this district the last few days and the local cottagers and country-folk have responded nobly by taking in a large number of them. The evacuees are largely from the East End and are apparently amazed to find they are expected to have baths daily, wash before meals, and change into night clothes when they go to bed! Fear is, in fact, being expressed that when, after the war, they return to their own very cramped and squalid homes, they will begin to rebel against a return to such conditions and there will be serious unrest in consequence. I am afraid, however, that the possible "unrest" from this source will be mild in comparison with the general unrest in Europe when the war is over, as discontent and distress is likely to be widespread no matter which side wins and the Soviet will exploit it to the full. The unrest after the war may, in fact, prove an even greater disaster than the war itself, though God forbid.

Monday 4th September 1939
Looks very much as though Italy, in spite of its recent protestations of firm support of Germany, intends to keep out of the War, even if she does not actually "rat" and turn against her ally. According to our Minister at the Hague, there is considerable unrest in Germany and in some places statues of Hitler are said to have been overturned, and the Gestapo are afraid to bully the people in their usual way lest it lead to serious outbreaks. These reports may be exaggerated, but are probably true up to a point, as there are other indications too that dissatisfaction is on the increase. Possibly this will be increased still further by the 6 million leaflets dropped over Germany yesterday by R.A.F. machines.

Tuesday 5th September 1939
Officially announced that 12 R.A.F. bombers carried out an air raid on Wilhelmshaven and the Kiel Canal yesterday with considerable success, a German warship receiving two direct hits. A fine piece of work.

Sunday 17th September 1939
Almost simultaneously with the announcement of an armistice concluded yesterday on the Manchurian-Mongolian border between Japan and the Soviet comes the news that at 4 a.m. today the Soviet invaded Poland. The Soviet try to excuse their action by declaring that the collapse of the Poles in their resistance to the German onslaught has created a situation dangerous to Russia, but this pretext is unlikely to deceive anyone and it looks very much as though the reports that the German- Soviet Pact included plans for the partition of Poland were true after all.

Monday 18th September 1939

According to wireless news the aircraft carrier "Courageous" was torpedoed and sunk last night by a German submarine with heavy loss of life- a sad loss, though the submarine, which is believed to have been destroyed by depth charges, deserves full credit for the risk it took and for its skill in eluding the destroyer screen. The German and Soviet armies are reported to have met at Brest Litovsk and exchanged friendly greetings. "The Times" has a very scathing "leader" on Soviet treachery and duplicity and compares the Soviet to a hyena, which helps itself to the prey seized by the Germans, who have at least fought for their victory.

Tuesday 19th September 1939

Hitler, in a speech at Dantzig today, warned England that, if she insisted on continuing the fight instead of agreeing to the terms offered by Germany when the Polish campaign is ended, he will be compelled to resort to a new weapon against which there is no defence. Is this just bluff or has he something in the nature of a death ray?

Saturday 23rd September 1939

Petrol rationing started, my allowance being only 6 gallons a month [i.e. only one trip home to Camberley per month!], though I also get 5 gallons a week for transportation between war station and billets.

Thursday 28th September 1939

To Camberley in evening for my day's leave, being taken there by Curnock, who was motoring down to Portsmouth. On arrival found Angus there, much annoyed that he has not yet been called up for service. He contends, with not a little justice, that it would be much better in every way to call up men like himself, who not only are able to train others but are much better suited for "cannon fodder" than youngsters who are potential fathers. Men of his age, he contends, can be spared much better, as their usefulness to the country is now virtually at an end, whereas youngsters in the early 20s have not yet had a chance to show their usefulness.

Friday 29th September 1939

German-Soviet agreement announced whereby Germany is to receive Soviet raw material in exchange for manufactured goods. The two countries also announce the partition of Poland between them and appeal to Britain and France to make peace. Also announced that the Soviet have bullied Estonia into a 10-year agreement, by which Estonia becomes to all intents and purposes a protectorate of the Soviet.
**Tuesday 10th October 1939**
Having turned Estonia and Latvia into virtual protectorates, the Soviet has now done the same to Lithuania, with whom this evening she concluded a 15-year mutual assistance treaty.

**Sunday 22nd October 1939**
Moved from Wavendon House to new billets at Aspley Guise, my new hostess being a Mrs. Arnold, who lives at Woodside House. A much more homely atmosphere and very comfortable.

**Sunday 12th November 1939**
To 7.45 a.m. Service at Aspley Guise and to Armistice Service at Bletchley in afternoon. In evening called in on Clothier, Rector of Aspley Guise, to ask if he knew of anyone in Aspley Guise who would provide billets for Sophie Harper and Maxie Russell, as they are wanting to leave their present place.

Listened in to Winston Churchill's broadcast and was rather disgusted with it. Unnecessarily boastful and vulgar in parts, he disgusted me particularly in his comments on the Soviet's actions in the Baltic States and Poland. Far from condemning them, he rather gloated over them in that they served to block the way for Germany.

**Monday 13th November 1939**
Maggie [wife] is by way of attending the tribunal at Hastings which is threatening to intern Evelyn Lachman (even though she herself is British-born) because she is married to a German and admits to being fond of her husband. The way in which both she and Dr. Lachman have been treated is an absolute scandal and makes one ashamed of one's own country. Some of the treatment accorded to the unfortunate Dr. Lachman is almost unbelievable in any country outside Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, and now Mrs. Lachman is being bullied by a magistrate rejoicing in the good old British name of Picciotto! Maggie has gone to give evidence in favour of Mrs. Lachman, as the said Picciotto refused to accept that of Mrs. Roscoe and another friend, who went to appeal for her last week, and he was infernally rude and insulting to them both.

**Tuesday 21st November 1939**
Home on 2 days' leave and heard from Maggie [wife] full details of her attendance at the tribunal last week. Seems that when Mrs. Lachman told Picciotto at the first hearing that she thought Handley Page and Lord Sempill would be prepared to vouch for her, Picciotto was damned rude to her and practically called her a liar, as (so he said) men like that would not mix themselves up with people like herself and her husband. He was somewhat taken aback therefore when Handley Page and Sempill appeared in person with Maggie and 4 or 5 others to speak in her defence and he got it straight from the shoulder from both of them; and, although he had previously professed to Mrs. Lachman that he had most damning evidence against her husband, he was compelled to admit to Handley Page and Sempill that he had no evidence against him at all. He also admitted that, contrary to ordinary British Law practice, these tribunals are run on the principle that the accused is guilty unless he can produce evidence to the contrary. Anyway, thanks to Handley Page and Sempill, Mrs. Lachman is now
a free woman and subject to no further restrictions of any kind, and Dr. Lachman is to have his case tried in London almost immediately. Seems that, so far as Sempill is concerned, it was the Admiralty who urged him to attend the tribunal, as they are very anxious to get Dr. Lachman acquitted as soon as possible, so that he can return to his work as a technical expert in aircraft construction.

In regard to Dr. Lachman’s application last year for naturalisation papers, Maggie tells me it was a case of "the conversion of Private McSlattery". Seems that Handley Page had been urging him for a long time to make the application; but although Dr. Lachman was a great admirer of Great Britain and had a strong dislike of the Nazi regime, he hesitated to change his nationality, as he did not feel he could give his undivided loyalty to Britain. One day last year, however, the King paid a visit to the Handley Page works and Dr. Lachman was presented to him. Dr. Lachman was so struck by his personality and by the keen interest he showed in his (Dr. L’s) work, that afterwards he went to Handley Page and said: "The King is a man to whom I feel I could give my undivided loyalty. I now wish to take your advice and become a British subject". He therefore applied for naturalisation papers and his application was on the point of being granted when the war broke out and he was interned. He was thrown into Lewis Gaol as though he were a common criminal and was then sent to a concentration camp at Clacton, where he was treated little better. With other German prisoners he was made to scrub the floors and perform other menial duties and was not even allowed to have his warmer clothes when it turned cold. One of his fellow prisoners, a 70-year old Count, was given solitary confinement for complaining against similar treatment and subsequently died from the effects while several other German prisoners fell ill. Seems almost incredible that such things should happen in England, but such was the case.

It is now believed that the Germans have been dropping a number of magnetic mines off the English coast by means of aircraft. It is thought that this is what Hitler had in mind when he threatened to use a weapon against which England would have no defence. Some means of defence will, however, be found nevertheless.

Saturday 25th November 1939

Read an interesting but somewhat disturbing despatch from Craigie, giving the combined and unanimous opinion of himself, the French Ambassador and the Polish Minister about the growing danger of Japan throwing in her lot with Germany and the Soviet in the belief that by no other means can she liquidate the China "affair" in a reasonably short time.

The Germans now claim that Majors Stevens and Best, the two Passport Control officers kidnapped recently from the Dutch side of the frontier in the Venloo affair, have made a full "confession" of their activities in the British Secret Service and that they were connected with the recent bombing attempt on Hitler’s life. This "confession" appears to have been made under the influence of the drug used by the Soviet to extort "confessions" in their infamous purges and need not, therefore, be taken very seriously, though they are said to have revealed (quite correctly!) the address of the British Secret Service Headquarters.

Thursday 30th November 1939
Soviet invaded Finland.

Tuesday 5th December 1939

Halifax, speaking in the House today, strongly condemned the Soviet's action in invading Finland, but laid the principal blame on Germany. While it is perhaps but natural that the Government should wish to avoid a clash with Russia at the same time as we have Germany on our hands, I can't help feeling that our own moral position would be greatly strengthened if we took our courage in our hands and risked war with Russia as we would very possibly rally the Scandinavian countries and others, including even the U.S., to our side if we did so.

Latest despatches from Craigie indicate that a titanic struggle is now taking place behind the scenes in Japan between the Shiratori faction, which advocates rapprochement with Russia and Germany, and Tani (Shiratori's former bosom friend and collaborator), who seeks closer friendship with Britain and the U.S. and France. Thanks to Germany's action in linking up with the Soviet and to the latest developments arising from the invasion of Finland, the Tani faction appears to be gaining ground.

Wednesday 6th December 1939

There is now a growing fear that the Soviet are planning to take action in the Balkans and it is considered ominous that Moscow has invited Roumania to conclude a mutual assistance pact as the Baltic States have done.

Thursday 14th December 1939

News of sea battle off River Plate yesterday, when German pocket-battleship "Graf Spee" was forced to take refuge in Montevideo harbour after great fight with 3 British light cruisers. League Council yesterday expelled the Soviet from the League- and a very good riddance too.

Monday 18th December 1939

"Graf Spee" was scuttled by her commander outside the harbour last night.

Monday 25th December 1939

Christmas Day! After lunch listened in to the King's broadcast, which ended up with a very appropriate quotation, though one quite unknown to me. His closing words were: "I would like to say to you: "I said to the man who stood at the Gate of the Year, "Give me a light that I may tread safely into the unknown." And he replied, "Go out into the darkness, and put your hand into the Hand of God. That shall be to you better than light, and safer than a known way". "May that Almighty Hand guide and uphold us all".

Thursday 28th December 1939

Returned to Bletchley and had a grand skid on the way, owing to snow which set in shortly after leaving Camberley.

Monday 1st January 1940

Another year started. How will it end? War still going strong or peace once more on the wing? If peace, what will internal conditions be like? Pretty grim, I fear me, but one can but hope for the best.

Friday 5th January 1940
45 today. Gosh!

Saturday 20th January 1940
Hard frost continues - 24 degrees of it last night.

Sunday 21st January 1940
Moved billets, from the Arnolds to the Clothiers.

Monday 22nd January 1940
The Finns continue to put up a wonderful resistance against the Soviet attacks, though there are indications from inside sources that, unless more aid is forthcoming from ourselves and others, they are unlikely to be able to hold out many more months and may be forced with the alternatives of surrender or annihilation once the thaw sets in.
The Japanese have made a strong protest against the stopping of the "Asama Maru" and removal of 21 German passengers by a British warship. Whatever our legal rights may have been, it is a pity we could not have done it on the other side of the Pacific, as the fact that the incident took place within 40 miles of Yokohama is likely to touch the Japanese on the raw and cause some pretty strong feeling.

Thursday 25th January 1940
The "Asama Maru" incident is assuming very disquieting proportions and anti-British demonstrations and protests are the order of the day in Japan. Obviously we can't afford to climb down, but unless something is done to ease the situation anything may happen, as Japan's "amour propre" has been hit badly and the pro-German element is doing everything possible to exploit an already dangerous state of sentiment and to bring about the downfall of the new Government, which is accused of being pro-British and weak-kneed.

Monday 29th January 1940
Roads appalling. Ran into snow drift on way back in evening and spent over half an hour digging out the car. Another half an hour or so was spent shovelling snow away before the car could get up to the garage and then had to employ 3 men and a blow lamp to open the garage, as the doors were frozen solid in the runners and refused to budge.

Wednesday 7th February 1940
Papers announce settlement of "Asama Maru" incident, the British agreeing to return 9 of the 21 Germans and the Japanese laying down that Japanese shipping companies are to refuse passage in future to the nationals of belligerent countries who are member of the fighting services or suspected of being on their way to serve as such. Craigie deserves high credit for his handling of a most dangerous situation.

Sunday 18th February 1940
Great jubilation in England over the bombing of the "Altmark" by a party of British sailors and the release of 300 British prisoners, whom the Germans had seized from various ships sunk by the "Graf Spee".

Sunday 10th March 1940
With the fate of Finland now in the balance, speculation is rife as to what can be done to help the Finns if- as one prays- they reject the Soviet demands and go on fighting. We can't send
troops via Sweden and Norway without the consent of those two countries and both decline to
give it, as they are scared stiff of Germany, who is said to have threatened to march on
Stockholm if consent is given. To send troops round by Petsamo- as some have suggested-
would be far too risky a venture, as the difficulty of convoy would be tremendous. It is thought
by some, therefore, that our only chance would be to strike at the Caucasus in order to divert
the Soviet's attention and thereby relieve their pressure on the Finns. That, however, would
necessitate direct attack on the Soviet, with ourselves striking the first blow, and some of our
bright beauties in the Labour Party- though willing enough to criticise the Government for lack
of initiative and push and for failure to help the Finns- profess to regard an "attack" on the
Soviet with holy horror. Personally I shall not be surprised if the next big move DOES come in
either the Balkans or the Near East and if oil does not play an important part in bringing it
about, as Roumanian oil is now much to the fore and Baku and Batumi are oil centres at
which we might well strike a useful blow by air, even if we cannot reach them by other means,
while the security of the Iraq and Iran oilfields and of our pipe-line to Haifa is bound to
influence the course of events in those parts to an immense degree.

Tuesday 12th March 1940
Evening wireless tells of contradictory reports of Finland signing peace. Also tells of Daladier
announcing that an allied force of 50,000 British and 50,000 French has been ready since
February 26th to proceed to Finland, though their despatch is dependent on a formal request
from the Finns and on Norwegian and Swedish permission to pass through their territory.

Thursday 14th March 1940
The Scandinavians are seemingly already beginning to scratch their heads about their own
future, now that Finland has accepted the Soviet terms.

Sunday 17th March 1940
The Germans carried out an air raid on Scapa Floe today. No great damage seems to have
been done, though one civilian was killed and one or two cottages were wrecked- the first air
attack on British soil since the war started.

Wednesday 20th March 1940
British carried out a series of air raids last night on Sylt and Hornum by way of reply to
German raid on Scapa.

Tuesday 9th April 1940
Looks as though the war is now about to start in real earnest, for today has seen big
developments. The first inkling was given in the 8 a.m. wireless news, in which it was
announced that Germany had landed troops in Norway and had marched into Denmark.
Further details came later, and in the course of the day it became known that the Germans
had carried out landings at Bergen, Oslo, and other points in Norway and were over-running
Denmark. Norway has declared war, but the wretched Danes have had to submit and
Copenhagen is now in German hands. One report has it that the Germans have landed as far
north as Narvik, but it is though that this is a mistake for Larvik, which is in the south of
Norway near Oslo.
Wednesday 10th April 1940
A great sea battle is now raging off the Norwegian coast, and by this evening it was known that German naval losses included the sinking of the "Blucher" and another cruiser, while we, on our side, have lost a couple of destroyers.
To Camberley in evening on 4 days' leave.

Saturday 13th April 1940
The Piggotts came over from Ewhurst [nr. Cranleigh, Surrey] in afternoon. Piggott tells me that the reason the warnings from Tientsin went unheeded in the summer was that they were short-circuited by Cadogan, who failed to pass them on to Halifax and Butler, who were kept in ignorance of them until too late. Piggott had this direct from Butler himself.

Sunday 14th April 1940
Officially announced in morning papers that 7 German destroyers were sunk yesterday in Narvik Fjord by British naval forces in a brilliantly executed attack.

Monday 15th April 1940
Returned to Bletchley a.m. Evening wireless announced the landing of British forces in Norway, but whereabouts and how many are not mentioned. It is to be hoped that their arrival will help to stiffen up the Norwegian defence, which has been handicapped from the start by treachery in their own ranks and by the rapidity and unexpectedness with which the Germans struck.

Tuesday 16th April 1940
Papers report statement made to the Press yesterday in Tokyo by Arita, expressing anxiety about the Dutch East Indies in the event of Holland being drawn into the War. Japan, he declared, will oppose the extension of the war into the Pacific and must consider the defence of her interests in the Dutch East Indies.

Thursday 18th April 1940
Statement by Cordell-Hull on the 17th in reply to Arita warns third Powers that the U.S. too are vitally interested in keeping the War out of the Pacific and in seeing that the status quo of the Dutch East Indies is maintained. Although it looked at first as though Japan's professed anxiety about the Dutch East Indies might be a pretext for carrying out a sudden coup, it now seems to have been perfectly genuine and devoid of ulterior motive. What Japan apparently fears is that the U.S. may place an embargo on oil, in which case she would have to depend on the Dutch East Indies for her oil supplies; but if Holland enters the war, the U.S.- according to rumour- might be invited to look after the Dutch East Indies. Japan might then be cut off from this source of supply too. All she wants to ensure therefore is the maintenance of the status quo.

Friday 26th April 1940
Mungo [son] notified of his appointment to H.M.S. "Hawkins" in the South Atlantic. Little did I think when I lunched aboard her at Yokohama with Admiral Levenson and Allington in September 1923 at the time of the Earthquake that my young son would join her as a "snottie" 17 years later in the next Great War!
Thursday 2nd May 1940
Evening wireless announced that Chamberlain had revealed in the House that we have withdrawn and re-embarked our troops from the Andalesnes area. Though the withdrawal is said to have been carried out by General Paget without loss, I'm afraid it will have a bad effect on our prestige.

Friday 3rd May 1940
Returned to work a.m. from Camberley after two very pleasant days there with the family- the last we shall have together for many a day, I fear, as the girls will be returning to school on Monday and Mungo [son] expects orders to sail any day now.

British evacuation of the Namsos area announced on wireless in evening, so South Norway is now left to the Germans who are, in consequence and not unnaturally, very cock-a-hoop. A sad blow to our prestige.

Saturday 4th May 1940
Mrs. Plowden, who has lived many years in Italy and is well versed in things Italian, tells me she feels reasonably confident that Italy will not come in against us. Her reasons are interesting and sound convincing. These are that the Pope has made it clear that, in the event of Italy joining in with Germany, he and the Vatican will leave Italy. This would have such a powerful effect on the Italian people as a whole- most of them being staunch Catholics- that Musso. is unlikely to accept the risk of driving the Pope out of Rome. The House of Savoy, too, would never tolerate such a step, and Musso. fears that if, in spite of this, he dragged Italy in on the side of Germany, the bulk of the people would turn against him and rally to the King. On the other hand she admits that, although Italians as a whole dislike the Germans intensely, they have absorbed so much German propaganda that they have come to have both hatred and contempt for the British.

Monday 6th May 1940
Eye witness accounts from Norway go to show that the movements of our troops there were simply paralysed by constant air attack to which, owing to lack of fighter machines and A.A. guns, we were unable to reply. At the same time, the moral effect of this constant bombing from the air is said to have been infinitely greater than the actual casualties inflicted by it. Our movements were likewise much hindered by treachery, as our gun positions were given away by Norwegian spies almost as soon as they were taken up.

Thursday 9th May 1940
Last night's division in the House resulted in a majority of only 80 for the Government, the voting being 201/281. One feels disgusted with the Labour crowd for the way they tried to make party capital out of the Norwegian set-back, though there can be no doubt that there is a widespread feeling in the country as a whole that drastic changes are required in the management and leadership of the country if we are to avoid further serious reverses, as even admitting the tremendous advantages accruing to the Germans from the dirty methods they are employing, it ought to be possible for us to show greater initiative and push than we have exhibited hitherto.
Mungo [son] has received order to join "Hawkins" at Freetown in Sierra Leone and is to sail from Liverpool abroad the "Accra" on or about the 14th.

To town with Maggie [wife] and Mungo in morning; then to Kew Gardens for the first time since Heavens-knows-when; and then back to Ealing to look up Midge and her father.

Seemed strange seeing Freeland Rd. [parents' home in 1920's], Castlebar Hill, Durston House [Kennedy's Preparatory School] and other once-familiar landmarks after all these years.

Friday 10th May 1940

Set off back to Bletchley after hearing on the 8 a.m. wireless of the German invasion of Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg some 4 or 5 hours previously. So much for German pledges. Got back to work in time to hear the 10.30 a.m. broadcast giving further details, and still further details kept coming in throughout the day. Brussels, The Hague, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Antwerp, and numerous towns and cities in France have been bombed. The invaded countries appealed at once to the Allies, and British and French troops are now pouring into Belgium and our air forces are bombing the Germans. The 9 p.m. wireless news opened with an address by Chamberlain, who announced his resignation as Premier and Churchill's appointment as his successor.

Saturday 11th May 1940

By this evening the wireless was able to announce that the Germans had lost over 200 planes since the start of the invasion early yesterday morning. Our own planes have bombed the Germans out of the aerodrome which they had seized just outside the Hague. Aerial warfare is being carried on on a tremendous scale and the Germans have landed large numbers of parachutists in various parts of Holland.

Sunday 12th May 1940

Aspley Guise has suddenly assumed quite a warlike appearance, as sentries with fixed bayonets and tin hats are now posted on all roads leading in and out of the village and watchers have been posted on high ground to keep a look-out for possible parachutist.

Monday 13th May 1940

"Times" reports that Arita sent for Craigie [British Ambassador] and other ambassadors and ministers concerned and emphasised Japan's determination to resist any attempt to alter the status quo of the Dutch East Indies. This is taken to mean, incidentally, that she would be just as much opposed to Germany taking them in the event of Germany winning the War as she is to Britain or America or anyone else taking over their protective custody at the present time. Italy becoming- at least outwardly- increasingly anti-British.

Tuesday 14th May 1940

Terrific fighting on land and in the air continues and it looks as though one of the decisive battles of the World is about to be fought in the vicinity of Brussels, along a line running roughly from Maastricht-Liege-Namur-Sedan.

Wednesday 15th May 1940
Bit of a shock on opening papers to find that North Holland has surrendered to the Germans. When it was announced on the 13th that Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch Government had moved to England, I thought it seemed a bit ominous, but it never occurred to me that things were quite so serious, as the Dutch were said to be fighting stubbornly and checking the German advance reasonably well. Apparently, however, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, General Winckelmann, was forced to the conclusion that further resistance in the north would simply entail a useless waste of lives and the destruction of Utrecht and other towns and cities, so the "Cease Fire" was ordered at 1.15 a.m. to-day in the north, though apparently resistance is to be continued in Zeeland and the south, and Holland remains at war and her Navy is to continue to fight on. Meantime the battle along the Meuse continues with increasing intensity.

Eden having made an appeal on the wireless last night for volunteers 17 to 65 to form local defence units against parachutists, I sent in my name this morning to join the detachment which is to be formed from my department at Bletchley, so I may yet have a chance to take a smack at Brother Bosche once more!

To Ealing in evening for my day off tomorrow. As it was Mungo's [son] last night in England, went up to town with him and Maggie [wife] to see the much advertised film version of "Gone with the Wind". Lasted no less than 4 hours and was a most dismal, sordid story and unnecessarily realistic in tragedy and horrors- hardly the kind of film to cheer up poor Mungo on his last night at home.

Thursday 16th May 1940

To town in morning to see Mungo [son] off from Waterloo for Southamption, whence he sails by the "Athlone Castle" to join his ship at Capetown, his orders to join her at Freetown having been cancelled. Though he was a bit quiet, he seemed in good fettle and it is rather a relief to know that he is going to a relatively peaceful zone, as 17 and a half is a bit young to be pitch-forked into the thick of operations. Sad to lose him, but good luck to him. Poor Maggie [wife] will miss him, I'm afraid, though she bore up very well at the station when seeing him off. From the station went to Canada House to enquire news of the Langleys [Canadian friends from Japan days] and relieved to hear they are safely back in England. Rang Mrs Langley up at the Hans Crescent Hotel and she asked us round to lunch there with herself and a Miss Barber of our Legation staff at the Hague who had escaped from Holland with the Langleys. Later we were joined by two other refugees from the Hague- Sharkey of the Canadian Legation and Franklin, an oil man- and finally, after tea, by Langley himself, whom I had not seen since we left Japan nearly 6 years ago. All of them had been through a pretty hard time and had been brought over from the Hook [of Holland] in a British destroyer with nothing but a small suitcase apiece. The first intimation they had had of the German invasion was about 4 a.m. on Friday, when they were awakened by the crash of bombs and guns and the roar of aircraft. The sky, they said, was simply alive with German planes, which came over in hundreds, some dropping bombs, others dropping parachute troops and equipment by means of parachutes, and others landing at the nearby airport with troops. Their own house was in a
block of three, and in the houses on either side of them were German civilians, who began sniping at the Dutch troops who came up the road later. It was the combination of 5th Column and German parachutists that caused the disaster, they said, and it was simply civil war. In the Rotterdam area alone there were some 50,000 German residents, and most of these were armed and organised to work in with the invaders. Incidentally, a "black-list" found on a German, who was caught, was found to include Langley's name. Whether he was to be "bumped off" or merely popped into a concentration camp is not clear! The Germans at The Hague were very peeved with Mrs. Langley for being on such friendly terms with the Japanese Legation people and thereby helping to counter some of their propaganda with them.

Friday 17th May 1940
Returned to Bletchley a.m. News from the front is not too good and seems to confirm to some extent what Langley told me in confidence yesterday, namely that the Germans have broken through the French line. According to this evening's radio, the "dent" they have made has now become a "bulge".

Saturday 18th May 1940
Shock to open this morning's paper and learn that the Germans have already entered Brussels.

Tuesday 21st May 1940
Shock to hear on evening wireless that the Germans are now in possession of Arras and Amiens. The main direction of their advance is towards the Channel ports and their new technique of attack is carrying them forward at amazing speed. This technique is to blast their way through with low-dive bombing and machine-gunning from the air and to follow up with masses of large tanks and motorised units before the defence has time to recover from the demoralising effect of this modern version of the old-fashioned artillery preparation. The daring and speed shown in the attack, combined with the prodigal use of machines and with the regardlessness of lives, is immensely effective, though it is plainly a desperate gamble with a lightning victory or final defeat as its two alternatives. Provided we can hold the Germans in check for a sufficient length of time - and check them we must - their ultimate defeat seems certain, as they cannot afford to keep up the pace for very long. Meantime, however, the situation is grave, though not hopeless, and the R.A.F. are doing magnificently and proving themselves individually greatly superior to the Germans. Reynaud did some plain speaking today and, while revealing that there has been rank incompetence in certain sections of the French Army and incredible mistakes and miscalculations, he has promised to mete out drastic punishment on those responsible. Amongst other things he revealed that no attempt had been made to destroy certain vital bridges over the Meuse and that the army, which should have held the line of the Meuse, failed to move up in time and was of very inferior composition. The Germans were therefore able to cross the river with their mechanised columns with little or no opposition and rapidly spread fanwise.
Hear confidentially that Churchill recently made a personal appeal to Mussolini to keep out of the War, but that Mussolini replied with a terrific blast.

**Wednesday 22nd May 1940**
Announced in afternoon that the Government has now taken control of all persons and all private property. Bang go our democratic rights and liberties, but all in a good cause, though it is just as well that this totalitarian act has been carried out by a truly national government, as otherwise there would have been a most almighty scream of "Hitlerism" from the Labour crowd. The U.S. are becoming increasingly alive to the dangers of the War and, were it not for their infernal elections, Roosevelt looks as though he would readily bring his country in to help us. Even as it is, the Isolationists appear to be losing ground rapidly and the U.S. are doing all they can to help us- short of armed intervention- by means of moral and material support.

**Thursday 23rd May 1940**
Evening wireless reported fighting in Boulogne. Though the Germans who have entered are probably only advanced detachments of motorised troops, the gravity of the situation is obvious. Mosley and a number of other Right Wingers have been arrested.

**Saturday 25th May 1940**
German claim to have captured Calais, but this is denied by our people, though there seems to have been some fighting there yesterday. East Anglia and the North Riding of Yorkshire were bombed this morning, though little damage and only 8 casualties.

**Sunday 26th May 1940**
Special services of intercession held all over the country today at the King's request. Went to 7 a.m. Service and again at 2 p.m. during lunch interval. News of the operations now taking place in France and Belgium is to be withheld for the time being lest it help the enemy. Seems probable that this may indicate that our own counter-offensive is now being prepared. What with news being banned, persons and private property placed under government control, M.P.s and others arrested, and so on, England is really beginning to look totalitarian. And high time too, as the only way to retain our liberty is to forego it for the time being. Fortunately the bulk of the country appreciate this hard fact.

**Monday 27th May 1940**
French now admit that Boulogne is now in German hands, the Germans having completed occupation of it yesterday. Pretty grim.

**Tuesday 28th May 1940**
Being my day off, ran over to Camberley by car to collect my uniform. Only Mrs. Webber was at the house and she insisted on my having lunch there with her- a most kindly act. Before sitting down to lunch, turned on the 1 p.m. wireless and was amazed to learn that the Belgian Army had capitulated to Germany at King Leopold's order early this morning. A terrible blow to us, as it exposes our left flank at a most critical moment. Though we are asked to withhold judgment on his action, Leopold appears to have behaved in a most dastardly way and to have surrendered against the advice of his own ministers and without giving any warning to us or to the French. His action seems almost incredible and must make his gallant father turn
in his grave. The French have no hesitation in calling it treachery. More vital and important to us, however, is the fact that, by this surrender, the Germans now have an open road to Ostend. Mrs. Webber, incidentally, told me that some of our troops have already been withdrawn from Ostend and brought back to England, some of them being now in camp at Camberley, on Barossa. Apparently they had a terrible hammering and were simply pulverised by air bombing and machine-gunning, which made movement impossible.

Wednesday 29th May 1940
After getting back from Camberley yesterday, changed into uniform and then went off to Bletchley to be on anti-parachute duty from 6 p.m. till this morning - then had to start in straight away on my ordinary work from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. Leopold's action has left us in a sorry plight and has placed the British Expeditionary Force in greater danger than ever. Difficult to see what alternatives they have other than fight to the last or surrender, though a certain number have apparently been evacuated from Boulogne.

Thursday 30th May 1940
Latest reports indicate that, though hard pressed, our men are fighting magnificently and have put up a remarkably fine defence at Calais and elsewhere. Lorraine, in a despatch to the Foreign Office, says Ciano has now informed him that it is now only a matter of days before Italy comes into the war against us. A curious piece of frankness! Lorraine, however, was equally frank in warning Ciano what was coming to Italy if she does join Germany against us. There are also indications of Hungary joining in with Germany, and the Soviet are making themselves unpleasant as usual. I only wish we would treat them [the Soviet] with the contempt and disgust they deserve, instead of trying to smarm up to them as we seem to be doing at present.

Friday 31st May 1940
Full details now coming in of our evacuation of troops from Dunkirk and Calais by sea and a remarkably fine piece of work it is. Hear the official figures for the number evacuated up to yesterday are 65,000 and the good work continues, in spite of violent bombardment from the air all the time. Ships and boats of every kind and description are being used - tugs, yachts, paddle-steamers, destroyers and Heavens knows what not besides. A good example of what command of the sea can achieve, as the Germans apparently counted on destroying or capturing the whole B.E.F. To some extent the Germans are being held up by the flooding of the country around to impede the movements of their tanks and mechanised forces.

Saturday 1st June 1940
The U.S. are becoming increasingly pro-Ally and many of their leading figures are openly declaring that our victory is essential for them and that we are really fighting their battles for them. Hear that a lot of the troops from Dunkirk are now in Northampton and are very far from dispirited, in spite of what they have been through. As an indication that the possibility of an attempt to land troops by air is being taken seriously, all signposts have now been removed. Captain Marcus, who took part in the withdrawal from Dunkirk, came in after dinner with his wife. He seems to have been through hell and is a very different man to what he was when he
left here a month or so ago. The ship which took him off was bombed and sunk, and he had to swim around some time before being rescued and taken on board another vessel. The Germans gave them an awful pounding from the air and he said he did not see more than half a dozen of our machines, as ours were apparently used mainly for attacking the German communications and storage depots etc in the rear.

Tuesday 4th June 1940

Churchill made a magnificent speech in the House this afternoon, describing the evacuation of Dunkirk which, he said, was completed last night. No less than 335,000 officers and men were brought off with the help of a most motley collection of ships and boats of every size and description- a most wonderful feat. In referring to it as a serious military disaster, he did not mince matters; but, at the same time, he emphasised the brilliancy of the operation and admitted that a week or so ago, when he warned the country to be prepared for grave news, it had been feared that not more than 20-30,000 could be withdrawn and that the greater part of the B.E.F. was doomed to annihilation or surrender. Actually 335,000 had got away, and although nearly 1,000 guns and all our transport and vast quantities of stores had been lost, the total losses in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to not more than 30,000- a heavy loss, but nothing to what had been expected.

He spoke very highly of the defence of Calais, where a force of about 1,000 French and 3,000 British troops refused to surrender and fought to the last, there being only 30 known survivors. On two things he gave warning- first, that the Germans would probably launch another great offensive almost immediately, and secondly that we must be prepared for the possibility of invasion. Though he considered a serious invasion of these islands unlikely, he envisaged the possibility of the whole, or part, of the country falling into enemy hands; but even if that happened, he was convinced that the Dominions would continue the fight and that, "in God's good time", they and the New World would overthrow the forces of evil and liberate all countries groaning under Nazi oppression.

Wednesday 5th June 1940

Germans launched great new offensive at 4 a.m. on a 120-mile front from the sea to the region of Laon.

Thursday 6th June 1940

On anti-parachute duty last night.

Saturday 8th June 1940

Being my day off, went by road to Watford to meet Maggie [wife] and then went on to S.M.B. [school] to take Jean and Aline [daughters] out for the day. Much interested to note preparations everywhere for dealing with possible parachutist landings, especially in the open country around(?) Whipsnade, where camouflaged machine gun posts at cross roads, movable barricades, and similar defence works were much in evidence. On way back in evening, found all roads in and out of St. Albans barricaded and armed guards with fixed bayonets at each barricade. All cars were halted and identity cards examined before being allowed to pass. On getting back to Aspley Guise about 10 p.m. learned that, according to
wireless, Berlin had been bombed and so too had Northampton, though I gather that only one or two bombs had been dropped on the latter.

**Sunday 9th June 1940**
Hear that the French are urging us to pretty well denude England of aircraft for the time being and to send every machine we can to help break up the German offensive. Churchill, however, declines to do so, as the risk would be too great, as the Germans could then swoop down on us and cause untold havoc to our aerodromes, factories etc, thereby dealing a blow which might prove fatal to the French as well as ourselves. The French, on the other hand, take the line that, unless drastic action is taken to break up the German offensive, the Germans may succeed in breaking through to Paris and crushing France. It is a grim choice whichever way you look at it and one can only pray that the French will not be smashed to bits by the terrible battering they are receiving. Hear, too, that the constant raids on Hamburg etc and on the German lines of communication etc by the R.A.F. are giving the Germans to think furiously and are inflicting terrific losses on the Germans. If only the Germans can be held back another 2 or 3 months, therefore, eventual victory for the Allies should be assured, as the Germans could not stand the present rate of loss much longer. Heaven grant that this shall be so and that the German attempt to terrify and demoralise the French will fail.

**Monday 10th June 1940**
German thrust continues and German tanks are reported to have reached the outskirts of Havre.

Italy has at last entered the War.

**Tuesday 11th June 1940**
Listened in to Roosevelt's speech broadcast at 12.15 last night. He did not mince his words, but referred outright to Italy's action as a cowardly stab in the back and, amidst terrific cheers (he was speaking at the University of Virginia) promised the full material resources of the U.S. for "the opponents of force". The change that has come over public opinion in the U.S. during the past 2 or 3 weeks is immense.

Sinking of the aircraft-carrier "Glorious" announced. Another blow.

**Wednesday 12th June 1940**
Had to come up to town yesterday afternoon to destroy documents stored in the strong room, so stayed the night with Maggie [wife] and took today as my day off.

**Thursday 14th June 1940**
On parachute defence last night and at 9 this morning was greeted with the news that the Germans had entered Paris.

**Saturday 15th June 1940**
Learned in afternoon from one of the French naval officers working with us that, unless Roosevelt gives a sufficiently satisfactory reply to Reynaud's latest appeal (made yesterday), France will probably throw up the sponge. In view of all her pledges to us about making no separate peace and so on, this sounds almost incredibly. The 9 p.m. wireless news this evening, however, seemed unpleasantly ominous, as it said that Roosevelt's reply, though not
yet published, had been received and was being studied by the French Cabinet in conjunction with Weygand and the chiefs of the fighting services. From another source I learned that the Germans have suffered such immense casualties in their great offensive that they have asked Switzerland if she can provide accommodation for 100,000 wounded, as all hospitals in Germany, Austria, Poland etc. are full to overflowing. If this is really so, it adds force to the belief that, if only we and the French can stick it out a few weeks more, the Germans will be left too exhausted to continue their push and victory for the Allies will be virtually assured. God grant we may stick it out.

Sunday 16th June 1940
Listened in to 7 a.m. wireless, giving the text of Roosevelt's reply to Reynaud's "final appeal". Roosevelt is very sympathetic and has promised to redouble U.S. efforts to aid the Allies with aircraft and war material of all kinds, but emphasises that this involves "no military commitments", as only the Senate has power to do this. The result of yesterday's French Cabinet meeting is still unknown, but further meetings were held this evening and the final outcome remains in the balance. Smith, however, tells me that Weygand is in favour of an armistice and that Reynaud alone insists on France fighting on. Churchill, he tells me, has been over to France again and it was only with his aid that Reynaud has so far been able to over-rule the other members of his Cabinet against giving in.

Monday 17th June 1940
This morning's papers announced the resignation of Reynaud and the formation of a new Cabinet under Marshal Petain with Weygand as War Minister. Had it not been for what Smith told me yesterday about Weygand, I would have regarded this as a good sign; but on speaking to Smith again this morning, he told me, much to my surprise, that Petain too has, from the outset shown defeatist tendencies. While, therefore, it came as an unpleasant shock, it was not an entire surprise when the 1 p.m. wireless announced that Petain had ordered the French Army to cease fighting. Churchill gave a brief broadcast this evening emphasising the gravity of the situation and our determination to fight on.

Maggie [wife] rang up this evening to ask if I would consider letting Mrs. Langley take Jean and Aline [daughters] with her to Canada. It is a big decision to make on the spur of the moment, as it would mean the break up of the family and a big expense as well; but if invasion is to come it would be a relief to know they were in safety.

Tuesday 18th June 1940
Smith tells me that the French asked us some days ago to relieve them of their pledge not to make a separate peace. Churchill finally agreed, provided they handed over their Fleet to us. Reynaud agreed to this, but on being succeeded by Petain he warned our Ambassador, Ronald Campbell, rather ominously that he could not guarantee that Petain would feel himself bound by this promise.
Churchill gave a most heartening speech in the House this afternoon. [He emphasised] that we have NOT released France from her pledge.

Wednesday 19th June 1940
General de Gaulle, now in England, broadcast to France last night declaring that France is not lost and inviting French officers and men and armaments technicians to get in touch with him. The Germans raided England last night with about 100 machines- their biggest raid on this country so far, though nothing to what we may expect in the near future.

Thursday 20th June 1940

Craigie reports to the Foreign Office that General Tsuchihashi, the Japanese Director of Military Intelligence, sent for Mullaley and delivered a virtual ultimatum, the gist of it being that unless we stop the transit of war material for China through Hong Kong and Burma and withdraw our troops from Shanghai, the Japanese Army will take drastic action. The D.M.I. added the warning that the Army is becoming increasingly pro-German and that many in Japan feel that Japanese of future generations will regard the Japanese of today with scorn if they fail to avail themselves of the present opportunity to seize bits of territory as Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. He also made very slighting remarks about the Japanese Foreign Office and told Mullaley that no heed should be paid to the reassuring remarks of the Foreign Office, as the Army as all-powerful. The D.M.I. may be trying to bluff, but his remarks and actions alike were ominous and significant; and if Japanese military leaders are prepared to speak in this way to foreign Military Attachés, I pity men like Arita, as, judging by past events, it may well mean that more assassinations are in the wind.

In a broadcast yesterday Weygand delivered what in effect was an apologia for seeking an armistice. There was something unpleasantly defeatist and discouraging about it in his attempts to explain the French collapse, though on one point he was probably correct in that, amongst the reasons given for it was the weakening of the country's moral fibre as shown by its search for pleasure to the exclusion of all else. I'm afraid this applies to ourselves, too, to some extent and it has hastened the decline of other empires in the past.

Letter to Captain Kennedy from his wife.

I had lunch with Ohs and H.B. to-day at a very expensive spot for which I am glad I didn't have to pay!! Before lunch we met for a few minutes a man who was just back from France and what he said really was rather comforting, although it in no way minimises the grimness of things. The walk through seems largely due to the fact the French simply folded up like a concertina. They left their AA posts for 2 or 3 hours (I gather during raids), simply wouldn't take their machines up, the country is strewn with more machines than (I THINK he said) the Yanks are supplying - perfectly sound- and officers have commandeered most of the mechanised transport, and filling them with their women and personal belongings and are legging it as hard as they can for Bordeaux or the south and will find themselves in the middle of the Mediterranean before they know where they are! The B.E.F. although livid at the loss of a scrap, are much relieved that they no longer have to watch a flank that was apt to fade away during the night. The C.E.F. were SO angry they all got blind drunk, cursed all and sundry and very nearly mutinied because they weren't going to get a fight. The man himself headed the List of those to be shot, when the Germans took over Holland. You men are
funny, the places you choose for imparting news! I had to caution both, and although H.B. said it was all past history and anyway known to the Germans there was quite enough especially regarding disguises to be of help if not definite use- and the couple next to us were definitely foreign. He was a little critical that Himler was not using the S.S. men from Holland, I told him he needn’t worry as they were probably all taped and in all probability being used. Forgive this letter, darling, but I thought it might interest you and I had better do it whilst it was still in the seive. I had better post it and then get changed. Much love Precious and take care of yourself- I suppose to-night is another of your sleepless nights? [on guard duty]

Friday 21st June 1940
Thanks to the agreement reached by Craigie and Arita a few days ago, the Japanese blockade of the British and French Concessions in Tientsin was lifted yesterday after lasting very nearly a year. Against this good sign, however, must be put a numero of very disquieting signs. Tsuchihashi’s virtual ultimatum to Mullaley was but one of several, and there are indications that the Japanese are seriously considering an attack on French Indo-China if the transit of arms to China is not stopped entirely. Actually the French have agreed to stop it, but it remains to be seen whether this will now satisfy the Japanese Military.

Saturday 22nd June 1940
Took today as my day off and went over to Bushey [location of daughters’ school] to spend the day with Maggie [wife] and the two girls. On way back in evening was stopped just outside Dunstable by L.D.V.s [Land Defence Volunteers] who had a barricade across the road. I and my passenger, a private in the Devons just back from France to whom I was giving a lift, were allowed to pass without difficulty after producing our papers, but 3 cyclists who had no identity cards were being given a very severe cross-examination.

Sunday 23rd June 1940
Listened in to 7 a.m. wireless, from which it was clear that the armistice signed last night by the French was a complete surrender, though it was not till the 9 p.m. news that we heard the actual terms. Seems almost incredible that any French Government, especially one which had given such specific pledges to its ally and had declared so vociferously that it would never accept a “shameful peace”, could possibly have accepted such terms, and Churchill is fully justified in the condemnation of its action which he issued in the form of a statement shortly after midnight last night.

Monday 24th June 1940
Announced on 9 p.m. wireless that the French signed their armistice with Italy this evening and fighting both with Germany and Italy is to cease at 35 minutes past midnight. Also announced that Japan has formally demanded the cessation of transport of supplies to China via Hong Kong and Burma. As the French have already accepted similar demands in regard to Indo-China, it looks as though we, too, shall have to accede with as good grace as we can or accept the consequences. For our present humiliating position we have to thank our own
fatuous Far Eastern policy of the past 20 years and those who refused to listen to the advice and warnings of those who knew and understood Japan.

Tuesday 25th June 1940
Awakened 1.15 a.m. by air alarm, but although bombs were dropped on various places in this country, no raiders passed this way.

Saturday 29th June 1940
A most interesting and significant despatch from Lord Lothian to the Foreign Office urging the advisability of making concessions to Japan in order to keep her from joining Germany and Italy. In his opinion, there is no likelihood whatever of the U.S. supporting us in the Far East. In fact, he goes so far as to say that the U.S. would take no action even if the Japanese occupied the Dutch East Indies and that they show signs of withdrawing the bulk of their Fleet to the Atlantic and abandoning all interest west of Hawaii. This is a great change of view on his part since I crossed swords with him in "The Times" in February 1935! He even suggests our giving some oil and rubber territory to the Japanese.

According to this evening's wireless, Arita has issued a statement, emphasising Japan's insistence on her position as the one stabilising influence in the Far East and declaring a virtual Monroe Doctrine for the Far East and South Seas. Provided she does not use actual force, there is something to be said for this - in fact, it is what I myself advocated at a time when it could have been allowed as an act of grace on our part instead of, as now, under force majeure.

Tuesday 2nd July 1940
In his latest despatch to the Foreign Office, Lord Lothian makes it quite clear that we can expect no help from the U.S. in the Far East and should therefore make what terms we can with Japan.

Monday 8th July 1940
The British reply to the Japanese demands for putting a stop to the transit of arms to Chiang via Hong Kong and the Burma road has now been handed over in Tokyo; but, as was rather to be expected, the Japanese, according to this evening's wireless, are dissatisfied with it. In our reply, however, we purposely left room for negotiation, so it is to be hoped that Arita and the more moderate elements will be able to hold the Army and the extremists in check, though Arita warned Craigie a few days ago of the serious difficulties confronting him and of the dangers that the hot-heads may precipitate war if the question of the Burma road is not settled to their satisfaction in the immediate future. We, for our part, are desperately anxious to avoid Japan's entry into the war on the side of Germany and Craigie has been instructed to use his own judgement as to how best he can avoid this without conceding any vital principle - a difficult task in view of the fact that, while concessions are likely to call forth strong criticism from the U.S. and may even turn China against us, the U.S. have made it clear that they are not prepared to come to our help in the Far East if our failure to placate Japan should lead to war with that country.

Monday 15th July 1940
Situation in Far East appears to have improved slightly, if only temporarily, as result of our agreeing to suspend the transit of munitions to China by the Burma road for 3 months on condition that real efforts are made during the intervening period to bring about peace between Japan and China.

Tuesday 16th July 1940
Evening wireless announced resignation of Yonai Cabinet after General Hata, War Minister, had forced its hands by resigning and making it clear that no other General was prepared to serve in the existing Cabinet. General expectation is that Konoe will take over the Premiership and carry out a "renovation of the internal structure of the country" on a one-party, totalitarian basis.

Too early yet to say what the effect will be internationally and whether, with the relatively liberal-minded Arita out of the way, Japan's foreign policy will turn more to the Axis Powers as urged by those who have been criticising Arita for being too "weak" with Britain and the U.S. and demanding that Japan should throw in her lot with Germany and Italy. Though Konoye himself has no special leanings towards the Axis, his foreign policy is likely to be more nationally inclined than Arita's.

Wednesday 17th July 1940
U.S. are critical of our agreement with Japan on the closing of the Burma road and contend that it constitutes "unwarranted interpositions of obstacles to world trade". Such criticism from official quarters in Washington seems hardly playing the game, considering that we have had to give in to Japan on this question because the U.S. decline to back us up.

Thursday 18th July 1940
Matsuoka is to be the new Japanese Foreign Minister, Tojo War Minister, and Yoshida remains Minister of Marine. With Matsuoka at the Foreign Ministry, one may expect diplomatic fireworks, and poor Craigie's task will certainly be made no easier.

Saturday 20th July 1940
According to Press reports, Konoe, after discussions with Matsuoka and the two Service Ministers, has decided to strengthen Japan's relations with Germany and Italy, and has also decided his future policy towards Britain, U.S., and Soviet. Sounds a bit ominous if true.

Sunday 21st July 1940
Also announced that Konoe has sent most friendly greetings to Australia and made an appeal to her for closer cultural relations between Japan and Australia as a means of ensuring the peaceful development and stability of the South Pacific regions. A rather hopeful and significant gesture.

Wednesday 24th July 1940
Konoe, in a broadcast yesterday, declared that Japan intended to retain its autonomy in disregard of immediate gains - a polite way of intimating to Germany that Japan is not prepared to succumb to her temptations unless it suits her purpose. This gentle snub - if snub it is - is possibly due to the German Ambassador having urged that Oshima (late Ambassador to Germany) be appointed Foreign Minister. Such, at least, is the report passed on a day or
two ago by Craigie, who emphasised the propaganda value of this report if handled properly, as nothing would be more calculated to turn the Japanese against Germany than to learn that Germany was trying to dictate to her in the matter of foreign policy.

Sunday 28th July 1940
According to the 9 p.m. wireless, the Japanese have arrested 10 British subjects, apparently charged with espionage, including Niel James and Cox. Sounds unpleasantly ominous.

Monday 29th July 1940
Poor Cox is reported to have committed suicide by jumping out of a window at the police station where he was being examined. Whether or not he and the others were guilty, the fact that 10 have been arrested and other arrests are threatened would seem to indicate that Japan is either making, or considering making, plans for action against this country and is therefore taking precautionary measures to prevent well-informed Englishmen from passing on information.

Tuesday 30th July 1940
Amongst the latest Englishmen to be arrested in Japan is Tom Ely. Looks as though I were lucky to be back in England, as otherwise I, too, would probably have been arrested! Cox was my successor as Reuter correspondent; Neil James followed me as F.B.I. representative; and I was no. 2 to Ely out in Korea when I was in the Rising Sun Petroleum Co.. All three of them have now been taken into custody.

From all that has been heard and said about these arrests, it looks rather as though they had been engineered by the pro-Axis elements in the Army, who are trying to provoke us into some action which would swing the Japanese people as a whole into the pro-Axis camp. As the Burma road question failed to provoke us into such action, they now hope to do it by wholesale arrests of prominent Englishmen in Japan and, by stirring up Japanese popular sentiment in the meantime with hair-raising tales of British spy networks in Japan, they are hoping to swing the country still further into the pro-Axis camp. In this they are being helped considerably by German and Italian propaganda.

Friday 2nd August 1940
In a speech yesterday dealing with Soviet foreign relations, Molotov emphasised the friendliness of Russo-German relations at the present time and indicated an improvement in relations with Japan. Towards Britain he was caustic but non-committal; towards the U.S. he was distinctly sharp, and he spoke disparagingly of French leadership. As usual he harped on Soviet neutrality and love of peace, though he frankly boasted of recent Soviet acquisitions of territory and of the strategic advantages conferred by ice-free ports on the Baltic.

Friday 9th August 1940
Announced that British garrisons in Shanghai and Tientsin are being withdrawn, ostensibly because they can be better employed elsewhere. The pity is that they were not withdrawn long ago, before there was any question of pressure from the Japanese.

Tuesday 13th August 1940
Looks rather as though the Japanese were seeking a "casus belli" with us, as, in addition to anti-British demonstrations in Japan and violent abuse of Britain in the Japanese Press, it is learned that, in spite of the "gentleman's agreement", certain Germans of military age and value are being allowed to leave the U.S. on Japanese ships and it is reported that Japanese warships are being sent to escort them.

Monday 19th August 1940
The German attempt to invade this country, which was expected yesterday, failed to materialise, though large-scale air raids were carried out. Of 600 German planes which came over, however, we brought down no less than 144 - splendid achievement.

Friday 23rd August 1940
News from Japan indicates something in the nature of a diplomatic "purge", as 5 ambassadors and no less than 19 ministers are being recalled. Glad to see Shigemitsu [ambassador in London] is not among them.

Thursday 5th September 1940
Report of a Japanese ultimatum to Indo-China demanding passage of troops, air bases, and the like have led Cordell Hull to issue a warning that the U.S. are opposed to any alteration in the status quo.

Sunday 8th September 1940
Another air raid warning during the night and Jean [older daughter] said she heard Church bells ringing - the signal for parachutists landing. Thought she must have imagined it, but on way to Church this morning we found troops out on guard at all main crossroads and we had to stop and show our identity cards no less than 4 times. The Church bells had rung all right and parachutists are reported to have landed nearby in the night, one report being that 60 of them had been rounded up in Aldershot in the Rushmoor Arena, though of this I am a bit sceptical!

Tuesday 10th September 1940
London again bombed last night. Roscoe, Flintham, and others, who have been in the thick of it the last few days, gave pretty grim accounts of the raid and speak of the terribly strain imposed by the constant alarms and the infernal din which make sleep almost impossible.

Wednesday 11th September 1940
Two air-raid warnings last night while on night duty and another this morning. Listened in to wireless broadcast at 6 p.m. by Churchill, who spoke with his usual vigour and determination. No attempt to minimise the seriousness of the crisis now facing us, but full of confidence. Spoke in particular of the German preparations for an invasion of this country, possibly within the next week or so, and of the great work being carried out nightly by the R.A.F. in breaking up German concentrations of troops and self-propelled barges.

Friday 19th September 1940
Watched the barrage over London in evening from my bedroom window, as I had heard it could be seen from around here. It gave one a rather uncanny sensation watching the constant flashes from the guns reflected 45 miles away on the sky and seeing the actual shell
burst, for all the world like the bright balls of fire thrown up by roman candles and other such
fire-works. One knew that over there, right in the heart of the Empire, German bombs were
spreading death and destruction while British guns were giving hell to the raiding aircraft; yet
here in Aspley Guise all was quiet and peaceful and not a sound of all that deafening racket
was to be heard.

Monday 23rd September 1940
Earlier in the day announced that Japanese troops had advanced into Indo-China and
clashed with the French. Fighting said to be due to misunderstanding and no actual attempt at
invasion appears to have been made and the actual situation is a bit unclear, as there are so
many contradictory reports as to the exact scope of the agreement reached between the
Japanese and the French on the basis of the Japanese demands. Indo-China, however, is a
definite danger point at the moment, as the situation now developing in the Far East has
dangerous potentialities in its bearing on the War.

Wednesday 25th September 1940
Just starting in to listen to the 9 p.m. news when a number of heavy explosions were heard
and a moment or two later pandemonium broke loose as the London refugees in the garage
and those of them in the elf and a threat to which she is prepared to reply by every means in
her power.

Though not published, learnt that in the recently concluded agreement between the Vichy
Government and Japan, France agrees to contribute to the "new order in Asia" and gives it
her benediction. Though she may have been pushed into this by Germany, it looks very much
as though the Petain Government had done it with the deliberate intention of embarrassing
the British.

Thursday 3rd October 1940
Announced on wireless that Chamberlain has resigned owing to ill health. Doubtless he made
mistakes while Premier, but the violent abuse and criticism hurled at him by some sections of
the community and by men like Wintringham and by "Cato" in his "Guilty Men" disgust one.

The really "Guilty Men" are his detractors like Attlee, Morrison, Bevin and Co, who did so
much to prevent the rearmament of the country, even after the great dangers confronting us
were clear to all.

Tuesday 8th October 1940
Speaking in the House this afternoon, Churchill reviewed various aspects of the present war
situation. He went on to review briefly the situation in the Far East as affected by the 3-Power
Pact and, while declaring our wish to remain on friendly terms with Japan, announced that, in
view of the changed circumstances, we had decided to reopen the Burma road on the
expiration of the present 3-month agreement with Japan on October 17th.

This last announcement was by no means unexpected, but seems likely to have serious
consequences, as Matsuoka and other Japanese leaders have already made it clear that the
reopening of the Burma road would be regarded as clear proof of unfriendliness and might
lead to strong measures by Japan. Whether this is to be interpreted as a threat or only bluff
remains to be seen, but in certain quarters it is reported that the Japanese are planning to use Indo-China as a base for attack on Burma and Malaya and that the Siamese are prepared to assist Japan if she does so. In the same quarters it is also reported that this attack will be launched simultaneously with an Italian attack on Egypt and German attacks on England and Gibraltar, and that these attacks will be launched before the U.S. elections or - at latest - before the end of the year, so as to strike before Britain and America have had time to devise counter-measures.

What reliance is to be placed on these reports is difficult to tell, but, as indicating the increasing seriousness of the Far Eastern situation, this evening's wireless news reported that the U.S. Government have advised Americans in the Far East to withdraw before it is too late.

Wednesday 9th October 1940

According to information obtained by our Military Attaché in Tokyo and passed on by Craigie to the Foreign Office, Prince Konoe was strongly opposed to the alliance with Germany and Italy, but, after threatening to resign, was finally persuaded by Matsuoka and Tojo that it was essential for Japan in view of present circumstances. The fact that he was persuaded against his better judgement bears out the fears and forebodings which made Iwanaga dissuade him from accepting the Premiership in 1934.

According to the same despatch, the Emperor, too, was strongly opposed to the Pact and some of the more extreme elements in the Army are said to be considering an "accident" to put him out of the way - a recrudescence, apparently of the movement reported at intervals since the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble 9 years ago. The Emperor is said, too, to have refused to have Terauchi as Prince Kanin's successor as Chief of the General Staff and to have insisted on Suganami, who has alway been regarded as a moderate and favourably disposed to ourselves.

In finally prevailing upon the Emperor to agree to the Alliance, the two main arguments used were:

(1) The real danger of war with the U.S.
(2) That the nation had been led to expect some spectacular act as a proof of the dynamic nature national structure. If no such act were forthcoming, there was serious danger of an internal explosion as a reaction to the hardships which the people had been persuaded to endure in the expectation of such an act.

This, combined with the fact that the Emperor is said to be contemplating ordering Prince Fushimi to follow Prince Kanin's example and retire, so that the Army and Navy General Staffs can no longer hold off criticism by sheltering being the sacrosanct persons of Imperial Princes, would seem to indicate that there is very considerable unrest and dissatisfaction in the country despite the outward appearance of absolute unity.

It is significant, too, that the argument about the danger of war with the U.S. should have been pressed so strongly, as there have been other indications, too, that the Government is seriously alarmed as to the results and meaning of recent actions by the U.S., such as the embargo on oil and scrap metals, and there are indications that, if the oil embargo is fully
imposed, Japan may feel compelled to take active measures, before the presidential election next month, to seize control of the Dutch East Indies in order to ensure her oil supplies.

Saturday 12th October 1940
Dined in evening with the Hubbards. Hubbard tells me our people are not too well satisfied with de Gaulle's men. De Gaulle himself is trusted, but many of his men hang around doing nothing and merely giving themselves a good time in London on English rates of pay. Many of them are believed to be Vichy sympathisers at heart and quite untrustworthy. De Gaulle himself is considered a good soldier, but, having been practically unknown even by name to most of his countrymen until a few months ago, is not a big enough man for the job.

Hear that Spain is far from being as pro-Axis as appears on the surface and that the Army, though by no means pro-British, dislike the Germans and Italians so intensely that they would readily accept British aid against the Germans if the Germans attempt to march through Spain. Suner and the Falangists, who profess to voice the nation's feeling, are cordially detested by the Army as a whole, and even Franco is said to have lost the confidence of the Army, who would get rid of both him and his brother-in-law if it were not for the fear that such an action would bring the Germans down on the country. In short, the Army wants Spain for the Spaniards and is bitterly hostile to the Germans and Italians for trying to interfere.

Monday 14th October 1940
In a report from Grimsdale to the War Office telling of a recent official tour in South West China, he records a rather surprising remark made to him by Clarke-Kerr [British Ambassador] at Chungking. Just before leaving for China to take up his appointment as Ambassador some two and a half years ago, Clarke-Kerr said he went round to the Foreign Office for a talk and to find out what instructions they had for him in regard to the policy he was to follow. To his surprise, they had no policy, and the only instructions he received were: "Keep this bloody war going at all costs!"

It sounds almost incredible, but explains a lot, as our Far Eastern policy has been simply deplorable these past 20 years and we are now reaping the fruit of our folly.

Saturday 19th October 1940
With the re-opening of the Burma road on Thursday, the Japanese bombed it yesterday, but the repercussions from our opening of the road are less than expected. Vituperation in the Japanese Press, but nothing more. Siam's future actions, however, call for some attention; and it looks as though the Soviet were on the point of joining in a non-aggression pact of sort with Japan.

Saturday 26th October 1940
Japan's overtures to Russia are attracting close attention and Tatekawa, who has just gone to Moscow as the new Ambassador, is expected to open negotiations entailing concessions by Japan of a nature which formerly would have been incredible. The general idea behind it all seems to be the fear of war with America being precipitated by Japan's new alliance and the consequent need of a friendly understanding with Russia to offset such an outcome.

Sunday 3rd November 1940
Having induced Mills to end our [Bletchley Park] Sunday lunch-time services with the National Anthem, he told me just before the service today that objections had been raised on the grounds that it smacks too much of jingoism and military parades and that therefore we were not to sing it after all! One knows that many people object to the 2nd verse on the grounds that its sentiments are un-christian, but it is simply amazing to me that anyone could object to having just the first verse, which is simply a prayer for his majesty. However, I am assured that there are many in this government department who do, and that one must recognise that the so-called "younger generation" hold strong views on such matters as the alleged "jingoism" of "God Save the King", the reprehensible "Imperialism" of Kipling, and the "stupidity" of Gilbert and Sullivan. All I can say is "Heaven help the younger generation!" It is on a par with the way in which people refer to the British Empire almost as though they were ashamed of it because, to them, it connotes imperialism of the Prussian type. To me such an attitude towards the Empire and the National Anthem is rather disquieting, as it seems to show that the mischievous League-of-Nations-Union form of pacifism, which did so much to jockey us into our present unfortunate position, is still alive in the land and liable to spring to the fore once more as soon as this War is over.

Thursday 7th November 1940

In a despatch to the Foreign Office, Clarke-Kerr [Ambassador to China] quotes Chiang Kai-shek as admitting to him that unless help is forthcoming from Britain and America before the end of the year, China's collapse is all but inevitable shortly, as the constant bombing has affected Chinese morale badly of late and the economic situation is going from bad to worse. Another thing he revealed was that the Soviet deliberately withheld supplies while the Burma Road was closed, as they wished to impress on China how dependent she was on Russia - a nice friendly action and very typical of Moscow.

Incidentally, according to Clarke-Kerr the Chinese Communists, taking advantage of China's economic plight, are extending their influence and making political headway.

Amongst other help required by Chiang from Britain and the U.S. is a large loan, but Clarke-Kerr urges that if we grant it it must be conditional on Chiang getting rid of Kung and others responsible for the present economic mess in China. Kung, he says, is not only inefficient, but thinks only of the vested interests which take no thought of China's fate.

Sunday 10th November 1940

Clarke-Kerr tells in his latest despatches to the Foreign Office about the increasing friction between the Soviet and Chiang. Instead of sending supplies to Chiang, they are sending them direct to the Chinese Communist Army in spite of Chiang's protests.

The withdrawal of large numbers of Japanese troops from China to Hainan and Formosa - as many as 100,000 according to some reports - is the cause of considerable speculation at the moment. It may be a precautionary defensive move against possible war with the U.S., but it might also be interpreted as the prelude to an attack on the Dutch East Indies and Malaya.

Thursday 21st November 1940
On arriving at office this morning, found it had been bombed in the night. Typists' room and telephone exchange in our building blown to bits by a direct hit and the vicarage next door damaged by another bomb which landed in the garden. A third exploded in the road outside, while two more landed over at the Park, one of them bursting a bare half-dozen paces from Hut 4. By great good fortune there were no casualties. We, however, have had to give up our room to the typists and have been moved to the room used by the S. American Section who, in turn, have been transferred to the Park.

Thursday 28th November 1940
Recent reports from the Far East are a bit disquieting. Siam seems to be bent on trouble and, taking advantage of French pre-occupation, she is seemingly trying to seize certain border districts of Indo-China and fighting on a fairly large scale appears to be in progress. Japan, too, appears to be up to no good and has withdrawn large numbers of her troops from China of late. This may be a purely precautionary measure, but it calls for close attention, as it may be preparatory to launching an attack on Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

Monday 2nd December 1940
According to information reaching the Foreign Office, Franco recently rejected Hitler's proposal to allow German troops to advance through Spain for an attack on Gibraltar from landward.

Thursday 12th December 1940
According to a despatch dated 4th December from Craigie to the Foreign Office, Matsuoka told him that what finally led Japan to join the Axis was the reported Anglo-American agreement for the joint use of Singapore. The report was unfounded, but it was firmly believed by the Japanese Government, who regarded it as a serious threat.

Saturday 11th January 1941
Situation and developments in Siam and Indo-China becoming increasingly confused. Siam accuses the French and the French accuse the Siamese of being the aggressors. Meantime, fighting between the two goes merrily on, while Japan appears to be double-crossing the two of them in order to reap advantages for herself. Japan is known to be supplying the Thais with arms and munitions on a barter basis and there are reports of some kind of military agreement or understanding between them. We don't want to see Japan over-running [the whole of Indo-China] and using it as a jumping board for an attack on Burma and Malaya such as some observers foresee happening if and when Hitler launches his great attempt to invade England.

Wednesday 15th January 1941
There have been numerous indications of late that Japan is by no means united in its support of the Axis.

Saturday 18th January 1941
In a despatch from Moscow, Cripps reports that Soviet politicians surreptitiously and the Soviet military officers openly are urging the Japanese to take advantage of the present situation to seize the Dutch East Indies.
Monday 27th January 1941
Japan's aims are becoming increasingly clarified by Matsuoka's Palmerstonian utterances in the Diet and elsewhere. A few days ago he included the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and even Burma in what he defined as Japan's "sphere of common prosperity", and it is known that Japan has put forward a number of far-reaching proposals (?) demands) to the Dutch, aimed to give her a large measure of control in the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch, however, have firmly declined and made it clear that they have no desire to be included in Japan's "sphere of common prosperity".
To-day's "Times" includes two further declarations by Matsuoka. In one he lays down the guiding rule that no nation but Japan can be allowed to mediate in disputes in East Asia. Accordingly she has mediated in the Thai-Indo-China conflict in order to prevent any attempt at mediation by Britain or the U.S. In his second declaration he lays it down that the U.S. must accept Japanese domination in the Western Pacific. Japan is certainly out to prove herself the predominant Power in East Asia and these latest pronouncements and developments are unpleasantly ominous for the immediate future. This seems particularly true of her mediation in the Thai-Indo-China dispute, for which she is expected to exact heavy payment in the form of naval and air bases in South Indo-China and a growing grip on Thailand, thereby placing herself in a strong strategic position for an advance on Malaya and Burma, if and when Germany launches a full-scale attempt to invade the British Isles.

Tuesday 28th January 1941
Official despatches indicate an increasingly serious rift between Chiang Kai-shek and his Communist allies, some of whose troops have been pretty brutally handled by the Kuomintang soldiery. The much-vaunted united front look far from united at the moment.

Wednesday 5th February 1941
There are indications that Japan is contemplating a serious move which may bring her into the war shortly. If she does launch an offensive against us in the Far East in conjunction with a German thrust in Europe, it will be in the nature of the desperate gamble which I have foreseen as a possibility ever since 1932 and about which I wrote in my last book.

Wednesday 12th February 1941
News from Japan reaching the Foreign Office increasingly disconcerting the last few days and, unless something unexpected comes along to ease the present rapidly increasing tension between our two countries, it looks as though we shall be at war with Japan ver shortly now. The next few days are likely to be extremely critical and we may even find Japan enring into an unholy alliance or pact with the Soviet, similar to the one into which Germany entered in August 1939. As a result of the increasing tension and consequent flood of work, our Section at the F.O. [Japanese Section GC&CS] now has to work from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. without even a half-day off.

Thursday 13th February 1941
Increasing tension in Far East situation is clearly reflected in today's papers, which are stressing the likelihood of Japan entering the war on the side of the Axis Powers in the
immediate future and seizing naval and air bases in Indo-China and Siam for an attack on Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Official despatches to the Foreign Office serve all too well to bear out this probability.

Monday 17th February 1941
A welcome if only temporary easing of Anglo-Japanese tension noticeable, due in part, apparently, to the Japanese becoming a bit less convinced that the U.S. will stand aside in the event of an attack on the Dutch East Indies or Singapore or other non-American territory in the Far East.

Tuesday 25th February 1941
The tragedy is that the Japanese, in their present frame of mind, are prepared to believe almost anything, and Germany and the Soviet, recognising this, are doing everything possible to spur on Japan against Britain and the U.S.

Monday 31st March 1941
The Germans are doing their best by flattery, cajolery and parvenu hospitality to persuade Matsuoka to bring Japan more actively into the War. Various reasons are advanced to show the advantage to Japan to strike at Britain now before it is too late, but there are reasons for believing Matsuoka is unlikely to commit his country too far unless and until Berlin is able to induce Stalin to give Japan the definite agreement she wants. One of the main, if not the main, objects of Matsuoka's visit to Europe appears, in fact, to be to reach an agreement with the Soviet.

Sunday 13th April 1941
Conclusion of Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact announced on wireless in evening, so Matsuoka will not return empty-handed. Both countries promise to remain neutral in the event of the other being attacked, so Japan is now relieved of anxiety from attack from the north i.e. provided the Soviet lives up to its engagements. In addition to the Pact, a joint declaration has been issued, Japan recognising Outer Mongolia while the Soviet accords recognition to Manchukuo.

It may be that the Soviet, by concluding this pact, hopes it will encourage Japan to take a smack at Britain and America and thereby extend the War. This would certainly be in accordance with the Soviet's policy of pushing as many countries as possible into the War so as to weaken them, while she herself sits tight and bides her time.

Wednesday 14th May 1941
To town for lunch given by Viscount Kano at Claridges, where met a number of old friends. A curious experience to walk through the battered streets of Mayfair, with buildings shattered and blasted from the recent "blitz", and then to find oneself amidst the sumptious surroundings of Claridges, seemingly unchanged in any way since pre-War days. To be summoned formally into lunch by a toast-master with the customary: "My lords, ladies and gentlemen! Luncheon is served!" seemed almost incongruous, though no more so than the repast which followed - oysters, smoked salmon, Surrey pullets, ice-cream with maron glacee, wines, coffee, liqueurs, cigars etc all of the very best - yet there was nothing on the menu
contrary to ration regulations. As Lindley [former Ambassador to Japan] remarked in reply to
Kano's after-lunch speech, it was a pity that the guests did not include Hess, who would then
have been able to see for himself how London "starved"!

Amongst others whom I had not seen since the War began was Hasegawa, who spoke to me
very bitterly - and obviously genuinely - about the way Japan was being linked so closely with
Germany. He clearly dreads the prospect of being dragged into the War on the German side
and said he could not see why his country should be made to fight for Germany. Piggott, with
whom I walked afterwards to the Mall, tells me that both Shigemitsu and Tatsumi have
spoken to him on similar lines and have been very outspoken in their criticism of Matsuoka
and his policy. This, of course, serves to bear out and amplify what one has heard from other
sources.

Piggott tells me it was all but settled for him to be sent off to Japan on a special mission when
Lord Lloyd died. Lloyd was very keen to arrange this as a means of trying to wean the
Japanese from their increasing swing towards the Axis, but much to Piggott's disgust the
whole project has been dropped since his death, as none of the other "higher ups" are
sufficiently interested in the matter. Piggott also threw some interesting light on the reason for
Mullaley giving up his post as Military Attaché so long before his time is up and for Burkhardt
being sent back from China. Poor Mullaley, owing to language difficulties, made a mess up of
the Japanese Director of Military Intelligence's remarks to him early this year and made them
appear far more startling and sensational than they really were, while Burkhardt was sent
home because Chiang Kai-shek considered him "pro-Japanese" because, apparently, he
forwarded a report from Father Jacquinot highly critical of Chiang and his pals. Chiang, it
seems, complained to Clarke-Kerr [Ambassador], who promptly had him removed. That, at
least, is the version received by Piggott who, not unnaturally, is very critical of Clarke-Kerr for
preferring to appease Chiang rather than listen to Burkhardt and Jacquinot, who are both
highly versed in Chinese affairs.

**Wednesday 21st May 1941**

Following recent indications of a possible attack by Germany on Russia, there are now
unpleasantly ominous reports to the effect that Hitler and Stalin may be preparing to spring a
surprise by forming a virtual alliance, the Soviet being given a free hand in Iran for an
eventual attack on India.

**Tuesday 27th May 1941**

Following the news in this morning's papers that the "Bismark" had been located once more
by aircraft and had been torpedoed from the air and slowed down came the announcement
on the 1 p.m. wireless that she had been sunk. Spontaneous cheering and clapping broke out
from those at lunch when the announcement was made, though some of us had, of course,
heard the good news shortly before.

**Tuesday 10th June 1941**

Information concerning the present state of German-Soviet relations is conflicting, as there
are seemingly equally authentic reports that Germany is about to take a smack at Russia in
order to secure the Ukranian granary and that Germany and Russia are about to conclude a virtual alliance. While the first of these two reports appears to be accorded the greater credence, the fact that both Berlin and Moscow were at such pains to deny the reports of an alliance seems a bit ominous.

Wednesday 18th June 1941

The Japanese-Dutch East Indies negotiations have now been broken off and extremists in Japan are hinting at strong measures, though it seems doubtful that the Japanese Government is prepared to go to extremes just yet, as this would almost certainly lead to war with Britain, Holland's ally, and - what the Government fears still more - war with the U.S. too.

Sunday 22nd June 1941

[Commenting on German attack on U.S.S.R.]

Much as one may hate Hitler and his methods, one cannot feel much sympathy for Stalin & Co. now that they are hoist with their own petard. They have done so much to set every country by its ears and to drive them into war with one another and to keep out of the war themselves that one feels it serves them damned well right now that they have been dragged into it all. At the same time, though it is pretty revolting to find ourselves fighting alongside the Soviet, one cannot but hope that Hitler will find he has bitten off a bit more than he can chew this time.

Monday 23rd June 1941

Japan is in a bit of a quandary, thanks to her mixed loyalties to the 3-Power Pact with the Axis and her Neutrality Pact with the Soviet, and there is good reason to believe she is feeling a bit sore with the Germans for failing to let her know their intentions.

Wednesday 2nd July 1941

Following an Imperial conference convoked overnight, statements were made by Matsuoka and Konoe indicating in very guarded terms that "important national policies" to meet the situation brought about by Germany's attack on the Soviet had been decided. Konoe in his broadcast stressed Japan's need to rely on herself - which is much what Akita, the Overseas Minister, said a few days ago and seems to indicate a certain feeling of "soreness" towards Germany for having kept her so much in the dark about her intention towards Russia.

Incidentally there are indications that Japan is beginning to feel a bit uneasy about the possibility of an all-powerful Germany reaching out eventually to the Far East.

Friday 4th July 1941

See that the "Daily Telegraph" has a telegram from Shanghai telling of "unconfirmed reports" from Tokyo that Japan is planning to seize naval and air bases in Indo-China and Siam. Looks rather as though there had been a deliberate "leakage" of this information for reasons which are better not mentioned.

Sunday 13th July 1941

Judging from confidential information and newspaper reports alike, Japan appears to have given up the idea of joining in against the Soviet - anyway for the time being - and to be preparing for a show-down in Indo-China about a week hence, the idea apparently being to
obtain naval and air bases in southern Indo-China, either by threat or by force, so as to be in
a position to strike at Malaya later if necessary, though ostensibly her idea is to forestall a
British or American occupation and to bring Indo-China definitely within the "co-prosperity
sphere". Matsuoka's recent reference to a "super-emergency" and the "momentous decision"
reached by the Imperial Conference are good pointers to the fact that something is in the
wind, as also is the recall of Japanese shipping to the Pacific, while the Press outburst about
Britain's "encirclement" of Thailand and her alleged military alliance with Chungking, together
with charges made against Indo-China and so on would seem to indicate that the ground is
being prepared for a southward thrust shortly.

Thursday 17th July 1941
Announced rather unexpectedly on wireless last night that the Japanese Cabinet had
resigned. Looks as though there had been a bit of a dust-up between those who advocate a
smack at Russia, those who prefer a thrust southward, and those who are opposed to any
more adventures lest Japan find herself at war with Britain and the U.S. No reason for the
resignation is given, however, apart from a somewhat vague reference to the need of a
stronger Cabinet to pull Japan through the present serious crisis; but whether this
foreshadows a still more reactionary, chauvinistic Cabinet or not is not clear.

At lunch time to-day, however, it was announced that Konoe had been called upon once more
to form a new ministry, a fact which seems, on the face of it, rather more reassuring, as he is
by no means a firebrand, even though he is a bit advanced in his views.

Saturday 19th July 1941
New Japanese Cabinet announced last night. Matsuoka is out and Admiral Toyoda succeeds
him. When I knew him in Tokyo, he was by way of being friendly to Britain, where, of course,
he had formerly been Naval Attaché, but he is said to have become strongly nationalistic of
late, so his succession to Matsuoka does not necessarily mean a more liberal foreign policy,
though it will probably mean less dependence on the Axis and more dependence on Japan
herself. The War, Navy, and one or two other posts remain unchanged, Ogura Masatsune of
the Sumitomo interests becomes Finance Minister, and for the rest the two main features are
the inclusion of a large proportion of generals and admirals and the exclusion of all party
politicians, while Hiranuma becomes a sort of Vice-Premier. Three admirals, four generals,
and four hard-headed businessmen out of a

Indications that Japan, having reckoned (and reckoned rightly) that she could occupy Indo-
China without a blow and with little likelihood of precipitating war with either Britain or
America, is preparing to take a fling at East Siberia if and when the opportunity presents itself.
It looks, in fact, as though her tentative programme may be: -
(1) Occupation of Indo-China, the furthest stage on her southward advance for which she can
aim at the moment without compelling Britain or the U.S. to use force against her.
(2) Forcing China to give in by cutting the Burma road, China's life-line, by a thrust northward
to Yunnan from Indo-China.
(3) With China out of the way, taking a smack at the Soviet in an attempt to seize the Maritime Provinces.

(4) With both China and the Soviet disposed of and her own position in Indo-China consolidated, proceeding with her southward advance, with Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies as prizes, Siam having possibly been taken under her "protection" as a start in much the same way as Indo-China, though this would certainly involve her in war with Britain if not with the U.S. as well. An ambitious and dangerous programme, but ________ they will rue it.

**Saturday 26th July 1941**

Britain's and America's reply to the occupation of Indo-China has not been long delayed and has come in the form "freezing" Japanese assets. This was announced in this morning's paper, and this evening's wireless announced that, in addition, Britain had denounced her commercial treaty with Japan. The general effect of all these measures, combined with Japan's retaliatory action in "freezing" British and American assets, will be to bring trade with Japan to a virtual standstill, an outcome which will hit Japan far more heavily than either the British Empire or America, who were Japan's most important customers and suppliers. One can only hope that it will not drive Japan into open war with us as a last desperate gamble, as we have not yet got the ships or men to spare at the moment for a war in the Pacific. It is a risk, however, that we had to take, so there is no point in crossing that bridge until we come to it.

**Monday 28th July 1941**

To Camberley in morning on 2 days' leave.

Looks rather as though Siam may be Japan's next objective, as there are signs of Japan increasing her pressure on that country and there are reports (Japanese made!) that Britain is planning to "seize" it in the same way as she "seized" Syria. These reports have an ominous ring, as similar reports preceded the Japanese demands on Vichy Indo-China and are being used to justify Japan's action in occupying Indo-China. The fact that the Japan-Vichy Agreement allows Japan to use 8 aerodromes and two naval bases in Indo-China is now officially admitted and reports indicate that about 50,000 Japanese troops are being sent to South Indo-China, the first detachments having landed already. These are, of course, additional to the 6,000 in northern Indo-China allowed under the agreement reached with Vichy in August last year. Meantime large numbers of Japanese troops are being moved into Manchukuo, presumably heading for the Soviet border for use if and when required for an attack on the Soviet Far East.

**Wednesday 30th July 1951**

Craige has been speaking his mind to Toyoda about the way in which Ohashi gave him a formal denial earlier this month about the truth of the reports that Japan had made demands on Vichy for air bases etc. in Indo-China.

**Tuesday 5th August 1941**
Situation in Far East increasingly tense, the "Asahi" remarking significantly that, in view of the increasingly hostile attitude of the U.S. (who last week prohibited the export of motor fuel oil for aircraft to Japan etc.), there is no room left for the two countries to readjust their relations. "It is now time for Japan to complete her preparations in anticipation of the worst to come". The fact that Siam has just recognised Manchukuo and has agreed to extend credits to Japan adds to the growing belief that Siam is giving way to Japanese pressure and may soon follow in the footsteps of Indo-China, in which case it is difficult to see how war can be avoided.

Wednesday 6th August 1941

According to evening wireless the Japanese in Indo-China are massing on the Thai border, presumably with the object of bringing Thailand to an acquiescent frame of mind. Both Hull in Washington and Craigie in Tokyo have given clear warnings to the Japanese Government that any attempt to advance into Thailand on the specious plea of protecting it will likely mean war. It is to be hoped therefore that this will serve to deter the Japanese from repeating in Siam what they have just done in Indo-China, though the fact that the Japanese Press is working up strong feeling about Japan's "encirclement", Siam's need for Japanese protection, and so on, is a bit ominous.

Saturday 9th August 1941

If one could put down even one half of the side-lights on the war that one learns in the course of one's work in my particular branch of the Foreign Office [GC&CS], it would provide absolutely grand material for a book of revelations after the war. The present whereabouts of Churchill may perhaps be made public before long, but one wonders if the true facts of how we caught the "Bismark", or how it happened that Admiral Somerville got onto the track of the Italian Fleet at Matapan (let alone how the opportunity was very nearly missed through the inability of a certain officer to believe the evidence before his eyes or to take the necessary action as soon as it should have been taken) will ever be revealed, as to do so might compromise valuable sources of information. Would that one were free to jot down such details! The hurried visit of the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pounds, and his reasons for it would, in itself, provide a first-class story, besides reflecting great credit on the admiral himself in giving credit where credit was due.

Sunday 10th August 1941

[Kennedy moved house from Camberley to Woburn to be near to his work at Bletchley Park] Took over "Jitty House" and its keys at 7 a.m. this morning. My only regret is that I shall have to wait till the family arrives on the 29th before moving into it. Meantime Barbara Orton (Roscoe as was) and her husband are looking after it for me, they having returned from their honeymoon yesterday.

Thursday 14th August 1941

Jean [older daughter] arrived this morning with two lorry loads of our goods and chattels, so we spent the day stowing it away in "Jitty House" and making the place look more or less habitable, I having taken the day off, my first day off for over a fortnight.
Broadcast by Atlee 3 p.m. announced the meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt at sea and the conclusion of an Anglo-American understanding in the form of an 8-point declaration setting forth the aims of the two countries.Briefly stated these boil down to two primary desiderata for the post-War World - freedom from want and freedom from fear.

Saturday 23rd August 1941
Increasing tension in the Far East. The Japanese are much worried about the transport of oil to Vladivostok by the U.S. and are threatening to stop the ships passing through the Tsugaru or Soya Straits, though this is probably just bluff. Meantime, large numbers of British and Americans who are wanting to leave Japan are being prevented, on one pretext or another, from doing so.

Sunday 24th August 1941
Churchill in his broadcast this evening gave a warning that Japan must stop threatening the Siamese etc. or take the consequences. This would seem to indicate an understanding of sorts with the Yanks, as it is unlikely that Churchill would deliver such a clear warning unless he were reasonable well assured of U.S. co-operation in the event of Japan disregarding it - an assurance which the U.S. have, hitherto, refused to give in so far as Siam is concerned.

Wednesday 27th August 1941
As I shall not be returning to the Rectory, the Clothiers gave me a real slap-up farewell dinner last night, but as I had to be at Bletchley by 9.30 p.m. for Home Guard night operations, I had to leave about 9 p.m..
To Camberley this evening after work to help finish off things at Fosse Bank by way of starting my week's summer leave.

Thursday 28th August 1941
The Germans are carrying out terrific thrusts against the Russians aimed at Kiev, Odessa, and Leningrad.

Friday 29th August 1941
After spending the morning seeing to the removal of all our remaining gear from Fosse Bank, set off with Maggie [wife] and the two girls by road about 2.30 p.m. for Woburn Sands and moved into our new house there.

Saturday 6th September 1941
On Home Guard duty at the Observation Post last night and this morning from 5 a.m. - 6.30. The Prime Minister paid us a surprise visit this morning and, after inspecting some of the work at Bletchley Park, gave a short talk thanking us for what we have done and stressing the great value of our work. Sir Dudley Pounds, the First Sea Lord, paid a similar visit of thanks at the time of the "Bismark" show. Very decent of these old boys to come down in person to thank us when they themselves must be so terribly loaded down with their own work and vast responsibilities. Instructions issued to keep Churchill's visit a secret; but all Bletchley seems to know about it!

Saturday 13th September 1941
From both official and unofficial circles there are welcome signs that Japan is cooling somewhat towards the Axis and that more moderate counsels are beginning to prevail once more. While this may be due in part to the anxiety caused by the joint economic pressure of the A.B.C.D. [America, Britain, China and Dutch East Indies] Powers, it would seem from what Craigie says that the Germans have, in part, brought these troubles on their own heads by overplaying their hand in Japan and getting the Japanese on the raw by the way they have treated them. One indication of this cooling off is seen in the treatment meted out to Ott and Indelli by Toyoda who, instead of being at their constant beck and call as Matsuoka allowed himself to be, shuffles them off onto Amau (who is now the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs) instead of seeing them himself. Incidentally Amau is said to have been removed from his ambassadorship in Rome by Matsuoka because of his luke-warm attitude towards the Axis, and since his appointment as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs he is said to have become markedly anti-Axis. This is all to the good, though it is too early yet to say how far the cooling off process will go. Much will probably depend on the outcome of the Japanese talks in Washington, about which the Yanks are extremely reticent even to Halifax.

Thursday 2nd October 1941
While there are evident signs that more moderate voices are being heard once more in Japan, the danger to Konoe, Toyoda and other leading figures from the extreme elements has been emphasised a number of times of late by Craigie. The reality of the danger is exemplified in one of his latest despatches in which he tells of an attempt made on Konoe’s life a few days ago, though the news of it has been banned.

Saturday 4th October 1941
The largest-scale manoeuvres ever held in this country ended yesterday, though tanks and mechanised troops of all kinds, which have swarmed all over these parts since Monday when the operations started, are still to be seen in considerable numbers.
In one of his latest despatches, Craigie reports that Konoe is planning to meet Roosevelt somewhere in the Pacific and is hopeful that, by means of personal contact, he will be able to bring his peace talks to a successful conclusion and, by presenting his countrymen with a fait accompli, will obtain the backing of those who, at the moment, are tying his hands by their extravagant demands.

Wednesday 8th October 1941
The significance of Hitler's boasts last week is now becoming apparent, as the Germans are now making a terrific thrust on Moscow and are seemingly determined to carry it through to success before the winter sets in irrespective of losses in men and material.

Thursday 16th October 1941
Following reports of a Government crisis in Tokyo, wireless announced this evening the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet. No indication as to Konoe’s successor, but the news seems ominous, as it appears to indicate the breakdown of any further attempt to seek a peaceful settlement with the U.S. and the over-ruling of the more moderate elements by the
extremists as a result, in part, of the growing belief in Japan that the Soviet's days are numbered and that now is the time to have a smack at her.

Friday 17th October 1941
New Japanese Premier is General Tojo, who was War Minister under Konoe. Tojo is fairly extreme, but is not an "out-and-outer", so it is too early yet to predict what his policy is likely to be. This may be more clearly indicated when one learns who is to be his Foreign Minister.

Saturday 18th October 1941
Togo (Shigenori), formerly Ambassador to Moscow, appointed Foreign Minister in new Japanese Cabinet. Though he has a German wife, he is not regarded as particularly pro-Axis, and the fact that Tojo is reported to have instructed Nomura in Washington to resume peace talks with the U.S. appears to indicate that the change in Government does not necessarily imply a change for the worse.

Sunday 19th October 1941
In addition to Premiership, Tojo has taken over the portfolios of War and Home Affairs, thereby concentrating further power into his own hands. It does not look, however, as though the fears of an immediate thrust either northward of southward conjured up by the change of Cabinet are to be realised.

Monday 27th October 1941
Disquieting signs that Japan is preparing further moves either north against Russia or south against Malaya, or against both simultaneously.

Tuesday 4th November 1941
Clarke-Kerr has transmitted a personal appeal to Churchill from Chiang Kai-shek, who stresses his own weakness in aircraft and his fears of a consequent collapse if, as he expects, the Japanese launch an offensive shortly against Kunming from Indo-China for the purpose of cutting the Burma Road and thereby severing Chungking's life line. He appeals, therefore, for both aircraft and airmen, pointing out with not a little truth that if, due to lack of air strength, he is finally compelled to give in, his collapse would release the bulk of Japan's military forces for operations elsewhere, e.g. Malaya, Dutch East Indies etc.. He argues therefore that it is to our own advantage as much as to his to ensure, as far as possible, that he does not have to give in to the Japanese.

On the other hand, if we provide him with actual units of the R.A.F., our action may well serve to precipitate Japan actively onto the side of the Axis, which is just what we do not want at the moment. Our hands are full enough as it is without plunging into war on yet another and more distant front.

There are, however, increasing indications that Japan is preparing for a possible further advance southwards, with either the Dutch East Indies, Siam, Malaya or Burma or any or all as her objective and it is thought by some that she is only awaiting the advent of the dry season in Siam and the Dutch East Indies (December to April) before setting operations afoot. As she is feeling the pinch of economic strangulation seriously now as a result of the
"freezing" orders and of her inability to obtain oil, it should cause no great surprise if she had a crack at the Dutch East Indies before long.

**Wednesday 5th November 1941**

It is, in fact, becoming increasingly evident that if, eventually, Japan enters the fray it will be of her own volition because it suits her purpose to do so, and not merely to help Germany. For that matter there is good reason to believe that Germany would much prefer to see her take a crack at the Soviet than the Dutch East Indies, as the Germans would like the Dutch East Indies for themselves. The Japanese appear to realise this, and the fact that they do so makes it all the more likely that if Japan decides on war she will, as a first step, try to make sure of the Dutch East Indies, so that she will have the prior claim to it in the event of the Axis Powers emerging victorious.

Meantime, the Japanese have apparently decided to make one more effort to bring about a peaceful settlement with the U.S. as it was announced this evening that Kurusu has been ordered to proceed at once to Washington to assist Nomura in his attempt to find a formula which will enable the present Japan-U.S. conversations to produce actual negotiations. Unless, however, the Japanese are prepared to make far greater concessions than, at the moment, they appear likely to do, the chances of a successful outcome seem extremely slender. The fact that, more or less simultaneously with the announcement about Kurusu, a special session of the Diet has been called for the 15th, has given rise to the rumour that Kurusu is to be given till then to find a satisfactory formula and, in event of failure to do so, the Diet will be informed that it is to be war. It seems rather a short time, however, for the wretched Kurusu to achieve anything, so the rumour has probably little foundation.

**Friday 7th November 1941**

Craigie has asked the Foreign Office to urge the U.S. to be a bit more frank with us about the scope and progress of their talks with Japan, as so far they have told us practically nothing and, as he points out, U.S. interests and ours in the Far East differ in a number of respects and we are liable to find ours being overlooked if we are kept in the dark as to what is happening.

Incidentally it is embarrassing to him at times to have to admit to Japanese officials and others that he does not know just what is going on and it is bad for our prestige with the Japanese to leave the U.S. to deal with matters of vital importance to us in the Far East without having any say in the matter. He is also rather worried about the way some of our people seem so utterly unconcerned as to whether Japan enters the War or not and seem to underestimate Japan's fighting abilities; and he contrasts Hitler's policy of "one at a time" with our tendency to adopt the attitude "the more the merrier".

**Monday 10th November 1941**

Speaking at the Lord Mayor's banquet to-day, Churchill delivered a very clear warning to Japan, that if she should fight the U.S. she will have to fight us too. While, however, he did not attempt to mince his words, he emphasised his own friendly feelings towards Japan in the past, including in connection with the concluding of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and he
pleaded with her to do nothing to necessitate his warning being put into effect. He revealed, incidentally, that we are now in a position to send a powerful fleet with a full complement of ancillary vessels into the Pacific.

Tuesday 11th November 1941

Kaya, the Japanese Finance Minister, has now joined the swelling chorus of bellicosity and is quoted as declaring that one of Japan's official despatches, wants 3 months in which to complete her war preparations, and there is reason to believe that Japan requires only 10 or 12 days.

Wednesday 3rd December 1941

On returning last night about 11.15 from Home Guard operations, found Mungo [son] had returned home on leave a couple of hours earlier. Looks bronzed and fit and little change in appearance since he left in May last year. Grand seeing him back again.

Latest despatches from Halifax [Ambassador to Washington] and Clarke-Kerr [Ambassador to China] throw interesting light on Japan-U.S. talks. While Chiang Kai-shek has been very critical of the U.S. State Department for its seeming readiness to revert to a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis Japan in connection with the proposed interim agreement [relaxation of sanctions by U.S., Japanese withdrawal from Indo-China], Cordell Hull has been pouring out his woes to Halifax and bitterly criticizing T.V. Soong for passing on distorted reports to Chiang and making Chiang imagine that the U.S. were prepared to sell out China. Soong, according to Hull, has always aimed to stir up trouble between Japan and Britain & the U.S., and his deliberate distortion of facts seems likely to achieve this aim. While, however, Hull's accusations against Soong are probably fully justified, Halifax rubbed it in to Hull that the present critical situation might possibly have been avoided if he, Hull, had taken the British into his confidence a bit earlier regarding the progress of the talks.

Soong, for his part, maintains that the proposed interim agreement would have had a disastrous effect psychologically on the Chinese and might have caused them to give up hope and give in to Japan. He either would not or could not see that, taking a long view, it would be to China's advantage that America should be free to fight Hitler without being embarrassed with a war with Japan.

Meantime Hull has been expressing himself to Halifax as being "horrified" at the "leakage" in England about the Washington talks; but from what our own Foreign Office has told Halifax it seems clear that the "leakage" came from an American correspondent and that it would never have got out if it had not been for the relaxed censorship forced on the British by the U.S.. Our own Foreign Office, incidentally, seem inclined to think that the real source of the leakage was the U.S. State Department itself.

In another despatch, Halifax quotes a friendly American newspaperman as telling him that Hull, in an "off the record" talk with some of the leading Pressmen, made it clear that the U.S. would help Britain if she were attacked by Japan.

Thursday 4th December 1941
No reply yet to Roosevelt's request to Japan for early explanation of the massing of Japanese troops in Indo-China. Situation increasingly tense, though it is hoped that the recent arrival of the "Prince of Wales" and other fresh naval units at Singapore may give Japan cause to think twice before plunging into war. The constant talk in the Japanese Press of late about the need to "defend" Thailand against British aggression seems particularly ominous and looks as though it portended a Japanese move into Thailand to "prevent" such "aggression". The fact that the Thais in general and Pibul, the Thai Premier, in particular are so spineless and scared stiff of the Japanese is in itself a danger; for despite Pibul's assertions to Crosby, our Minister in Bangkok, he and his countrymen seem far more likely to give way to Japanese coercion than to listen to our promises to guarantee their independence after the War, unless we can ensure adequate support in the event of a Japanese attack - which they know we can't.

Should Japan decide on war, latest indications are that she will attempt a landing near Kota Bharu in the north-east corner of Malaya, so as to induce us to move into Thai territory in order to eject the Japanese landing parties, as this would be the best way to do so. We, however, would then be guilty of violating Thai neutrality and the Thais would then join the Japanese against us.

One ray of hope is conveyed in one of Craigie's latest despatches, according to which the Emperor is doing his utmost to avoid war with either Britain or America and might even use his right of veto, if the worse came to the worst, in order to prevent it, though, as a constitutional monarch, he would be loth to exercise this prerogative. The suggestion is made that a personal appeal from Roosevelt to the Emperor might help.

Saturday 6th December 1941
Owing to the critical situation, was on duty at the office from 9 a.m. yesterday till 9 a.m. today. From now on, for time being, we are to take turn about at night in case anything calling for immediate action comes in. Incidentally, the "all highest" (Smith's name for Churchill!) is all over himself at the moment for latest information and indications about Japan's intentions and rings up at all hours of the day and night, except for the 4 hours in each 24 (2 to 6 p.m.) when he sleeps. For a man of his age he has the most amazing vitality. His chief form of recreation, I gather, is to get out onto the Admiralty roof whenever there is a raid on London and shake his fist at the raiders! As there have been no serious raids on London now for 6 or 7 months, he must be missing this recreation!

Sunday 7th December 1941
Following the announcement on 9 a.m. wireless that Roosevelt had made a direct appeal to the Emperor - news which, in view of Craigie's recent despatch and of one from Halifax reporting that Kurusu had privately suggested this course of action, gave rise to hope that a clash might be averted - came the announcement in the 9 p.m. broadcast that Japan, without warning or declaration of war, had struck at the U.S. A message received just before leaving the office this evening had indicated that the outbreak of war was probably only a matter of hours, but the news on the 9 p.m. wireless, that Japan had opened hostilities with an air raid
on Pearl Harbour, more than 3,000 miles out in the Pacific, came as a complete surprise. Though details are lacking, the attack appears to have been on a pretty heavy scale and it looks rather as though the Yanks had been caught napping, as otherwise they should have had warning that Japanese warships, including one or more aircraft carriers presumably, were in the offing.

In view of Churchill's recent promise to go to America's help within an hour of an attack, this means that we are now at war with Japan too. Sad, but unavoidable, though one cannot but feel that this sorry outcome might well have been avoided if only the advice of those on the spot had been followed.

Monday 8th December 1941

That Japan, if she struck, would strike swiftly and heavily was only to be expected, but the wide-spread nature of her attacks has come as a surprise and shows extraordinary audacity. In addition to the powerful blow at Pearl Harbour, the 7 a.m. news announced air raids on Singapore, Guam, and the Philippines and a landing at Kota Bharu, while later in the day came reports of attacks on Siam, Hong Kong, Wake Island, and elsewhere, while, as was only to be expected, the Concessions and Settlements in Tientsin and Shanghai have been seized by the Japanese.

Pearl Harbour and other naval and military establishments in Hawaii have apparently suffered heavily and it seems clear that the Yanks were caught as unprepared as were the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904.

The landing at Kota Bharu, though not wholly unexpected in view of recent information, provides a serious threat to Singapore, especially in view of this evening's news that Siam has caved in and agreed to the passage of Japanese troops to the Malayan and Burma borders, as this gives Japan, amongst other things, command of the Kra Isthmus, thereby severing our land communications.

Wednesday 10th December 1941

Something like a gasp of dismay went round the dining room at Bletchley Park when the 1 p.m. news opened with the announcement that the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" had been sunk off Singapore by Japanese air attack. A terrible blow just at this time when, with the U.S. Pacific Fleet so severely hit at Pearl Harbour, we are so badly in need of every ship we can get. By this stroke, not only is the whole balance of power in the Western Pacific seriously upset for the time being, but the war must be regarded as lengthened very considerably.

Friday 12th December 1941

From what Churchill said yesterday and from other information it seems clear that the loss of the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" was largely due to lack of air support, the Japanese apparently having the skies pretty well to themselves. Crete over again! Most, if not all, our aerodromes in the northern part of the peninsula appear to have been badly plastered and put out of commission by the opening air raids and the important aerodrome at Kota Bharu is in Japanese hands, so all possibility of adequate air support was ruled out; but why is it that we never seem to learn the need for adequate protection of our airfields?
Wednesday 17th December 1941

Last night I was engaged in Home Guard night operations and the night before in Home Guard patrolling, so have had no time till now to jot down the developments of the past 3 days.

Our withdrawal from Kowloon was confirmed on Monday, and subsequent Japanese reports of landings in British North Borneo were confirmed to-day. Taken in conjunction with the bombing of Rangoon and or withdrawal northwards from Victoria Point and southwards in Kedah towards Penang, the general picture in the Far East is, at the moment, one of almost unrelieved gloom.

Chiang is strongly in favour of the A.B.C.D. Powers entering into a military alliance amongst themselves in order to counter the Triple Alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan. Though sympathetic towards the idea in principle, the Foreign Office realizes that, if such an alliance were brought about, China's claims might prove very embarrassing when the time comes to formulate peace terms.

Thursday 18th December 1941

Up to town with Maggie [wife] and Mungo [son]. While they shopped in morning, I looked in to the War Office to see Chapman for talk on the Far Eastern situation and he showed me the latest situation reports etc. from Malaya. Tells me the War Office gave an almost exact forecast of where the Japanese would land and how they would act, but our naval people pooh-poohed the idea and said the Japanese would never dare to take such risks - all of which goes to confirm my belief for a long while past that the Navy sadly under-rated the Japanese. He confirmed, too, that we are sadly lacking in material and aircraft in those parts, as most of our stuff is in Libya and a lot, of course, has been diverted to Russia. We can, he said, bring reinforcements from India, but without material they would stand little chance against the Japanese mechanised divisions.

Surprised to learn from him that our withdrawal to Hong Kong from Kowloon really was "according to plan", as it was decided some time ago that, in the event of attack from the mainland, our best plan would be to withdraw to the island, as we had not enough men and material to spare for the defence of the Leased Territory. On my remarking that our withdrawal there and our reverses in Malaya had come as a bit of a shock, he replied grimly that it was nothing to the shocks that were still in store for us! From what Chapman tells me it looks as though Singapore itself may be fated to play a role [similar to that of Port Arthur] and that grave fears are held as to its ability to hold out. Thailand's collapse, as he said, has struck at the very roots of our defence plans.

Took Maggie and Mungo to Ludgate Circus to see St. Paul's, as I had not seen it since the bombing of the City and I wanted to see for myself the new vista opened out by the destruction of the buildings all around, about which there had been much talk. The scene of desolation is pretty grim and reminds me forcibly of Yokohama after the 1923 earthquake.

Friday 19th December 1941
This evening came the sad news that Penang is now in Japanese hands and that the Japanese have now effected a landing in Hong Kong itself.

Tuesday 23rd December 1941

The situation in the Far East is increasingly grim and close on 100,000 Japanese have now been landed in Luzon [Philippines].

Monday 12th January 1942

Loss of Kuala Lumpur confirmed. Situation in Malaya increasingly gloomy.

C.C. Grey's book, "Bombers", just published, provides a revealing light on recent developments in the Far East. Grey is by way of being one of our leading authorities on air matters, yet his book shows him to have been completely out in his reckoning about the strength and ability of the Japanese Air Force. He considers the Japanese hopelessly inferior in the air and belittles both their aircraft and their inadequacy of the defence measures taken in the Far East, he explained that this had been due to the more urgent calls of Russia and the Near East prior to Japan's entry into the War. We had never had the power to provide effectively for all three and the Government's policy had been to avoid embroilment with Japan. Had we scattered our forces over immense areas in the Far East on the off-chance of a Japanese attack, we should have been ruined. It was considered best therefore to concentrate on the immediate needs of Russia and the Near East rather than including the (then) purely speculative requirements of the Far East. In view of the great come-back staged by Russia (largely as a result of our help) and of our successes in Libya, where we had inflicted 61,000 casualties on the enemy at a cost of only 18,000 to ourselves, he felt that our strategy had, on the whole, been justified.

Incidentally he mentioned that one of the limiting factors in our despatch of men and material to the Far East had been the immense amount of shipping required for transport everywhere - an interesting point in view of the fact that there are good reasons for believing that Japan is feeling concern about the limited amount of her own shipping. Limitations of shipping and of aircraft may, in fact, lead in time to Japan's undoing.

Wednesday 4th February 1942

Announced this evening that Thailand, which we have treated hitherto as enemy occupied territory, has declared war on us. In view of inside information this should cause no great surprise, though regrettable.

Wednesday 11th February 1942

"The Times" has a very pathetic account of the derelict appearance of the naval base at Singapore which had to be evacuated some days ago on account of it being so fully exposed to artillery fire from Johore. A sad end to so many years of hard work and expenditure of so many tens of millions, and sadder still if, as now seems, 650,000 under arms and 4,000,000 trained and 6,000,000 untrained reserves.

Saturday 21st February 1942

To Bedford in morning to give my second lecture on Japan to our [GC&CS] Japanese class there, which consists of 25 "hand-picked" classical scholars from public schools and
universities, who are being put through a 6-month intensive course in Japanese. Normally one would say that 6 months is totally inadequate and possibly it may prove so, but it is an interesting experiment to see if youngsters, who have shown special aptitude for Latin and Greek, will be able to master Japanese in the same way.

Wednesday 25th February 1942
Two very disconcerting bits of news (needless to say unpublished). One is that Java is probably to be evacuated and Wavell to move his H.Q. elsewhere. The other, which would seem almost incredible had I not seen it in black and white, is that the "Hermes" has arrived at Colombo without a single aircraft on board. Someone has blundered badly.

Wednesday 4th March 1942
Orders definitely issued for our branch of the Foreign Office to return to London next week. Feel very sore about it, as the move has been manoeuvred by certain "interested parties" and by gross misrepresentation of facts, while Denniston is so utterly spineless that, on his own admission, he has made no attempt to question the order or to point out all the serious snags and difficulties involved. No small portion of the personnel who, for one reason or another, are unable to go, have had to resign and for may of us the move will entail from 4 to 5 hours travel daily to and from work, with an early start (about 8 a.m.) and a late return (9 p.m. or later). And yet Denniston has the brass to contend that efficiency will be increased "in the tenser atmosphere of London!" We and others have sent in memos and made personal protests, pointing out how efficiency will be seriously affected rather than increased, but our warnings are simply brushed aside and we are censured by Denniston for having the temerity to question the decision. "I never questioned it," he said, as though it were to his credit, though by this very admission he damned himself as utterly unfitted to be head of a show like ours. By failing to put forward his view and to point out the facts, he is guilty of negligence and incompetence and has failed deplorably in his duties as No.1.

Saturday 7th March 1942
Denniston has circulated an absolute masterpiece of fatuous "pep talk" to those of us who are being sent back to London. In it he describes our coming return there as being "in the nature of an adventure in the middle of this war" and says we shall be able to "carry out our duties more in the front line" and that "the tenser atmosphere (of London) will urge us on still further", though how he reconciles this with his assertion that we shall be "more exposed to daylight raids" is somewhat mystifying! It is all in line, however, with his remark to us the other day that, if we continue to work in the peaceful atmosphere of Bletchley Park our work might suffer from "dolci far niente"!

Monday 9th March 1942
From the Philippines comes the news, admittedly unconfirmed though with very circumstantial details, that Homma has committed "hara-kiri" by way of atonement for failure to overcome MacArthur. The Japanese deny this, but say he has been replaced as Commander-in-Chief by Yamashita, the victor of Malaya. Personally I hope the report is not true, as Homma is an officer of the best type and one of my oldest and best friends in Japan.
Tuesday 10th March 1942
Eden has given out details of Japanese atrocities in Hong Kong that she has been "let down" by us after she herself had done so much to help us, the close ties between Australia and the Mother Country may become seriously and permanently weakened. One hopes that such fears will prove groundless.

Tuesday 17th March 1942
There are indications that Japan may be contemplating a crack at the Soviet if and when the Germans launch their much-heralded Spring offensive.

Thursday 19th March 1942
Received a not unpleasant "unsolicited testimonial" this morning from Chapman, when I was ringing him up at the War Office. He had been re-reading "The Problem of Japan", he said, and had been much struck by the way in which I had foreshadowed so much of what had come to pass in the last four months. And yet, he added, people here at the War Office and in the country in general talk as though the tactics employed by the Japanese and the successes attained by them were something wholly unforeseen and unexpected.

Friday 3rd April 1942
I must say that, much as I admire Chiang himself, I am quite unable to share the current enthusiasm for our Chinese allies. All honour to them for the fight they have put up since 1937, but the prospect of a victorious China gives me no great thrill. Confidential reports from Chunking etc. make it quite clear that the Chinese have little or no love for us and that they are becoming inflated with the idea that they are, militarily and in sundry other respects, vastly superior to us. They are becoming hopelessly intolerant of advice and think they know everything, and they dream of themselves as the future leaders of Asia against the West.

Saturday 11th April 1942
Another serious loss for us yesterday in the Indian Ocean, the "Hermes" having been sunk some miles off Ceylon by Japanese aircraft. It was, if I remember right, the "Hermes" that was sent out to the Indian Ocean hurriedly about the end of February and, through some incredible oversight, fetched up without a single machine [aircraft] on board. She was to have taken some on at Durban or Cape Town on her way out, but they were not ready, so she sailed without them. I learned this confidentially at the time through a signal to the Admiralty from the Commander-in-Chief who was, very naturally, furious. Simply amazing. An aircraft-carrier without a single machine!

Though of course no mention is made of it in the Press, [the British Government] is bringing pressure to bear on the Persian Government to close down the Japanese Legation at Teheran and to clear out its inmates, as not only are they in a position to report all our movements in those parts, but they are engaged in active propaganda among the Persian malcontents and others and causing much trouble. As usual, however, our Persian "allies" are hedging and making all kinds of excuses. Fortunately the Yanks and, to some extent, the Soviet are backing us up, and the Persians are likely to find themselves without the food and
other supplies they need so badly from us if they don't act in the way we demand, though it is
unfortunate that we have to bring pressure in this and other ways.

Official reports reaching the Foreign Office indicate that the U.S. naval programme is being
carried out with amazing rapidity and that the U.S. are simply pouring out new destroyers by
the score from the naval shipyards. This is most welcome to know, as also is the evidence
from official and other sources that the Soviet are supremely confident of success and are
training and equipping vast numbers of new troops, though one cannot but have certain
qualms as to how we ourselves shall fare if the War ends with a victorious Soviet sprawled all
over Europe.

Wednesday 15th April 1942
Officially announced that the Persians have ordered the Japanese Legation to close down
and the Japanese diplomats etc. to leave within a week. Press reports profess to believe that
the Persians have done this on their own initiative!

Cannot help being struck by the difference in tone of our Chungking telegrams to the Foreign
Office sine Seymour succeeded Clarke-Kerr there as our Ambassador. No longer are the
Chinese held up as veritable paragons of virtue, but their shortcomings are given just as
much attention and emphasis as their better qualities.

Saturday 18th April 1942
Outstanding development of to-day has been the announcement of raids on Tokyo,
Yokohama, Kobe and Nagoya by U.S. aircraft. Although the Japanese claim that little serious
damage was done, the moral effect is likely to be most wholesome, as the Japanese have
now experienced for the first time in their homeland what they themselves have done with
such relative impunity to others.

Thursday 30th April 1942
Burma situation grave. The Japanese, by diverting a column eastwards, have more or less
by-passed Mandalay and occupied Lashio after advancing some 50 or 60 miles in the past 24
hours or so - a fine piece of work militarily, but pretty grim for us. With the terminus of the
Burma Road now in Japanese hands and with our own forces more or less (seemingly)
bottled up with no adequate line of retreat, the situation could hardly be much worse. Matters
are not improved by the attitude now being adopted towards us by the Chinese "higher ups" -
an attitude of openly expressed contempt and derision, as reflected, for example, in an article
contributed to a New York paper by Mme. Chiang, who, in order to support her sneers, has
not hesitated to distort facts and spread deliberate lies. The British, she contends, surrender
practically without fighting, whereas the Chinese never give in! It is a pity, in a way, that these
and other hits below the belt by our gallant Chinese "allies" cannot be brought to the notice of
the British public and our Sinophile cliques; but for political reasons, of course, such matters
have to be hid from them and nothing but good may be said of the Chinese. It is all very
nauseating.

Tuesday 5th May 1942
By way of forestalling a repetition of Indo-China in Madagascar, we carried out a landing in the wee hours of the morning after the local Vichy authorities had rejected a demand to hand over the naval base of Diego Suarez.

Glad to see by official despatches that the Chinese Ambassador here in this country has been told very plainly just what [the British Government] thinks of the spate of anti-British propaganda being put out by Chungking.

Saturday 9th May 1942
Mrs. Roscoe has shown me a letter from the B.B.C. about a series of very crude anti-Japanese broadcasts they started 2 or 3 nights ago. The producers of this somewhat nauseating propagandist effort rejoice in the good old British names of Brigid Maas and Ralf Bonwit! Bon Halfwit would be a more apt name.

Saturday 23rd May 1942
Reports reaching the Foreign Office indicate that the Chinese forces under the American Commander in Burma have degenerated into a undisciplined rabble, looting and murdering as they go and doing infinite harm to the British and allied cause. The Foreign Office is urging that they be disarmed, but this may be easier said then done.

Much interested to read an official appreciation (not for publication of course) of the Japanese Air Force, which gives high praise to the efficiency of Japanese aircraft, air personnel, bombing, tactics, etc, all of which, it frankly admits, is far greater than anticipated. The type "0" [Zero] fighter in particular is praised for its manœuvrability and long range and in having been turned out in far greater numbers than expected, and torpedo-carrying bombers likewise come in for commendation. Navigation efficiency and the skill and accuracy of Japanese bombing and torpedo work, the efficiency of the maintenance personnel, and the high courage and high morale of the airmen and their confidence in their leaders also are emphasised, while special mention is made of the thoroughness of Japanese fighter attacks on ground aircraft and of the rapidity of bringing bombed and demolished aerodromes into operational use after capture. The tragedy is that we have had to pay so heavily in men, territory, and material in order to learn all this.

Monday 25th May 1942
While the Japanese continue to strike at the Chinese from the Burma Road, they are taking a crack at them also in Chekiang with the idea of seizing potential allied air bases, as they are afraid of Yank or other aircraft using air grounds in Chekiang as bases for raids on Japan.

Sunday 31st May 1942
Mass air raid on Cologne last night with over 1,000 machines. What with the promise of many more raids on an equal or even greater scale and of an eventual full-scale invasion of the European Continent, increasing confidence in Germany's ultimate downfall seems not uncalled for. Seems now, in fact, that a full-scale invasion by us and the Yanks is a virtual certainty sooner or later, whether the Germans win or lose against the Soviet; for if they look like winning we shall have to strike in order to prevent their doing so and if, on the other hand,
they show definite signs of defeat, we shall have to step in to ensure that the Soviet do not thereupon overrun Europe!

Monday 8th June 1942
Rather disgusted to hear Halifax quoted on the wireless as saying to some American student gathering that we must get rid of "Hitler and Hirohito and their gangs". Halifax knows very well that Hirohito (as he slightly calls the Emperor of Japan) has had very little to do with bringing this war about and that he himself is very definitely a man of peace. He is purely the victim of circumstances and our best policy would be to aim at creating a rift between the Japanese masses and the chauvinist element by getting the former to see that the latter have deliberately misused the name of the Emperor to achieve their own ends. To use slighting terms of their Emperor and to try and make him out as being responsible for the War is crass idiocy, as nothing is more likely to keep Japan united and to rouse her feeling of hostility against us.

Friday 12th June 1942
In view of the fact that the Japanese have seemingly been sounding out the Soviet about prospects of a German-Soviet peace on terms favourable to the Soviet, the announcement [to-day] of the 20-year treaty [of alliance] between ourselves and the Soviet, plus a tightening up of American-Soviet co-operation, seems likely to come as a bit of a blow to the Axis partners in crime. Provided the Soviet do not go back on their signature, this treaty should be of immense importance both for the War and the post-War periods and bids fair to easing the general world situation after the War very considerably, as the two parties to the Treaty pledge themselves to refrain from interfering with the internal administration of other countries and from territorial aggrandizement.

Tuesday 16th June 1942
From information recently received, looks rather as though the Japanese are preparing for a crack at the Russians before very long, possibly early in August, their main object being to get Vladivostok and other points on the mainland from which Japan could be bombed in the event of the Soviet joining forces with ourselves and the Yanks against Japan. That the raid on Tokyo a month or two ago has made the Japanese increasingly apprehensive of bombing has already been made clear by their attacks on potential bombing bases in China and in the Aleutians during the past few weeks. While therefore they have much to gain at the moment by keeping on outwardly friendly relations with the Soviet, their increasing fear of the potentialities of Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces of Eastern Siberia may well end by leading them to launch out into a bit of "preventive strategy".

Tremendous U.S. programme of naval construction announced, main features being the large proportion of aircraft-carriers and the absence of battleships. The importance of aircraft-carriers has been made very clear by what has happened in the Pacific area. The Japanese owe much of their success to their skillful use of them and the Americans in the Coral Sea and Midway actions showed they had learned their lesson.

Thursday 25th June 1942
In China the Japanese, in addition to striving to secure all possible points from which Japan could be bombed, are now trying also to secure all the main railway communications linking Korea with Malaya with the object, apparently, of using them for the transport of men and materiel and thereby conserving their limited shipping, about which they are increasingly anxious.

Took the day off, as Angus, whom I had not seen since December, wrote to say he could come over for the day. Good to see him again and swap yarns and comments on the War. Though he seems intensely interested in his work and gets on famously with his Poles, he has some misgivings as to the effect, after the War, of "training half the thugs and adventurers of Europe" in the gentle arts of sabotage, silent murder, guerrilla warfare and the like!

Thursday 16th July 1942

Russian situation increasingly critical and the Soviet Government has warned its people that "the Fatherland is in mortal danger. The Germans must not reach the Volga". If the Germans reach the Volga, oil supplies from the Caucasus will be cut off and the main Russian forces more or less ham-strung. Should that happen, it might even result in Russia throwing up the sponge, in which case not only would the Germans be able to turn pretty well their whole weight against us, but Stalin & Co., in order to divert the anger of their people from themselves, would almost certainly launch a violent campaign against this country, laying the blame for everything on the British for having "refused" to form a "second front" or do anything to help Russia. Well as Stalin and Molotov etc. know that this is not strictly correct, there is just enough surface truth in it to give it plausibility and to get it accepted as gospel, not only by the Russians themselves, but also by many of our own people, who would be only too ready to denounce the Government and the existing social system and so forth on the strength of it. The resultant internal unrest and disunity might well prove disastrous.

Monday 20th July 1942

A Mrs. Tanner has just joined our section at the Foreign Office for clerical work. Find she was at Singapore until just before its fall and then escaped to Australia. She confirms the unfortunate report we received at the time, that the Australian troops in Singapore showed up so badly in the final stages and simply chucked in their hands and either deserted or surrendered in hundreds. In view of this, she felt all the more disgusted on reaching Australia to find the local inhabitants openly abusing the British for having "let them down" and accusing the British of thinking of their own skins and making Australians and others do all the fighting. A sad commentary.

Tuesday 21st July 1942

Had MacDougal to lunch at the E.S.U. and questioned him about his escape from Hong Kong. Seems he managed to get away with a party of 15 or 20 in a launch a few hours after the place surrendered and after various adventures, in the course of which he himself was wounded and 7 of his companions killed, he got ashore in Mirs Bay and, with the help of local guerrillas, eventually reached Chungking. (One of those who escaped with him was the one-
legged Chinese Admiral, Chan Chak). As he did not seem anxious to talk about the alleged Japanese atrocities at Hong Kong, I did not press him to do so, but he said they were rather worse than described by Eden. He confirmed that the Canadian contingent did not show up too well and that this was seemingly due to inadequate training.

Tuesday 4th August 1942
Germans claim capture of Voroshilovsk, 180 miles south of Rostov. Though the Russians are still holding up their advance on Stalingrad, the rapidity of the German thrust southwards into the Caucasus makes the situation pretty grim. The gravity of the situation is well indicated by a hint received yesterday about Churchill, a hint which is better not recorded in writing, though doubtless there will be a public announcement about it before long.

Thursday 6th August 1942
In addition to their recent landings in the Gona-Buna region of Northern Papua and their overland advance towards Port Moresby, the Japanese, it is now revealed, occupied the Kei, Aru, and Tenimbu groups of islands in the Arafura Sea north of Darwin on 30th July. Whether this indicates a serious attempt on Australia in the near future or not is not clear, though it seems more probable that Japan's main intention is to keep the Australians etc. from taking the initiative. The Australians, however, are clearly worried and according to one school of thought the Japanese are about to launch simultaneous attacks on Australia and Siberia. Personally, I consider there are good reasons to believe that, much as the Germans would like Japan to take a crack at Russia, she has reasons of her own for doing nothing of the sort at the moment, for if the Germans win, she will be able to deal with Siberia anyway, and in case they lose, she wishes to consolidate her position in the territories she has already taken so as to make it all the harder for anyone to dislodge her.

Saturday 15th August 1942
Much interested to see that the Labour Party has issued a warning to its members to avoid association with the Anglo-Soviet friendship committees and other activities run by the Communist Party in this country. After recalling the curious changes in the Communist Party’s attitude towards the War, the manifesto points out that the Communists are merely using these committees as camouflage for subversive activities. The warning against being "led astray by the expensive propaganda of a very small political organization mysteriously in command of very large funds" are of particular interest, especially coming as they do from the Labour Party, as I have commented on these very points to Brennan time and again in connection with the mass of Communist Party posters to be seen in the Underground stations and elsewhere. These posters, announcing mass meetings on behalf of India, of a second front, of help to the Soviet, and so forth, are changed every few days and must use up quantities of paper (which ordinary advertisers and others are unable to obtain) and cost a pot of money.

Saturday 5th September 1942
As for Togo’s resignation on Tuesday, the explanation seems to be that he objected to the whittling down of the Foreign Office's powers by the setting up of the newly established
Ministry of Great East Asia, which is taking over many of the duties and functions of the Foreign Office.

**Tuesday 22nd September 1942**

Had a talk with one Baxter, who has recently joined the Chinese Section. Born and brought up in China, the son of a missionary, he tells me he was living in Japanese-occupied China until about a year ago and that, although his sympathies were with the Chinese, he himself got on very well with the Japanese on the whole and received courteous treatment from them, especially when he was with his children.

**Thursday 8th October 1942**

Had talk with Ashton-Gwatkin on the coming I.P.R. Conference in America and on post-war planning. With regard to the former, he tells me we are to send as strong a delegation as possible by way of trying to counter the growing criticism of British "imperialism" in the U.S., especially concerning India. For this purpose Lord Hailey is to head the British delegation. Gwatkin suggests that, in view of the attitude of the Southerners towards negroes, the U.S. might be brought to understand our difficulties in India better if we tried a bit of "tit for tat" to Yanks who criticize our attitude towards the Indians! With regard to post-War planning he tells me that the question is being closely studied by Chatham House experts and others in Oxford, who are working in with the special branch of the Foreign Office formed for that purpose. Hudson is doing the Far East end of it for Chatham House, and Pratt is also connected with it. I imagine therefore that Schaefer's [Frenchman] job in Oxford is linked up with this, as he told me when he went there that his job would be to work in with British experts on Syria on the question of Anglo-French co-operation in Syrian post-War reconstruction.

**Tuesday 13th October 1942**

Cunningham and Sawbridge, who returned from Japan with Craigie & Co. last week, looked into the office this afternoon. Like Brain [Consul at Dairen], they too looked very fit and well and in good form, in spite of their long internment.

**Wednesday 14th October 1942**

In a letter from Lady Lindley to Maggie [wife] telling of Alice's return from Japan she says that Alice speaks very highly of the treatment accorded to the Embassy during their internment. Food was plentiful and they were allowed to retain their Japanese servants. Though they were not allowed to leave the Embassy compound, they got plenty of exercise with tennis, squash etc. and were able apparently to write to their Japanese friends, as Alice wrote to Makino's daughter and mentioned that the soap they got was of rather poor quality, whereupon Count Makino sent her and Lady Craigie a consignment of beautiful scented soap as a present.

**Friday 16th October 1942**

Although the U.S. profess to be satisfied with the progress of events in the Solomons, there are increasing indications that a situation of possibly vital importance to the whole war in the Pacific is developing rapidly. That the American move into the Solomons was not intended to
be the start of a major offensive against the Japanese, but was defensive in character, has now been admitted, for, as has been pointed out, the Japanese, if they had been permitted to develop their hold on these islands without interruption, would by now have been ready to make their next step southwards into the New Hebrides and then to New Caledonia and North-east Australia. Japan is unlikely to give up after a first repulse, as the next American step, after consolidating her position in the Solomons, would be northward to Raboul, which would endanger the Japanese outposts in New Guinea and place their main naval base in the South Pacific within reach of U.S. bombers. Hence the present Japanese offensive against Guadalcanal, where the Americans have now reinforced their Marines with Army units and where the Japanese have managed to land reinforcements on the North-west coast. Fighting is going on mainly in the northern coastal area - the only non-mountainous part of the island.

Had lunch at the Rag with Wards, who returned from Japan with Craigie last week. Good to see him once more. Seemed rather more embittered against the Japanese than Cunningham, Brain etc. were, and gave rather a different picture of the way the Japanese treat their prisoners. Poor old Bishop Heaslett, for instance, who has always been such a good friend of Japan, was imprisoned on some fantastic charge of being a spy and was put in a small cell with 7 Japanese prisoners and later was kept in solitary confinement for 4 months. Wards watched the air raid on Tokyo from the Embassy roof and counted 7 fires, but he does not think there was much damage. In point of fact he considers the raid did more harm than good, as it showed the Japanese the faults of their air defence system and enabled them to remedy the defects.

Monday 19th October 1942

Phipps, who has just returned from Japan in the exchange ship, looked in to the office this morning and will probably be joining us shortly. Like all the other "internees" from the Far East, he was looking remarkably well and fit and was apparently quite well treated at Seoul, where he was Consul-General at the time.

Heard some amusing yarns of the treatment given to our Embassy in Tokyo. Though they were not allowed to leave the compound except under police escort, the police were very friendly on the whole, and helpful. When Lady Craigie, for instance, wanted some British and American flags for the King's Birthday, her police escort took her to a flag shop, and when the shop-keeper expressed regret that, owing to our being at war with Japan, he no longer kept such flags, the policemen insisted on his searching his go-down in case there was any "old stock" put away there - and there was; so he emerged triumphant with an armful of Union Jacks and Stars & Stripes and presented them to Lady Craigie! On another occasion, when some of the Embassy cars were being sold and rather low prices were offered, the police intervened and insisted on fair prices being paid. The only trouble was, that whenever a policeman became too friendly, he was promptly replaced by another!

Sunday 1st November 1942

Hear that Austen, who was Consul-General at Yokohama when the Japanese joined in the War, speaks highly of his treatment. He was not, of course, allowed to leave the Consulate
grounds, but the Chief of Police on one occasion sent him a present of 5 lbs. of meat, and on the day before he was released for repatriation, the prefectural Governor had him to lunch at his house and was most friendly and kindly. Incidentally, in spite of Austen's interment, various local officials called on him from time to time to notify their arrival in the district or their transfer elsewhere! Something rather pleasantly Gilbertian about it all!

On the other hand, Gatenby, who was teaching at Sendai and was interned there, says the local police officials showed up very badly and there was a lot of stealing and pilfering by the prison guards and others, though the local populace showed great kindness.

Monday 2nd November 1942
To Bedford for the third of my series of lectures [to students on the GC&CS crash Japanese course]. Hear there was a lecture a few days ago by a fellow who has just returned from Shanghai in one of the exchange ships. Seems he was doing naval intelligence work, so was interned by the naval people who, he says, treated him well and allowed him considerable freedom.

Sunday 29th November 1942
And now to go and hear Churchill on the 9 o'clock wireless.
In conclusion he put forward the suggestion that very possibly the war in Europe may end before the war in Asia. If so, we must send all our forces there to the help of America, China, Australia and New Zealand. Though he naturally said nothing about Russia in this connection, there is good reason to believe that, with Germany out of the way, Russia would turn on Japan too. As this would mean that Japan could then be bombed from Eastern Siberia, it would certainly help very considerably to hasten her downfall, though I must confess that the idea of both Russia and China being in "at the kill" rather revolts me and I rather fear me that it will not be in the best interests of the future peace and stability of the Far East, as it is liable to make Russia too powerful out there and may lead to future trouble.

Monday 30th November 1942
Hear that, although Hunt was helped by Chinese guerrillas after his escape from Shanghai, they demanded and obtained ransom money before they would agree to hand him over to our people in Chungking. A fine lot of allies we have!

Friday 11th December 1942
Angus tells me his Poles are more anti-Soviet than ever and, much as they hate the Germans, are very peturbed at finding the Russians such fine fighters, as fear of the Soviet is now added to their hatred of them.
Looked into the War Office to see Winterborn to talk over sundry Far Eastern affairs before being transferred back to Bletchley Park. He seems a bit worried at the Foreign Office's usual failure to work out any definite post-war policy in regard to Japan and the Far East, for, as he says, you can bet on it that Russia, China, and the U.S. have already got theirs pretty well cut and dried and, in consequence, we are more than likely to find ourselves left out in the cold when the time comes if we don't knuckle down without delay to deciding just what we are aiming at. The "laissez faire" attitude of the Foreign Office in regard to the Far East has been
the curse of this country ever since the last war, and it may well prove an equal danger to us when the present war has been brought to an end if the Foreign Office doesn't pull itself together in time to think out just what is needed to maintain the future peace of the Far East and the safeguarding of our interests in the Western Pacific.

Though not considered probable, Winterborn tells me that the General Staff considers a Japanese attack on Eastern Siberia during the coming winter as a serious possibility owing to the fact that Japan is beginning to realize that, if and when Germany is knocked out, Russia will most certainly take a crack at Japan in conjunction with Britain, America and China and that, accordingly, Japan's only hope is to get her blow in first and seize Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces so as to deny their use to the Allies as bases from which to bomb Japan. In this connection I was interested to learn that the General Staff consider that if, for this reason, the Japanese decide to get in the first blow, they will do so in the winter months, as I myself have always held the view (and stated it in black and white in my last book) that if ever Japan took a crack at Russia, she would do so in the winter when rivers and roads were frozen solid and her own training in "setchu kogun" [marching in the snow] could be turned to account. In the past, however, I have often had my views on this strongly questioned.

Monday 14th December 1942

Started in work at war station [Bletchley Park]. Great changes there since I left for town in March. From a mere 200 or so there at the start of the war, there are now over 3,500 there.

No wonder the war costs so much!

Friday 25th December 1942

From Algiers comes the news that Darlan has been assassinated. Though this may help to solve the difficulty brought about by his change of sides [to the Allies] and the subsequent disgust of the Fighting French, it will no doubt be used by the Axis to charge us with deliberately plotting his murder. Incidentally there are indications that Nogues may succeed him, and according to what Menzies [Head of SIS] who is as well placed as anyone to know the facts, remarked to Roscoe a day or two ago, Nogues is even more untrustworthy than Darlan.

Roscoe told me this when I saw him this afternoon, and he also mentioned that Menzies, on the same occasion, commented very adversely on the U.S. forces in North Africa and was very critical of their organization and staff work. As a result, however, British prestige in those parts has gone up very considerably, as we have shown up very well in comparison. Menzies also revealed that Giraud, though a man of great personal courage, was no great soldier.

Tuesday 9th February 1943

Announced this evening that the Japanese have evacuated Guadalcanal. Following as it does their recent clearance out of Papua, it looks as though the tide were really beginning to turn at last, though if they put up as stiff a resistance everywhere as they did in Papua and Guadalcanal, there's a long, long way to go before we can hope to see even the beginning of the end. Much as one may detest some of their actions, they have shown themselves magnificent fighters and, so far as their officers are concerned, they have stuck firmly to their
code of "No Surrender", though of late there has been a more noticeable tendency on the part
of the rank and file to surrender when death has been the only alternative.

Friday 19th February 1943

Brought Burnett back to dinner last night, he having turned up at Bletchley Park a few days
ago from Washington, where he has been doing liaison work with the Yanks. He was, of
course, at Singapore at the time the Japanese opened their attack, but was sent off to
Colombo and then on to Kilindini [near Mombasa, Kenya] before it fell. He confirmed that the
warnings given to our military people at Singapore by Wards, who was sent there some little
time before the Japanese entered the war, fell on deaf ears and that Wards was regarded by
them as a sort of unbalanced crank for what he said. Wards, of course, told me this himself
with some bitterness when we met up in town in the autumn, but I was interested to hear
Burnett confirming it. The old, old story. The prophet without honour.

How slow our people are to accept elementary facts about Japan is well illustrated by a
remark in a "Times" leader to-day. Commenting on a very interesting article on Japanese
fighting ability by an American military correspondent (Baldwin), the "leader" blandly remarks
(as though it were something quite new!) that the article reveals that the Japanese are not
mere copiers, but adapters and improvers of other people's ideas and methods! How many
times, I wonder, have I myself tried to rub in this fact in lectures and in writing for many a long
year past, and how many times has it been stressed by others with first-hand knowledge of
Japan. But apparently it has only just dawned on "The Times" that it is a fact! Well, well, well!

Wednesday 17th February 1943

Being my day off, walked over to Husbourne Crawley in morning to see Hubbard, who is laid
up, and had a long yarn with him on Far Eastern affairs. What he tells me tends to confirm my
fears that the government has no very clear ideas as to post-war policy in the Far East and is
likely to find itself faced with a Russia, a China, and an America with very definite ideas of
their own when finally Japan has been disposed of - always assuming, of course, that we
shall dispose of her. Hong Kong, he considers, can be definitely written off as never ours
again no matter what happens, and in this I'm afraid he is right, but he seems very dubious
also of our ever recovering even Burma or Malaya, as the Chinese are apparently out to have
it for themselves. In brief, there seems every prospect of a real good tussle between Russia,
China, and the U.S. for the main say in the future disposition of Far Eastern territories, while
we ourselves seem likely to fare little better as "victors" than Japan will fare as the defeated
Power! Perhaps this is taking rather too gloomy a view, but the picture drawn by Hubbard on
the basis of the recent I.P.R. discussions etc. fit in all too well in most respects with my own
interpretation of the situation and, remembering our deplorable policy (or lack of policy) in the
Far East in the 1920's and 1930's, one cannot feel too happy about the present indications
that the fatal policy of "drift" is still the ruling passion in Foreign Office circles.

Thursday 25th February 1943

Mungo [son], who arrived back in this country some 10 or 12 days ago, his ship having come
in for an overhaul, writes to say that he has applied and been accepted for submarines. It is a
risky service, but offers good scope for youngsters, so good luck to him. Incidentally, just before returning to England, he went to Russia on convoy duty. Apparently the previous time when his ship went there, the Russians would not allow anyone to land and fired on a party of officers who were heading for shore in a cutter! This time, however, they were allowed ashore and were received very hospitably, though some R.A.F. men, whom they were taking to Russia on a mission of sorts, were, much to their annoyance and disgust, turned back by the Russians, who said they did not want them there! Seems a funny business, though apparently there have been several other similar incidents, the Russians' idea apparently being that they want our planes, and tanks and so forth but not our men, despite the fact that they are always urging us to open "a second front". Though never made public, they refused our offer last summer to send troops to the Caucasus when they were so hard pressed there. The pity is that those in this country who shout so vociferously for a "Second Front" and declare that we are doing nothing to help the Russians can't be told about such things.

**Sunday 28th February 1943**

Referring to the rather queer collection of people now working at Bletchley Park, one of my passengers in my car on the way there this morning mentioned the latest "bon mot" about the place - "to work there, you needn't be mad; but it does help"! This is worthy to be set beside the explanation of the Intelligence Corps badge, so prominent at Bletchley Park - "a pansy resting on its laurels"!

**Wednesday 7th April 1943**

Though no doubt there is still plenty of heavy fighting ahead, it seems reasonably certain that the Axis forces in Tunisia will be faced either with a Dunkirk or a Stalingrad before very many weeks have passed, as they will have either to withdraw by sea and air or fight on to the last in an increasingly confined space of territory.

There is very good reason to know that this, combined with the rapidly approaching threat of invasion and with our increasingly heavy and frequent air raids on Italy and Sicily, is having a very depressing effect on the Italians and that there are definite signs of a break-down in Italian civil morale.

**Tuesday 13th April 1943**

On getting back from work last night, found Albinia and her husband here, he having come up from Portsmouth on leave. Asked him about the R.A.F. mission which was turned back from Murmansk by the Russians. Seems the mission was to have established bases for air reconnaissance in connection with convoy protection, but the Russians jibbed at the last moment and refused to have them. The Russians, he says, are most uncooperative, a remark which is fully borne out by other things I have heard of late. Baghino, for example, told me only a day or two ago of our troubles in Persia, where the Soviet forces have instructions to refuse to fraternize in any way with our troops. A nice ally!

John Willes (Albinia's husband) says they brought a party of Russian diplomats and couriers back with them from Murmansk and that they were both sullen and unsociable. The couriers,
he said, were typically "bolshie" both in appearance and behaviour and he could well picture
them standing on soap boxes and denouncing the "bourgeoisie" and all their ways!

**Saturday 17th April 1943**

[German allegations that the bodies of several thousand Polish officers have been found near
Smolensk]

**Sunday 18th April 1943**

Miss Pellow, who has a large number of Polish friends, tells me that they have often told her
about the 8,000 missing Polish officers, and that they will always remain convinced that these
officers were massacred in cold blood by the Soviet. She says, too, that the Poles are very
indignant at the humiliating treatment accorded by the Soviet to the Polish Embassy in
Kuibyshev, and that the Poles will probably break off relations with the Soviet before long.
We, of course, are in a difficult position, as we have to keep up an outward show of perfect
unity against the Axis.

**Tuesday 20th April 1943**

Mungo [son] returned home on leave last night after a year at sea in northern waters and
good it is to see him again. Though mostly engaged on the northern patrol, they took part in
the North African landings and he tells me that just before the transports were to sail, detailed
instructions were given about an attack on Dakar. Much to everyone's surprise, however, the
ships did not sail that night and the men were allowed ashore for a couple of hours, though
normally, for security reasons, no one is allowed ashore after such orders have been given
out. It was only later that the reason for this curious lapse of precaution became clear, as
Algeria was the main objective, not Dakar. The instructions on Dakar were given out and the
men allowed ashore, as it was realized that this was the best way of ensuring a "leakage" of
news to the Germans, the news in this instance being a deliberate fake!

**Wednesday 21st April 1943**

Surprised to learn this morning that Shigemitsu has replaced Tani as Foreign Minister in
Tokyo, as there had been no previous indications of the change.

**Wednesday 28th April 1943**

Had a visit from Thatcher, whom I had not seen since Tokyo days. He is joining the Japanese
Naval Section at Bletchley Park shortly and has just returned from Mombasa. His ship was
torpedoed and sunk on his way back to this country and amongst those lost was poor
Forman, who was coming back from Kilindini with him.

**Thursday 29th April 1943**

The Soviet Press is indulging in the most vehement abuse of the Poles [because of
accusations over the murder of Polish officers]. The extraordinary and, to me, most damnable
thing about the whole sad business is that our own Press, including even "The Times", seems
bent on trying to excuse the Russians and put the blame on the Polish Government for "falling
into the German trap", and I have been amazed and disgusted to find that this seems to be
the general attitude of people here with whom I have discussed the matter in the past few
days. Baghino, in fact, is about the only one who shares my views. The Germans, I fear me,
are just about right when they taunt us with readiness to put aside moral principles rather than risk causing offence to a strong ally.

Thursday 6th May 1943
In connection with this question of Polish-Soviet relations, I had a letter from Angus last night. He, of course, has known of the massacre for a long time past - in fact, pretty well since he was appointed Commandant of his Polish training establishment 2 years ago and he says "there is no doubt whatever that the Russians did it". One of his Poles, he says, went to Moscow over a year ago on a mission concerning the massacres, though it had to be kept quiet, of course, for political reasons. Several Poles who went to Russia to investigate, he adds, have been quietly removed by the Russians as spies.

Thursday 3rd June 1943
U.S. Navy Department announced yesterday that the Japanese casualties at Attu [Aleutians], where all organised resistance ceased on the 29th, amounted to 1,500 killed but only 4 prisoners, from which it would seem that the Japanese continue to live up to their tradition of no surrender. Though the Japanese loss of Attu is not, in itself, likely to have any very decisive influence on the War, there are definite signs that the Japanese are getting a bit worried at future prospects, including in particular the possibility of the Soviet allowing us and the Yanks the use of air bases in Eastern Siberia. There are indications, too, that the U.S. attack on Attu is making them apprehensive of the Kuriles and that, in consequence, they have withdrawn some of their naval units from the South Pacific.

Thursday 17th June 1943
Speaking in the Japanese Diet, Tojo has emphasised Japan's determination to fight to a finish. To anyone who knows the Japanese, this, of course, is only to be expected, and it seems extraordinary that there are still people, even in high places, who continue to talk glibly of the probability of Japan's rapid collapse after Germany has been finished off.

Tuesday 22nd June 1943
The Japanese have at last revealed the arrival of Chandra Bose in Japan, blissfully ignorant apparently that we knew, even before he left Germany, all about his plans, and that we know both how and when he got to Japan - items which the Japanese are keeping secret! One cannot but wonder what the other Bose, Rash Behari, thinks of it all, as he presumably will now be somewhat eclipsed by Chandra, and Rash Behari is not the kind of man to welcome eclipse from anyone.

Monday 5th July 1943
To Watford by train and met there by Angus (whom I had not seen since before Xmas), who drove me out to his place near Chalfont St. Giles, where I lunched with him and two of his officers, Andrews and Rees by name, in the Mess. His next course does not start till the 15th, so there were none of his Poles there, but he showed me all round the place and told me a lot about the particular activities with which he is concerned. All most interesting, but not for mention even in a private diary. While there, switched on 1 p.m. wireless and greeted with the sad news of Sikorski's death in an air crash on way back from Gibraltar. Came as a terrific
shock to Angus and his pals who, of course, have been working in with him and think very highly of him. According to Angus, he will be almost irreplaceable, as he was the one real statesman amongst the Poles in this country and absolutely honest and straight-forward - very different from others at Polish Headquarters, most of whom are self-seeking, scheming politicians, always intriguing among themselves.

Sikorski, he says, was on his way back from Syria, where he had gone hurriedly in order to stop a virtual mutiny, the outcome of the indignation aroused by the Katyn massacre of Polish officers.

Friday 16th July 1943

Good progress reported in our latest operations in New Guinea, and Mubo is now in our hands. There and at Munda in New Georgia, however, the Japanese are putting up an unpleasantly stout defence, fighting as usual to the last rather than surrender - in which connection I hear that, according to an American officer who has just come over from Washington, the total number of Japanese prisoners in American hands since the war started is no more than 46. Seems almost incredible, though one knows, to our own regret, how seldom we ourselves have been able to secure Japanese prisoners for interrogation purposes.

Monday 19th July 1943

Quite apart from what has been made known to the general public, there are increasing indications from unquotable but highly reliable sources that Italy’s position is becoming desperate and that despondency is setting in in high places in Italy.

Saturday 7th August 1943

Munda taken at last - a further step towards easing the Japanese threat to Australia. The Japanese, however, put up a magnificent defence, fighting as usual to the last man against overwhelming odds. This “fighting to the last man” is not merely a Japanese figure of speech put out for propaganda purposes but, as shown time and again in the official reports which come to our department from Australia, the U.S. etc., is literally true. Captured documents, moreover, constantly emphasise the theme of “no surrender”, and the very few Japanese prisoners who have fallen alive into Allied hands since Japan came into the War make it clear that they can never hope to return to their own country again, as they would be held in utter contempt and disgrace, even by their own families and former friends, for having allowed themselves to be taken alive. Permanent civic exile must therefore be their lot. This is true of wounded and unwounded alike, and in actual fact a recent official report mentioned that although 72% of the P.O.W.'s were severely wounded or incapacitated and unable to offer resistance, they felt so disgraced that they refused to write home.

It is perhaps a healthy sign that, in spite of periodic tirades against the Japanese, a marked feature of our official and unofficial reports alike is the ungrudging tribute generally paid to the "courage", "tenacity", "intrepidity", "skill" and so forth of the Japanese troops with whom we are fighting. While, however, one cannot but admire the Japanese as fighters, their cult of "no withdrawal; no surrender" certainly adds to our own difficulties and one cannot help recalling
the Japanese Admiral who was quoted, shortly before the War, as saying: "We will hold to the
last man every inch of territory we gain; we will make it so terribly expensive to evict us that
we think you will get tired; we are prepared to sacrifice 10 million men in this war. How many
men are you prepared to sacrifice?" It recalls, too, what General Tachibana said to me at Port
Arthur in 1920 about the "unforgivable crime" of surrender and what the officers at Chiba
[Infantry School] told me about fighting a war to solve the population question - victory would
bring territory for expansion, while defeat could only occur after so many Japanese had been
killed that there would no longer be any undue pressure of population!

Saturday 28th August 1943
attended very interesting lecture by Redman, who is now head of the Far Eastern Department
of the M.O.I. [Ministry of Information]. Much struck by the objective way in which he described
his seizure and imprisonment by the Japanese and discussed its legal niceties. No trace of
rancour against the Japanese for what they did, but just as friendly disposed towards them as
ever. It was the system rather than the men working it which he blamed, his main criticism
being against the procuratorial portion of the whole judicial system. The actual judges, whose
job it was to consider the findings of the procurators, were scrupulously fair, he said.

had lunch with him and Morris, who came over to give a talk in afternoon on his impressions
and experiences in Tokyo after Japan's entry into the war, he having been one of the very few
Englishmen whom the Japanese allowed to move about freely after 7.12.41 and did not
intern. I had not met him before, though for reasons connected with my work I had been much
interested in him ever since about 1936, when his name first cropped up as Medley's
successor. Originally a Gurkha officer, he helped to organize one of the Mount Everest
expeditions and is the author of a book on Nepal, where he spent some time as a recruiting
officer. He is now in charge of Japanese broadcasts etc. at the B.B.C.

Another old friend of Tokyo days who turned up today on a hurried official visit was
Colegreave whom I had not seen since he left us for Hong Kong some 5 or 6 years ago.

Sunday 29th August 1943
From the Solomons comes the news that all organized resistance in New Georgia is now over
and that the U.S. forces are now in full possession of the island.

Tuesday 31st August 1943
Another great Russian victory announced yesterday. Taganrog is now in their hands.

have seen some very enlightening extracts from Japanese diaries etc. captured by the Yanks
at Attu [Aleutians]. From these it is clear that the wretched Japanese garrison there had a
pretty miserable existence on starvation diet in bitter cold and thick fog. A fried thistle was
described by one diarist as a great luxury and others spoke of days without food of any kind
and of their longing for even a rice ball. But in spite of all hardships their morale remained at
the highest till the end, and diarists wrote unblushingly of the delight they felt at their coming
death on behalf of their Emperor and of the thought of their spirits being enshrined at Kudan.
The final stages make grim reading, as even the wounded in hospital were given overdoses
of morphia or disposed of by other means (Grenades were mentioned as one such means) so
that they should not suffer the disgrace of falling into enemy hands alive. One used to think that Japanese talk of "death rather than surrender" was probably a figure of speech to a large extent, but this war has shown that, in this instance, Japanese words and actions are literally identical. Fanatical and ridiculous, one may say, but one cannot but feel a sneaking admiration for the spirit that impels such complete contempt of death and, when one thinks of the current belief that the Japanese male regards his wife as little more than a chattel, it tends to make one revise this opinion when one reads these very human entries in the diaries of both officers and men with farewell messages for their wives and children couched in the most affectionate terms.

Saturday 4th September 1943
According to figures given out in Washington by Colonel Knox, the Japanese have lost two-and-a-half million tons of shipping since Pearl Harbour. As she had only 6,368,000 at the outset and is believed to have added only one-and-a-half million tons since then, this means that about one third of her merchant shipping has been destroyed. Another report puts Japanese aircraft losses during August at 585 destroyed. As shipping and aircraft construction are Japan's two most delicate and vulnerable points, this is very satisfactory news.

Monday 27th September 1943
The Japanese are in a bit of a fix about Mussolini - whether to recognise his or the Badoglio government as the legitimate government of Italy. From the Japanese point of view, Mussolini has rather complicated matters by denouncing the throne and setting up a republic, an action of which the Japanese, with their intense devotion to the monarchical system, can not very well approve.

Friday 15th October 1943
To Chatham House for talk with Hubbard in morning and then on to Clifford's Inn to see Pratt, who tells me that the main reason for his attack on Hubbard in War and Politics in China was to try and draw attention to the harm done by him and other writers on China by accepting statements by Joseph and others on Far Eastern history without question - hence the strange myths which pass for history and which put Britain in an undeservedly poor light. I was much interested to hear this explanation, as I have heard much criticism of Pratt in the last few days in connection with his book and his attacks on Hubbard and Co. - in fact, his book appears to have caused a bit of a flutter in the Far Eastern dove-cots!

Thursday 21st October 1943
Letter from Piggott who tells me of a talks with Woodhead [at Ministry of Information], whose views on China, he says, corroborate what one is hearing from many good sources. Looks as though we had a rod in pickle for ourselves there all right. J.O.P. Bland, of course, is equally strong on the subject. A pity, in a way, that people in this country can not be warned of the true facts and that, instead, they are made to picture China as a sort of knight in shining armour, innocent, democratic, and everything that is good.

Friday 22nd October 1943
See that Chandra Bose, who is now in Singapore, has announced the formation of a provisional government of "Free India", whose task is "to carry the war into the enemy's country and free India for all time" with the help of Japan who, he declares, has "repeatedly affirmed that she has no political, economic, military or territorial ambitions in India".

Saturday 23rd October 1943
See the "Daily Herald" carries reports from Washington of the German plans for guns with 500 k.m. range for bombarding England and aircraft capable of crossing the Atlantic in 7 hours for bombing the U.S.. It was from the U.S., too, that the "Daily Mail" got its news of the submarine blockade runners between Germany and Japan. This information, like the other, was from a particularly "hush-hush" source and should not therefore have been communicated to the press, lest it give the Germans and Japanese a clue to how the "leakages" occurred. The trouble seems to be that even official Yanks are unable to keep their mouths shut. [Information derived from Signals Intelligence, intercepts of German and Japanese communications]

Tuesday 2nd November 1943
Announced that Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek had a five-day conference in North Africa, apparently in Cairo, last week and decided to strip Japan of every bit of territory she possesses, other than her own homeland and Southern Sakhalin. That she should be made to clear out of China and of all she has taken since 1937 and, of course, out of the Mandated Islands and possibly Manchuria as well, is natural enough, but to deprive her even of Korea and Formosa seems the grossest folly. Not only will this serve to prolong the War by driving the Japanese to fight on with the courage of desperation, but it sows the seeds of future conflict, as you cannot bottle up a virile nation of 70,000,000 in an area little larger than the British Isles (and singularly lacking in essential natural resources) and expect nothing to happen. Besides, Korean independence is a myth, and to talk of it as a practicable proposition is to emulate the ostrich with his head in the ground. The Koreans are quite incapable of standing on their own - their whole history shows that - and if the Japanese are thrown out, either the Chinese or the Russians will step into the resultant vacuum sooner or later; and then what? Are we going to fight another war to rescue the Koreans or to hold the Russians off the Chinese if the Russians and the Chinese start scrapping over Korea and Manchuria? And what of Churchill? As a war leader he is beyond praise; he is magnificent. But some of his articles and statements in the Press before he became Premier seemed to indicate that, in so far as the Far East was concerned, he was lacking in certain essentials of true statesmanship. In subscribing to the present declaration on the stripping of Japan he appears to have demonstrated this same unfortunate deficiency.

Thursday 9th December 1943
Tojo is quoted as declaring in a broadcast that "the officers and men of our imperial forces do not entertain any idea of ever returning alive".

Sunday 12th December 1943
Read a most interesting account in one of our intelligence summaries by an American officer who escaped recently from the Philippines. He seems to have got on very well with his captors whom he divides into two categories - hardened campaigners and reservists. The former were more considerate of their prisoners than were some of the latter, though they were more taciturn than the reservists, who were inclined to be loquacious. The hardened campaigners, he says, showed no dislike or contempt for their prisoners, but merely a puzzled curiosity, whereas some of the reservists were bitter about the 1924 Exclusion Act, which they regarded as a personal affront, the naval ratio, U.S. help to China and so on. The hardened campaigners showed little enthusiasm for the war and had apparently written themselves off as casualties, never likely to return home - an interesting point which bears out Tojo's remarks in his recent broadcast. Most of their talk was of their farms and their families. They were frankly surprised that their prisoners were convinced of Japan's eventual defeat and they quoted extremely erroneous statistics to prove that Japan was bound to win. They were equally convinced that American men were soft, spineless drunkards and jitter-bugs - a good indication of the harmful impressions left by Hollywood films.

The reservists were suspicious at the start, but soon became friendly and kindly disposed. The writer, in fact, stated that dozen or more sentries had given him their addresses in Japan and begged him to visit them there after the war - a typically Japanese gesture and probably made in all sincerity. These reservists, he said, had no interest in the war and only wanted to get back home as quickly as possible. They seemed scared of their N.C.O.s and hated their officers, and had neither liking nor respect for their political leaders, whom they regarded as self-seekers, war-profiteers, or misguided patriots - a most interesting and significant fact if true.

Though it was forbidden to take fruit into the camp, no attempt was made to prevent this being done, so long as it was not done too openly, and fruit could always be bought provided permission was sought to do so.

In view of rumoured bad treatment of British prisoners in some places, this account of conditions in the Philippines is particularly interesting and one can only hope the rumours are only rumours and that our men are getting as good treatment as this American officer appears to have had.

Monday 27th December 1943

Great news this morning. The "Scharnhorst" was sunk yesterday when, with a strong covering force, she came out of hiding in an attempt to smash up a large convoy bound for Russia. Though not yet announced, hear that only two British warships received any damage, one of them being Mungo's late ship, "Norfolk", which apparently received one direct hit, though not seriously damaged. Poor old Mungo [son] will kick himself at having missed this action!

Thanks to certain information which cannot be mentioned here, we were able to catch the "Scharnhorst" off her guard by bringing up battleships which she had not expected to encounter - an instance similar to the way we caught the "Bismark".

Tuesday 28th December 1943
Had an interesting talk with a Major Godley, who has joined us temporarily prior to going out to India on "I" [intelligence] work. He was formerly doing similar work in West Africa and was very revealing about the situation out there prior to the allied landings in North Africa a year ago. He considers Hitler made a major blunder in failing to send an airborne force there to seize Dakar and other points on the Atlantic coast. Everyone there apparently expected him to do this and the Vichy crowd in Dakar etc. were fully prepared to hand over everything to the Germans when they came. German technicians etc. were there in large numbers and had made full preparations for taking over as soon as the airborne troops arrived; but they never came and, in the meantime, we ourselves had been secretly organising British, West African, French and Belgian forces in our own West African possessions and were able to take immediate action when, instead of Germans, the allied forces took the initiative and seized the French African ports. It was very much touch and go, though, for a time, and if Hitler had struck first, the U-boat campaign might well have succeeded, as there would have been U-boat bases all down the Atlantic coast.

Thursday 30th December 1943

See that Grew [U.S. Ambassador to Japan 1931-41] is quoted in a Washington Press despatch as strongly emphasising the pacific qualities of the Japanese Emperor and urging that, following Japan's defeat, everything should be done to strengthen his position. Such advice is eminently sound and it is to be hoped it will be taken to heart both by his own Government and [the British Government]. Given that Americans are not generally given to up-holding monarchical systems, it is all the more striking that this advice should come from an American, though Grew, of course, is exceptionally broad-minded and understanding in this and other respects. One point on which I do not quite agree with him, however, is in his contention that, in the circumstances, Emperor worship might be regarded as an asset. There I can't agree. To strengthen the Emperor's hand is one thing. To encourage the retention of belief in his divinity is quite another matter; for so long as the Japanese believe in his and their own descent from the gods, so long will they believe in their "divine mission" and consequent right to "spread the divine rule" to other less favoured lands.

Friday 7th January 1944

See that at a recent conference of prefectural governors, the chief of the Japanese aircraft production department declared that an absolute requirement for the successful prosecution of the War was the production of aeroplanes on a large scale in the shortest possible time and the attainment of this objective would be the most important factor in deciding whether Japan won the War or not. Further indications that Japan's leaders are becoming a bit worried are to be seen in Tojo's remarks to the Upper House. "The Allied counter-offensive," he was quoted as saying, "has become real and serious". Sea transport, he went on to say, was the only means of supply in the South-west Pacific and Japanese ships were ferrying troops and supplies secretly by night. The situation in the New Britain area was assuming the character of "a war of supply". That is Japan's great difficulty at the present time - to keep her widely scattered land forces in the South-west Pacific supplied and to compete with the Allies in the
production of adequate numbers of the aircraft and surface vessels required for keeping open her channels of supply.

Wednesday 19th January 1944
Letter from Angus, in which he mentions his Poles being very "disturbed" over the Russian frontier question; but beyond adding that "there's the hell of a lot more in the matter than the papers or the public know", he is naturally a bit reticent.

Saturday 22nd January 1944
New Allied landing this morning in Italy.
Another "Japanese atrocity" story gone west! "Alf" Bennett, who was supposed to have been tortured to death by the Japanese when they took Hong Kong, is alive and well in the POW camp there according to a letter received by Mrs. Brain from an American friend who was recently repatriated from Hong Kong. She also mentioned Charles Boxer as being in good fettle.

Friday 28th January 1944
Following the U.S. statement on Japanese ill-treatment of prisoners, Eden has come out in the House today with similar allegations. That individual Japanese and groups of Japanese have been guilty of the most brutal behaviour is beyond dispute, but it rather disgusts me to find the government striving to stir up hatred of the Japanese by making it appear that brutality to prisoners is the rule rather than the exception. The prime object of it is so obviously to whip up hatred of the Japanese with a view to ensuring that our people will readily carry on the war against Japan after finishing off Germany. Knowing that the government is not unnaturally worried lest the country, after finishing off Germany, should tend to sit back and lose interest in the war against Japan, I have been expecting a campaign of "atrocity stories" of this kind to be launched and I imagine that this is only the beginning of it and that from now on we shall be increasingly drenched with heart-rending accounts of Japanese barbarities and the like. The whole thing disgusts and revolts one - this constant attempt to defame your opponent and to whip up hatred against him.

Saturday 12th February 1944
Though few of them get published in this country, Japanese broadcasts make interesting reading for anyone interested in knowing what the Japanese are telling their own people and what their reactions are to current developments. As was only to be expected, the recent British and U.S. "revelations" of Japanese atrocities has brought forth not only denials but also counter-allegations of Allied - especially American - atrocities. Amongst these are the killing of Japanese wounded at Guadalcanal, the bombing of hospital ships and the machine-gunning of life-boats etc. and the lynching of Japanese in Davao early in the War. What truth there is in these counter-charges is difficult to tell, but the point is that these allegations receive just as much credence in Japan and arouse just as much horror and disgust there as Anglo-U.S. allegations of Japanese atrocities do in this country. Another example of the damnable effect of so-called "political warfare".
Read some interesting extracts from a diary found on a dead Japanese soldier at Buna. After repeated entries about the desperate straits in which he and his pals found themselves as a result of disease and starvation and about their determination to fight to the last, a final entry is made, addressed to "the foreign officer" who finds his dead body. "I am sorry to trouble you," he writes, "but I beg you to bury me with my head facing north-west". The apologetic way in which this request, to bury him facing the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, is made is rather pleasing and typically Japanese.

Monday 21st February 1944

From Japan itself comes the surprising news that the Chiefs of the General Staff and Naval Staff have resigned and that Tojo has taken on the post of Chief of the General Staff himself in addition to all his other duties as Premier, War Minister and Minister of Education, while Shimada is now both Navy Minister and Chief of the Naval Staff. One interpretation of this seems to be that there has been friction between the two Chiefs of Staff and the Government on the question of naval and military policy; another is that Tojo, who has hitherto been regarded primarily as the representative of the fighting services, has decided to emulate Mussolini & Co. and to get more and more power into his own hands. By becoming Chief of the General Staff himself, he makes it impossible for the Army (unless through the Inspector-General of Military Education) to appeal direct to the Throne over his head, as the War Minister is the only other Army man who can do that and he himself holds that post also. By getting his Navy Minister to take on the additional post of Chief of the Naval Staff, he strengthens his position still further, as the Chief of the Naval Staff is likewise now under his control and no longer likely to go over his head with a direct appeal to the Throne. All in all a most astute and significant move on Tojo's part.

As for the first interpretation, it may well be that Sugiyama and Nagano considered that the Government's policy in the South-west Pacific Area was dictated too much by the political aspect of the Greater East Asia [Co-Prosperity Sphere] doctrine and too little by strategic considerations and that, accordingly, they declined to accept any further responsibility for the naval and military operations and therefore resigned.

Saturday 29th April 1944

Read interesting report on Japanese Army morale, in which, quoting from captured diaries etc., it showed that whereas the officer either fights to the last of does himself in with his sword or revolver to prevent capture, the men generally carry a dose of poison with them to use as a last resort or are given a grenade or a spare bullet to use on themselves. The volatile nature of the Japanese is clearly reflected in these diaries and it is emphasised by the writer of the report that, although they are frightened and terrorised by weight of metal, their morale is not easily undermined and they quickly got over their momentary terror and show amazing courage - as happened at Tarawa where, after a shattering bombardment, they rapidly manned what was left of their trenches and fought practically to the last man, over 2,000 being killed and only a handful of wounded surrendered. This rapid recuperative capacity of the Japanese is, of course, a noticeable characteristic in other matters besides
fright e.g. in connection with their particular form of fatalism which makes them metaphorically 
shrug their shoulders after a quake or other disaster and immediately set to work to remedy 
things - a characteristic which should help them considerably after their defeat in this war. 
Hear that there are increasing signs of friction between the Japanese Army and Navy, the 
former accusing the latter for failing to give them proper support and for leaving them to their 
fate in Bougainville, the Bismarcks, New Guinea etc.. The fact of the matter, of course, is that, 
as a result of dispersing their forces so widely after their initial naval successes, the Japanese 
are now faced with the "defender's dilemma", i.e. the choice between sacrificing outlying 
possessions and their garrisons or risking their irreplaceably battle fleet in their defence - and 
they have chosen the first of these two alternatives as the lesser of two evils.

Saturday 6th May 1944

The Japanese have announced the death of Admiral Koga while directing operations from an 
aircraft. Koga's predecessor as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral 
Yamamoto, was killed in the same way only a few months ago and there is reason to believe 
that both deaths were brought about by Yank attacks based on "inside information".

[Intercepts of communications]

Friday 30th June 1944

To town to give a morning and afternoon talk on the Japanese Army etc. to Colonel Lithgow's 
people at Hampstead and, after the latter, looked in to the Foreign Office, to see Butler, now 
Sir Paul Butler, whom I had not seen since his return to this country. From what Butler told 
me, it looks much as though the Foreign Office have still not learned their lesson and are just 
as ready as before the War to refuse to face facts in so far as the Far East is concerned. 
Their besetting sin is to try and make the facts fit the policy instead of basing policy on facts 
and, in consequence, Butler not unnaturally feels pretty disgruntled. Though, as he says, it is 
only natural that the main attention at this stage should be turned to Europe and that post-
War reconstruction in the Far East should occupy a very secondary place, he thinks that more 
attention should be paid to Far Eastern affairs than is in fact being done. He himself, it seems, 
is the only man at the Foreign Office with any real first-hand knowledge of Japan and little or 
nothing is being done to prepare ground for proper consideration of post-War problems in 
regard to Japan. On the other hand, he says there are all too many self-styled "experts" on 
Japan who are receiving all too much attention and who are a real menace. 
Interested to find that Butler shares my view that, even if and when we smash the Japanese 
Fleet and land in Japan, the Japanese armies in Manchuria and North China are likely to fight 
on and, though not so well armed as ourselves, should be pretty well self-supporting in 
essentials. As only to be expected, he agrees too that the Koreans will be unable to stand on 
their own feet after their release from Japanese rule. Apart from lacking men of practical 
administrative ability, they are hopelessly disunited among themselves and their economic 
system is so closely intewoven with Japan's that it is difficult to see how they could manage 
certainly at the outset. He seemed to think that the Russians would get the main control and 
he mentioned that the ablest Koreans were those living in Eastern Siberia.
Wednesday 12th July 1944

Had a long yarn with Reece, who was over here on duty for the day. Confirms what I had heard before about the tremendous amount of looting and pilfering going on in the bombed areas, his own house having been rifled no less than 3 times since the "doodle bugs" started last month. A damned disgrace and it would be all to the good if the police were given the right to shoot any looter on sight. It is a particularly contemptible form of crime and a shooting or two is needed to rub that fact home.

Good progress continues to be made in Burma, despite the monsoon weather, and captured documents indicate Japanese distress at their failure to obtain Imphal and to retain Kohima. Japanese casualties, excluding those in the China operations, which are put at some 150,000 killed since July 1937, are now estimated by us at about 170,000 killed since December 1941, including 61,000 this year (37,000 in Burma and 28,000 in the Pacific) compared with 20,000 in the first 6 months of last year. This gives a total of 320,000 dead or about 9% of the total strength of their Army at the present time, which is put at about 2,800,000. The number of wounded is reckoned at about the same as those killed and large numbers are known to have died of malaria. In addition there are probably 50,000 or more virtually cut off with no chance of escape in the Solomons, Bismarcks, and East New Guinea.

Wednesday 19th July 1944

A further shake-up in Japan, Umezu succeeding Tojo as Chief of the General Staff, and Yamada the Inspector General of Military Education, succeeding Umezu as Commander-in-Chief Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo.

Saturday 22nd July 1944

New Japanese Cabinet announced, with Koiso as Premier, Yonai Navy Minister, and Sugiyama War Minister. Shigemitsu remains Minister of Foreign Affairs. Tojo's stock seems to have slumped heavily of late. A week ago, he was Premier, Chief of the General Staff and War Minister - an all-powerful and unique combination. Now he has lost all three of these key posts, the last-named of which he has held in three successive Cabinets ever since his first appointment to it in July 1940, just 4 years ago.

A copy of an order captured by us early this month makes interesting reading. Signed about June 1st by the Japanese general in command of operations in the Imphal area it reads: "It is my resolve to take Imphal. If a decisive victory is not obtained, we shall not be able to strike back again. One this one battle rest the fate of the Empire." The last sentence, is, of course, a crib from Togo's famous signal at Tsushima, but it shows what great importance the Japanese attached to driving us out of Imphal and how serious their failure to do so must have been.

Read a most interesting captured document, in which the Japanese quote instance after instance in the operations off the Solomons last summer in which, thanks to radar, the Yanks were able to outmanoeuvre them and get in the first blow.

[Names former army colleagues who had become senior officers]. Only I, now a wretched "civvy", remain "unhonoured and unsung". While I have much for which to be thankful, I would
give much to be soldiering once more instead of living my present cabbage-like existence, doing work for a large part of which I have little liking and but mediocre aptitude. The intelligence side is, of course, of great interest, but the bulk of the work is linguistic and just about drives me "crackers" at times. I have never regarded myself as any great shakes at the lingo, but the trouble is that there are so few who know the Japanese language that even a pedestrian knowledge of it, such as mine is, is regarded as of vastly greater importance by the Powers-that-be than any other asset that one may have, and all other qualifications go by the board. That, of course, was why the Foreign Office refused to let me go when the War Office wanted me to take charge of M.I.2c and I curse myself now for not having just snapped my fingers at Denniston & Co. and gone to the War Office, as the work there would have been far more to my liking and, without wishing to boast, I am sure I would have been of far more value to the government, as it would have been work of a kind for which I am far better qualified. Incidentally I should probably by now have been a Lieutenant-Colonel instead of a bally civilian and would have been able to feel that I was really pulling my weight in the war, whereas in my present job I have the unpleasant feeling that I am not. Foolish perhaps, and possibly tinged with snobbishness, but all too true.

Thursday 3rd August 1944

Had a letter from Angus with some caustic comments on some of the stuff put out by the B.B.C. and the Press on Soviet-Polish relations. While well pleased with the military situation in general, he remarks that the political situation, so far as his Polish friends are concerned, has been "ghastly" and he foresees they will "have to eat dirt". "Knowing parts of the truth anyway", he writes, "it infuriates me to hear and read some of the stuff put out by the B.B.C. and newspapers. No credit or mention is given for the Poles' help to the Russians' great advances and victories, though actually their underground (so-called) army, (not the guerrillas and saboteurs) have been fighting openly in uniform as organized divisions for some time, and been responsible for the chaos on the lines of communication behind the German front. Bah! All, of course, directed by the Polish Government here in England, and nothing to do with the scallywag Communist Government set up by Moscow".

Monday 14th August 1944

See that one of the points promised in a recent statement on the policy of the new Japanese Government is "freer expression of public opinion". In view of the fact that Machida has been induced to join the new Cabinet, it looks as though he had made this promise of freer expression a condition for his entry into the Cabinet. Another healthy sign is that not only has Shigemitsu been retained as Foreign Minister, but he has also been given the Greater East Asia portfolio. This looks like a victory for the Foreign Office over the Army, as in effect it restores to the Foreign Minister the power and authority of which he was shorn when, at the Army's instigation, Greater East Asian affairs were placed outside the sphere of the Foreign Office and placed under a separate Ministry of Greater East Asia.

Tuesday 5th September 1944
Meantime Soviet-Polish relations are becoming embittered once more over the seemingly deliberate way in which the Russians are leaving the wretched Poles in Warsaw to be slaughtered in tens of thousands by the Germans, and Sosukowski, Polish Commander-in-Chief in London, has in his bitterness of spirit come out with a very ill-advised, though quite understandable, Order of the Day, criticising the Russians and British alike for withholding aid from his people in Warsaw. In point of fact, of course, we have tried to send help by air and have lost a number of men and machines in doing so, but our assistance has been restricted and our losses increased by Russia's refusal of landing facilities in territory under their control.

Wednesday 6th September 1944
In recent broadcasts the Japanese have been accusing U.S. troops of desecrating their dead and of sending the skulls of Japanese killed in action to their wives and families as souvenirs and play-things. Being somewhat sceptical of this I asked Lloyd what he thought about it. He, I found, was quite prepared to believe it, because, when he was returning from Australia last year, some U.S. Marines who were in the same ship showed him some Japanese ears, which they had cut off dead Japanese and were taking home as souvenirs. We have some nice allies!

Wednesday 13th September 1944
Hear that the Germans have started using their much-vaunted secret weapon V2, one tremendous explosion having been experienced apparently last Friday, in Epping Forest and another in Chiswick, though the matter is being hushed up and passed off as a "gas explosion" so as to give the Germans no clue as to the results.

Tuesday 3rd October 1944
After 2 months of hell and gallant resistance, Warsaw has fallen [to the Germans]. One cannot but feel that the Russians, had they felt so disposed, could have done very much more than they did to help the wretched Poles, but, quite apart from their attitude to the Poles, it is becoming increasingly clear that the main aim of the Russians is to get a strangle-hold on the Baltic States, the Balkans and that part of Poland which they seized in 1939, and that they are making little or no attempt to drive into East Prussia and Germany itself or to drive the Germans out of the remainder of Poland. True, they may talk of desiring an independent Poland and independent Baltic and Balkan States, but they are only likely to be independent so long as their governments dance to the Russian tune. There are even indications that the Russians are out to get control of the Bosphorus and that, unless we back them up in this, they will make no real attempt to enter Germany and may even be prepared to come to terms with the Germans. One can only hope that this interpretation of recent developments is incorrect, but there are all too many signs to bear it out and, though not made public, there are good reasons for believing that the Japanese have been urging the Germans to make peace with the Russians and that they themselves (the Japanese) have been doing all they can to improve their own relations with Russia.

Monday 6th November 1944
This evening brings news of a speech by Stalin in which he emphasised the need for continued co-operation [between the Allies] after the War. It was a statesmanly speech, but perhaps the most significant point about it was his reference to Japan as an aggressor. With Japan going all out at the moment to increase her friendly relations with Russia, this will come as a bit of a jolt for her.

Monday 13th November 1944

Rather surprisingly I hear from Lloyd that considerable difficulty is being experienced in getting either Churchill or Eden to evince any great interest in Far Eastern affairs. That they should, at the moment, be concerned mainly with Europe is perhaps but natural, but it seems extraordinary, if true, that they should fail to take any interest in the Far East, though I know from other sources that interest in Far Eastern affairs is singularly lacking at the moment in high quarters - a rather unfortunate state of affairs in view of future developments.

Friday 17th November 1944

A pretty grim account of the treatment meted out to British and Australian prisoners in Burma and Siam has been given out by Sir James Grigg in the House today on the basis of statements by survivors from among the 152 rescued by U.S. submarines after the recent sinking of a Japanese transport conveying POWs from Singapore to Japan. Seems they had been forced to work on the construction of the railway linking Siam to Burma under pretty appalling conditions, as a result of which about 2,000 out of 10,000 are said to have died. Although prisoners in Japan itself and in Formosa, Hong Kong and elsewhere appear to be reasonably well-treated, the trouble is that, as the Japanese, with their strong views on the "no surrender" principle, are completely indifferent to their own prisoners in Allied hands, they seem incapable of appreciating how strongly Westerners feel about the proper treatment of prisoners of war and they probably see nothing wrong in making prisoners work under such conditions. This is not, of course, intended to condone their actions.

Friday 24th November 1944

To-day comes the news that industrial targets in and around Tokyo have been bombed for the first time by land-based bombers from Saipan, a round trip of no less than 3,000 miles, and it is emphasised that this was no tip and run raid, but the opening round of a systematic series of air attacks, which have been planned to strike at the heart of Japan with the object of "softening" Japan's defences as a preliminary to eventual landing operations. One very satisfactory and reassuring feature of this raid is that the attacking force was instructed to avoid bombing the Imperial Palace and shrines. It would seem, therefore, that the U.S. authorities have taken note of Grew's emphasis in his "Ten Years in Japan" on the fact that the Emperor himself is no war-monger and that he may well prove a liberalising and steadying influence when once the Military Party has been overthrown. The fact that every part of the Japanese Empire is now within bombing range by land-based aircraft is extremely significant.

Thursday 7th December 1944
An interesting sidelight on Japan's preparations for her attack on Pearl Harbour came my way to-day in the form of a Japanese POW statement. The POW, a Japanese P.O., was taken at Goodenough in July last year and had previously served in the aircraft carrier "Kaga". According to his statement, the "Kaga" left Etorofu in the Kuriles on November 22nd 1941 and on December 2nd, while at sea, the men were informed by the Captain that war was to be declared on the U.S. on the 8th and that they were to strike at Pearl Harbour. In view of recent Japanese propaganda (according to which Cordell Hull's Note of November 26th, which led to the suspension of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations in Washington, amounted to an ultimatum and was therefore "the first shot" in the War), these dates are of great interest and would seem to indicate that by November 22nd all preparations had been completed to strike in case the negotiations fell through and that actual orders for the attack must have been issued some time between the 26th, when Hull delivered his Note, and December 2nd, when the "Kaga" skipper revealed what was about to happen.

Wednesday 13th December 1944
Letter from Cowgill to say that he had applied for me to take on the post in question, but that Bletchley Park had declined on the grounds that I could not be spared. As I had previously received both Travis's [head of GC&CS] and Jacob's permission and benediction to go ahead, this sudden withdrawal of sanction has come as a bit of a shock and all the more so since enquiries show that it was Travis himself who turned down Cowgill's application for me. Feel there must be some misunderstanding, so rang up Cowgill to find out if the post was still open and, if so, whether he could hold it open till Travis's return on Friday. This he very readily agreed to do, as he is particularly anxious to have me.

Saturday 16th December 1944
Another U.S. landing in the Philippines, this time on Mindoro Island to the South-west of Manila.
Travis was unable to see me till just on 6 o'clock this evening and I had pretty well given up all hope of getting the post offered by Cowgill, but Cowgill very sportingly extended the time limit to 8 p.m. this evening, and shortly after 6 I was able to ring him up to say that I had induced Travis to reverse his decision and to release me from my present post in order to take up the post offered by Colonel Cowgill. Travis is a grand chap and I felt all along that, in view of the strong recommendations he had made about me to the Director of Military Intelligence in the summer, he would be prepared to let me go if only I could see him personally and explain matters to him. I was right, for he listened to my plea with the utmost sympathetic attention, in spite of his being over-burdened with far more vital work, and then told me to ring up Cowgill to say I could take the post offered.

Secret Intelligence Service, 1945 -
Monday 1st January 1945
Starting work in Section V, Secret Intelligence Service, I have started the New Year by taking up my new appointment under Cowgill and, while working in town at Headquarters, am staying with the Davieses, who are very kindly putting me up at their flat in Holland Park for the month or so that I expect to be in town.

Wednesday 3rd January 1945

This evening comes news that Turkey has broken off relations with Japan - a bit of a blow for the Japanese, who will thereby be deprived of one of their main "listening posts" in Europe.

Saturday 3rd February 1945

Learned from a source which cannot be quoted [intercepts of Japanese communications] that Mungo's [son] submarine was sunk on the 12th in the Malacca Straits as a result of two separate attacks, first by depth charge and then by air. There is just a chance, therefore, that he may have been able to escape before the "Porpoise" sunk and have swum ashore or been picked up by the Japanese. It is somewhat ironic that I cannot mention this information to dear old Margaret [wife] or anyone else as yet and must, for the time being, keep it to myself.

Saturday 17th February 1945

The Admiralty has now officially announced that the "Porpoise" is "long overdue and must be considered lost", though no other details are given and there is no further news of dear old Mungo [son].

Monday 5th March 1945

To town on duty. At lunch shared a table with two Poles, with whom I got into conversation. They opened up on the decisions on Poland reached at the Yalta Conference and were very indignant about them, one of the two repeating over and over again that it was "unconditional surrender for Poland". Both declared it meant they would never be able to return to Poland again and said the Russians were already deporting thousands of Poles from Lvov etc., packed like cattle in open trucks. It is all very tragic and makes one think furiously.

Wednesday 21st March 1945

Higham, who has just been seeing Admiral Stark, tells me [of and interesting remark] made to him by Admiral Stark. [Stark] happened to be with Cordell Hull when the news of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour came in. On hearing it, both of them simultaneously remarked "Thank God!", indicating their relief that it provided the U.S. with a clear-cut reason for entering the War on the side of Britain and that the whole country would be united in their readiness to enter the War in such circumstances.

Thursday 5th April 1945

From Japan comes news of two significant developments, the replacement of Koiso as Premier by the 77-year old Admiral Suzuki, Lord President of the Privy Council, and Russia's denunciation of the Neutrality Pact. Ever since the announcement of the San Francisco Conference the Japanese have been apprehensive of the Russians taking this step, though of late they seemed to have satisfied themselves that the Russians would not do so. Moscow's action must therefore have come as a bit of a shock.

Sunday 8th April 1945
From the Far East comes news of General Anami and Admiral Yonai as Ministers of War and Navy respectively in the new Suzuki Cabinet and of fighting in Indo-China between the Japanese and the French.

The true implications of the Soviet denunciation of her Neutrality Pact with Japan still remain uncertain, though it is regarded as significant that the reasons given for the denunciation (Japanese assistance to Germany and Japan's war with Russia's two great allies) provide Moscow with an excuse for declaring war on Japan (if she seeks a pretext to do so) before the expiry of a year following the denunciation as required by the terms of the Pact. For my own part I rather doubt that Moscow does intend to join in the war against Japan, for although she no doubt wants to see Japan defeated, she knows that Britain and the U.S. will see to this in any case and she, Russia, is in a strong enough position to safeguard her own interests in the final settlement without the sacrifices of blood and treasure. At the same time, the loophole she has left for joining in the fray gives her a valuable bargaining counter for extorting concessions from Japan, who is desperately anxious to ensure Russia's continued neutrality in the Far East and is apparently prepared to pay a pretty high price for it.

Monday 9th April 1945

Now announced that Togo has been appointed to succeed Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister in the new Japanese Cabinet, an appointment of possible significance, as he is a former Ambassador to Russia and an advocate of closer relations with the U.S.S.R.

Meantime Tokyo and other Japanese cities continue to be pounded from the air and heavy fighting continues on Okinawa.

Thursday 12th April 1945

On the political front comes the not unexpected news that Spain has broken off diplomatic relations with Japan. The real object is clearly to curry favour with Britain and the U.S., who are, however, far too much alive to the way the present regime in Spain has worked hand in glove with both Germany and Japan to be particularly impressed by this eleventh hour conversion on the part of Franco & Co. The fact, however, that Madrid has been one of Japan's most valuable intelligence centres in Europe and will no longer be available as such is all to the good.

Monday 23rd April 1945

Another significant development is that Patton's 3rd U.S. Army has suddenly swung south and southeast towards the Danube at Regensberg and towards the Bavarian redoubt instead of pressing on into Czechoslovakia - possibly due in part to political considerations, as Russia regards Czechoslovakia as coming within her preserve.

This evening we celebrate the end of the "Dim Out" and need no longer draw curtains and screen lights.

Thursday 26th April 1945

Yesterday saw the opening of the San Francisco Conference, on the success or failure of which so much will depend. The Polish question remains unsettled and a serious cause of friction between Britain and America on the one side and Russia on the other.
Tuesday 1st May 1945
Another unfortunate political storm appears to be brewing over Tito's seizure of Trieste and Fiume, and action bitterly resented by the Italian partisans and all other good Italians.

Saturday 5th May 1945
Yet another mass surrender announced this evening, this time is South Germany.
Comes news also that a widespread uprising in Czechoslovakia appears to have broken out.

Jubilant though one may feel over the war news of the past few days, a serious damper to premature rejoicing comes this evening in the lastest developments of the Polish question, which Eden and Stettinius have characterised very naturally and somewhat ominously as causing "grave concern". In brief, the Soviet have at last replied to the pressing enquiries by Britain and the U.S. as to the whereabouts of the Polish leaders who have been missing since the end of March when, at Russia's invitation, they met General Ivanov in order to carry out discussions. This reply is to the effect that they have been arrested on a charge of "diversionary activities against the Red Army". Even if the charge has any foundation to it - and there is only Moscow's word to it - it is a most monstrous piece of bad faith, both to the Poles who accepted the Russian invitation in all good faith and to Russia's Allies, Britain and America, who have been given evasive answers all this time and been treated with gross discourtesy. Little wonder, therefore, that "grave concern" has been caused by this revelation and that [the British Government] and the U.S. have notified Molotov, who conveyed the reply, that they cannot continue the Polish talks with Russia and have demanded a full explanation regarding the arrest of the Polish leaders.

It bodes ill for the success of the San Francisco Conference and for the future peace of Europe that Russia should act so blatantly at so early a stage in the attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement of Europe, though it is all in line with other recent acts of bad faith by Russia - her refusal to implement the promises made at Yalta about the setting up of a real Polish government, her refusal to let any of her allies see the true conditions in Poland at first hand, and her unilateral action in setting up an Austrian government without consultation with her allies. That the leopard has not changed its spots seems all too apparent.

Tuesday 15th May 1945
As foreshadowed by Togo's recent criticism of Germany, Japan has decided to denounce the Tripartite Pact. So ends her alliance with Germany, an alliance which was forced on to Japan by Oshima and other Germanophiles only after long and bitter opposition by the more moderate and far-seeing elements in Japan, including the Emperor.

Japanese airmen continue to carry out suicide attacks on British and U.S. warships by making, or attempting to make, deliberate crashes on the decks and blowing themselves up in the attempt. One cannot but have a sneaking admiration for their complete disregard of their own lives, even though it seems a bit overdone at present. On Okinawa they continue to hold out against overwhelming numbers and, as elsewhere, are fighting to the death.
Returned to work after 11 days of very pleasant and refreshing leave. Thanks to the end of the war in Europe which came just after I set off on leave, there have been considerable changes at Bletchley Park, even during my short absence, as a large part of the work done there has now ended and numbers of people have already left or are on the point of leaving, while many others have been transferred to duties connected with the war in southeast Asia.

Friday 18th May 1945
Admiralty announces the sinking of a 10,000-ton Japanese cruiser by British warships in the Straits of Malacca some 50 miles west-south-west of Penang - a significant development, as this is the first time that Allied surface craft have entered the Straits since early 1942, though of course we have had submarines operating in those waters for some time past and it was in them that the "Porpoise" with dear old Mungo [son] was sunk in January this year.

Saturday 19th May 1945
While Soviet-Polish relations continue to cause grave anxiety for the future, Alexander has come out with a stern warning to Tito and his Yugoslavs in regard to Trieste and district, emphasising that unilateral political action, such as they are taking there, cannot be tolerated and is entirely contrary to the agreements provisionally reached. This warning has the full backing of both Britain and the U.S., though Moscow has so far said nothing and, in fact, appears to be encouraging Tito & Co. on the quiet. A truly fine bunch of allies!

Wednesday 23rd May 1945
From Japan comes news indicating that a section of the Japanese has already started to agitate for peace, as the Japanese Procurator General, Nakano, is quoted as demanding the arrest of all "peace agitators". Though it is doubtful if this agitation has gone very far as yet and it would be foolish to put much faith in it yet, it is an interesting and significant sign. Had the Cairo declaration not insisted so emphatically on stripping Japan bare of all her overseas possessions, including even Korea and Formosa, skillful propaganda on our part addressed to the Japanese masses might strengthen the hands of these agitators very considerably and do us much good, but the Cairo declaration must be a very definite handicap to any such propaganda. I said this at the time and I have no reason to alter my belief.

Friday 25th May 1945
Glad to hear Grimsdale rub in, in a wireless talk this evening, that it will be necessary to defeat the Japanese in China before the war is ended and that it will be no easy matter to do this. This is a contention that I am constantly putting forward, though most people seem to think me a bit "crackers" and pessimistic for saying so. As Grimsdale speaks from recent first-hand observations in China, it is to be hoped that people will be more prepared to listen to him than they are to me.

Saturday 26th May 1945
Further devastating raids on Tokyo, 9,000 tons of incendiary bombs having been dropped on it in the past 48 hours. 40 square miles of the city are now reported completely burnt out and the Japanese say the Imperial Palace is among the buildings completely destroyed.

Sunday 10th June 1945
While the Chinese are "talking big" about their recapture of Foochow, Nanning, Pinyang etc, there is now unimpeachable, though unpublished, evidence that there was no fighting whatever and that the Japanese, for reasons best known to themselves, had already withdrawn without any pressure from the Chinese. It is equally clear that U.S. estimates of Japanese casualties and U.S. successes in the Philippines and on Okinawa have been far too optimistic. Brett-Smith, one of whose jobs it is to keep tab of such matters, tells me that the number of Japanese whom MacArthur's men claim to have killed on Okinawa is more than double the number comprising the total Japanese garrison at the start.

Rumours of peace-feelers by the Japanese continue to circulate, but there is good reason to believe that, in so far as the Japanese Government is concerned, they are without foundation. On the other hand there is reason to believe that in certain U.S. quarters apprehensions are cropping up about Russian intentions in the Far East and it is being questioned whether it is wise to crush Japan completely and whether it would not be better to offer her terms which would enable her to help adjust the balance in the Far East in the event of Russia trying to step in to her place in Manchuria and Korea.

Monday 11th June 1945
As I have now definitely informed Chatham House that I do not feel I can ask to be released from government service just at this stage in order to take up the post about which they have sounded me, I have asked Milne to speak to Kim Philby about taking me on if and when my present job ends. He has promised to do so.

Thursday 28th June 1945
A great day at Bletchley Park, the Combined Chiefs of Staff paying a visit to express their thanks and appreciation of our work. Tedder, unfortunately, was prevented at the last moment from coming, but Sir Alan Brooke and Admiral Cunningham both came, and Brooke made a speech on behalf of all three. It is pleasant to have one's work recognised in this way by the Powers-that-be; and some of the examples he quoted to show how valuable our work had been were of great historical interest although, unfortunately, they are not of a kind that can ever be made public.

Friday 29th June 1945
According to a Japanese wireless report, Japan's main industries are to be moved to Manchuria. Some of them are, of course, there already, but why the Japanese should announce this publicly at this moment is not clear, unless it is intended to emphasize that, even though we land in Japan and overrun it, the fight will still be carried on in Manchuria. Though I know there are many who do not share my view, I have always contended that, even if Japan itself were occupied by the Allies, the Japanese army would still fight on in Manchuria and even the government itself might withdraw there in the same way as the British government intended to withdraw to Canada in 1940 if the Germans had invaded the British Isles.

Monday 2nd July 1945
By arrangement with Milne, looked in to see Philby [Kim Philby] while up in town on duty today. Though he cannot make a definite promise as yet, he thinks it reasonably certain that he will be able to take me on if and when my present job peters out (as it probably will do when the war with Japan ends), as he needs someone with a first-hand knowledge of Far Eastern affairs and seems anxious to get me.

Tuesday 10th July 1945

As I had to go up to town on duty, had Millar to lunch with me at the R.E.S. Had not seen him since I left Japan 11 years ago. He is back in this country for a couple of months on leave from Burma, where he had the job of interrogating Japanese prisoners. He confirms that one of the main reasons for their readiness to talk is undoubtedly that, being prisoners, they feel that officially they have lost their nationality. At the same time, they feel that their captors, in sparing their lives, have done them a favour and that therefore, in accordance with Japanese custom, they (the POWs) must return the favour in the only way open to them i.e. by giving their captors the information they want. Another reason is, of course, that, as the Japanese officially assume that no officer or man will allow himself to be taken alive, not attempt is made to instruct the troops about the need for security in the event of becoming a POW.

Sunday 15th July 1945

Churchill and Truman have both arrived in Potsdam for the "Big Three" talks, which are due to open there to-morrow, though there is no word as yet of Stalin's arrival. As there is very good reason for believing that the Japanese have intimated to Moscow their readiness to consider peace terms (though not unconditional surrender), there may possibly be some connection between this and Stalin's delay. The reason for this belief cannot be mentioned here and no word of it is likely to be made public unless it is divulged at Potsdam.

Sunday 22nd July 1945

One Captain Zacharias, broadcasting from America, has urged Japan to surrender now in order to avoid destruction. Though he did not say it in so many words, he rather intimated that the Japanese would receive more consideration by immediate surrender than they would if they went on fighting - in other words, "unconditional surrender" was a relative term. If this interpretation is correct, it would seem to bear out reports of a growing feeling in the U.S. against aiming at the complete collapse and destruction of Japan and that, while the U.S. want the war to end as soon as possible and recognise that Russia's entry would help to shorten the War, they are apprehensive lest Russia should join in against Japan and extend her influence in the Far East if Japan does not surrender shortly.

In this connection it seems increasingly clear that Russia, as of old, is playing for outlets to the sea, both in the Mediterranean and the Pacific - an ice free port in the latter. Hence her recent demands on Turkey and her recent abrogation of her Neutrality Pact with Japan.

Tuesday 31st July 1945

For 21 days now Japan has been bombarded by air and sea with ever-increasing violence, thousands of tons of bombs being rained down on her towns and cities daily, smashing her
factories, her oil installations, airfields and communications and laying mines in her harbours and straits. Even her sea communications with Korea are in a parlous state.

Friday 3rd August 1945
The main decisions reached by the Big Three at Potsdam were announced last night. Nothing is said about the Far East or about Russian participation in the war against Japan.

Monday 6th August 1945
This evening's news is, as the B.B.C. announcer put it, "dominated by" the announcement that, British, U.S., and Canadian scientists, working in close conjunction, have produced the atomic bomb and that it has been tried out today for the first time on Hiroshima. The pall of smoke and dust was so tremendous that it has been impossible so far to tell what damage was done; but as a single bomb is said to have the force of 20,000 tons of high explosive, the effect must have been pretty considerable.

Though natural enough that the scientists should feel well pleased with themselves at this revolutionary discovery, the whole idea rather sickens one. Quite apart from the dangerous implications for the future of mankind, there is an unpleasant air of smug hypocrisy about the way in which we denounce the Germans and others for terrorist raids and indiscriminate bombing and make a great song and dance about their "barbaric" methods of warfare, yet we give a whoop of delight and hail it as a great achievement when we invent an atomic bomb and, apparently, pretty well wipe out a city of 350,000 souls with it. To me it is absolutely nauseating. By the grace of Heaven, our own scientists completed their work before the German scientists, who were working on similar lines; but it might have been otherwise and the consequences, had they done so, are too horrible to consider. And what is there to prevent some actual or potential enemy of the future from using atomic energy against us or against anyone else?

Tuesday 7th August 1945
What all this boils down to is that this new discovery spells one of two things - either the end of all wars or the end of mankind. There seems to be no alternative, and in view of the intense national hatreds and unrest so widely in evidence at the present time, it looks unpleasantly like as though it will be the latter.

Wednesday 8th August 1945
This evening has brought the news that Russia, running true to form, has declared war on Japan, presumably in order to be "in at the kill" as she was with Poland in 1939.

The Russians, having entered the War, have at last made public the fact that Japan sought their mediation for peace just prior to the opening of the Potsdam Conference. That Konoe was to have been sent to Moscow as the Imperial messenger is not specifically mentioned, though no doubt that and all the other details so far "kept hid" will be revealed in due course.

Thursday 9th August 1945
With the ghastly extent of the holocaust caused at Hiroshima now being made known comes the news of a second atomic bomb dropped this morning, this time on Nagasaki. The news simply revolts and sickens me and I find that it has had much the same effect on most of the
people to whom I have spoken on the matter. To let off even one such bomb was bad enough, but to drop yet another so soon after the first, without giving the Japanese time to reconsider the question of surrender in face of this new devastating discovery, seems little short of criminal lunacy and moral degeneration. We raised a howl of righteous indignation when the Germans dropped a few hundred tons of bombs on Coventry and killed a few hundred innocent civilians, and again more recently, when they started V1 and V2 attacks. And now we, who called this barbaric and inhuman (as indeed it was), cheerfully wipe out two great cities and slaughter an estimated quarter-of- a-million "innocent civilians" by means of this latest brutal discovery. This is not war, but blind wholesale butchery and massacre and, even though it hastens Japan's surrender as undoubtedly it must, it is difficult to see how any decent-minded person will be able to feel either pride or satisfaction in concluding the war by such means. Apart from anything else it simply strikes at the very roots of the moral pose which we have adopted throughout the war with the Axis Powers and exposes us to the world as arrant hypocrites and humbugs.

No doubt we shall learn some day how it came about that this y forebodings were justified and that the rejoicings reported from London and elsewhere are likely to prove a bit premature. The fact that China has demanded that the Emperor be treated as a war criminal is but one among a number of reasons why this stipulation is unlikely to be accepted without demur. The fact, however, that Japan has shown herself ready to accept all the other implications of unconditional surrender shows that the end cannot be far off, though I fear me that poor Togo, the Foreign Minister, who has put forward this offer to surrender, has virtually signed his own death warrant by doing so, as the super-patriotic fraternity are likely to regard it as their patriotic duty to assassinate him sooner or later in consequence. The pity is that Japan's surrender, if it does come now, will have been brought about by the atomic bomb rather than by military defeat in the orthodox sense, as not only will this leave the Japanese with an intense and justifiable bitterness and deprive our victory of the moral effect which a straight-forward military victory would have had, but it will mean that Japan's main armies, though forced to disband, will be deprived of the chastening effect of a major defeat in actual fighting. In years to come, therefore, this may well lead to a revival of the dangerous myth of an "invincible" Japanese army which has never been defeated in the field. The more one hears and reads and thinks of our use of the atomic bomb, the more one feels disgusted and ashamed; and one gathers from letters now appearing in "The Times" and other papers and from talks with other people that this feeling is very widespread. That this is so is in itself a healthy sign, though it is a curious thing that this feeling of revulsion appears to be more common among the men than among the women to whom I have spoken on the subject. Incidentally, considering that the future use of the atomic bomb as a weapon of war would spell extermination, it is a bit shattering to read in to-day's "Times" a commentary by their Aeronautical Correspondent on the future design of warplanes, pointing out the changes required for carrying atomic instead of ordinary bombs. From the calm, dispassionate way in
which he discusses the question, one might imagine that the future use of atomic bombs and all it would imply were taken for granted.

In Manchuria the Russians appear to be making pretty rapid progress, especially in the west where they have already taken Hailar. This, however, still leaves them west of the Khingans, which has doubtless been chosen as Japan's main line of defence. Incidentally one cannot but be struck by our somewhat cynical disregard of the fact that, although Russia denounced her Neutrality Pact with Japan some months ago, she has deliberately violated the pledge contained in it, i.e. in connection with the clause binding both contracting parties to remain neutral until the lapse of 12 months from the time of denunciation. Not only, therefore, has she struck Japan in the back in the same way as she struck Poland, but she has done so in violation of her written pledges. It is a sad commentary on the state of international morality that whereas, if this blow had been against ourselves or one of our allies, it would have been most roundly condemned, we now applaud it or tactfully ignore the implicit treachery of the action merely because it is to our advantage to do so. In point of fact, even the advantage is likely to prove more apparent than real, as Russian papers are now writing quite openly about recovering Port Arthur, Dairen, the Chinese Eastern Railway and everything else taken from them by the Japanese since the Russo-Japanese War; so it does not look as though the Chinese are likely to have Manchuria restored to them unless - which is extremely unlikely - we are prepared to fight Russia and compel her to hand it back to the Chinese.

Saturday 11th August 1945

This evening comes the news that the Allies have replied to Japan that the Emperor and the Government will have to do as the Allied Supreme Commander orders them to do. This is, of course, as it should be, as otherwise, if the Emperor were to be allowed to retain his prerogatives as urged by the Japanese, it would leave the Japanese with all kinds of loopholes by which to evade the Allies' demands. At the same time, this question of the Imperial prerogatives is so fundamental to Japan that it would not greatly surprise me if the Japanese decide to fight on a bit longer. In any case, there seems bound to be most violent discussions in Japan before a final decision is reached, so it may well be some days before we get their reply. And even if they accept our demands, it may well be that even the Emperor's own orders to his troops to lay down their arms will be disregarded in China and elsewhere, as many of the commanders in the field are likely to feel the humiliation of surrender too great to be borne. Some, possibly many of them, will commit "harakiri", while others will quite possibly just fight on till killed.

It is now reported that the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki was even more powerful than the one on Hiroshima. It really is simply revolting.

Incidentally, it seems that we and the Americans are keeping the secret of it to ourselves and not imparting it even to our Soviet ally. For this, one can be heartily thankful, though it may well lead to resentment on the part of Russia and others on the grounds that, by keeping the secret to ourselves, we are now in a position, if we cared to do so, to dominate the world and force others to do our will. This resentment, in its turn, may lead others to work out the secret
for themselves - a definite possibility before very long - and then Heaven help us and the
world in general! Meantime, of course, the fact that we alone hold the secret of it may serve
as a deterrent to Russia both in Europe and the Far East, but our ability to hold her in check
in this way can only exist for so long as she and others fail to discover the secret for
themselves.

Sunday 12th August 1945

Baghino who, like most others with whom I have discussed the matter, is revolted with our
resort to the atomic bomb, tells me he saw a news film last week depicting a Japanese soldier
screaming in agony and rolling on the ground in an effort to put out the flames which had set
his clothes on fire, while a Yank soldier continued to spray him with a flame thrower. That
such films should be shown in public cinemas is, as he said, almost incredible, and it seems
equally incredible that any movie operator should stand coolly by taking such films for public
display. If audiences regard such films as entertainment, it only remains for enterprising
entertainers to revive the old Roman pastime of throwing people to the lions in an arena or to
reinstitute public exhibitions of burning people at the stake.

From Korea comes the news that Rashin and Yuki are now in Russian hands - a serious
matter for the Japanese.

Monday 13th August 1945

Those who regard China as democratic and progressive would do well to read the article on
the Chinese armies in to-day's "Times", which tells of the increasingly ruthless methods of
conscripting recruits and the cruelty and corruption prevalent in the Chungking [Kuomintang]
forces (the so-called Communist armies of Yenan are infinitely better in this respect).

Tuesday 14th August 1945

Starting with the news on the 8 a.m. wireless that a Tokyo broadcast had just announced the
despatch of Japan's acceptance of the Allied surrender demands, the day brought a series of
contradictory reports, and the 9 o'clock news this evening is still unable to ed that Russia had
promised at Potsdam that she would enter the war against Japan 3 months after Germany's
capitulation. This promise was carried out to the very letter, as she entered it 3 months to the
day after Germany surrendered.

In replying to criticisms which had been raised against the use of the bomb, he contended it
was fully justified in that it brought the War to a rapid conclusion and thus saved tens of
thousands of lives. This excuse has, of course, been put forward by others, but personally it
strikes me as sheer sophistry and casuistry and gross hypocrisy. And, quite apart from any
question of ethics, it seems a very short-sighted view in that it leaves out of account the fact
that, although it has forced Japan to surrender, the Japanese Army itself can still claim with
some truth that it remains undefeated and can thereby keep up the myth of invincibility with all
it implies. For the past year or more I have been trying, for this reason, to emphasize the
inherent danger of accepting a Japanese surrender unless and until a major defeat had been
inflicted on the main Japanese armies in the field; and now it seems that the very danger I
envisaged has been brought about by our resort to the atomic bomb.
Meantime fighting continues in Manchuria where the Russians, in their thrust from the west, are reported to have by-passed Solun and reached Taonan and Taonan, thus cutting one of the main North to South railways. Taonan in the west and Rashin in the east, both now in Russian hands, conjure up vivid recollections of my Manchurian trip in 1934, as I visited both. This evening comes news of a Japanese counter-offensive in Manchuria.

Friday 17th August 1945

Comes the somewhat unexpected news of Prince Higashi Kuni's appointment as Premier in succession to Suzuki. The appointment of an imperial prince to this post sets another very striking precedent and seems a healthy sign, as the country as a whole, and the Army and extremist nationalists in particular, are far more likely to accept the Emperor's orders in connection with Japan's surrender through an imperial prince as Premier than they would through a commoner. A further indication of the Emperor's desire to ensure faithful observance of the surrender demands is seen in the decision to send imperial princes to the various fronts to convey the Emperor's commands about laying down arms.

Saturday 18th August 1945

A healthy sign is that Prince Higashi Kuni has declared his intention to introduce measures for freedom of the Press, freedom of speech, and freedom of association while the Japanese Press and responsible Japanese leaders are at one in urging the people to remain calm and the more extreme nationalist elements to restrain themselves and avoid creating serious incidents.

Shigemitsu has been brought back as Foreign Minister and Yonai as Navy Minister - both very satisfactory appointments. Prince Higashi Kuni is War Minister as well as Premier. The announcement of Grew's resignation just at this stage must rouse some apprehensions. If it is merely a preliminary to his appointment to some special post in connection with Japan, well and good; but there is no indication of his being given a new assignment and it looks rather as though he had resigned on account of a difference of opinion on the policy to be adopted towards Japan or possibly even as a protest against the use of the atomic bomb. If so, it is much to be regretted, as there are all too few men in high places who understand Japan and the Japanese as he does.

Thursday 23rd August 1945

Occupation of Manchuria and Southern Sakhalin by the Russians completed, ceasefire at last in Burma, and surrender talks in the Philippines, but there are still a few isolated points without orders from Japan owing to disruption of communications.

Friday 24th August 1945

Chandra Bose dead, killed in an air crash together with a Japanese general accompanying him, while flying from Singapore to Manchuria. So ends the head of the self-styled Provisional Government of Free India and of the Indian National Army and probably it is just as well that his end has come in this way as otherwise, had he fallen into our hands alive, we would have had to string him up and thereby lay ourselves open to further trouble in India, where Congress extremists and others would doubtless have proclaimed him a martyr. Just why he
should have been heading for Manchuria is not clear, though it seems probable that, fearing to fall into British hands, he was hoping to escape to Russia and to enlist Soviet aid and sympathy in the cause of Indian independence - aid that might well have been forthcoming, as Soviet machinations in India have caused us trouble before now and are like to do so again.

Sunday 26th August 1945

From Chungking this evening come the reported details of the recently concluded Sino-Soviet Treaty. It is to last 30 years and under its terms Russia promises to withdraw from Manchuria within 3 months of Japan's surrender; Port Arthur to be under joint control as a naval base; Dairen to be a free port; the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway to be operated jointly; China to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia; and Russia to recognize Chiang and the central government as the sole government of China. What Yenan and the Chinese Communist forces will think of this last point remains to be seen.

Tuesday 28th August 1945

The first Allied troops were landed in Japan this morning, these being an American airborne detachment at Atsugi. They appear to have received quite a friendly reception and all has gone smoothly and peacefully. The probability is, of course, that the general populace will be just as friendly and ready to fraternize as their grand-parents were in the 1860s, but, as in those days of 80 years ago, it is the individual super-patriot who is likely to cause trouble and probably bloodshed.

Wednesday 29th August 1945

The vernacular Press in Japan continues to hammer home to its readers the seriousness of their defeat and the need for rectifying their outlook. The "Asahi" in an outspoken editorial is quoted as declaring that Japan's defeat is due to serious errors in national policy, both foreign and domestic. The fundamental error of the country's international conduct, it declares, is based on excessive faith in military force, and political freedom is needed to liquidate political backwardness and militarism. This is pretty plain speaking and, coming as its does from the "Asahi", which has always had liberal leanings, can be taken as a genuine expression of opinion and not merely intended for foreign consumption.

Higashi Kuni is quoted as speaking equally bluntly at a Press conference and, while promising free speech and a free Press for Japan, declaring that to this end the political department of the gendarmerie will be abolished and the political activities of the police will be restricted. This will be a tremendous step forward if it really is carried out, as it is the political side of the police and the "kempei" that has done so much harm.

Another healthy sign is seen in an article in the "Yomiuri" by Lt. General Ishihara Kanji, an adviser to the East Asia Federation, in which he declares that Japan should realize her mistakes of the past and apologise to the Chinese for her imperialistic policy. He also comes out strongly in favour of free speech etc.. While this may be intended in part for foreign consumption, it has a genuine ring about it and is published in a vernacular paper intended primarily for its Japanese readers. Incidentally, General Ishihara is, I imagine, the Colonel
Ishihara who was supposed to be the real "brains" behind Itagaki, Doihara and Co in Manchuria in 1932 and thereabouts.

Thursday 30th August 1945
Landings in Japan are now in full swing. Today General MacArthur himself landed at Atsugi and has set up his HQ in the Grand Hotel at Yokohama, pending the formal signing of the surrender on board the "Missouri" on Sunday, after which he is expected to move to Tokyo. Incidentally a number of super-patriots are reported to have done themselves in in Tokyo during the past few days after making their obeisance to the Imperial Palace at the Nijubashi. If all the super-patriotic fraternity followed their example in this way, it would certainly help to remove the danger of "incidents"; but perhaps this is too much to hope for.

Looked in to see Roscoe on my way back from work, I having just learned that the Japanese Section in Berkeley Street is closing down tomorrow, except for himself and Braithwaite. The end has come even more abruptly and drastically than expected and Roscoe seems to think it quite possible that he and Braithwaite too may find themselves out of a job before many more months have passed.

I, of course, am in much the same boat myself, as my present job is unlikely to last more than another month or so and it is now just a question of whether I shall then be transferred to a new post up in town or be sent out to Japan or be given my congé. It is all a very unsettling prospect.

Sunday 2nd September 1945
Japan's surrender formally signed this morning.

Tuesday 4th September 1945
Hong Kong once more in British hands.

Wednesday 5th September 1945
Singapore is once more in British hands. May it never again leave them.

Thursday 6th September 1945
A most damning indictment of Japan in regard to the treatment accorded to POWs has been issued in Washington. Though I still find it difficult to believe that these brutalities are general or that they are always deliberate, there is no getting away from the fact that they are pretty widespread and call for drastic punishment of those responsible. Most of the suffering has, of course, been caused by our chaps being made to live on a Japanese diet, which is quite unsuitable for the average Westerner, though the Japanese can claim with some justice that they could not be expected to feed their prisoners better than their own people. What is wholly inexcusable, however, is the personal violence and deliberate brutality used against individual prisoners in so many instances, even though it be true - as it probably is - that this is mainly due to the fact that the Japanese, with their "death-rather-than-surrender" teaching, hold all POWs in contempt. In this connection it is significant that the treatment of civilian internees, for whom there is not this same contempt, appears to have been very much more lenient and humane.

Monday 10th September 1945
Glad to see that the Allies have had the good sense to leave the Japanese Government a reasonably free hand to carry out their instructions, as only by this means can chaos and bloodshed be avoided. This is what I myself strongly advocated in a letter to Hubbard a year or so ago when he was presiding over the committee which was sitting at Chatham House to draw up recommendations for the post-war treatment of Japan. Meantime, thanks to the policy of leaving the Japanese a relatively free hand to manage their own affairs, the Allied occupation of Japan and of Japanese-held territory continues to go smoothly. Roughtly speaking the British are taking over Hong Kong, and everything south of 16 degrees North (i.e. up to about Turane in Indo-China), while the Chinese take over all China together with Indo-China north of 16 degrees North and the Russians take control of Manchuria, Sakhalin, the Kuriles and the northern half of Korea down to 38 degrees North. Everything else, including Japan itself and the Southern half of Korea (including Seoul) is left to the U.S.. Incidentally today's "Daily Telegraph" carries a telegram from its Washington correspondent, on the front page with appropriate headlines, disclosing that Japan's defeat was greatly helped by the fact that all Japan's naval code messages were read and we therefore knew all her plans beforehand. As an example it quotes the case of Admiral Yamamoto's death, which was brought about by our knowing the full details of his schedule and thereby being able to seek out and shoot down his plane. That such "leakages" should be allowed is simply scandalous and whoever was responsible for this and others that have come out in the past day or two (made possible, presumably, by the lifting of the censorship) should be shown no mercy. A case of Yardley and his Black Chamber all over again. One had always feared that in years to come, when memories of the Official Secrets Act and the like had begun to fade, "leakages" of this kind would begin to appear, but that they should come out so soon as all this seems almost incredible.

Wednesday 12th September 1945

Distressed to see that Homma is one of those arrested yesterday for trial as war criminals, he being held responsible for the so-called Bataan death march, as he was Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese invasion forces in the Philippines at the time. Technically, as Commander-in-Chief, he was perhaps responsible, but knowing him so well and over so long a period as I do, I find it very difficult to believe that he would ever be directly responsible for any brutality. See also that my old friend Tatekawa has died. Though very reactionary in his later years, I always found him a very good friend from the time I first met him in 1918, when he was still only a major, up to 1934 when I finally left Japan and he was a lieutenant general. Woodroffe's description of him as "a real white man" was not, I think, far wrong at the time he said this.

Thursday 13th September 1945

Delighted to see that MacArthur has ordered the dissolution of the Black Dragon Society and the arrest of 7 of its leading members. This is a step I have long advocated as an essential preliminary, if and when we defeated Japan.
To-day's "Times" carries a very interesting and enlightening report of an interview given by Konoe who, in effect, declares that both the China "Incident" and the war itself could have been averted had it not been for the militarists taking matters into their own hands and overriding the Government by force. The one objective therefore of the present Japanese Government, he says, is to eliminate the Army from the political and social life of Japan, though he stressed his belief that the Army is still so powerful that its dominating influence could only be removed with the aid of the U.S. forces. He felt sure that most Japanese wanted this, and, by his attitude, he indicated a feeling of joy and relief that the Army's oppressive regime was at an end and that future Japanese governments would be able to keep their promises. This, he said, had not always been possible in the past and Japan had been distrusted accordingly, as the Government had been like a 2-headed dragon, one head, the regular Government, promising one thing while the other, the military, ordered another. Incidentally he maintained that, with the Military thoroughly discredited, the outside World could rid itself of the fear that Japan would plan another war.

Maybe therefore my pet theory that a Japanese defeat might well lead to a revulsion in Japan against the Army as strong as the revulsion against military rule brought about in England after the overthrow of Cromwell's major-generals may yet prove justified.

Particularly revealing was his account of how he himself, a man who had been 3 times Premier, had been maltreated. For the past 3 years, he said, he had been dogged and threatened by the "kempei" and on one occasion, while actually Premier, he had been seized by the Army when he was about to board a ship at Kobe on his way to see Chiang for peace discussions (This was presumably the meeting in 1938 which Hallett Abend was asked to arrange).

He also told of how Roosevelt had accepted his invitation for a personal meeting with a view to easing tension between Japan and the U.S. and of how the military had then begun to make stipulations with the result that Roosevelt's advisers became suspicious and the meeting was called off. Tojo was apparently the chief stumbling block. When, for instance, the U.S. proposed the withdrawal of Japan's forces from China, the Emperor and most of the Cabinet favoured acceptance of the U.S. terms, but Tojo, with the backing of the Military, opposed this proposition so violently that Konoe had to give way. Later, he said, Tojo was constantly urging the Emperor to go to war on the grounds that the embargo was choking Japan and that therefore it was a case of fight or perish. Finally, when the Emperor was persuaded to sign the Rescript for war, the Rescript was apparently left undated, as the Emperor intended it merely for use as a club to ensure the success of negotiations and he had no idea it would be used in the way it was.

Monday 17th September 1945

By way of bringing home to the Japanese the reason why such revulsion is felt towards them, the Japanese papers are being made to publish photographs and official descriptions of the atrocities perpetrated by some of their own troops on POWs and others. Provided the
Japanese public can be brought to realize that these are authentic photos and accounts and not merely propaganda, this should do much good.

Comes the news this evening that Shigemitsu, for reasons unstated, has resigned and has been succeeded by Yoshida as Foreign Minister. Sorry to hear this, as Yoshida has very little in him whereas Shigemitsu is a man of strong character and carries far more weight.

Saturday 6th October 1945
Shidehara has been brought out of retirement and has been made Premier. Neither an easy nor an enviable task.

Saturday 10th November 1945
Dined last night with Norman and Irma MacLeod. John MacLeod, who has just returned to this country, was to have been there too, but he is still in hospital and was unable to get away. Poor chap seems to have had a pretty grim time, as he was one of the POWs sent to work on the Siam-Indochina railway and the working conditions were pretty fierce. Surprised, though, to learn that he was not captured at Singapore as originally believed, but later, on a Dutch island off Sumatra to which he had managed to escape in a small boat with 3 of his men after being wounded in action on the Slim River. On reaching the island he was received in a very friendly way by some officers of the local Dutch garrison, who invited him and his men to their Mess; but having got them there, the Dutch proceeded to lock them up and hold them prisoner until the Japanese came and then handed them over to the Japanese - a pretty treacherous piece of work for a so-called ally. John's opinion of the Dutch - i.e. the Dutch colonial troops - is therefore pretty poor - in fact he hates them as much as he hates the Japanese and says that not only are they treacherous and ready to sell their own grandmothers for money, but are brutal to the natives and to their own men alike. On the other hand, although he received pretty harsh treatment from the Japanese and went down a number of times with malaria, dengue, and other diseases, he apparently kept fairly fit on the whole and often had as many as 4 eggs a day, as the local Chinese set up duck farms near the camp and sold the eggs to the POWs.

Friday 16th November 1945
Heard some rather unpleasant details of the treatment of Japanese prisoners from Brazier. As an intelligence officer in Burma he naturally wanted prisoners for interrogation, but few as were the Japanese who surrendered, fewer still were those who reached him alive, as their captors all too frequently killed them, either because they could not be bothered with them or because they were so worked up with stories of Japanese cruelty. In some cases of which he heard, Japanese wounded or sick had their heads kicked in. The Chinese, he said, were the worst in this respect, as they liked to prolong the agony.

Sunday 16th December 1945
Comes the news that Konoe, who was to have given himself up today for trial as a war criminal, has committed suicide by taking poison. In a note left by him, he blames himself for his mishandling of the China situation but hopes that, when tempers and feelings have died down, history will show that he was not as black as at present he is painted. He could not,
however, face the humiliation of being tried by an American court. Near his bed was found a
copy of Oscar Wilde's "De Profundis" with certain passages, very apt in his own case, heavily
underlined and there was also a volume of "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire". Poor
Konoe seems to have been more sinned against (by the military extremists) than sinning, and
his death recalls the forebodings made to me about him by his great friend, Iwanaga, in the
Spring of 1934.
MacArthur's recent long string of arrests of leading personalities in Japan seems to have
caused a virtual paralysis in Japanese administration, as no one knows whose turn it is to be
next. One can only hope he is not overdoing it. He has also been acting pretty drastically and
sweepingly in other directions too - ordering drastic alterations in the system of land tenure,
the destruction of the monopoly of wealth and power by dissolving the great holding
companies of Mitsui, Mitsubishi etc., it being on this monopoly that the position of the old
ruling class was based.

Friday 28th December 1945
The result of the Moscow Conference was announced last night. In so far as the Far East is
concerned, a Far Eastern Commission, normally sitting in Washington, where its HQ will be,
and composed of representatives of the Allied countries with Pacific interests, is to replace
the present Far Eastern Advisory Commission, while an Allied Control Council consisting of
one member each of the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China and a joint member for Britain, Australia,
New Zealand and India, plus the supreme commander, will sit in Tokyo. In Korea a
provisional democratic government will be set up and a joint commission representing the
U.S. command in the south and the Soviet command in the north will assist in the task, its
recommendations being passed on to the British, U.S., Soviet and Chinese governmments for
consideration and proposals for a 4-Power trusteeship of Korea submitted.

Saturday 29th December 1945
Letter from Roy Piggott to say he has been asked by MacArthur if he would be willing to give
evidence on Homma's behalf. Very naturally he is, though it is not yet certain whether he is to
fly to Manilla for the trial or to give evidence on affidavit in this country. Delighted to hear this
and hope he will be able to get Homma acquitted, as it is difficult to believe that Homma was
guilty of any deliberate cruelty or that he condoned the harshness of those subordinates of his
responsible for the death march.

Sunday 30th December 1945
MacArthur has issued a statement denying any knowledge of the decision reached at
Moscow to set up an Allied Control Council for Japan and disclaiming any responsibility. On
the contrary, he declares that he opposed the proposal absolutely when he was sounded out
about it in October and had been told nothing more about it until it was announced on
Thursday. In view of the vital issues involved, however, he promises to do his best to make
the agreement work. That he should not have been kept informed of what was happening
seems truly extraordinary considering how closely it concerns him.
The New Year opens with the issue of a rather striking and significant imperial rescript by the Japanese Emperor, repudiating the doctrine of his divinity, the superiority of the Japanese people over other nation, the belief in Japan being fated to rule the World and all other such "legends and myths".

Though I have seen no mention of the Empress Dowager, I cannot help but feel that her guiding hand is behing this document, especially about sharing the people's joys and sorrows, as this seems very much in line with the sentiments expressed by our own King and Royal Family, for whom the Empress Dowager has so much admiration as Araki confided to me in 1934.

Tuesday 8th January 1946

Looks as though Shidehara may have to resign as a result of MacArthur's recent directive debarring all officials connected with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association etc., and with Japan's agression since 1937, from office. As one spokesman has put it, this is "calculated to paralyse all forms of government down to village level" and will destroy the Japanese political and adminstrative machine at a single blow, as their is hardly one Japanese with administrative experience who has not been connected with Japan's war effort.

Thursday 10th January 1946

See that an "intercept" of a telegram from Oshima [Japanese ambassador] in Berlin in November 1941, telling of a talk with Ribbentrop, provided one of the highlights in yesterday's trial at Nuremburg. While it is true that the Yanks had already pretty successfully "spilt the beans" by quoting freely from "intercepts" in connection with Pearl Harbour, it is very surprising to find such documents being used by the British in the Nuremburg trials.

Tuesday 15th January 1946

Piggott asked me along to "the Rag" to talk over the Affidavit he has drawn up in Homma's defence, as the Foreign Office is not too keen on his going to Manila in person. Interested to see that he has laid special emphasis on the point I suggested to him i.e. that it was on Homma's recommendation that a number of officers concerned in the Nanking outrages were recalled, amongst these being the notorious Colonel Hashimoto (Kingoro), who was responsible for the sinking of the "Panay" and who has played so prominent and malevolent a part in various extremist activities.